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ABSTRACT OF THESIS
The thesis deals with the Treaty of December 11*
1973 on Mutual Relations between the Federal Republic
of Germany and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, its
historical background, substance and importance.
The thesis begins with the historical background.
Part I shows that in the tenth Century a Czech
Kingdom developed in Bohemia and Moravia which formed
part of the "Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation" and
that Bohemian Kings were repeatedly elected emperors of
this Reich. Germans lived in large numbers in this
Kingdom. The Kingdom eventually passed to the House of
Habsburg and remained part of the hereditary lands until
the dissolution of Austria-Hungary at the end of World
War I. Slovakia and Ruthenla were from the beginning part
of the Kingdom of Hungary and remained so until the
collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy.
In 1918 Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia and Ruthenla were
combined in the new State of Czechoslovakia, which
included more than three million Germans. In 1938 Hitler
demanded the union with Germany of the territories with
predominantly German inhabitants and threatened to march
into Czechoslovakia. For the sake of peace France and the
United Kingdom urged the Czechoslovak Government to yield
to Hitler's demand. The Prague Government consented to
do so.
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At the Conference of Munich on September 29, 1938
Prance, Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy arranged
some of the terms and conditions governing the cession
of the Sudeten German territory. The remaining questions
were settled by the German-Czechoslovak Agreement of
November 20, 1938 under the auspices of the International
Commission composed of representatives of Prance, Germany,
the United Kingdom, Italy and Czechoslovakia. In this
manner, the surrender of the territory of Germany was
realized.
On March 15, 1938 Hitler annexed the rest of Bohemia
and Moravia to the German Reich as a Protectorate. The
non-Hungarian areas of Slovakia became a separate State.
The State of Czechoslovakia had ceased to exist, but it
was subsequently restored. With the exoeption of a small
number who were allowed to remain, the German inhabitants
were deported from the territory of Czechoslovakia and
completely expropriated,
The Federal Republic agreed as early as 1966 to
normalize relations with Czechoslovakia, but difficulties
developed which were not resolved until December 11, 1973
when the Treaty on Mutual Relations was signed.
Part II examines these difficulties.
The most important difficulty was caused by the
adherence of the Czechoslovak Government to the view
that the Munich Agreement was void from the very beginning,
whereas the Federal Government took the view that the
VIII
Munich Agreement was legal, but that the subsequent
annexation of the rest of Bohemia and Moravia by Hitler
on March 15# 1938 violated the Agreement. Prance and
Italy as signatories of the Agreement share Czecho¬
slovakia's view; the United Kingdom shares that of
Germany.
The Czechoslovak Government agreed to the cession
to Germany of the territory with a predominantly German
population, to the Munich Agreement of September 29,
1938, and to the German-Czechoslovak Agreement of
November 20, 1938 and have executed and fulfilled these
agreements. Thereby the argument that the Czech Parliament
in accordance with the Czechoslovak Constitution did not
give its assent to the declarations of the Czechoslovak
Government loses force. The fact that Hitler obtained
the assent of Czechoslovakia by threatening to march in
with his forces was according to existing international
law not a ground for the invalidity of the treaty.
Moreover, the Munich Agreement was not part of the
conspiracy against the peace planned by Hitler. In 1938
Hitler intended to crush Czechoslovakia. However,
because of the intervention by the powers of the
Conference, especially the United Kingdom, he was forced
for the time being to renounce this plan and to content
himself with the cession of the predominantly German
territory. In an Annex to the Munich Agreement, Hitler
as well as Prance and the United Kingdom promised to
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guarantee the existence of the rest of Czechoslovakia.
However no obligation to fulfill such a guarantee was
accepted. The fact that this guarantee was not fulfilled
is, therefore, not a violation of the Treaty.
The Munich Agreement became void when Hitler annexed
the rest of Bohemia and Moravia in 1939 and as a
consequence Prance and the United Kingdom withdrew from
their treaty commitments.
The thesis then deals in Part III with the basic
conception of the German-Czechoslovak Treaty of 1973 and
the settlement of problems resulting from it.
An agreement on whether the Munich Agreement was void
from the beginning or became void at a later date could
not be reached. Therefore, it was merely stated that the
Munich Agreement was invalid, and it was determined that
the legal effects arising from the application of German
Law in the period between September 30, 1938 and Mqy 9»
1945 would not be affected, and that the Treaty would not
constitute any legal basis for material claims by the
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and its natural and legal
persons.
After the annexation of Bohemia and Moravia, German
law conferred German nationality in any case on all ethnic
Germans who possessed Czechoslovak nationality. After
the restoration of Czechoslovakia the Czech leaders
refused asa general principle to re-confer Czechoslovak
nationality on ethnic Germans, and expelled them.
X
They even refused to grant Czechoslovak citizenship
to those ethnic Germans who had not accepted German
citizenship, and these people were expelled as well. In
1953 Czechoslovak citizenship was forced on those ethnic
Germans who had not been expelled and who were considered
German nationals according to German law. The German-
Czechoslovak Treaty contains the mutual settlement of
questions concerning nationality.
In consequence of the Czechoslovak opinion that the
Munich Agreement was void ab initio, the Government
maintains that all acts of German administrative bodies
in Bohemia and Moravia had been illicit and had resulted
in claims for damages. These claims do not find any
legal basis in the Treaty and its declarations. German
claims for damages are not affected by the 2reaty,
The Germans remaining in Czechoslovakia on whom
Czechoslovak citizenship was conferred for the most part
are willing to immigrate to Germany. The Exchange of Letters
on Humanitarian Questions, annexed to the Treaty, obligates
Czechoslovakia to consider benevolently the requests for
emigration, but does not give the applicants the right to
emigrate. The German side declared reversely that, in
accordance with the laws and regulations applicable in the
Federal Republic, persons of Czech or Slovak nationality
who so desire may emigrate to Czechoslovakia.
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The Letters contain further the mutual promise to
give attention to the humanitarian questions, to develop
travel between the two countries and to examine
possibilities of technical improvements of travel. The
contents of this exchange of letters will in principel be
applied analogously to Berlin (West).
A Unilateral Letter of the Czechoslovak Government
annexed to the Treaty informs the German Government of the
statute of limitation for all punishable acts with the
exception of those considered war crimes or crimes against
humanity and which carry the death penalty.
Finally, another Exchange of Letters determined that
Article II of the Treaty is valid also in Berlin (West)
and that consequently the consular representation of
natural persons living in West Berlin is effected by the
Federal Government and its diplomatic missions. The
Parties further proposed to agree in each individual case
on the extension to Berlin (West) of treaties arising out
of the implementations of Article V of the Treaty.
The importance of the Treaty cannot be underestimated,
for it solves the age-old problem of the German-
Czechoslovak mixed population in Bohemia and Moravia
by the renunciation of territorial claims against the CSSR
by the Federal Republic of Germany. However, this solution
is defective since it does not adequately deal with the
regulation of the emigration of the Germans remaining in
XII
the CSSR. The question as to when the Munich Agreement
became void is dealt with satisfactorily. The rest of the
Treaty takes into account the policy of dfetente which
has begun between East and West, the success of which
will determine the significance of the Treaty,
The decision of the German Federal Constitutional
Court of January 25, 1977 concerning the law of July 12,
1974 securing assent to the Treaty of December 11, 1973




1) Chronology up to the Establishment of the First
Czechoslovak Republic
At the time of the Munich Agreement of 1938 Czecho¬
slovakia comprised the territories of Bohemia, Moravia,
Slovakia and Carpatho Ukraine. Apart from the last
mentioned area all the other territories are now again
part of Czechoslovakia.
At the beginning of the Christian era Bohemia was
under the dominion of the Markomans, a Germanic tribe
which later migrated to Bavaria. They were soon followed
by the Czechs, and by the 9th Century Bohemia and Moravia
were united as parts of the Great-Moravian Reich,
subsequently destroyed by the Hungarians in 907-908.
In Bohemia, under King Przemysl and his successors, a
Czechoslovak Kingdom developed, which not only became part
of the "Holy Roman Empire" but whose rulers were highest
in rank among the princes of the Reich and the only
entitled to call themselves kings. During the years
1018-21 Moravia was added to the Kingdom of Bohemia and
from that time the two countries have been united.
King Ottokar II of Bohemia was also in possession of
Austria, Styria, Carinthia and Krainia (Krain) but was
deprived of these territories by Rudolf von Habsburg, the
2.
founder of the Habsburg dynasty. In 1306 King Przemysls'
family died out and the Kingdom of Bohemia passed to the
House of Luxembourg. The new rulers added the territories
of Eger, Upper Lausitz and Silesia to the Kingdom. In
point of fact, the second of the Luxembourg princes who
acceded to the Royal Throne at Prague was elected Emperor
of the "Holy Roman Empire" (Charles IV, 1346-78). Charles
governed the Reich from Bohemia, which in the meantime
had become itB administrative centre. His reign was known
as the Golden Age of Bohemia. In 1348 he founded the
4
first German university at Prague.
The last representative of the House of Luxembourg on
the Bohemian throne, the Emperor Sigismund, ordered the
persecution of the Hussite movement which was not only
a religious but also a Czech national movement. Although
Sigismund bequeathed the Bohemian crown to the House of
Habsburg, the Hussite George Podiebrad (1458-71) refused
to acknowledge this and declared himself King of Bohemia.
He was succeeded by Wladislav from the Polish House of
2
Jagiellones. It was not until the reign of Ferdinand I
that Bohemia came almost permanently under the rule of
the House of Habsburg - the only interruption occuring
1. Prinz zu Lbwenstein, Deutsche Geschlchte. p. 190;
Rimili, Weltgeschichte. Bd. tt pp. 251 *-4.
2. Schieder, Handbuch der Europaischen Geschlchte. Bd. 3
pp. 219-22.
3.
during the Thirty Years War, when Frederick V, Elector
of Palatinate, became King of Bohemia. The Habsburgs
continued to rule over Bohemia and Moravia until the end
of the First World War.
Slovakia had also been part of the Great Moravian
Reich during the 9th Century but was taken over
subsequently by the Hungarians after the Reich was
destroyed; thenceforth, until the end of the First World
War, it remained part of Hungary which itself was part of
the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Thus, apart from the episode
of the Great Moravian Reich, Slovakia has never in her
history been united with Bohemia and Moravia.
As the political leaders of the various nations
represented in the Danubian monarchy made preparations
for the independence of their peoples, with the collapse
of the monarchy imminent, the leader of the Czechs,
Thomas G. Masaryk, and Slovak immigrants signed a treaty
on May 30, 1918 in Pittsburgh (USA) to provide the basis
for the unification of the Czechs and the Slovaks within
x
one State. .
2) The State and the German Minority
At the time of the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy at the end of the First World War, a government
3. Hoensch, Geschlchte der Tschechoslowaklschen Renublik
1918-1965. n. 30.
4.
of German Bohemia was established in the German parts of
Bohemia which aimed at unification with Austria. This
German Bohemian government, however, was expelled by the
Czechs. The Czechs, supported by the Peace Conference at
Paris, founded the multi-peoples' State of Czechoslovakia,
in the boundaries of which Czechs, Slovaks, Germans,
Hungarians, Poles and Ruthenians were united.*
4. Prinz zu Lbwenstein (f.n.1), p. 455.
The preamble of the Treaty of September 10, 1919
states: "Whereas the union which formerly existed
between the old Kingdom of Bohemia, the Markgraviate
of Moravia and the Duchy of Silesia on the one hand
and the other territories of the former Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy on the other has definitely
ceased to exist; whereas the peoples of Bohemia,
of Moravia and of part of Silesia, as well as the
peoples of Slovakia, have decided of their own free
will to unite, and have in fact united, in a permanent
union for the purpose of forming a single sovereign
independent State under the title of the Czechoslovak
Republic; and whereas the Ruthene people to the south
of the Carpathians have adhered to this union;
whereas the Czechoslovak Republic in fact exercises
sovereignty over the aforesaid territories and has
already been recognized as_ta sovereign independent
State by the (other) High Contracting Parties; the
United States of America, the British Empire, France,
Italy and Japan on the one hand, confirming their
recognition of the Czechoslovak State as a sovereign
and independent member of the family of Nations within
the boundaries which have been or may be determined in
accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Peace with
Austria of even date; Czechoslovakia on the other hand,
desiring to conform her institutions to the principles
of liberty and justice, and to give a sure guarantee
of all the inhabitants of the territories over which
she has assumed sovereignty; the High Contracting
Parties,...have agreed as follows"•..•(Nouveau Recueil
Gfenferal (f.n.6), loc.olt. p. 512. French text).
5.
Yet, the government of this multi-peoples' State
lacked the resolve to introduce the Rights of Minorities
promulgated by the League of Nations.
Es war den Tschechen in den zwanzig
Jahren ihrer staatlichen Selbst&ndigkeit..•
nicht gelungen, ... (das) Kernproblera ihres
Staates einer tragfahigen LSsung zuzufiihren und
die im Staate lebenden VSlker und Volksgruppen
im Wege eines innerpolitischen Ausgleichs in ein
dauerhaftes Verh&ltnis sum Staate zu bringen.5
A source of constant irritation for sections of the
German population is provided by the question of the
protection of minorities.
On September 10, 1919 a Treaty between the Allied
and Associated powers (United States, Great Britain,
France, Italy and Japan) and Czechoslovakia was signed
(Protection of Minorities)^ which in Article 2 granted
to minorities in Czechoslovakia complete protection of
5. Korkisch, Zur Frage der Weitergeltung des Miinchener
Abkommens. loc.clt. p. 89-90. E.t.s within the twenty
yeairs of their national sovereignty, the Czechs
proved unable to solve... (the) central problem
of their State in a satisfactory manner, namely to
establish a durable relationship between the
various peoples and ethnic groups and the State by
means of internal arrangement.
6. Hudson, Internatlonal Legislation. Vol. I No. 4,
pp. 298-312! Nouveau Recueil Gbnferal de Traitfes,
TroisiSme Serie, Tome XIII, pp. 512-520. This treaty,
envisaged in Article 57 of the Treaty of St. Germain
of September 10, 1919, is modelled on the Treaty for
the Protection of Minorities in Poland of June 28,
1919 (Hudson, loc.cit.. No. 3, pp. 283-298).
6.
life and liberty, and which attributed to German nationals
habitually resident or possessing rights of citizenship
Czechoslovak citizenship ipso facto.
Article 7 granted free use of any language in private
intercourse, commerce, religion, in the press or
publications of any kind and at public meetings. In
addition facilities for the use of the minorities'
language before the courts were provided. Article 8
prescribed that the minorities should enjoy the same
treatment and security in law and in fact as the other
Czechoslovak nationals and equal rights to establish,
manage and control charitable, religious and social
institutions, schools and other educational establishments
were announced. Article 9 granted them adequate
facilities for ensuring that the instruction would be
given through the medium of their own language. These
minority rights, however, were difficult to realize.
Numerous complaints had been submitted to the League
of Nations long before Hitler's dictatorship.''' However,
7. Wright, The Munich Settlement and International Law.
loc.clt.Jp. 17 writes; "Czechoslovakia was bound bv
the treaty of St. Germain (Art. 57), the Minorities
Treaty of September 10, 1919, and the Council
resolution of November 29, 1920, to respect rights
of minorities and to accept the supervision of the
League of Nations in regard thereto."
The Guarantee of the League of Nations with regard
to the stipulations contained in Chapters I and II
of the Treaty between the United States, the British
Empire, France, Italy and Japan on the one side, and
Czechoslovakia on the other, signed at Saint Germain-
en-Laye, September 10, 1919 reads as follows:
7
"The Council of the League of Nations resolves
that:
1. The stipulations of Chapters I and II of the
Treaty between the United States of America, the
British Empire, Prance, Italy and Japan on the one
side, and Czecho-Slovakia on the other, signed at
Saint-Germain-en-Laye, 10 September, 1919, so far
as they affect persons belonging to recial, religious
or linguistic Minorities be hereby placed under the
guarantee of the League of Nations.
2. The Secretary-General of the League of Nations
shall collect and submit, in due time, to the
Council of the League of Nations, information
respecting the constitution of the Ruthene territory
south of the Carpathians, within frontiers delimited
by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, as an
autonomous unit within the Czecho-Slovak State"
(League of Nations, Official Journal 1920, pp. 80-1).
8.
these complaints never brought any relief, for the
procedure, as it was provided for and practised at
Geneva, made it extremely unlikely that such complaints
would ever be acted upon. After a formal proceeding of
admissibility was held before the Secretary General of
the League of Nations, a preliminary discussion of the
evidence at hand was conducted in the Three Powers*
Committee of which the President and two additional
Council representatives were members. However, an actual
trial before the League Council was possible only if one
of the powers represented in the Council determined that
the case should be heard and presented it as a matter of
8
interest to itself. Such a development rarely occurred.
In any case Prague overlooked from the very beginning
an essential fact which George P. Kennan characterized as
follows t
Czechoslovakia is, after all, a Central
European State. Its fortunes must in the long
run lie with - and not against - the dominant
forces in this area.9
8. Strupp-Schlochauer, Wbrterbuch des VSlkerrechts.
Minderheitenrecht (Law of Minorities;, Bd, 2,
p. 533*
9. Kennan, Prom Prague after Munich. Diplomatic papers
1938-1940, p. 5.
9.
Because of these circumstances and due to the
treatment of the Germans in Czechoslovakia strong
feelings of dissatisfaction existed in Germany long
before Hitler came into power, allowing him to justify
easily his expansionist aims and to pursue the "solution
of the question of the Sudeten Germans", -Thus, his policy
found unexoepted support in the uncompromising attitude
10
of the government in Prague.
Soon after Hitler had come into power, Konrad
Henlein's Sudetendeutsche Heimatfront (Sudeten German
Home Front), founded in October 1933, and which after
1935 continued to exist as the Sudeten German Party, began
to assert the complaints of the German minority with a
* 1
hitherto unknown vehemence. But the Prague Government
proved an uncompromising attitude towards the Sudeten
German demands which aimed at no more than autonomy within
12
the Czechoslovak State,
The Government in Prague seemed to become more
conciliatory only when Hitler's position became steadily
stronger. Thus Dr, Benes, the President of Czechoslovakia,
on the occasion of a visit to the Sudetenland in
1936 admitted that the government had made mistakes in
10. See Hoensch (f.n.3)# p. 65-70,




its treatment of the Sudeten Germans. He also promised
several times to carry out reforms concerning the
minorities* law. However, no really substantial reforms
were ever carried out in a way which could have deprived
Hitler of any Justification for going ahead in this
question.
The German "Anschluss" with Austria in the Spring of
1938 weakened the strategic position of Czechoslovakia
decisively, and as the Czechoslovak Government had not
kept their promise of 1937 to carry out certain reforms,
Henlein's demand for autonomy for the Sudetenland, which
he presented in a speech at Karlsbad in April 1938, not
only received the support of all Sudeten Germans, but
found understanding in foreign circles as well.^
13. Wright (f.n.7)# p. 21.
14. See Runciman Report, Appendix D: Wheeler-Bennett,
Munich. Prologue to tragedy, pp. 450, 453; Krai,
Das Abkommen von Mttnchen 1938. p. 10-2: Bolton,
(Tzech Tragedy, pp. 141-2.
On April - 24> 1938, at the Party meeting of the
Sudeten Germans at Karlsbad, Konrad Henlein in
speaking for the German national group, stated their
political attitude to the Czechoslovak Government's
proposals for a settlement of the minority question
(the minority Statute, etc.), and propounded his
eight points as the basis of this and "the way for
a peaceful development" as follows:
11.
1. Restoration of complete equality of German
national group with the Cssech people;
2. Recognition of the Sudeten German national
group as a legal entity for the safeguarding
of this position of equality within the State;
3. Confirmation and recognition of the Sudeten
German settlement area;
4. Building up of Sudeten German self-government
in the Sudeten German settlement area in all
branches of public life insofar as questions
affecting the interests and affairs of the German
national group are involved;
5. Introduction of legal provisions for the
protection of those Sudeten German citizens
living outside the defined settlement area of
their national group;
6. Removal of wrong done to Sudeten German element
since the year 1918t and compensation for damage
suffered through this wrong;
7. Recognition and enforcement of the principle:
German public servants in the German area;
8. Complete freedom to profess adherence to the
German element and German ideology.
(Memorandum of the Eight Demands made by Konrad
Henlein at the Sudeten German Party Congress at
Karlsbad, The Eight Demands of Konrad Henlein
accounced at Karlsbad, April 24» 1938, Documents
(Germany), Ser. D, Vol, II p. 242).
12.
On April 28/29» 1938 Prance entered into negotiations
with the British Government in order to establish a common
policy with regard to the question of Czechoslovakia, for
under the terms of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance with
Czechoslovakia Prance was obliged to c&me to her support
in case of an unprovoked attack. The result of the Anglo-
French talks was a decision to work for a peaceful
solution of the Sudeten question.
But even at this time Prague adhered to her
15
uncompromising attitude J and on May 20 proclaimed the
partial mobilization of her armed forces. Hitler's
reaction was the order of May 30, 1938 to prepare for the
elemination of the Czechoslovak State by means of a
16
military operation.
In the same month Henlein's party achieved remarkable
successt the result of the communal elections of May 21
demonstrated that 90$ of the Sudeten Germans supported
17
his party. Nevertheless, the Sudeten German Party
continued to seek a compromise by aiming at autonomy
within Czechoslovakia. However, Henlein's Plan was
not recognized and accepted by the Czechoslovak Government.
15* This may be illustrated by a quotation from the
Runciman Report, loc.cit.. p. 451): "I believe these
complaints to be in the main justified. Even as
late as the time of my mission (August 1938), I
could find no readiness on the part of the Czecho¬
slovak Government to remedy them on anything like
an adequate scale."
16. Krai (f.n.14), p. 13—4-; Hoensch (f.n.3), pp. 89-90.
17. Hoensch, Ibid.. p. 90.
13.
An eine Erfilllung der Karlsbader Forderungen
dachte am 30. Mai niemand in Prag.18
The negotiations between the Prague Government and
the Sudeten German Party dragged on without reaching any
positive conclusion.
The French Government, by virtue of their treaty
obligation resulting from the Treaty of Mutual Assistance
with Czechoslovakia had approached the British Government
during a Ministers1 Conference from April 28 to 29 in
London with a request to maintain a common attitude in the
1Q
German-Czechoslovak conflict. ^ As a result of these talks
the Government in Prague was requested to make extensive
20
concessions to Sudeten Germans. As these requests went
unheeded, the British Government on July 25 inquired in
Prague whether agreement could be reached on a proposal
to appoint an "advisor" whose task would be to mediate in
the conflict between the Government and the Sudeten
21
Germans•
After Prague had given her assent to this suggestion,
the mediator, Lord Runciman, arrived in Prague on August
3,1938 and began his work. On September 21 he handed
over his report, known as the "Runciman Report", in which
18. Hoensch, Ibid,. p. 90. E.t.: A realization of the
Karlsbad demands was not-taken into consideration
by anyone in Prague on Mgy 30, 1938.
19. Hoensch, Ibid.. p. 88; Krai, Ibid.. p. 12.
20. Krai, Ibid.. p. 15.
21. Wright (f.n.7), p. 22; Krai, Ibid.. p. 17.
14.
he recommended that territories with a clear majority of
German population should be immediately transferred to
Germany. He concluded:
Any kind of plebiscite or referendum
would, I believe, be a sheer formality in
respect of these predominantly German areas.
A very large majority of their inhabitants
desire amalgamation with Germany. The
inevitable delay involved in taking a
plebiscite vote would only serve to excite
popular feelings, with perhaps most dangerous
results. I consider, therefore, that these
frontier districts should at onee be transferred
from Czechoslovakia to Germany... .22
3) The September Crisis of 1938
During Lord Runciman's stay in Czechoslovakia a
fundamental change concerning the political aims of the
Sudeten Germans had taken place: they were no longer
content with an autonomous status within the State of
Czechoslovakia but demanded the cession of the
territories in question to the German Reich.
At the beginning of Runciman's mission negotiations
were conducted on the basis of the programme of Karlsbad,
known as the Eight Point Programme, proposed by the
Sudeten Germans, to which the Czechs answered with their
so called Fourth Plan.2^
However, when bloody riots occurred in the Sudeten
German area on September 12 and 13. the Sudeten German
Party broke off negotiations on September 13. Thus the
22. British White Paper, H.M.S.O. Cmd. 5847, No. 1,
Wheeler-Bennett(f.n.14), p. 453.
23. Hoensch (f.n.3), p. 95.
15.
original purpose of Lord Runciman's mission, to achieve
a reconciliation between the Prague Government and the
Sudeten Germans, had failed. It now appeared to him as
well that the only possible solution to the problem was
to transfer those territories to Germany that were almost
completely populated by Germans. This sudden change of
opinion was facilitated by the fact that at the time when
a solution of the Sudeten German question was envisaged
in terms of an autonomous status within the Czechoslovak
State, Runciman had declared that this could only be
Pit
considered "temporary, not lasting."
The riots of September 11/12 brought the tension to
its climax. On September 12 Hitler made a speech at
Nuremberg in which he demanded the right of self-
determination for all Sudeten Germans.
On September 15 the Sudeten German leaders, with
Henlein as their spokesman, demanded for the first time
that the German territories should be transferred to
Germany.2'* Knowing that this act would be considered
high treason by the Government in Prague they left Czecho¬
slovakia and called for the formation of the so-called
"Freikorps" (volunteer corps) whose function would be to
guarantee the protection of the German population in
p c.
Czechoslovakia.
24. Wheeler-Bennett (f.n.14)» p. 452.
25. They proclaimed on this day the so-called "Heim-ins-
Reich"-Aufruf (Home to the Reich challenge). See
Hoensch (f.n.3), p. 95.
26. Hoensch, Ibid,
16.
This "Freikorps" obviously never attained any
significant importance. Thus lord Runciman declared:
Unless, therefore, Herr Henlein^ Freikorps
are deliberately encouraged to cross the
frontier, I have no reason to expect any
notable renewal of incidents and disturbances.
In these circumstances the necessity for the
presence of State Police in these districts
should no longer exist. As the State Police
are extremely unpopular among the German
inhabitants, and have constituted one of
their chief grievances for the last three
years, I consider that they should be withdrawn
as soon as possible. I believe that their
withdrawal would reduce the causes of wrangles
and riots.27
Undoubtedly Lord Runciman would never have made such
suggestions if he had envisaged any possible danger of
an attack of the "Freikorps" against Czechoslovak
territory. At any rate the events of the next days
robbed the Freikorps-plans of their importance.
The failure of Lord Runciman's attempt at mediation,
the riots in the Sudetenland mentioned above and the
uncompromising attitude of the Prague Government caused
the British Government to launch immediate action to
prevent a violent solution of the problem.
On September 15 the British Prime Minister, Sir
Neville Chamberlain, flew to Berchtesgaden in order to
28
have a private talk on the matter with Hitler himself.
27. Runciman Report, in Wheeler-Bennett (f.n.14),
p. 452.
28. Hoensch (f.n.3), p. 96.
17
British and French reviewed the Hitler-Chamberlain
pq
meeting on September 18. ^ The results of this
conference are expressed in the official notes of the
two Governments addressed to the Czechoslovak Government,
The notes were handed over in Prague on September 19»
1938. The notes provided, in parti
We are both convinced that, after recent
events, the point has now been reached where
the further maintenance within the boundaries
of the Czechoslovak State of the districts
mainly inhabited by the Sudeten-Deutsch cannot
in fact continue any longer without imperilling
the interests of Czechoslovakia herself and of
European peace. In the light of these
considerations both Governments have been
compelled to the conclusion that the maintenance
of peace and the safety of Czechoslovakia's vital
interests cannot effectively be assured unless
these areas are now transferred to the Reich.3o
29. Celovsky. Das Mtinchener Abkommen 1938. o. 356:
Hoensoh p. 96.
30. Akten zur Deutschen Auswartigen Politik 1918-1945.
Nr. 523. P. 664~5: Documents on British Foreign
Policy. Third Series, Vol. II, pp. 404-6 CNo. 937):
Viscount Halifax to fir. Newton.
The further text of the Statement by the
Governments of Great Britain and France to the
Czechoslovak Government, September 19, 1938
runs thus:
"Representatives of French and British
Goverments, after consultation in London, are
agreed to address the following message to President
Benesj...
1• The representatives of the French and British
Governments have been in consultation today on the
general situation, and have considered the British
Prime Minister's report of his conversation with
Herr Hitler, British Ministers also placed before
their French colleagues their conclusions derived
from the account furnished to them of the work of
his Mission by Lord Runciman. ...
18.
2. This (transfer of areas inhabited mainly
Sudeten Germans to the Reich) could be done either
by direct transfer or as the result of a plebiscite.
We realise the difficulties involved in a plebiscite,
and we are aware of your objections already
expressed to this course, particularly the
possibility of far-reaching repercussions if the
matter were treated on the basis of so wide a
principle. For this reason we anticipate in the
absence of indication to the contrary that you may
prefer to deal with the Sudeten-Deutsch problem by
the method of direct transfer, and as a case by
itself.
3. The areas for transfer would probably have
to include areas with over 50 per cent of German
inhabitants, but we should hope to arrange by
negotiations provisions for adjustment of frontiers,
where circumstances render it necessary, by some
international body including a Czech representative.
We are satisfied that the transfer of smaller areas
based on a higher percentage would not meet the
case.
4. The international body referred to might
also be charged with questions of possible exchange
of population on the basis of right to opt within
some specified time limit.
5. We recognise that if the Czechoslovak
Government is prepared to concur in the measures
proposed, involving material changes in the conditions
of the State, they are entitled to ask for some
assurance of their future security.
6. Accordingly His Majesty's Government in the
United Kingdom would be prepared, as a contribution
to the pacification of Europe, to join in an inter¬
national guarantee of the new boundaries of the
Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression.
One of the principal conditions of such a guarantee
would be the safeguarding of the independence of
Czechoslovakia by the substitution of a general
guarantee against unprovoked aggression in place
of existing treaties which involve reciprocal
obligations of a military character.
7. Both the French and British Governments
recognise how great is the sacrifice thus required
of the Czechoslovak Government in the cause of peace.
But because that cause is common both to Europe in
general and in particular to Czechoslovakia herself,
they have felt their duty jointly to set forth
frankly the conditions essential to secure it.
19
8, The Prime Minister must resume conversation
with Herr Hitler not later than Wednesday, and
earlier if possible. We therefore feel we must ask
for your reply at earliest possible moment.N
(Kloehko and others. Hew Documents on the History
of Munich, pp. 83-85).
20.
The Czechoslovak Government had already decided
to proclaim general mobilization of her armed forces
and to justify this step by claiming to have information
about considerable military activities on the German
"=51
side. Therefore the first reply of the Prague
Government to the French and British notes was couched
in a tone very much appropriate to their uncompromising
attitude. The suggestions of the two Governments were
"52
plainly rejected on the evening of September 20.
• Akten. Nr. 524» p. 665.
32. Note from the Czechoslovak Government to the
Governments of Great Britain and Prance, September
20, 1938 (excerpts):
"Le Gouvernement tchfecoslovaque remercle les
Gouvernements britannique et fran^ais de la
communication qu'ils lui ont faite, en formulant
leur fa^on de voir sur la solution des difficulty
Internationales actuelles concernant la Tchfecos-
lovaquie. Conscient de sa responsabilitfe qui
dfecoule pour lui des intferfets de la Tchfecoslovaquie,
des intferfets des amis et allifes de cette dernifere,
ainsi que des intferfets de la paix gfenferale, il
exprime sa conviction que les projets qui y sont
contenus ne sont pas d mfeme de rfealiser le but que
poursuivent les Gouvernements britannique et franeais
dans les grands efforts qu'ils dfeploient en faveur de
la paix.
Ces projets ont fetfe con9U8 sans consultation
prfealable avec les reprfesentants de la Tchfecos-
lovaquie. ...
En effets le Gouvernement tchfecoslovaque n'a
mfeme pas la possibilitfe au point de vue de la
Constitution de pouvoir prendre une dfecision
concernant les frontifres. ...Dans tous les cas,
le parlement devrait fetre entendu.
De l'avis du Gouvernement, 1'acceptation d'un
projet de cette nature fequivaudrait a laisser
mutiler entiferement l'£tat & tous fegards, ...
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Le Gouvernement tchfecoslovaque est sincdrement
reconnaissant de 1*Intention des Grandes Puissances
de garantir l'intfegritfe de la Tchdcoslovaquie, il
l'estime et l'apprecie hautement. Une telle garantie
ouvrirait certainement la voie d une entente entre
tous les intdressds, si les conflits nationalitaires
actuals se rdglalent d 1'amiable sans imposer d la
Tchdcoslovaquie des sacrifices inacceptables. ...
La Tchfecoslovaquie est toujours restde fiddle
aux traitfes et a rempli les engagements qui en
dfecoulaient pour elle d l'fegard soit de ses amis,
soit de la Socifetd des Nations et de ses membres,
soit des autres peuples. Elle a bth et est toujours
prdte d y faire honneur dans toutes les circonstances.
Si elle se dfefend aujourd'hui contre la possibility
de violences, (sic) elle le fait en s'appuyant sur
les engagements encore rfecents et les declarations
de son voisin, ainsi que sur le Traitfe dfarbitrage
du 16 octobre 1926, que plusieurs declarations du
Gouvernement allemand actuel ont reconnu dtre encore
en vigueur. Le Gouvernement tchfecoslovaque souligne
la possibility d'appliquer ce traitfe et en demande
1*application. Paisant honneur a sa signature, 11 est
prSt d accepter la sentence d'arbitrage qui serait
prononcfee. Toute espdce de conflit pourrait dtre ainsl
conjurfee. Cela rendrait possible une solution rapide,
conforms d l'honneur et a la dignitfe de tous les
^tats intdressfes. ...
La Tchfecoslovaquie a toujours fetfe lide avec la
Prance par l'estime et l,amiti6 la plus ddvoufee ainsi
que par une alliance d laquelle aucun gouvernement
et aucun Tchdcoslovaque ne failliront jamais. Elle a
vfecu et continue a vivre dans sa foi en la grande
nation fran^aise, dont le gouvernement lui a si
souvent assurd la soliditfe de son amitife. Elle est
lide d la Grande-Bretagne par un dfevouement et une
amitife traditionnels, par le respect et l'estime,
dont s'inspirera toujours la Tchecoslovaquie dans
la collaboration...
Le Gouvernement vtchdcoslovaque salt que les
efforts dfeployfes par les Gouvernements brltannique
et fran^ais decoulent d'un veritable intferdt. II
les en remercie bien sincdrement. Mais, pour les
motifs ddja Inumferds, il leur adresse de nouveau
un appel supreme et les prle de reconsiddrer leur
point de vue (Documents on British Foreign
Policy, 1919-1939, Third Series, Vol. II, No. 987,
PP. 434-6).
22.
E,t,: The Czechoslovak Government thanks the
British and French Governments for the communication
which they have made to it in which they set out
their point of view on the solution of existing
international difficulties regarding Czechoslovakia.
Conscious of its responsibility for the interests of
Czechoslovakia, the interests of her friends and
allies as well as for the interests of general peace,
the Czechoslovak Government expresses its conviction
that the proposals which are contained in that
communication cannot attain the object at which
the British and French Governments are aiming in the
great efforts which they are making in favour of
peace.
These proposals were drawn up without previous
consultation with representatives of Czechoslovakia.
• • •
Actually the Czechoslovak Government is not in
a position from the point of view of the Constitution
to take a positive decision regarding the frontiers
of Czechoslovakia. ... In any case it would be
necessary to consult Parliament.
In the opinion of the Government acceptance of
a proposal of this kind would be equivalent to
acquiescence in the complete mutilation of the State
in every respect, •••
The Czechoslovak Government is sincerely grateful
for the intention of the Great Powers to guarantee
the integrity of Czechoslovakia, it highly values
and appreciates this intention. Such a guarantee
would certainly open the way to understanding
between all those interested if existing nationality
conflicts were amicably settled without imposing on
Czechoslovakia unacceptable sacrifices. ...
Czechoslovakia has always remained faithful to
treaties and has carried out engagements arising
from them either with regard to her friends or to
the League of Nations and its members or to other
peoples. She has been and is always ready to honour
treaties in all circumstances. If she defends her¬
self today against the possibility of violence, she
does so relying on engagements which are still recent
and on declarations of her neighbour as well as on
the Arbitration Treaty of October 16, 1926, which
has been recognised to be still in force byseveral
declarations of the present German Government. The
23.
Czechoslovak Government underlines the possibility
of applying this treaty and demands that it should
be applied. Honouring their signature they are
ready to accept whatever arbitral decision might
be made. Any kind of conflict could be thus
avoided. This would render possible a quick
solution in conformity whith the honour and dignity
of all interested States, .«•
The Czechoslovak Government knows that the
efforts exerted by the British and French Governments
arise from a real interest. The Czechoslovak
Government thanks those Governments very sincerely.
But, for reasons enumerated above, it addresses to
them a new and last appeal, and asks them to
reconsider their point of view. ...
See also Hoensch (f,n.3)» p. 96.
24.
On September 21 the British and French ambassadors
made oral statements as to the attitude of their countries.
According to a request of the Prague Government these oral
statements were accompanied by written notes. The British
note reads in parti
If on reconsideration the Czechoslovak
Government feel bound to reject this advice,
they must of course be free to take any action
that they think appropriate to meet the situation
that may thereafter develop.
The French Government, on the other hand, frankly
admitted:
La France, d'accord avec l'Angleterre, a mis
sur pied la seule procedure qu'elle a jugfe en
fait, dans les circonstances actuelles, propre
d empfecher l'entr§e des Allemands en Tchechoslo-
vaquie. En repoussant la proposition franco-
britannique, le Gouvernement tchfeque prend la
responsabilitfe de determiner le recours d la
forde de l'Allgemagne.33
33. Celovsky (f.n.29)» p. 370. E.t.i In agreement with
Great Britain France has suggested the only possible
solution to prevent a German invasion under the
present circumstances. In the case of refusing to
accept the French and British suggestions, the
Czechoslovak government bears the full responsibility
if German should be determined to resort to force.
Text of the Note from the British Government
to the Czechoslovak Government:
"In the view of His Majesty*s Government the
Czechoslovak Government's reply in no way meets the
critical situation which the Anglo-French proposals
were designed to avert and if adhered to would, when
made public, in the opinion of His Majesty*s Government
lead to an immediate German invasion. His Majesty's
Government therefore urge the Czechoslovak Government
to withdraw this reply and urgently consider an
alternative that takes account of realities. The
Anglo-French proposals remain, in their view, the
only chance of avoiding an immediate German attack.
25.
On the hasis of the reply now under consideration
His Majesty*s Government would have no hope of
any useful result ensuing from a second visit to
Herr Hitler and the Prime Minister would he obliged
to cannel the arrangement for it. They therefore
beg the Czechoslovak Government to consider urgently
mid seriously before producing a situation for which
His Majesty's Government could take no responsibility.
His Majesty's Government would of course have been
willing to put the Czechoslovak proposal for
arbitration before the German Government if they had
thought that at this stage there was any chance of
its receiving favourable consideration. But they
cannot for a moment believe that it would be
acceptable now nor do they think that the German
Government would regard the position as one that
is capable of being settled by arbitration as the
Czechoslovak Government suggest.
If on reconsideration the Czechoslovak Government
feel bound to reject this advice, they must of course
be free to take any action that they think
appropriate to meet the situation that may there¬
after develop" (Documents on British Foreign Policy,
1919-1939, Third Series, Vol. II., p. 442-3).
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After these developments the British and French
demands were first discussed by the President and his
political Ministers, then in the enlarged circle of the
whole Cabinet and finally in the twenty member
Committee of the Czechoslovak Parliament.'^-
On September 21 the Prague Government handed over
their official reply to the British and French
ambassadors, fhis note reads, as follows:
Forcfe par les circonstances et les
insistences excessivement pressantes et d la
suite de la communication des gouvernements
frap9ais et britannique du 21 septembre 1938,
dans laquelle les deux gouvernements ont exprimfe
leur manidre de voir au sujet de 1*assistance d
la Tchfecoslovaquie si elle refusalt d*accepter
les propositions franco-britanniques et seralt
d la suite de cela attaqufee par l'Allemagne, le
gouvernement tchfecoslovaque accepte dans ces
conditions avec des sentiments de douleur les
propositions franoaises et britanniques en
supposent que les deux gouvernements feront
tout pour les faire appliquer avec toute
sauvegarde des intferfets vitaux de l'^tat
tchfecoslovaque, II constate avec regret que
ces propositions ont fetfe felaborfees sans la
consultation(prfealable)du gouvernment tchfeeo-
slovaque.
Regrettant profondfement que sa proposition
d*arbitrage n*a pas fetfe acceptfee, il les accepte
comme un tout, en soulignant le principe de la
garantie, comme elle est formulfee dans la note
et les Qccepte en supposant que les deux
gouvernements ne tolereront pas 1'invasion
allemande sur le territoire tehfecoslovaque
qui restera tchfecoslovaque jusqu'au moment
od le transfert du territoire aprds la fixation
de la nouvelle frontidre par la commission
Internationale dont on parle dans les propositions,
pourra fetre effectufe. II est d*avls que la
proposition franco-britannique suppose que
34. Celovsky, Ibid., p. 371
27.
tous les details de la realisation pratique
des propositions franco-britanniques seront
fix£ d'accord avec de gouvernement tchfeco-
slovaque.35
Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939»
Third Series, Vol. II, pp. 447-8.
E.t.i Forced by the circumstances and by
excessively urgent pressure and as a result of
the communication of the French and British
Governments on September 21, 1938, in which the
two Governments express their attitude on the
subject of assistance to Czechoslovakia in the
event of her refusal to accept the Franco-British
proposals and being, as a result, attacked by
Germany, the Czechoslovak Government accepts,
in these conditions, with feelings of grief, the
French and British proposals in the belief that
the two Governments will do everything to have
them put into force with every safeguard for the
vital interests of the Czechoslovak State. It
notes with regret that these proposals were
elaborated without (prior) consultation with the
Czechoslovak Government.
Regretting profoundly that its proposal far
arbitration has not been accepted, the Czechoslovak
Government accept the proposals as a whole, while
emphasizing the principle of guarantee as it is
formulated in the note, and accepts them in the
belief that the two Governments will not tolerate
a German invasion of Czechoslovak territory, which
will remain Czechoslovak until the moment when the
transfer of the territory becomes possible, after
the new frontiers have been fixed by the inter¬
national commission referred to in the proposals.
The Czechoslovak Government is of the opinion
that the Franco—British proposal presupposes that
all details relating to the practical execution of
the Franco-British proposals will be settled in
agreement with the Czechoslovak Government (Authors
translation. An Incomplete translation of the document
in the form of a telegram from Mr. Newton (Prague)
to Viscount Halifax is to be found in: Documents
on British Foreign Policy, Ibid.. p. 447).
28.
The next day Chamberlain, the British Prime
•XC.
Minister, and Hitler met at Godesberg"^ because, though
the German demands had been accepted by Prague, a
constructive agreement between the Western powers
and Czechoslovakia had not been achieved thus far.
Meanwhile Poland and Hungary had officially brought
forward their own territorial claims.
Hitler demanded that the annexation of the Sudeten
German territories must be carried out not later than
October Czechoslovakia ordered the general
mobilization.'® Chamberlain requested Hitler (on
September 23# while still at Godesberg) to hand over
to him a Memorandum which would contain the German
suggestions and which he would then forward to the
36. Hoensch (f.n.3), p. 97.
37. Ibid., p. 98.
38. The CZech population of Czechoslovakia used the
(at least) verbal surrender of the Prague
Government to the Anglo-French demands as the
occasion for protest demonstrations. Further,
they demanded a military dictatorship under
General Syrovy who was, in point of fact,





The Memorandum^0 which was handed over in
consequence of this request, the Godesberg Memorandum,
stated that for a final settlement of the boundary-
line a plebiscite would be necessary, preparations
for which, however, would take considerable time.
Nonetheless it was pointed out that the general
situation in the Sudetenland was completely Intolerable
and had become a danger to European peace.
39. Akten zur Seutschen Auswartigen Politik 1918-1945*
Nr. 574, p. 712.
Cerainly there is no doubt that during the
conference with the British Prime Minister Hitler
threatened to solve the Sudeten German question by
invading the Sudeten German territory of Czechoslo¬
vakia. This follows not only from the wording of
the common message sent by the British and French
Governments to the President of Czechoslovakia on
September 18, but also from the letter Chamberlain
sent Hitler on September 23, which reads as follows I
"In the meantime, until I can receive their
reply, I should be glad to have Your Excellency's
assurance that you will continue to abide by the
understanding, which we reached at our meeting
on September 14th and again last night, that no
action should be taken, particularly in the
Sudeten territory, by the force of the Reich
to prejudice any further mediation which may be
found possible."
Czechoslovakia was then informed of Hitler's
threat (Akten, Nr. 523, p. 664-5; Nr. 574, p. 712;
Letter of Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Benes, September
27, 1938, published in Laffan-Toynbee, loc.cit.
p. 411).
4°. Ibid.. Nr. 584,pp. 724^6.
The President of the United States in a note of
September 26, 1938 wrote to Hitler: "I most earnestly
appeal to you not to break off negotiations looking
to a peaceful, fair and constructive settlement of
the questions at issue, I earnestly repeat that so
long as negotiations continue differences may be
reconciled" (Akten, Nr. 632,pp. 767-8).
30.
Under these circumstances it was therefore absolutely-
necessary to carry out the envisaged transfer of the
Sudeten territory without any further delay. An equitable
arrangement had to be completed and, consequently, the
territories marked on an enclosed map^"1 were to be
occupied immediately by German troops. The remaining
area would remain under Czechoslovak military control.
Further adjustments of the boundaryline could be made
at a later date by public vote. To this end the German
Government proposed the following:
1. Withdrawal of the Czechoslovak armed forces, police
forces and customs-officers from the marked area
which was to be transferred to Germany on October
1, 1938.
2. The ceded territory was to be handed over in its
present state. A Czechoslovak representative would
co-operete during the procedure with the German
headquarters.
3. All German members of the Czechoslovak armed forces
and the police were to be dismissed.
4. All German nationals who were imprisoned on grounds
of political crimes were to be set free.
5. A public vote supervised by an international
commission which was responsible as well for
determining subsequent adjustments of the frontier
41. See Map No. 1 in the Annex (Celovsky, (f.n.29),
pp. 483-5).
31.
was to "be held not later than November 25, 1938.
While the vote was taken troops on both sides were
to be withdrawn*
6. For the settlement of all further details a German-
Czechoslovak Commission was to be established,
On September 25, the Prague Government rejected these
proposals after 1,5 million men had been called to arms
by general mobilization* Thus the danger of war had
reached its zenith and Hitler threatened that Germany
would also order general mobilization on September 28,
at 2 p.m.*^
42. British White Paper, Cmd. 5847, No. 6; Akten Nr.
584, p. 724-6.
43. Hoensch (f.n.3)» p. 98-9; Wright (f.n.7), p. 27.
A resolution of the General Assembly of the
League of Nations of September 29, 1938 runs as
follows:
"Representatives of forty-nine States meeting as
delegates to the Assembly of the League of Nations
havevatched with deep and growing anxiety the
development of the present grave situation in
Europe.
The Assembly is convinced that the existing
differences are capable of being solved by peaceful
means. It knows that recourse to war, whatever be
its outcome, is no guarantee of a just settlement
and that it must inevitably bring untold suffering
tonmillions of individuals, and imperil the whole
structure of civilization in Europe.
The Assembly, therefore, voicing the prayer of
the peoples of all countries, expresses the earnest
hope that no Government will attempt to impose a
settlement by force.
The assembly welcomes with great satisfaction the
action taken by the President of the United States
of America and fully associates itself with the
spirit which inspired it" (League of Nations, Official
Journal, Special Supplement No. 183, Records of the
nineteenth ordinary session of the Assembly, pp.94-5).
32.
It is a historical fact that towards the end of 1937
Hitler had already forged his plans of aggression against
Czechoslovakia. The most important evidence to support this
is provided "by the so-called Hossbach Memorandum which
states:
Der Ftihrer fUhrte...aus: Das Ziel der
deutschen Politik sei die Sicherung und die
Erhaltung der Volksmasse und deren Vermehrung.
Somit handele es sich um das Problem des Raumes...
Zur Lbsung der deutschen Prage konne es nur den
Weg der Gewalt geben, dieser niemals risikolos
sein. ...Zur Yerbesserung unserer milittir-poli-
tischen lage mtisse in Jedem Fall einer kriegerischen
Verwicklung unser 1• Ziel sein, die Tschechei und
gleichzeitig Osterreich niederzuwerfen. ...Sei die
Tschechei niedergeworfen, ...so kbnne eher mit
einem neutralen Verhalten Polens in einem deutsch-
franztisischen Konflikt gerechnet werden...Der Zeit-
punkt unseres Angriffs auf die Tschechei und Oster¬
reich mtisse abhangig von dem Verlauf des italienisch-
englisch-franzbsischen Krieges gemacht werden. ...
Der Fllhrer.. .wolle in eigener Selbst&ndigkeit...
den Feldzug gegen die Tschechei beginnen und durch-
ftihren, wobei der tlberfall auf die Tschechei "blitz-
artig schnell" erfolgen mtisse. ,..Hinsichtlich
unserer Offensive nach Stidosten machte Feldmarschall
von Blomberg nachdrticklich auf die St&rke der
tschechischen Befestigungen aufmerksam.«.General-
oberst von Fritsch erwahnte, dass es gerade der
Zweck einer durch ihn angeordneten Studie dieses
Winters sei, die Mbglichkeiten der Ftthrung der
Operationen gegen die Tschechei unter besonderer
Beriicksichtigung der Oberwindung des tschechischen
Festungssystems zu untersuchen..,.44
44. Excerpts of Notes on the Conference in the Reichskanzlei
on November 5, 1937, Per Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegs-
verbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militarcerichtshof.
pp. 4&M3 (465), Sok. 5ag-$S), U.
E.t.: The Ftihrer ... stated: The aim of German
policy is the security and the preservation of
the nation and its propagation. This is consequently
a problem of space... The German question can be
solved only by means of force, and this is never
33.
without risk..,.For the improvement of our military
political position it must he our first aim, in
every case of entanglement by war, to conquer
Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously,..•
Once Czechoslovakia is conquered...then a neutral
attitude by Poland in a German-French-conflict could
more easily be relied upon...The date of our attack
on Czechoslovakia and Austria must be made independent
of the course of the Italian-French-English war...
The Fuehrer...in complete independence wishes to
begin to carry out operations against Czechoslovakia.
The attack on Czechoslovakia would have to take
place with the "speed of lightning". With regard to
our offensive in a South-easterly direction, Field
Marshal von Biomberg drew special attention to the
strength of the Czechoslovak fortifications,...
Generaloberst von Fritsch mentioned that it was
the purpose of a study which he had laid out for
this winter to investigate the possibilities of
carrying out operations against Czechoslovakia with
special consideration of the conquest of the Czecho¬
slovak system of fortifications,...
Note? Sentence two of the German text is
grammaticly not quite correctly formulated. In the
document cited is should reads "...nur den Weg der
Gewalt geben, der nlemals risikolos.,."
34,
Zourek writes, that
during the Nuremberg Trial it was convincingly-
proved that the Nazi conspiracy against peace, which
occasioned the Second World War, also comprised
aggression against Czechoslovakia. The preparations
for this aggression began during secret deliberations
held with Hitler in the Chancellery of the Reich on
November 5, 1937» and probably earlier. During these
deliberations armed aggression against Czechoslovakia
was planned —the so-called "Case Green".45 On May
30, 1938 Hitler declared his irrevocable decision to
exterminate Czechoslovakia by military action in the
immediate future.46
45. Time of attack "Gruen", conference-note: Document
388-PS, Berlin, 27.9.38:
"Geheime Kommandosache... Gemeinsame Angriffszeit
von Heer und Luftwaffe angestrebt..• Eine nach dem
Heer liegende Angriffszeit der Luftwaffe verhindert
jedd taktische Oberraschung der feindlichen Luft¬
waffe und bedingt gewisse Anderungen des Angriffs-
verfahrens... Wenn man die frtihe Angriffszeit des
Heeres als unumgglngliche Notwendigkeit ansieht,
muss unter Umstiinden auf einen gleichzeitigen An-
griff der Luftwaffe...verzichtet werden. Daher
Vorschlag: Angriff des Heeres -unabhangig von dem
Angriff der Luftwaffe- zu dem von ihm gewiinschten
Zeitpunkt- 6,15 Uhr und Genehmigung, dass vorher
einzelne Teilunternehmungen stattfinden kbnnen, je-
doch nur in solchen Ausmassen, dass nicht die ge-
samte tschechische Front alarmiert wird. Angriff
der Luftwaffe zu dem ihr mbglichen Zeitpunkt. (Per
Prozess gegen die Hauntkriegsverbrecher. p. 528-9).
E.t.: Top secret...strive after coordinated time
of attack by Army and Air Forces. ... As a matter
of principle, every effort should be made for a
coordinated attack by army and air forces on X day
... If the Luftwaffe were to attack at the time
desired by the Army no tactical surprise of the
enemy's air force would be achieved and it would
necessitate certain changes in the method of attack
... If an early hour of attack on the part of the
army is regarded an indispensable, a simultaneous
attack by the air forces, —desirable as it may be
may possibly have to be dispensed with... Thus it
is proposed: attack by the Army - independent of
the attack bj- the air force - at the time desired
by the Army (0615) and permission for limited
operations to take place before then, however, only
to an extent that will not alarm the entire Czech
front. The Luftwaffe will attack at a time most
suitable to them.
46. Unrichtige Ansichten hber das Mtinchener Abkommen
4n Kimminich,pp. 45-6. Original texts: Czech and German.
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Zourek Is referring here to the passage of the
Nuremberg Judgement dealing with the occupation of
Czechoslovakia.^
4) The Munich Agreement and the Territorial Changes
In the grave situation Mussolini suggested a
Conference to be held at Munich between Great Britain,
Prance, Italy and Germany. The Prague Government was
invited to delegate an observer who, however, was not
permitted to participate in the negotiations.
47. "The conference of the 5th November 1937 made
it quite plain that the seizure of Czechoslovakia
by Germany had been definitely decided upon. The
only question remaining was the selection of the
suitable moment to do it...On the 21st April 1938,
a discussion was held between Hitler and the
defendant Keitel with regard to "Case Gruen",
showing quite clearly that the preparations for
the attack on Czechoslovakia were being fully
considered. On the 28th May 1938, Hitler ordered
that preparations should be made for military action
against Czechoslovakia by the 2nd October, and from
then onwards the plan to invade Czechoslovakia was
constantly under review. On the 30th May 1938 a
directive signed by Hitler declard his "unalterable
decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action
in the near future...On the 31st August 1938,
Hitler approved a memorandum by Jodl dated 24th
August 1938, concerning the timing of the order
for the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the question
of defense measures. This memorandum contained the
following: Operation Green will be set in motion
by means of an 'Incident' in Czechoslovakia, which
will give Germany provocation for military
intervention. The fixing of the exact time for
this incident is of the utmost importance...These
facts demonstrate that the occupation of Czecho¬
slovakia had been planned in detail long before
the Munich Agreement" (Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression,
Opinion and Judgement, pp. 24-26). German text: Das
Urtell von Ntlrnberg.pp. 50.
36.
The result of the Conference was the Agreement
4.8
among the four Powers signed on September 29, 1938.
This agreement, which in a more restricted sense
represents the famed Munich Agreement, contains,
however, only a part of the settlements which are
usually included under the expression "Munich Agrgement",
namely that hitherto Czechoslovak territory was to be
transferred to Germany, Poland and Hungary. The
understanding achieved in Munich does not, however,
impose any obligation on the part of Czechoslovakia
to transfer these territories, although it presupposes
that an agreement of that kind had already been reached.
The purpose of the understanding was merely to formulate
AQ
the conditions and modalities of the transfer. y
According to this, the evacuation of the territories
in question was to commence on October 1, 1938 and was
to be completed without any disturbances or delay by
October 10, 1938, An International Commission consisting
of the representatives of the four Conference Powers
and Czechoslovakia was to work out detailed provisions
concerning the evacuation. However, it must be taken
into consideration that an essential part of the
settlement, including detailed dates of the German
occupation, had already been fixed in the Munich Agreement.
48. Hoensch, Ibid., p. 99-100; Document No. 6.
49, Strupp-Schlochauer, Bd. 2, p. 554; Wheeler-Bennett,
Sketch Map based on the map annexed to the agreementsigned at Munich on September 29. 1938. after p. 4-64.
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The international commission was to determine the
exact date and the area where a plebiscite would be
held. In addition, the final settlement of the new
boundaries was to be within the competence of this
commission*
Finally, a right of option to emigrate from or
to immigrate to the transferred territories was granted
to the population, and the Czechoslovak Government was
obliged to dismiss all Sudeten Germans from the armed
forces and the police.
In an Annex to the Agreement it was confirmed that
the Governments of the United Kingdom and France would
maintain their offer as expressed in paragraph 6 of
the Anglo-French proposals of September 19, 1938,
which concerned the international guarantee of the new
boundaries of Czechoslovakia in the case of unprovoked
attack.
Germany and Italy were also expected to guarantee
Czechoslovak security as Boon as the question of the
Polish and Hungarian minorities had been settled. In
an additional Declaration the Conference Powers expressed
the view that the question of the Polish and Hungarian
minorities in Czechoslovakia would have to be the subject
of a further conference among the four powers if these
problems were not settled within three months.'*®
50. Document Ho. 6 (Declaration of the Heads of
Government of the Four Powers).
38.
On September 30, 1938 the Czechoslovak Government
in separate notes addressed to the Governments of Great
Britain, France and Italy declared their consent to the
<51
Agreement.
51. Krai (f.n.14), p. 27; Zourek, Unrichtlge Ansichten
tiber das Munchener Abkommen. p. 45; Wright (f.n.7),
p. 28: "The Czech Government accepted this virtual
ultimatum...
Document: The (German) Chargfe d'affaires in
Czechoslovakia (Henecke) to the Foreign Ministry,
Excerpt of a telegram, Prague, September 30,
1938-9 p.m.
"The Italian Minister here gave me the following
information regarding today's demarches by the
Ministers of Italy, Britain, and France. He personally
had received orders from his Government early this
morning to see either the President of the Republic
in person or some other high Czechoslovak official
and to advise him urgently to accept the Munich
agreements and to avoid incidents of any kind during
the evacuation of the Sudeten-German area. As the
President was at the Council of Ministers, he was
received by Samakt, Chief of the Presidential
Chancellery, who promised to convey his recommendation
to Benes at once. On this occasion the Italian
Minister also conveyed the wish of the Ambassadors
in Berlin of Italy, Britain, and France that Minister
Mastny (Czechoslovak Minister in Germany} should be
appointed Czechoslovak delegate.
...At their own request the Ministers of Italy,
Britain, and France were received in a body about
noon today by the Foreign Minister, who...said:
"The President and the Government submit to the
conditions of the Munich Agreement which has come
into being without Czechoslovakia and against her.
The Czechoslovak Government reserves the expression
of its attitude in writing." At the same time Krofta
asked the Ministers to use their influence with the
Reich Government for the cessation of anti-Czech
propaganda which was making difficult the execution
of the Munich Agreement. ..." (Documents on German
Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series D, Yol. IV,
pp. 4-5).
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An official report was also published on
September 30, containing what was from the German
view the official Czechoslovak comment on the Munich
four power agreement:
The Government of the Republic held a meeting at
the castle this morning under the chairmanship of
the President of the Republic. The purpose of the
meeting was to give full consideration to the inter¬
national. situation as created by the four power
agreement concluded in Munich on September, 29.
The Government has closely examined this accord
as well as all aspects which need to be taken into
consideration in this connection. After detailed
consultations and deliberation of the recommendations
made by the British and French Governments, and
conscious of its historical responsibility, the
Czechoslovak Government - after obtaining the
full approval from the representatives of the
political parties - has decided to accept the Munich
four power agreement. She has taken this decision
aware of the necessity to maintain the nation as such,
and of the fact that any other decision seems out of
the question.
While announcing their consent, the Government of
the Czechoslovak Republic wish to protest before the
whole world against decisions made unilaterally and
in its absence.
(E.t. according to the German translation in the
book of Spengler, Zur Frage des vblkerrechtlich
gttltlgen Zustandekommens der deutsch-tschechosTo-
waklschen Grenzrefeelung von 1938. n. 58).
Mr. Chamberlain said clearly during the
Parliamentary Debate of October 3» 1938, that
Czechoslovakia had accepted the Anglo-French proposals.
He stated: "The first is this: We did not go there
to decide whether the predominantly German areas
in the Sudetenland should be passed over to the
German Reich. That had been decided already.
Czechoslovakia had accepted the Anglo-French
proposals. What we had to consider was the method,
the conditions and the time of the transfer of
the territory" (Extract of Speech by the Rt. Hon.
Neville Chamberlain, Prime Minister, October 3,
1938, Documents on International Affairs, 1938,
Vol. II pp. 292-3, by Curtis).
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According to the provisions of the Agreement, the
International Commission was thereupon established. It
was within this commission that on November 20, 1938
the Czechoslovak Government and the Government of the
Reich agreed on the final settlement of their common
boundaries without holding a plebiscite. This agreement
was recorded in a memorandum of the same day and accepted
•52
at the Commission's session on November 21, 1938.-'
52. Ninth Session of the International Commission,
November 21, 1938, (excerpts),..
"In the absence of State Secretary von Weiszaecker,
Ambassador Ritter acted as chairman and opened the
meeting.
The chairman began by recalling the resolution
of the International Commission on October 13 that
the work of rectifying and finally delimiting the
frontier should be begun at once by the German and
Czechoslovak Governments. These negotiations had
now resulted in an agreement which was embodied in
a memorandum signed by the leaders of both delegations
on November 20, 1938.
The Czechoslovak Minister confirmed this statement.
He recalled the words of State Secretary von
Weizsaeker at the opening of the first session
of the International Commission when he expressed
the wish that the deliberations of this Commission
should be conducted in a spirit of friendship and
reconciliation. This wish expressed by the State
Secretary had greatly helped the work of the
Commission, and the Czechoslovak delegation would
like to record that they too had been inspired by
this spirit in the course of the negotiations. The
Czechoslovak delegation naturally had had to defend
their vital interests, while at the same time taking
into account that a state which gives up part of its
population on the basis of the nationality principle
has to sacrifice not only large tnrritorial but
also economic interests. These sacrifices had been
very heavy, and the Czechoslovak delegation could
not conceal the feelings of deep grief which filled
the hearts of the Czechoslovak people. In submitting
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to these stern necessities, however, the Czechoslovak
delegation did not fail to appreciate that these
sacrifies offered on the altar of peace dispelled
the unrest of the past in order to bring peace in
the future. The Czechoslovak delegation, therefore,
looked more to the future than to the past. It was
this spirit which had Inspired the Czechoslovak
Delegation in their work with the German delegation,
the result of which was now submitted to the
International Commission. He had nothing to add
to this result. He would, however, take the liberty
of expressing the firm conviction of the Czechoslovak
Government that the sacrifices made by Czechoslovakia
might contribute to establishing good neighbourly
relations as well as bonds of friendship and
profitable cooperation with Greater Germany.
The chairman expressed his thanks to the Czecho-
Slovak Minister for having brought the negotiations
on this important matter to a close in the same
spirit of reconciliation and friendship in which
State Secretary von Weizsaecker had opened them.
The members of the International Commission
appreciated the remarks off the Czechoslovak Minister
on the sacrifices made by the Czechoslovak State. He
pointed out that Germany, too, compared with her
expectations, had made sacrifices. It was also
painful for Germany and the German race (Volkstum)
that so many Volksdeutsche remained outside the
frontiers of the German Reich. He agreed with the
Czechoslovak Minister that the two states would render
themselves and Europe the best service by now
devoting themselves entirely to the tasks of the
future. The Government of the Reich was prepared
to enter into good neighbourly and friendly cooperation
with Czechoslovakia. The agreements on various subjects
concluded in the last few days already gave proof of
this willingness.
The chairman referred to paragraph 6 of the
Munich Agreement. In the absence of statements to
the contrary, he assumed that the frontier between
the German Reich and Czechoslovakia could now be
regarded as final. He prpposed that this resolution
be formally recorded in the minutes of the meeting
in the following terms:
"The International Commission has today taken
cognizance of the minutes of November 20, relating
to the delimitation of the German-Czechoslovak
frontiers by the German and Czechoslovak delegations
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as well as of the maps appended to this record.
It declares that the frontier marked on these maps
is the final frontier within the meaning of
paragraph 6 of the Munich Agreement." ...
The chairman noted...that the proposed text
had heen accepted. This text would he Incorporated
in the minutes of the meeting. Further, in
accordance with a wish expressed by the Commission,
the resolution was signed by the five members of
the International Commission" (Documents (Germany)
Ser. D, Vol. IV, pp. 164-5).
43.
The French and British representatives on the commission
expressed their satisfaction that direct agreement had
been reached between the two Governments concerned.****
Meanwhile, on October 2, Poland occupied the
territory of Teschen."*^ The Governments of Czechoslovakia
and Hungary agreed that Germany and Italy should arbitrate
53. Documents (Germany) pp. 164-5.
54. A Note Verbale from the British Embassy in Berlin
October 1, 1938 (Polish Ultimatum) was handed to
the Foreign Ministry with the following text:
"According to information which has reached the
Foreign Office, the Polish Government had delivered
an ultimatum to the Czechoslovak Government demanding
immediate satisfaction of their territorial claims.
If a satisfactory reply is not received by noon
to-day, Poland proposes to invade Czechoslovakia
to-morrow.
Mr. Chamberlain regards this procedure as being
wholly contrary to the spirit of the Agreement
reached at Munich which provided that the settlement
of the territorial problems in Czechoslovakia should
be achieved by negotiation and not by force. Ample
provision is made in the Agreement for the settlement
of Polish claims.
The British Government is making immediate
representations in this sense at Warsaw. Mr. Chamber¬
lain would be grateful if the German Governmant
would use their influence to induce the Fiish
Government to defer action and to seek satisfaction
in the spirit of the Munich Agreement" (Documents
(Germany;, Ser. D, Vol. IV, p. 7).
44.
and settle the Hungarian territorial claims. This was
cc
done by the Arbitration of Vienna, on November 2, 1938. ^
55* Hoensch (f.n.3)» p. 101. Complete text of the
Arbitral Award:
"1. The areas to be ceded to Hungary by Czecho¬
slovakia are marked on the annexed map. Demarcation
of the frontier on the spot is delegated to a
Hungarian-Czechoslovak Commission.
2. The evacuation by Czechoslovakia of the areas
to be ceded and their occupation by Hungary begins
on November 5» 1938, and is to be completed by
November 10, 1938. The detailed stages of the
evacuation and occupation, as well as other
procedures connected therewith, are to be settled
at once by a Hungarian-Czechoslovak Commission.
3. The Czechoslovak Government will Insure
that the territories to be ceded are left in an
orderly condition at the time of evacuation.
4. Special questions arising out of the cession
of territory, in particular questions relating to
nationality and option, are to be regulated by a
Hungarian-Czechoslovak Commission.
5* Likewise, special measures fbf the protection
of persons of the Magyar nationality remaining in
Czechoslovak territory and of persons not of the
Magyar race in the ceded territories are to be
agreed upon by a Hungarian-Czechoslovak Commission.
This Commission will take special care that the
Magyar ethnic group (Volksgruppe) ip Pressburg be
accorded the same status as other ethnic groups
there.
6. Insofar as disadvantages and difficulties in
the sphere of economics or trailway) traffic may
be caused by the cession of territory to Hungary
for the area remaining to Czechoslovakia, the
Hungarian Government will, in agreement with the
Czechoslovak Government, do its utmost to remove
these disadvantages and difficulties.
7. In the event of difficulties or doubts
arising from the implementation of this sward, the
Royal Hungarian and Czechoslovak Governments will
settle the matter directly between themselves.
Should they, however, fail to reach agreement on
any question, this question will then be submitted
to the German and Italian Governments for final
decision" (Documents (Germany), Ser. D., Vol. IV,
pp. 125-6).
45.
The guarantees of the four Conference Powers to
maintain the integrity of the rest of the Czechoslovak
State envisaged in the Annex to the Agreement were not
Kg
confirmed by any party. After the settlement of the
Polish and Hungarian territorial claims the Czechoslovak
Government addressed the Conference Powers on the subject
of the promised guarantee. None of them,, however, showed
willingness to fulfill the promise.
5) The Dissolution of Czechoslovakia
Slovakia, which, according to the Agreement of
Sillein of October 6, 1938, enjoyed an autonomous status
within the Czechoslovak State, declared its independence
on March 14, 1939 after a constitutional crisis had
broken out on March 9, 1939 and the Central Government
at Prague suspended the regional government and inter¬
vened militarily.
On March 15, 1939 the Prague Government sent Hacha,
the President of Czechoslovakia, on a mission to Berlin.-*'
There Hacha was forced "to put the fate of the Czech
56. Staatslexikon, Recht. Wirtschaft. Gesellschaft.
10. Bd. 2. Erg. Bd. col. 687.
57. Krai (f.n.14), p. 40.
46,
people and country into the hands of the Ftihrer of
the German Reich.M^8
58. Document No. 9; Markus, Le traitfe germano-
tchfecoslovaque du 1 5 Mars 1959.loc,cit.p. 658.
It is well imaginable that Hacha was brutally
pressured into signing. Even a report which the
Hitler government drew up on the talks between
Hitler and Hacha alludes to this pressure, though
of course such a biased report makes no mention
of the worst means of pressure used.
In this regard the Nuremberg Tribunal mentioned
the following:
't)n the 14th March 1939, the Czech President
Hacha and his Foreign Minister Chvalskovsky came
to Berlin at the suggestion of Hitler, and attended
a meeting at which the defendants von Ribbentrop,
Gbring, and Keitel were present, with others. The
proposal was made to Hacha that if he would sign
an agreement consenting to the incorporation of the
Czech people in the German Reich at once, Bohemia
and Moravia would be saved from destruction. He
was informed that German troops had already received
orders to march and that any resistance would be
broken with physical force. The defendant Gbring
added the threat that he would destroy Prague
completely from the air. Faced by this dreadful
alternative, Hacha and his Foreign Minister put
their signatures to the necessary agreement at
4:30 in the morning, and Hitler and Ribbentrop
signed on behalf of Germany (Toynbee, loc.cit.
p. 50). Kempner refers to an interrogation of
Meissner, the head of the Presidential Chancery,
during the Nttrnberg "Wilhelm Strasse" trial in
1949 at which time Meissner said:
"Es ist wahr, dass Hacha im Laufe der Nacht einen
Schwacheanfall hatte und dass er hrztliche Hilfe be-
kam, nach der er sich wieder verhandlungsfahig er-
klSrte". (E.t.: It is true that Hacha had an attack
of faintness during the night and that he received
medical assistance, after which he declared himself
fit to resume negotiations). Kempner, Das Dritte
Reich im Kreuzverhor. p. 171; Nazi Conspiracy and
Aggression, p. 27: Judicial Decisions, A.J.I.L. 1947
pp. 196-7.
47.
Immediately on the following day the law which
established the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was
passed; according to this these Czechoslovak territories
CO
became part of the German Reich. Furthermore a treaty
was signed with the newly "independent" Slovak State
which placed Slovakia under the protection of the Reich
as a guarantee for her independence and the integrity of
60 61
her territory. Ruthenia was taken over by Hungary.
59. Hitler always launched his propaganda campaign for
the Sudeten German territories with an appeal to the
right of self-determination. And according to world
opinion this was the only justification for the
cession of a part of Czechoslovakia to Germany.
The British Prime Minister explained in his
statement of March 15# 1939: "...I cannot regard the
manner and the method by which these changes have
been brought about as in accord with the spirit of
the Munich Agreement... . Hitherto the German
Government in extending the area of their military
control has defended its action by the contention
that they were only incorporating in the Reich
neighbouring masses of people of German race. Now
for the first time they are effecting a military
occupation of territory inhabited by people with
whom they have no racial connection."
Hitler himself had asserted during the
negotiations with the British Prime Minister:
"We don't want Czechs in the Reich", and, "We
have no further territorial ambition", as Chamberlain
said in his speech in Birmingham on March 17# 1939.
(Kenndy, Why England Slept, p. 186; Bolton, p. 141;
v. Richthofen. loc.cit. p." 45; Toynbee, loc.cit.
pp. 62, 69).
60. Document No. 10.
61. Kennan (f.n.9)» p. XX.
48.
The most important States of the World did not
recognize the annexation of the rest of Czechoslovakia.
On March 17, 1939 the British Government addressed to
the Government of the Reich a note which stated that,
"...they cannot hut regard the events of the past few
days as a complete repudiation of the Munich Agreement..."
likewise, the French Government protested against these
measures, indicating that these actions represented an
obvious violation of both the letter and spirit of the
go
Munich Agreement of September 29.
The two Governments at first merely pointed out
the violations of the agreement without drawing any
juridical or political consequences therefrom. It was
not until the war that the consequences were drawn. The
first step was taken by the British Government with a
note of August 5. 1942 which stated:
As Germany has deliberately destroyed
the arrangements concerning Czechoslovakia
reached in 1938... His Majesty's Government
regards themselves as free from any engagements
in this respect.®3
62. Toynbee, Documents on International Affairs,
pp. 71-2; Document No. 11.
63. Document No, 14.
The point of view of the Czechoslovak government-
in-exile concerning the Munich Agreement was, how¬
ever, by no means formulated on the basis of
"ex-tunc nullity."
49.
When Benes, who had resigned as President of
Czechoslovakia in 1938, formed the Czechoslovak
government-in-exile in London after the outbreak
of war, this government was recognized by the allied
powers as the legitimate Government of the Czecho¬
slovak State. Mr. Benes issued on November 17# 1939
a communiqufe which declared that the arbitrary
agreement between Hitler and Hacha of March 15#
1939 was void but which did not however imply that
the Munich Agreement itself was void. He said (cit.
french newspaper "Le Temps"# November 19# 1939):
"Par les accords de Munich...# M. Hitler s'engageit
formellement k garantir les nouvelles fronti&res de
la Tehfecoslovaquie". E.t.: With the agreement of
Munich..•# Herr Hitler has formally undertaken the
obligation to guarantee the new voundaries of
Czechoslovakia.
On the contrary,we can see that the voidness of
the Agreement of March 15# 1939 is explained by the
argument that in the Munich Agreement Hitler had
formally undertaken obligations to guarantee the
new boundaries of Czechoslovakia. It is obvious
that this document argues on the basis of the
validity of the obligations formulated in the
Munich Agreement.
Even when the British Government informed the
Czechoslovak government-in-exile of their new
attitude -"as Germany has deliberately destroyed
the arrangements... His Majesty's Government regards
itself as free from any engagements in this respect
the Czechoslovak government-in-exile did not
contradict this interpretation, but declared in
an answering note of August 5, 1942:
"My Government accept Your Excellency's note
as a practical solution of the questions and
difficulties of vital importance for Czechoslovakia
which emerged between our two countries as the
consequence of the Munich Agreement, maintaining,
of course, our political and Juridical position with
regard to the Munich Agreement and the events which
followed it...% (H.M.S.O. Cmd. 6379; Carlyle, loe.
cit. pp. 317-9; Document No. 14).
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On September 29, 1942 the French National Committee
in London informed the Czechoslovak government-in-exile
that they regarded the agreement signed in Munich on
September 29» 1938 as invalid from the beginning, ^
After Mussolini's fall the Italian Government also
adopted the French point of view. In a declaration of
September 26, 1944, the Italian Government expressed
its viewpoint in the following manner:
Constatando che la politica del regime
fascists nei confronti della Cecoslovacchia
fu dontraria non solo alle pid nobili tradizioni
dell'Italia, ma ai nostri pid essenziali
interessi, e affermando che tale politica
costitui una delle manifestazioni pid gravi
dell'asservimento del fascismo alia German!a
hitleriana, il Governo italiano proclama
solennemente che considers nulli e non awenuti
gli accordi di Monaco del 29 settembre 1938, la
sedicente decisione arbitrale Ciano-Ribbentrop
formulate a Vienna il 2 novembre 1938 e con
essi qualsiasi altro atto che, come conseguenza di
tali accordi e di tale decisione, abbia mirato
a nuocera all'indipendenza della Repubblica
cecoslovacca,
II Governo italiano dichiara, di fronte al
mondo ed alia storia che tutti quegli atti e
accordi tradirono il pensiero e la volontd del
popolo italiano che, finchd libero, voile una
politica fidente e feconda collaborazione con
la Cecoslovacchia, nell'interesse della pace
e della liberta europea.65
64. Schickel, Das Mtinchener Abkommen. loc.cit. p, 26.
65. L*Italia proclama la nullitd degli accordi di Monaco
del 1938, Notizze Nazioni Unite, N. 34, 27 Settembre
1944, p. 5j see further: Ort, tiber die Ungultlgkeit
des MUnchener Diktats, loc.cit. p. 72. a.t.: In **""
consideration of the fact that under the Fascist
regime Italian policy toward Czechoslovakia was
not only contrary to the noble traditions of
Italy but also against our own essential
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interests, and admitting that such a policy
supported a most grievous enslavement of Czecho¬
slovakia by the Fascists of Hitler's Germany, the
Italian Goirarrment solemnly declares that they
consider the Munich Agreement of September 29,
1938 together with the award made by Ciano and
Ribbentrop on November 2, 1938 in Vienna and all
other declaratory aots which are to be considered
consequences of that Agreement and arbitration null
and void, and they regard them as a violation of the
independence of the Chechoslovakian Republic.
The Italian Government declares before the whole
world and history that all the above mentioned acts
and agreements lbstrayed the intentions and the
thinking of the Italian people who with freedom
restored desire a policy of trust and fruitful
co-operation with Czechoslovakia in the interest
of the freedom of Europe.
52.
The attitude of the World Powers which were not
signatories of the Munich Agreement is. summarized hy
Bretton^^ thus:
"...(Les) Etats-Unis ont appliqufe la doctrine
Stimson en refusant de reconnaltre les changements
territoriaux imposes & la Tchfecoslovaquie non d
1'occasion de 1'accord de Munich mais lore de
l'fetablissement du 'protectorat' allemand consacrant
le dfemembrement de la Tchfecoslovaquie en mars 1939.
L'Union Sovifetique fit de mdme,67 puis d&s Juin
1941 affirma la nullitfe ab initio de l'accord de
Munich. Cette position ne s'est pas dfementie par
la suite: on la retrouve d'abord dans le projet
sovifetique de traitfe de paix avec l'Allemagne du
10 janvier 1959°8. puis dans le memorandum
sovifetique adresse a la R.P.A, le 21. novembre 1967
sur le non recours de la force.°9 Mais c'est dans
1'article 6 du trait6 d'amitife, de coopferation et
d'assistance mutuelle signfe d Prague le 6 mai 1970
par l'U.R.S.S. et la Tchecoslovaquie que figure la
condamnation la plus explicite de cet accord:
•les H.P.C. constatent que l'accord de Munich
du 29 septembre 1938 a etfe obtenu sous la menace
d'une guerre d'agression et de l'emploi de la
force contre la Tchecoslovaquie, qu'il faisait
partie de la conspiration criminelle de l'Allgemagne
nazie contre la paix, qu'il constituait une
violation grossiere des rdgles fondamentales du
droit international et qu'il est en consequence
nul et non avenu depuls le debut avec toutes les
consequences qui en dfecoulent.* "7o
66. Bretton, Les negotiations germano-tchecoslovaQue
sur l'accord de Munich du 29 septembre 1938.
A.P.D.I.P., 1973, pp. 199-200. E.t.: The United
States through its refusal to recognize the
territorial transfer - in the manner in which it
was imposed on Czechoslovakia - has applied the
Stimson doctrine. However, this was not done on
the occasion of the Munich Agreement but in
connection with the creation of the German
"protectorate" through which the partition of
Czechoslovakia in March 1939 was approved.
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The Soviet Union did the same, and as from
June 1941 she confirmed the nullity of the Munich
Agreement ab initio. She never abandoned this
position, even subsequently. One can find it first
in a Soviet draft of a peace treaty with Germany
dated January 10, 1959, then in a memorandum dated
November 21, 1967 on the renunciation of force
addressed to the Federal Republic of Germany. However,
art. 6 of the Treaty oh Friendship, Cooperation and
Mutual Help signed in Prague on May 6, 1970 by the
USSR and Czechoslovakia, contains a clear condemnation
of this agreement* "the sovereign contracting parties
hereby declare that the Munich Agreement of September
29, 1938 came into being under the threat of a war
of aggression and use of force against Czechoslovakia.
These represented part of the criminal conspiracy
of Nazi Germany against peace, and constituted a
gross violation of the basic rules of international
law, thus leading to its nullity from the very first
moment of its coming into being and with all the
consequences thereof."
Text of Note from the Soviet Government to the
German Embassy in Moscow, March 18, 1939:
I have the honour to confirm the receipt of your
Notes dated March 16 and 17 informing the Soviet
Government of the inclusion of the Czech provinces
in the German Empire and of the establishment of
the German protectorate.
The Soviet Government does not consider it
possible to pass over the above-mentioned Notes in
silence and thus create a false impression of its
allegedly indifferent attitude to Czechoslovak
events, and therefore finds it necessary, in
answer to the afrove Notes, to express its real
attitude to the aforesaid events.
(1) The political and historical conceptions
expounded in the introductory part of the German
ordinance (announcing the establishment of the
Protectorate) as grounds and {Justification for it,
and in particular the references to the existence
of the Czechoslovak State as a source of constant
unrest and menace to European peace, to the lack
of vitality of the Czechoslovak State and to the
resulting necessity for particular care on the part
of the German Empire, cannot be considered as correct
and corresponding to the facts known to the whole
world.
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In actual fact, after the First World War the
Czechoslovak Republic has been one of th£ few
European States where internal tranquillity and
a peaceable foreign policy were really secured.
(2) The Soviet Government is not aware of
any State Constitution that entitles the Head of
a State to abolish its independent existence as
a State without the consent of his people.
It is difficult to admit that any people would
voluntarily agree to the destruction of their
independence and to their inclusion in another
State, still less a people that for hundreds of
years fought for their independence and for 20
years maintained their independent existence.
In signing in Berlin the Act of March 15
Dr. Hacha, President of Czechoslovakia, had no
authority from his people for doing so, and
acted in manifest contradiction with Articles
64 and 65 of the Czechoslovak Constitution.
Consequently the afuresaid Act cannot be
considered legally valid (Documents on Inter¬
national Affairs 1939-1946, Vol. I p. 75, by
Toynbee).
Article 10: "L'Allemagne recommit la nullitfe
de 1*accord de Munich avec toutes les
consequences qui en dlcoulent et declare que
le territoire de l'ex-rfegion sud£te sera
reconnu de facon permanente comme partie
intfegrante du territoire de la Rfepublique
Tchfecoslovaque." E.t.i Germany recognizes
the nullity of the Munich Agreement with all the
consequences ensuing from it, and declares that
the territory of the former German Sudeten region
will be recognized permanently as an integral
part of the territory of the Republic of Czecho¬
slovakia.
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69. Article 4» "Vu que 1*accord de Munich en dqte
du 29 eeptembre 1933 a fet6 signfe sous la menace
d*une guerre degression et du recours 4 la
force contre la Tchfecoslovaquie, la R.P.A.
declare cet accord nul et non avenu", E.t.:
With regard to the Munich Agreement of
September 29, 1938, which was signed under the
threat of a war of aggression and use of force
against Czechoslovakia, the Federal Republic of
Germany declares this agreement to be null and
void.
70. Khlestov, New Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty. J.A.,
1970 (No. 71), p. 9.
56.
6) The Restitution of the State and the Expulsion
of the Germans
After Germany's collapse in 1945 the Czechoslovak
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State was restored within its former boundaries.'
71. In 1945 the victorious powers thus decreed
-pursuant to the supreme powers assumed by them
in Germany- that in their future dealing with Germany
the position should be taken to be that of December
31, 1937 (Declaration of June 5, 1945). By this act,
German sovereignty in all the territories annexed
to the German Reich after that date was annulled and
the Sudeten territories were returned to Czechoslovakia.
Under international law, an actual change in the
legal status of these territories thus took place
(cf. also Rumpf and Kimminich in: Eastern Treaties-
Berlin Status. Munich Agreement Relationship between
FRG and GDR, Hamburg 1971, Kiel Symposium, pp. 189
and 183;.
The decision of the victorious powersnot to consider
any of the territories situated outside the Reich's
frontiers of December 31, 1937 as part of Germany
was later accepted by the Federal Republic of Germany.
Consequently, the Federal Republic of Germany and its
State organs have never staked a claim to the Sudeten
territories; on the contrary, they have always acted
as if the territories belonged to the Czechoslovak
Confederation, No Federal German Government has in
this respect ever raised even a reservation of
international law.
The German Constitution, too, does not contradict
in any way, through various territorial statements,
the attitude adopted by the Federal Republic of
Germany towards Czechoslovakia. The reunification
mandate specifically does not extend to those
territories which - as with the Sudeten territory -
lie outside the German frontiers of December 31,
1937.
57.
Only the Carpathian part of Ruthenia^2 was annexed by
the Soviet Union.
In the course of the diplomatic events of the
immediate post-war period the German Democratic
Republic in a common declaration with the Czechoslovak
Republic of June 23. 1950 made the following statement:
Unsere beiden Staaten haben keine
Gebiets- oder Grenzansprttche und ihre
Regierungen betonen ausdrticklich, dass
die durchgefiihrte Umsiedlung der Deutschen
aus der Tschechoslovakischen Republik unab-
Snderlich, gerecht und endgtiltig gelbst ist.
72. "...eine Provinz, die in der Tat nicht einen einzigen
Tschechen oder Slowaken aufweist und die ausschliess-
lioh von Ruthenen und Magyaren bewohnt ist" (von
Papen, Per Wahrheit eine Gasse. p. 620). E.t.s...a
province where indeed not a single Czech or Slovak
is living and which is exclusively inhabited by
Ruthenians and Magyars.
73. Article 1 of the relevant Treaty of June 29. 1945
between the Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Republic
states that this region "has been reunited with the
Ukraine" (French text of the Treaty with supplementary
Protocol (same date) in Colliard, Actualitfe Inter¬
nationale et diplomatique 1950-195€>» Vol.
pp. 609-11;.
74. Document No. 15; E.t.i Our two States have no
territorial or boundary claims against one another
and our Governments explicitly emphasize that the
evacuation of Germans from the Czechoslovak
Republic has to be considered irrevocable,
legitimate and definitive. See also KiJniger,
Die Stellungder beiden deutsohen Staaten zum
Miinchener Abkommen von 1938. loc.cit. pp. 1051.
58.
This declaration does not contain any reference to
the question of the validity or nullity of the Munich
Agreement.
However, in Article 7 of the Treaty of Friendship,
Co-operation and Mutual Assistance concluded between
the two States on March 17, 1967, the Munich Agreement
is referred to as a "Diktat", which had been accomplished
by means of pressure and extortion and whose imposition
upon the Czechoslovak State constituted a serious
violation of international law; therefore this Agreement
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had to be considered void from the beginning.
Poland, which had also received Czechoslovak
territory through the arrangements of 1938, was asked
immediately at the end of the war to declare the Munich
Agreement void. Poland, however, refused to issue such
a declaration, whereupon a Polish-Czechoslovak dispute
developed which had to be settled by Stalin himself.
Even in the Treaty of Mutual Friendship and
Assistance concluded between Poland and Czechoslovakia
the Munich Agreement remained unmentioned and it was
not until the Treaty of March 1, 1967 that it was
stated:
75. GB1. (DDR) I, 1967 p. 54-56 (55).
59,
•••the Munioh Agreement came into being.••
by threat of an offensive war and use of force
upon Czechoslovakia. It was part of the
criminal conspiracy from the side of the
Government of National Socialist Germany
against the peace, a brutal breach of
principles of international law already
in force at that time and therefore invalid
from the beginning with all the consequences
resulting from these facts.76
In the settlement of peaceful relations with
Czechoslovakia in 1947, Hungary declared that it
considered the Munich Agreement invalid from the
beginning. At the same time it was agreed that Hungary
should be freed from any negative legal consequences
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which might arise from the declaration of nullity.'
Nearly all Germans who lived in Czechoslovakia
were concentrated in camps, deprived of their property
and evacuated to Germany.
76. Article 6 of the Treaty; see MBller, Die Verat&ndigung
zwlschen Bonn und Prag, loctqlt. p. 3~.
77. Ibid., p. 334.
78. One will not be able to say unequivocally that
the expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia had
been carried out with the express approval of the
Great Powers. Rather, their standpoint on this
matter supported the deoisions made at Potsdam
which indicated that the displacements had been
unavoidable under the given circumstances.
With regard to this whole complicated matter,
it must not be overlooked that at this time the
Czech action against the Sudeten Germans had been
underway for quite some time (see also Brtigel,
Tschechen und Deutsche 1939-1946. pp. 169.
60.
During the debate on June 13# 1946 in the House
of Commons, the question directed to the Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs, "whether the expulsion
of the Sudeten Deutsch population from Czechoslovakia
is a unilateral action on the part of the Czechoslovak
Government; and whether it has the endorsement of the
major Allied Governments", was answered as follows:
"His Majesty's Government have no detailed
information as to the extent to which such expulsion
is taking place. They consider that the transfer,
to whatever extent may be agreed on, of Germans
from Czechoslovakia to Germany should be carried
out in an orderly fashion as an integral part of
the plans of the controlling Powers for the post¬
war settlement of Germany. They have made this view
known to the other controlling Powers and to the
Czechoslovak Government" (Parliamentary Debates,
Hansard, Fifth Series, Vol. 411# col. 1632).
61.
The expulsion, which, according to the Potsdam
Agreement of August 2, 1945, was to be carried out in
terms of a "resettlement of the German inhabitants of
Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary in Germany in a
legal and humane way", nevertheless deteriorated into
a haphazard procedure which was preceded by total
expropriation, internment in camps and other un¬
civilized and violent actions. In this way more than
three million Germans who had survived the war and
7q
its aftermath were expelled from Czechoslovakia.'^
79. Strupp-Schlochauer, Bd. 3, p. 560; Franzel,
Die Yertreibung Sudetenland 1945/46. pp. 21;
by the same author. Sudetendeutsche Geschichte.
pp. 411; Dahm, Vblkerrecht. Bd. 1 p. 411:
Beck, Wbrterbuch der Zeitgeschichte seit 1945.
p. 375. riilf, Die tschechoslowakische Forderunfe
der UngliltigkeTt" des Mtinchner Abkommens ab initio.
loc.cit. PP. 847.
For more interesting details concerning this
aspect of post-war history I recommend especially
the chapter (and the appendix) "Die Sudeten
deutschen Vertreibungsexporte 1946" in Bohmann,
Das Sudetendeutschtum in Zahlen. p. 249. This
interesting book provides the reader with
extensive statistical material and offers
interesting insights into the Sudeten Germans'
fate since the end of the First World War.
68.
7) The Preparation and Conclusion of the Treaty
Concerning the Establishment of Normal Relations
between Prague and the Federal Republic of
Germany80
The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany,
after having spent much time before giving a precise
explanation of her point of view in this question, declared
in a note addressed to Czechoslovakia on March 25, 1966:
Die Bundesregierung ist der Auffassung, dass
das Miinchener Abkommen aus dem Jahre 1938 von Hitler
zerrissen wurde und keine territoriale Bedeutung mehr
hat. Sie erhebt daher, wie sie mehrfach erklart hat,
gegeniiber der Tschechoslowakei keine territorialen
Ansprtiche.®''
80. Talks concerning an exchange of trade legations had
already started in 1964, but had been broken off as
early as March 1965. Officially no reasons were given.
Unofficially, however, it was said that the Federal
Republic had been unable to continue negotiations due
to the demand by the CSSR for the unqualified
revocation of the Munich Agreement, and its refusal
to include West Berlin in the trade agreement.
Negotiations were finally resumed in 1967, and on
August 3, 1967 an agreement on the mutual exchange
of trade legations, governing also the traffic of
goods and credit transfers until the year 1969 (with
subsequent extensions), was signed in Prague - the
first such agreement since the end of the Second
World War (B.Ar, 1968 No. 61), p. 1), not taking
into consideration the minutes of the meetings of
a mixed commission (held from February 4, 1952 to
April 29, 1952, and on July 15, 1952) concerning the
traffic of goods and credit transfers, and the
minutes dated September 24, 1956 concerning credit
transfers (B.Ar. 1962 (No. 149) p. 1? 1956 (No. 206)
p. 1). Members of the trade legations were given
diplomatic status (see v. MUnch, Ostvertrage III,
pp. 163-5).
81. E.t.: The Federal Government holds the opinion
that the Munich Agreement of the year 1938 had
been breached by Hitler and is now without any
territorial relevance. This Government has, there¬
fore, as it had declared several times before, no
territorial claims against Czechoslovakia.
63.
This note, of course, did not produce normal
relations between the Federal Republic and the CSSR,
because such normalization required the prior solution
of a great number of problems. But this declaration
represanted an extensive concession on the part of the
Federal Republic with regard to the solution of the
Sudeten German question which had been imposed by the
Czechs with the support of the Allied Powers ever since
May 1945.
However, the intention to come to an understanding
was manifested by successive Federal Governments and
particularly by the "Great Coalition" in the government
declaration of December 13, 1966, In that declaration
the Federal Government emphasized its interest in
terminating a dark episode in German-Czechoslovak history
characterized by Hitler's politics against Czechoslovakia
and in establishing conditions of mutual trust between
neighbours.
82. Earlier proposals by Czechoslovakia for the two
countries to take up diplomatic relations and
sign a non-aggression treaty foundered due to the
failure of Adenauer's government to reply to a
letter of Prime Minister Siroky of July 14, 1958
dealing with this question. Siroky had already
indicated in the Government statement of July 30,
1956 a similar willingness to normalize relations
between the two States. (Weigand, Per Yertrag liber
die gegenseitigen Beziehungen zwischen der Bundes-
repuollk Deutschland und der Tschechoslowaklschen
^ozialistischen Republik vom 11. Dezember 1973 -
elne vblkerrechtliche Analyse, p. 1: Arch. a.G.
5912;.
64.
In a later Government declaration of October 28, 1969
the Bonn Government renewed its expression of readiness to
reach an agreement with its immediate neighbour, the CSSR,
which would serve to lessen the burden of the past. The new
Federal Government has confirmed this readiness by the
Government declaration of January 18, 1973.
The declaration in September 1970 by the Czechoslovak
Prime Minister Strougal, that the signing of the Treaty
between the Federal Republic and the CSSR had created a
satisfactory atmosphere in Europe and the World and
presented an opportunity for regulating relations between
the Federal Republic of Germany and the CSSR, led late in
March 1971 to exploratory talks between the Federal
Republic and the Government of Czechoslovakia.
These exchanges covered six separate meetings up to
April 1973* held alternately in the CSSR and the Federal
Republic.8'* Their purpose was to provide the framework
for a German-Czechoslovak treaty. Underlying these
exploratory talks was the search for an agreement whioh
83. These official negotiations were preceded by
exploratory talks held on October 13/14, 1970 and
March 31/April 1, 1971 (in Prague), on May 13/14
and September 27/28, 1971 (in Bonn), on November
18/19, 1971 (in Rothenburg o.d.T., FRG), on June
29/30, 1972 (in Prague) and finally on April 12/13,
1973 (in Bonn), (Arch.d.G. 15790 B, 16202A, 16261 B,
16571 B, 16696 C, 17190 C and 17849 A).
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would "be tolerable for both sides in view of the questions
which resulted from the problem of the Munich Agreement of
September 29, 1938 - of central importance in the view of
Czechoslovakia.
Although the talks met with difficulties, they were
finally brought to a positive conclusion.
The actual treaty negotiations took place in two
sessions in Prague and Bonn in May 1973.
The German-Czechoslovak Treaty on Mutual Relations
was initialled provisionally on June 20, 1973 in Bonn by
the respective Foreign Ministers and signed subsequently
on December 11, 1973 in Prague8^- by Chancellor Brandt,
84. Protocol of Signature on the signing of the Treaty
on Mutual Relations between the Federal Republic of
Germany and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and
on the Exchange of letters thereto (excerpts)s
"The Treaty on Mutual Relations between the Federal
Republic of Germany and the Czechoslovak Socialist
Republic was signed today in Prague...
At the same time
(1) an Exchange of letters on the extension of
Article II of the Treaty on Mutual Relations between
the Federal Republic of Germany and the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic and on the extension of further
treaties within the meaning of Article Y of the Treaty
to Berlin (West);
(2) an Exchange of letters on the settlement of
humanitarian questions...
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czecho¬
slovak Socialist Republic, Mr. Bohuslav Chnoupek,
Eng., handed Herr Walter Scheel, Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, a letter
on matters of criminal prosecution on behalf of the
Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.
Done at Prague on 11 December 1973, in duplicate
in the German and Czech languages" (Press and
Information Office of the FG of Germany, pp. 16-7).
66.
oc
Prime Minister Strougal and the two Foreign Ministers.
On the same day diplomatic relations were
86 87
established between the two States.
85. See BT-Drucksache 7/1832 of March 20, 1974, G.d.B.
Document No. 1, section 2; Europe Archive, 3/1974,
D 57.
86. Document No. 3.
87. The final communiqufe of December 11, 1973 on the
negotiations in Prague stated:
"Beide Seiten sehen in dem Vertrag zwischen der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Tschechoslowaki-
schen Sozialistischen Republik ebenso in den voran-
gegangenen Vertragen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
mit der UdSSR, der Volksrepublik Polen und der DDR
sowie im Viermachte-Abkommen vom 3. September 1971
einen bedeutsamen Beitrag zum Prozess der Entspannung
inEuropa." (Presse- und Informationsamt d, BRe
Nr. 322754 12.73, p. 32).
E.t.s Both sides regard the Treaty between the
Federal Republic of Germany and the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic, the treaties previously concluded
by the Federal Republic of Germany with the USSR, the
Polish Pepple's Republic and the GDR as well as the
Quadripartite Agreement of September 3, 1971 as major
contributions t> the progress of dfetente in Europe.
Having initialled the Treaty on June 20, 1973 in
Bonn, Foreign Minister Scheel declared:
"Von dem, was Geschichte geworden ist, l&sst sich
nichts rtiekgangig machen. Was wir jedoch tun kbnnen,
ist, gereift durch die historische Erfahrung, Grund-
lagen zu schaffen ftir ein neues Verh&ltnis zwischen
unseren Staaten und VSlkern. Es soil uns zu einer von
den alten Belastungen befreiten weit gespannten Zu-
sammenarbeit fiihren. Diesem Ziel dient der Vertrag."
E.t.: What is possible for us who have learned the
lessons of the past, is to lay the foundations for a
new relationship between our states and our peoples.
This relationship will lead to wide-ranging co¬
operation freed from the burden of the past. That is
the Treaty's purpose (Press and Information Service
of the FRG p. 38).
67.
The signing of the treaty and the exchange of
ambassadors were delayed until the last moment by the
divergent views concerning consular representation of
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Wet Berlin by the Federal Republic of Germany.
The Federal Government was seeking equality of
treatment not only for the inhabitants, but alBO for
the institutions and courts of West Berlin with those
of the Federal Republic. In the end, the question of
the exchange of legal assistance far the West Berlin
Courts -which became the culminating point- was
negotiated with the Soviet Government. However, in
October 1973 Foreign Minister Scheel returned to Bonn
with nothing more than a joint declaration of intention
to settle the issue at a later date. The Soviet Union
did not oppose the wish of the German Foreign Minister
that the solution should be found in the direct exchange
between courts. This loose agreement with the Soviets was
not accepted by the Czechs as binding themselves. Prague
has in particular refused to include the legal assistance
clause in the normalization package.
88. See Partlll, item 2d) of this thesis.
68.
The Federal Government was faced with the question
of whether to refuse to take up diplomatic relations and
leave the normalization treaty unsigned, with the sole
intention of enforcing their right to consular
representation of Berlin. A satisfactory solution was
hinted at from the Czechoslovakian side, without relating
it, however, to the normalization of relations with
QQ
Bonn. An exchange of notes -which the Federal
Government officially announced on December 5f 1973-
took place on November 23/27, 1973 prior to the signing
of the Normalization Treaty. The announcement read:
Zwischen den Regierungen der Bundesrepubllk
Deutschland und der Tschechoslowakischen Soziali-
stischen Republik hat folgender Notenwechsel
stattgefunden:
Yerbalnote vom 23» November 1973s "Die Handis-
vertretung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der
Tschechoslowakischen Sozialistischen Republik
beehrt sich, dem Ministerium ftir Auswartige Ange-
legenheiten der Tschechoslowakischen Sozialistischen
Republik unter Bezugnahme auf die Kontakte zwischen
beiden Seiten in der Frage der Gewahrung von Rechts-
hilfe folgendes mitzuteilen:
Aniasslich seines Besuches in Moskau vom 31. Oktober
bis 3. November 1973 hat der Bundesminister des Aus-
w&rtlgen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Herr Walter
Scheel, aufgrund einer Abstimmung mit der Regierung
der UdSSR folgende Erklarung abgegeben:
Beide Seiten vereinbarten, anschliessend in
einen Meinungsaustausch zu Fragen der Gewahrung von
Rechtshilfe einzutreten. Was die Gewahrung von
Rechtshilfe fiir Westberliner Gerichte betrifft, so
beabsichtigen sie, diese Frage in einer flir die
interessierten Seiten annehmbaren Form entsprechend
dem Viermhchte-Abkommen vom 3. September 1971 zu
regeln. Soweit gegenwartig entsprechende Verfahren
gelten, bleiben sie bis zur Erzielung einer solchen
Regelung unbertihrt.
89. NZZ,of December 5, 1973.
69.
Dazu kann ich folgendes feststellen: Auf der
Basis dieser Abrede sollen verschiedene Formen des
Rechtshilfeverkehrs erwogen werden, einschliesslich
der MSglichkeit des direkten Verkehrs zwischen
Gerichten der Sowjetunion und Gerichten der Bundes-
republik Deutschland und Gerichten der Sowjetunion
und Westberliner Gerichten.
Das Ministerium fiir Auswartige Angelegenheiten
der Tschechoslowakischen Sozialistischen Republik
wird um Mitteilung gebeten, ob die tschechoslowakische
Regierung bereit i®t, auf entsprechender Grundlage
zusammen mit der Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutsch¬
land anschliessend an die ins Auge gefassteAufnahme
diplomatischer Beziehungen eine Regelung der Frage
der Gewhhrung von Rechtshilfe einzuleiten. ..."
Czechoslovakia's Note in reply of November 27# 1973
reads as follows:
(Formal introduction).
Die Regierung der Tschechoslowakischen
Sozialistischen Republik ist bereit, die Frage
der GewShrung von Rechtshilfe nach der Unterzeichnung
des Vertrages ilber die gegenseitigen Beziehungen und
der Aufnahme diplomatischer Beziehungen zwischen der
Tschechoslowakischen Sozialistischen Republik und der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland in vollem Einklang mit der
in dieser Frage in Moskau in den Tagen vom 31. Oktober
bis 3. November 1973 erreichten Vereinbarung zu
regeln. (Complimentary Clause).9o
9o. E.t.! 2he following exchange of Notes has taken
place between the Government of the Federal Republic
of Germany and the Government of the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic.
Note Verbale of November 23, 1973: The Trade
Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany in the
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic presents its compliments
to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic and, with reference to the contacts
between the two sides regarding the question of
granting judicial assistance, has the honour to
communicate the following:
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On the occasion of his visit to Moscow from
October 31 to November 3, 1973, the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of
Germany, Herr Walter Scheel, made the following
statement on the basis of an understanding with
the Government of the USSR:
The two sides to enter subsequently into an
exchange of views on questions regarding the
granting of judicial assistance. With regard to
the granting of judicial assistance for West
Berlin courts, they intend to regulate this
question in a form acceptable to the interested
parties in accordance with the Quadripartite
Agreement of September 3» 1971. In so far as
appropriate procedures currently apply, they
shall remain unaffected until such regulation
has been brought about.
Ip this regard, I can state the following:
On the basis of this understanding, different
forms of judicial assistance are to be considered,
including the possibility of direct contacts
between courts of the Soviet Union and courts
of the Federal Republic of Germany, and courts
of the Soviet Union and West Berlin courts.
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is requested to
dommunicate whether the Czechoslovak Government
is willing on a corresponding basis to proceed
together with the Government of the Federal
Republic of Germany, subsequent to the proposed
establishment of diplomatic relations, towards
a regulation of the question of granting judicial
assistance. ...
Note in reply of November 27, 1973 (Formal
introduction)
The Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist
Republic is willing to regulate the question of
granting judicial assistance fully in conformity
with the agreement on this question reached in
Moscow between October 31 and November 3, 1973,
after the signing of the Treaty on Mutual
Relations and the establishment of diplomatic
relations between the Czechoslovak Socialist
Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany
(Complimentary Clause).
71.
The Treaty came into force on July 19, 1974.^ To
this were added an Exchange of Letters regarding
Berlin (West) (Document No. 2), another Exchange of
Letters on Humanitarian Questions (Law Gazette II p. 993)
and a Unilateral Letter on Criminal Prosecution from the
Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs to his colleague
in the Federal Republic, in which the Federal Government
was informed that according to Czechoslovak law all
criminal acts committed between 1938 and 1945 only capital
crimes, i.e., acts which carry the death penalty and at
the same time answer the characteristics of war crimes,
may still be prosecuted; other crimes are barred by the
statute of limitations since 1965 (Law Gazette II p. 997).
91. The first debate on the bill for ratification of
the Treaty of December 11, 1973 (see BT-Drucksache
7/1832, loc.cit.) was held on March 20, 1974
following the presentation of the text of the
Treaty with the appended letters by the Office
of the Federal Chancellor (file number 1/4 (II/1)-
30130-VE 15/74, BT-Drucksache 7/1832 loc.cit., p. 3).
In the Federal Diet reports on the Treaty were
presented by Herr Friedrlch (SPD) and Dr. Heck (CDU).
Whereas the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Herr Scheel,
emphasized that the Treaty should open the door to
better relations between both countries, the speaker
for foreign affairs of the parliamentary group of
the CDU-CSU party, Herr Marx, described the agreement
as disappointing and announced the rejection of the
bill by the CSU-CSUopposition, (loc.cit. tn, 6006 C,
6034 D=Scheel; tn. 6008 D, 6041 D=Marx ). The bill was
transmitted the same day to the Committee of Foreign
Affairs and the Committee of Legal Affairs, (loc.cit.
tn. 6004 D).
72.
Earlier on February 27, 1974 the Committee for
Foreign Affairs of the Federal Council, in
accordance with Article 76 para 2, sent. 7, of
the Constitution, had dealt with the bill and the
procedures of ratification (Bommentatorj Governing
Lord Mayor of Berlin, Herr Schiitz).
The Federal Council received his report at its
session of March 8, 1974 (tn. 59A) and decided not
to raise objections to the bill but, in accordance
with the motion introduced by the Federal States of
Baden-Wilrttemberg, Bavaria, Rheinland-Pfalz, Saar¬
land and Schleswig-Holstein (BR-Drucksache 77/74) to
present its official position on the matter within
six weeks under Article 76 para 2, sent. 2 of the
Constitution (BR-Drucksache 77/74, tn. 65B).
Further debate and discharge of the bill of
ratification were on the agenda of the Federal Diet
on June 20, 1974. (BT-Druoksache 7/1832 and 7/2270).
The bill was adopted over the opposition of the
CDU-CSU (BT-Drucksache 7/2270).
On the following day, June 21, 1974 the CDU/CSU-
led Federal States (which enjoy a small majority in
the Federal Council) rejected the bill and appealed
to the Mediation Committee under Article 77» para 2
of the Constitution (BR-Drucksache 449/74). This
committee consists of 22 members, 11 each from the
Federal Diet and the Federal Cotuicil. The recommendation
of the Mediation Committee (BR-Drucksache 490/74 (new)
Resolution) readst "The Statute, adopted by the
Federal Diet on June 20, 1974, is confirmed" (13th
session of the Committee on June 27, 1974).
On July 1, 1974 the Federal Council at its 409th
session by majority vote decided to file an objection
against the bill under Article 77 para 3 of the
Constitution (BR-Drucksache 490/74 (new) tn. 301A
and B, 302C). It is to be noted that for treaties
of international law, in the legislative process it
is not possible to effect concessions because these
treaties may only be adopted or rejected as a whole.
The German Federal Diet thereupon passed the bill
on July 10, 1974 with the absolute majority of votes
required. The roll-call vote was 262 votes in favour,
167 votes against (BT-Drucksache, Debate and Decision,
tn. 7633 B, C and D, 7634-7640).
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On July 11 , 1974 the First Senate of the
Federal Constitutional Court unanimously rejected
the petition of a Sudeten German (file number
1 BvQ 5/74) to suspend temporarily the signing
of the ratification instruments by the Federal
President, otherwise if the instruments have
already been signed to suspend temporarily the
exchange of the instruments of ratification
regarding the treaty (Art. 32 LFCC).
The Federal President executed the law of
ratification on July 12, 1974 with counter¬
signatures of the Federal Chancellor and the
Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs.
The law was published in the Law Gazette on
July 16, 1974 (Part II p. 989). The instruments
of ratification were exchanged in Bonn on July 19#
1974 (see Article VI of the treaty). The notification
of the coming into force of the treaty carries the
date August 1, 1974 (Law Gazette II, p. 1127).
At that time five constitutional complaints
were received by the Constitutional Court, thus
not only applications for summary proceedings as
In the above-mentioned case file number 1 BvQ 5/74.
They were registeredunder file nos. 1 BvR 210/74#
1 BvR 221/74, 1 BvR 222/74, 1 BvR 248/74 and
1 BvR 301/74. The complaints filed were identical.
The wording of the applications was as follows:
The law of July 12, 1974 concerning the Treaty of
December 11, 1973 on Mutual Relations between the
Federal Republic of Germany and the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic (Law Gazette II, p. 989) is
unconstitutional•
The constitutional complaints were unsuccessful
(see Part III, f.n.1, paragraph 11 at p. 276 and
the addendum at pp. 462-74;.
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To appreciate the significance of the Treaty
and to understand its ramifications it is necessary
to discuss the problems particular to German-
Czechoslovak relations and to demonstrate how the
Treaty settles them.^'
92. The last one of the so-called Ostvertrage (East
Treaties) after the Treaty between the USSR and
the Federal Republic of Germany of August 12,
1970 and the Treaty between the Polish People's
Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany of
December 7, 1970, concerning the bases of
normalization of their mutual relations.
Sulek, The Normalization agreements of 1970-
1972 writes (loo.cli. p. 21^1:
A quarter of a century after the end of World
War II Europe entered a new stage of development.
For the first time since 1945 our continent was
given a real chance to shape a new type of inter¬
national relations. The overwhelming majority
of European States and nations realized the need
to bring the era of cold-war confrontation to an
end and replace it by an era of all-European
cooperation based on perceptible detente, mutual
trust and all-round cooperation between all the
countries of Europe."
93. Documents No. 15 and 16 in the Annex outline the
early course of relations between the GDR and the
CSSR in the post-war period. The final settlement
of the relations between the two States came with
the Treaty on Friendship, Collaboration and Mutual
Assistance of March 16, 1969. It was, however,
little more than a formality because of the
normalization of relations which had by then
existed in practice over a lengthy period of time
(GB1 (DDR) I 1967, p. 54). The common declaration
of October 17, 1974 (ND, October 19» 1974) states
the progress of further inter-governmental co¬
operation.
Part II
Difficulties in Mutual Relations Between the
Federal Republic of Germany and the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic and their Settlement in the
Treaty of December 11. 1973
1) The Question of Nullity of the Munich
Agreement of 1958 (ex tunc)
a) Introductory Remarks Concerning the
Legal Problems
In all developed legal systems, "nullity"
represents a well-known result of legal defects which
can affect legal transactions and acts of sovereignty.
Frowein writes:
Es handelt sich ... um einen Rechtsbegriff,
deasen Voraussetzungen und Folgen sich nicht von
selbst verstehen, sondern der Rechtsordnung zu
entnehmen sind. Die Nichtigkeit 1st abzugrenzen
von der Nichtexistenz, deren Wesen darin besteht,
dass nicht einmal der Schein eines Rechtsgeschaftes
oder Hoheitsaktes erzeugt worden 1st. Bei der
Nichtigkeit liegen dagegen gewisse Voraussetzungen
des Aktes vor. Gleichbedeutend werden haufig
"Unwirksamkeit" oder "Ungiiltigkeit" gebraucht,
die freilich nicht dieselbe Scharfe aufweisen.
Dasselbe gilt im Englischen von "invalidity" und
im Franzbsischen von "invalidityAuch hier kommt
wohl die sthrkere juristische Pr&zision den der
Nichtigkeit entsprechenden Termini "nullity"
- "nullitfe" zu.«
1. Frowein, Zum Begriff und zu den Folgen der Nichtigkeit
von Yertragen Im Vblkerrecht. loc.clt. p. 107.
E.t.: Thisis ... a legal term whoseprerequisites and
effects are not obvious but have to be deduced from
the general body of law. Nullity must be distinguished
from non-existence, the essence of which lies in the
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fact that not even the appearance of a legal
transaction or an act of sovereignty has been
created. For nullity to arise, the act must have
been subject to certain prerequisites. "In-
operatility" and "invalidity" are often used as
synonyms, but do not have precisely the same sense.
The same can be said about the English term
"invalidity" and the French term "invaliditfe".
Here, too, the terms "nullity" and "nullitfe"
approach the greater legal precision of the
German term "Nichtigkeit".
For the French law (compared with public
international law) see Cavarfe, Le Droit International
Public Positlf. Tome II, pp, 136-1.
French administrative law makes a distinction
between "actes absolument inexistants" (instruments
absolutely inexistant) and "actes quasi inexistants"
(instruments quasi inexistants); the German




When the Federal Government and Czechoslovakia
started negotiations for normalizing their mutual
relations, both Parties agreed that the Munich Agreement
was invalid, but disagreement existed as to when the
Treaty became invalid: the Czechoslovak opinion
maintained that a valid Treaty had never been concluded
because what had taken place in Munich was null and void
ex tunc or ab initio, i.e. from the beginning; whereas the
German interpretation was that the Agreement has originally
been valid and only later became invalid because of
subsequent events, namely the elimination of Czechoslovakia
in March 1939» i.e., nullity ex nunc or subsequently
appearing nullity.
Authors here in the West and in Eastern Europe have
referred to nearly the entire array of sources of defects,
which can affect an international legal transaction, as
possible grounds for ab initio (ex tunc) nullity in a
wider sense of the Munich Agreement or for nullity which
set in at a later date (ex nunc): non-compliance with
formal procedural rules when concluding the agreement;
breach of Czechoslovak constitutional law; lack of intent
on Czechoslovakia's part due to the threat of military
aggression; fraudulent inducement to conclude the agreement;
violation of the basic principles of international law;
contravention of existing agreements; non-fulfillment of
German contractual duties of performance (promise of
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guarantee); and violation of the ban on the use of force
as a result of the Protectorate Agreement of March 15#
1939.
In his first important analysis on this subject
with the title: The Munich Agreement in the light of
international law, published in 1959, Zourek writes:
If one wants to see the Munich Agreement under
the proper perspective of international law, one
must remember that all the signatories of this
agreement were bound, just like Czechoslovakia,
by the Pact of Paris (Briand-Kellogg-Pact) of
August 27, 1928....Moreover, at the time the Munich
Agreement was signed, Czechoslovakia, as a member of
the League of Nations, was bound, just like Prance,
Great Britain and Italy, to the League of Nations
Covenant whose Article 10 imposed on all member-
States the duty to safeguard and defend the territorial
integrity and political independence of all member-
States of the League of Nations against any attack
from outside. ...
There was an arbitration agreement in force
between Germany and Czechoslovakia which had been
concluded in Locarno on October 16, 1925; according
to this arbitration agreement both parties were
under the obligation to settle all disputes in a
peaceful way. ...In addition to the Pact of Paris
and the League of Nations Covenant Prance was tied
to Czechoslovakia also through other pacts of
alliance.... As far as Nazi Germany was concerned,
absolutely convincing proof that the acts of
aggression against Czechoslovakia constituted part
of a large-scale conspiracy of the Nazi Party against
peace was presented already at the International
Military Tribunal in Nuremberg at the trial of the
main war criminals of the European Axis Powers.
...In order to trigger off the aggression against
Czechoslovakia, the Nazi Government made use of the
German minority living in Czechoslovakia, that is to
say, by using the Sudeten German Party as agent. ...
In the system of international law, fundamental
principles are of particular importance; among these,
the principle of the sovereignty of States occupies
the first place. The logical consequence is found
in the principles of equality and independence of
States, and the ban against interference in the
internal affairs of foreign States. ...
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The Munich Agreement represents a gross violation
of the sovereignty of the Czechoslovak Republic,
since it was concluded without consulting the
Czechoslovak State... As the Munich Agreement
was concerned with the encroachment on the
territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia, it was
void from the very beginning.
It was known in learned circles long before
World War Two that the threat of armed intervention
for the purpose of resolving an international
dispute or a conflict constituted a violation of
the Pact of Paris of 1928. ...
Ergo: the acceptance of the British-French
proposals by the Czechoslovak Government on
September 21, 1938 and the acceptance of the
Munich Agreement on September 30 represent imposed,
and from the very beginning void and legally not
binding acts. Consequently, all international
agreements which accompany or supplement this
agreement are void, especially the Minutes of
November 2, 1938 concerning the arbitration decision
in the matter Czechoslovakia and Horthy'B Hungary.
Furthermore, the Munich Agreement was concluded
in violation of the Constitution of the Republic of
Czechoslovakia.
The deception perpetrated by the Nazi Government
makes the Munich Agreement void. It was proved in
front of the International Military Tribunal and in
other published documents that Hitler did not
conclude the Munich Agreement in order to bring to
a final solution the dispute which the Nazi
Government had artificially created with the help
of the German minority living in Czechoslovakia, but
for the sole purpose of creating better conditions
to further the criminal conspiracy against peace. ...
However, in order to enable one to properly and
fully assess the Munich Agreement it is not sufficient
to judge it only in the light of international law
as it stood in 1928. It should be looked at, rather,
in the light of the international law which emerged
when war stopped being a legal means of resolving
international disputes. ...2
Each of the above-mentioned arguments would suffice
as a ground for the ab initio nullity of the Munich
Agreement. All together, though, they form a ground
which is unassailable by academic arguments.
2. This is for Zourek the whole development in the
field of public international law since 1945.
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In contrast, the argument that Hitlerhad
trampled on the Munich Agreement by invading
Czechoslovakia on March 15, 1939 must be
rejected.*
Endorsing by and large the preceding point of view,
Zourek, in a later study (1968), comes to the following
conclusion with regard to the nullity problem:
As ascertained by the Nuremberg Tribunal at the war
crimes trials, Hitler had already in 1937 drawn up a plan
for the destruction of Czechoslovakia through military
aggression, the so-called "Green" plan. The Munich
Agreement had been part of this plan of aggression.
II est done elair que cet accord ne fut
rien d*autre qu'une fetape de la conspiration
des nazis contre la paix et ne saurait §tre
consider! comme un traitfe international,4
As a further reason to treat the Munich Agreement
as "not existent", Zourek adds the following in his
essay in the newspaper "Le Monde":
...la conclusion de 1*accord de Munich fut
de la part de Hitler un acte dolosif, puisqu'il
ne l'a conclu que pour s'assurer des conditions
favorables en vue de la seconds fetape de son
aggression contre la Tch&choslovaquie. ... Le
tribunal de Nuremberg est done parvenu & la
conclusion que Hitler n'avait jamais eu 1*intention
3. Translation from the German text, published by
Obermann-Polisensky, Die Hintergrilnde des Mtinchner
Abkommens. pp. 131.
4. E.t.: It is, therefore, clear that this agreement
represented only another step in the conspiracy of
the Nazis against peace, and should not be
considered an international treaty. See. f.n. 6.
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de respecter 1'engagement prls A Munich.
Celui-ci doit done etre considferfe du point de
vue m§me du droit des traitfes comme un acte
purement dolosif excluant la naissanoe d'un
engagement juridique.5
It is also argued, that the Munich Agreement
infringed the principles of sovereignty and equality of
States, principles which represent the peremptory norms
of general international law (jus cogens). The Agreement
had violated the political independence of the Czecho¬
slovak State by surrendering to Germany - with the
aid of the international commissions which the Agreement
had set up - strongholds situated in areas with a purely
Czech population as well as a large section of industry,
and by cutting off the main routes of communication,
A further reason which prevented a valid legal act
from arising is Hitler's order to Henlein, leader of the
Sudeten German Party, to instigate the German population
of the frontier territory to revolt against the Czecho¬
slovak State.
5. le Monde, April 11, 1968, Annulation ou Inexistence?
(Original text* French). E.t.! ...The signing of the
Munich Agreement was a fraudulent act on the part of
Hitler, since he only concluded it to ensure himself
a vantage point in view of the second stage of his
aggression against Czechoslovakia. ...The Nuremberg
Tribunal, therefore, arrived at the conclusion that
Hitler never intended to respect the obligations
assumed at Munich. This then must be considered, even
from the point of view of the Law of Treaties, a
purely fraudulent act which precluded any legal
obligation.
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In addition, three of the four parties at the
Munich conference were under an obligation to protect
Czechoslovakia's territorial integrity and political
independence from any outside aggression, in accordance
with Article 10 of the League of Nations Covenant.
Members of the League of Nations were bound by Article
20 of the Covenant not to conclude any agreements which
were incompatible with the Covenant.
An agreement clearly violating the provisions of
Article 10 of the Statute was to be inadmissible.
The final reason for the ab initio nullity is to
be found in the Czechoslovak Constitution operating at
that time, which specified that any changes to the
national territory required statutory authority. Such a
law was never passed.
Michal writes:
The Munich Agreement trends from the legal
premise that the exchange of the Anglo-French notes
of September 19 and the Czechoslovak note of
September 21 gave rise to a valid international
agreement. The Munich Agreement thus contains
just the technical details for the implementation
of that agreement. The content of the Czechoslovak
declaration, however, is legally ineffective not
only from the point of view of domestic law but
also from that of international law.
Article 64 paragraph 1 of the Czechoslovak
Constitution of 1920 lays down that any change in
the territory of the Czechoslovak State is
effective only when it has been approved by the
National Assembly. From a legal point of view,
this approval cannot be replaced by any Government
statement. The content of the note of the Czecho¬
slovak Government shows that the Government's
consent depended on two conditions;
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a) the Czechoslovak Government accepts these
proposals in their entirely from which the
principle of guarantee - as formulated in
the note - cannot "be separated...
b) the Czechoslovak Government interprets the
French-British proposals as meaning that all
the details concerning their practical
implementation must be agreed upon with the
Czechoslovak Government.
Neither of these conditions was fulfilled.
A further reason why the Munich Agreement
is void ab initio is because its acceptance was
imposed on Czechoslovakia through the threat of
force in breach of international law. Nazi
Germany, thus, not only violated the League of Nations
Covenant but also the Briand-Kellogg-Pact which had
been ratified by Germany...6
Ort holds the following view:
Plenty of legal arguments were advanced,
showing that from the point of view of international
law the Munich diktat was void ab initio. Czecho¬
slovakia - which was the subject matter at Munich -
was not itself a signatory of the Agreement,
thereby violating the fundamental principles of
international law which speak of the sovereignty of
States and the non-interference in the internal
affairs of individual States... In addition, the
Munich Agreement stood in clear opposition to the
principles of the Covenant of the League of Nations
whose members had undertaken in Article 10 to
preserve and protect the territorial integrity
and the existing political independence of all
members of the League of Nations against any
outside aggression. Moreover, there is not a
shadow of doubt that the Munich Agreement was
imposed on Czechoslovakia through the threat of
force. ...
The Munich diktat is considered by the
Czechoslovak side as a violation of the Constitution.
6. Michal, Das Mtlnchener Abkommen In der zeitge-
nbssischen' westdeutschen bourgolsen tlteratur. pp. 49.
(translation from a dzech-German translation).
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According to the Czechoslovak Constitution,
agreements effecting any territorial change of
the State could be concluded by the President
only with the approval of the National Assembly.
This was not done On September 7, 1938. ...'
The standpoint favoured by West German scholars
was summarised by Kimminich as follows:
Die Prage nach dem gttltigen Zustandekommen
Oder Nichtzustandekommen eines vblkerrechtlichen
Vertrages richtet sich nach den Willenserklhrungen
und Rechtshandlungen beira Abschluss des Vertrages,
die nach dem in jenem Zeitpunkt geltenden Vblker-
recht zu beurteilen sind.
3ei der Beurteilung des Mtinchner Abkommens
ist zun&chst zu beriicksichtigen, dass es von vorn-
herein keine Einigung iiber die Gebietsabtretung
herbeigeftlhrt hat Oder herbeifiihren wollte,
sondern vielmehr von der "Ubereinkunft, die hin-
sichtlich der Abtretung des sudetendeutschen
Gebietee bereits grunds&tzlich erzielt wurde"
(Art. 1 Abs. 1 des Abkommens...) ausging und nur
die "Bedingungen und Modalithten dieser Abtretung"
festlegen wollte.
Die "grundshtzlich erzielte" tibereinkunft,
auf die das Mtinchner Abkommen in seinem ersten
Absatz Bezug nimmt, war durch den Notenwechsel
zwischen England und Frankreich elnerseits, der
tschechoslowakischen Republik andererseits, in
der Zeit vom 19. bis 21. September zustande-
gekommen. .,•
Die Konstruktion einer vertraglichen ttber-
eihkunft tiber die Gebietsabtretung zwischen der
tsohechoslowakischen Republik und den beiden
Westmachten durch den Notenwechsel vom 19./21.
September 1938 reicht jedoch nicht aus, urn eine
rechtsgtiltige Zession zu begriinden. Denn an
dieser tJbereinkunft war der Zessionar, d.h.
das Deutsche Reich, nicht beteiligt. Dass das
Deutsche Reich seine Zustimmung erkl&ren wlirde,
stand freilich ausser Z^eifel, und im Mtinchner
Abkommen ist eine solche Erklhrung zu sehen. ...
7. Ort, uber die Ungtiltigkeit des Milnchner Diktats.
loc.cit. cp. 67. (translation from a Czech-German
translation).
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Da die Tschechoslowakei am MUnchner Abkommen
nicht beteiligt war, konnte eine Rechtsbindung
nur durch den Beitritt dieses Staates zum
MUnchner Abkommen bewirkt werden. Ein solcher
Beitritt erfolgte durch die Erklarung der
Tschechoslowakei vom 30, September 1938, die
jedoch zugleich einen Protest gegen die MUnchner
Regelung enthielt. Die Prage, ob der verbale
Protest die rechtliche Wirkung der Annahme-
erkliirung annulieren konnte, ist von der literatur
verneint worden. Zur BegrUndung wird angefUhrt,
dass es zu einer totalen Rechtsunsicherheit fUhren
wlirde, wenn der verbale Protest die Wirkung einer
vblkerrechtlichen Willenserklarung beseitigen
kbnnte. Die Wirkung der tschechoslowakischen
Annahmeerklarung vom 30. September 1938 bestand
gerade darin, dass die GSR an der DurchfUhrung des
MUnchner Abkommens, d.h. an der Festlegung der
Grenze und der MocLalitaten der Abtretung beteiligt
wurde, ...
Bei den Argumenten, mit denen die rUckwirkende
Beseitigung der rechtsgUltig zustande gekommenen
MUnchner Regelung begrUndet wird, steht der Bruch
des Abkommens an erster Stelle. Es wird darin ge-
sehen, dass das Deutsche Reich unter Verstoss
gegen das im Miinchner Abkommen enthaltene Garantie-
versprechen den grbsseren Teil der Resttschechoslo-
wakei im Marz 1939 militarisch besetzte.8
8. Kimminich-Rumpf, locycit. p. 177-80. E.t.: The
question of whether a treaty hased on international
law was validly created or not depends on the
declarations of intent and legal acts performed at
the conclusion of the treaty; these must be judged
in accordance with international law in force at
that time. In analysing the Munich Agreement one
must consider first of all that it did not lead nor
was it intended to lead to an agreement regarding
the ceding of territory, but that it relied rather
on the "agreement which had already been basically
reached concerning the cession of the Sudeten German
territory" (Article 1, paragraph 1 of the Agreement
and whose purpose was solely to lay down the
"conditions and modality of such a cession".
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The agreement which was "basically reached" and
reference to which is made in the first paragraph
of the Munich Agreement, had been formed between
September 19, and 21, through the exchange of notes
between England and France on the one hand and the
Czechoslovak Republic on the other hand. ...
However, it is not sufficient to construe a
contractual settlement concerning the territorial
cession made between Czechoslovakia and the two
Western Powers through the exchange of notes of
September 19/21, 1938 as a legally valid iression,
since the transferee,i.e., the German Reich, was
not a party to the agreement. It was beyond doubt
that the German Reich would consent to it, and the
Munich Agreement must be seen as exactly such a
consent. ...
As Czechoslovakia was not a party to the Munich
Agreement, a legal connection could only be achieved
if this country had been a party to the Munich
Agreement. This, in fact, happened when Czechoslovakia
made its declaration of September 30, 1938 which, at
the same time, contained a protest against the Munich
Agreement. The question of whether the verbal protest
could annul the legal effect of the declaration of
acceptance has been answered in the negative by
authoritative literature, the arguments advanced
being that it would lead to complete legal insecurity
if the verbal protest could set aside the effect of a
declaration of intent of international law. The effect
of the Czechoslovak declaration of acceptance of
September 30, 1938 must be seen in the very fact that
the CSR participated in the performance of the Munich
Agreement, i.e., by determining the frontiers and the
modality of the cession. ..
The violation of the Munich Agreement is the first
and foremost reason given when arguing in favour of
a retrospective annulment of the Munich settlement
which had been concluded in a legally valid manner.
The violation is seen in Germany's military occupation
of the greater part of the rest of Czechoslovakia in
March 1939 in breach of the guarantee undertaking
contained in the Munich Agreement.
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Kimminich does not go as far as examining and
deciding the issue of whether Czechoslovakia's
Declaration of September 30, 1938 was legally defective
due to the violation of provisions pertaining to
Constitutional law, in the form of a lack of consent
by the Czechoslovak Parliament, or whether it was
because political or military pressure was exercised on
Czechoslovakia before it made its declaration of intent,
and was, therefore, legally questionable. He shifts the
question instead to the Czechoslovak Declaration of
September 21, 1938 concerning the acceptance of the
French-British proposals, and states:
...(Es ist) ... die vblkerrechtliche Erheblich-
keit der Hichtbeachtung von Verfassungsvorschriften
eines Vertragspartners zu untersuchen. Nach der
heute herrschenden "Erkl&rungstheorie" ist auf die
Erklhrung des Vertragspartners abzustellen. Hier
kommt noch hinzu, dass eine allgemeine Zust&ndig-
keitsvermutung fttr das Staatsoberhaupt spricht.
Die genaue Kenntnis des Verfassungsrechts des
Vertragspartners ist von den Unterhhndlern nicht
zu verlangen. Ausnahmen gelten nur bei evidenten
Verstbssen gegen die Verfassung.
...Die von den Westmachten vorgeschlagene Lbsung
sollte (die) Kriegsfurcht bannen. Es ist zu fragen,
ob Vertrage, die aus einer solchen allgemeinen
Kriegsfurcht entstanden sind, urn die Kriegsgefahr
zu beseitigen, sphter als von Anfang an nichtig an-
gesehen werden kbnnen. Im Jahr 1938 neigte die
Vblkerrechtswissenschaft offenbar nicht zu dieser
Auffassung. ...9
9. Ibid.. p. 178-9. E.t.» ...(One must)...examine the
relevance in international law of a contractual
party's non-compliance with constitutional rules.
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In accordance with the "statement theory", one
must foous on the statement of the contractual
party. One must also add to this a general implied
authority on the part of the Head of State. A
precise knowledge of a contractual party*s
constitutional law cannot be demanded of the
negotiators. Exceptions can be admitted only in
the case of obvious violations of the Constitution,
...The solution arrived at by the Western Powers
was meant to banish the fear of war. The question now
is, whether agreements which were concluded as a
result of fear of war in order to remove the threat
of a war can be considered void ab initio. In 1938,




Das eigentliche Mtinchner Abkommen, d.h., der
Vertrag zwischen dem Deutschen Reich, Gross-
britannien, Frankreich und Italien vom 29. und
30. September 1938, setzt ... das Abkommen, "das
hinsichtlich der Abtretung des sudetendeutschen
Gebiets bereits grunds&tzlich erzielt wurde",
voraus und regelt nur noch die "Bedingungen und
Modalit&ten dieser Abtretung" und ..."die danach
zu ergreifenden Massnahmen"... Das Grundabkommen
bestand in einem Notenwechsel zwischen den
Regierungen Grossbritanniens, Frankreichs und
der Tschechoslowakei. Im Anschluss an das Vier-
machteUbereinkommen vom 29. - 30. September, zu
dem die tschechoslowakische Regierung am 30.
September ihr Einverstandnis erkl&rt hatte, wurde
dann zwischen dem Deutschen Reich und der tschecho-
slowakischen Republik am 20. November 1938 noch
ein Ausftihrungsabkommen tiber Staatsangehbrigkeits-
und Optionsfragen geschlossen. Lbst man in dieser
Weise das mit der Uberschrift "Miinchner Abkommen"
versehene Paket auf, so findet man also:
1• -^inen Grundvertrag zwischen den beiden West-
machten und der Tschechoslowakei tiber die Zession
des Sudetengebietes an das Deutsche Reich.
2. Den Vierm&chtevertrag zwischen dem Deutschen
Reich, Grossbritannien, Frankreich und Italien
tiber die Bedingungen und Modalitaten dieser
Abtretung.
3. Einen deutsch-tschechoslowakischen Vertrag tiber
einzelne Fragen der Durchfiihrung,
Eine Erklarung dariiber abbugeben, ob das Grund-
abkomraen rechtsgtiltig zustande gekommen ist Oder
aber von Anfang an nichtig war, steht der Bundes-
republik Deutschland nicht zu, da es sich um eine
res-»inter«-allos~acta handelf. Der Umstand, dass
dieses Abkommen eine Gebietsiibertragung an das
Deutsche Reich zum Inhalt hatte, berechtigt die
Bundesrepublik nicht, heute in einem Vertrag mit der
tschechoslowakischen Republik zu erkl&ren, das der-
zeltige Abkommen der drei anderen Mhchte sei nicht
giiltig zustande gekommen. 1o
Ibid,. p. 186. E.t.: The actual Munich Agreement,
i.e., the agreement made between Germany, Great
Britain, France and Italy on September 29 and 30,
1938, has as pre-requisite ... the agreement "which
had been basically reached with regard to the cession
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of Sudeten German territory", and lays down only
the conditions and modality of such cession as well
as "the measures to be taken thereafter". ...The
basic agreement consisted in an exchange of notes
between the British, French and Czechoslovak
Governments. The Four-Power agreement of September
29/30, which was approved by the Czechoslovak
Government on September 30, was followed by an
implementation agreement concerning questions of
nationality and options concluded between Germany
and the Czechoslovak Republic on November 20, 1938.
If one opens in this way the package marked "Munich
Agreement" one finds:
1. A basic agreement concerning the cession of the
Sudeten territory to Germany and made between the
two Western Powers and Czechoslovakia.
2. The Four-Power Agreement made between Germany,
Great Britain, France and Italy, dealing with the
conditions and modality of such a cession.
3. A ferman-CzechoSlovak Agreement dealing with
individual questions of Implementation.
It is not up to the Federal Republic of Germany
to make a statement on whether the basic agreement
concluded was legally valid or whether it was void
ab initio, since it is a case of res inter alios
acta. The fact that this agreement concerned the
Transfer of territory to Germany does not give the
Federal Republic the right now to declare in an
agreement with Czechoslovakia that the agreement
concluded at that time by the other three Powers
had not been validly made.
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Rumpf, thus, does not take up any definite position
with regard to the nullity problem.
Akehurst's view must not be taken seriously at all
costs; relying on Article 70, paragraph 1 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties he states:
German title to the Sudetenland had been
created as a result of the execution of the
Munich agreement prior to its termination, and
therefore termination of the Munich agreement
(whether as a result of its breach or for any
other reason) would not cause the Sudetenland
to revert to Czechoslovakia.1'
Kimminich appropriately observes:
Damit geht Akehurst in seinen Schluss-
folgerungen tiber das hinaus, was von der tiber-
wiegenden Mehrheit des deutschen Schriftturns
aus dem rechtsgttltigen Zustandekommen des
MUnchener Abkommens abgeleitet wird. Es soil
nlcht verschwiegen werden, dass auch im deutschen
Schrifttum die Behauptung aufgestellt worden 1st,
das Sudetenland unterstehe vblkerrechtlich nach
wie vor, bis zu einem gesamtdeutschen Frledens-
vertrag, dem Deutschen Reich und sei bis zur
endgUltigen Gebiets- und Grenzregelung die
"tschechoslowakische Besatzungszone Deutschlands."
Aber diese Ausftihrungen «,.haben in der deutschen
11. Akehurst, Burying the Munich Agreement, loc.clt.
p. 474.
12. Kimminich, Der Prager Vertrag. loc.cit. p. 81.
E.t.: In his conclusions, Akehurst goes beyond what
German literature deduce from the legally valid
formation of the Munich Agreement. One must also
not omit to mention that in German literature, too,
it has been contended that from the point of view
of international law the Sudetenland still belonged
to the German Reich until an overall German peace
treatywas made, and that until a final territorial
and frontier settlement was arrived at, it remained
"Germany's Czechoslovak occupation zone." However,
these statements ... have not found an echo in
German literature on international law.
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The formulae which the Federal Republic of Germany
has used in commenting the Munich Agreement have changed
as time has gone by.
At the conference of Foreign Ministers in Geneva
in 1959 the delegate from Bonn stated that the Federal
Government noted that the Munich Agreement was the subject
of controversy, and that the Federal Government had no
1 "*>
claims against Czechoslovakia. J
On June 11, 1964 Federal Chancellor Erhard stated
before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York to
the effect that
Hitler broke the Munich Agreement by marching
into Czechoslovakia. The Federal Republic has no
territorial claims against Czechoslovakia, and
disassociates itself emphatically from statements
which would have led to another interpretation.1^
The Statement made by the Federal Government in
the Note of March 25, 19661** was repeated in the
Government Statement made by the Federal Chancellor
on the same day.^
13. Raschhofer, Die Sudetenfrage. Staatslexikon,
loc.cit. col. 872.
14. Bulletin vom 12.6.1964, Nr. 93, P» 852,
15. See Part I, p. 62, E.t.j f.n. 81.
16. Bulletin vom 26.3.1966, Nr. 42, pp. 329-30.
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In the Government Declaration made by Federal
Chancellor Kiesinger on December 13, 1966 one can read:
Auch mit der Tschechoslowakei mdchte sich das
Deutsche Volk verst&ndigen. Die Bundesregierung
verurteilt die Politik Hitlers, die auf die Zer-
stbrung des tschechoslowakischen Staatsverbandes
gerichtet war. Sie stimmt der Auffassung zu, dass
das unter Androhung von Gewalt zustande gekommene
MUnchener Abkommen nicht mehr gtiltig ist.17
The so-called Bahr Paper of December 12, 1970
contains the following passage:
Zwlschen der Eegierung der Bundesrepublik
und der Regierung der Union der Sozialistischen
Sowjetrepubliken besteht Einvernehmen dariiber,
dass die mit der Ungtiltigkeit des MUnohner Ab-
kommens verbundenen Fragen •.. geregelt werden
sollen.18
Thus, also this official statement of the Federal
Government, like all previous statements, is based on
the premise that the Munich Agreement is void. However,
the Federal Government did not give in to the demand
originally made by Czechoslovakia and brought by the
latter into the negotiations concerning the normalization
treaty, that the Agreement should be considered void
ex nunc.
17. Bulletin vom 14.12.1966, Nr. 157, p. 1268. E.t.: The
German people would like to come to an understanding
also with Czechoslovakia. The Federal Government
condemns Hitler's policy which was directed at the
destruction of the Czechoslovak State federation. It
agrees also with the view that the Munich Agreement
which came into being as a result of duress is not
valid any longer.
18. Der Vertrag vom 12.8.1970, loc.cit. p. 18. E.t.: The
Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
agree that all issues connected with the nullity of
the Munich Agreement...must be settled.
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In the Bill relating to the Treaty of December 11,
1973 brought in by the Federal Government one can reads
Bekanntlich haben die Bundesrepublik Deutschland
und die CSSR zu der Frage, ob das MUnchener Ab-
kommen zunachst rechtswirksam zustande gekommen oder
von vornherein nichtig gewesen sei, seit jeher gegen-
satzllche Auffassungen vertreten, die auoh in den
mehr als zweljahrigen Sondierungen und Verhandlungen
nicht auf einen Nenner gebracht werden konnten. Die
Bundesrepublik Deutschland hat zwar niemals be¬
strifcten, dass das MUnchener Abkommen durch die
wsihrend des Zweiten Weltkrieges von Grossbritannien,
Frankreich und Italien abgegebenen Erklarungen
seine ursprUngliche Rechtswlrkung verloren hat.
Gleichwohl Mlt sie daran fest, dass das Mtinchener
Abkommen vom 29. September 1938 seinerzeit rechts¬
wirksam zustande gekommen war. Die CSSR hat dem-
gegentiber den Standpunkt vertreten, dass das
Mtinchener Abkommen von Anfang an nichtig gewesen
sei.19
Fitzmaurice, as Special Rapporteur to the Inter¬
national law Commission, defined in Article 22, paragraph
2 the difference between nullity ex tunc and
subsequently appearing nullity in his Third Report to
the Commission.
19. BT-Drucksache 7/1832, G.d.B. v. 20.3.1974, p. 19.
E.t.: It is a known fact that the Federal Republic
of Germany and Czechoslovakia have divergent views on
the question of whether the Munich Agreement was
validly made at first or whether it was void from
the beginning; these views could not be reconciled
even after more than two years of exploratory talks
and negotiations. The Federal Republic of Germany,
though, had never disputed the fact that the Munich
Agreement lost its validity as a result of the
declaration made during the Second World War by Great
Britain, France and Italy. Although it still maintains
that the Munich Agreement of September 29, 1938 came,
at that time, validly into being. In contrast,
Czechoslovakia holds the view that the Munich
Agreement was void ab initio.
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(a) ...Where ...the treaty is void ab initio
or totally inoperative, the whole transaction is
a nullity and void with retroactive effects any
steps taken in consequence of it are automatically
nullified, and, in so far as this may arise and may
be possible, there must be a complete restitutio
in integrum or restoration of the status quo ante,
"but damages or reparation will not, as such, be
recoverable except in cases involving an element
of fraud.
(b) Where the treaty is merely voidable, the
obligations of the parties cease as from the date
of voidance, but without retroactive effete or the
automatic nullification of any steps already taken
under or in execution of the treaty.20
The proposal submitted by the International Law
Commission to the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties
states}
The Commission considered that the establishment
of the nullity of a treaty ...would mean that the
treaty was void ab initio and not merely from the
date, when the ground was invoked.21
Guggenheim distinguishes the acte inexistant. which
legally does not even come into existence.
20. Draft of 1958, UN Doc. A/CN.4/115, YB. I.L.C. 1958,
p. 28.
R.Piccard-E.Thilo-E.Steiner, Rechtawbrterbuch.
write} "ex tunc=dds 1*origins, qui se dit d*une
annulation dont les effe.ts remontent au debut"
(E.t•} from the beginning, refers to an anaflLment
the effects of which go back to the commencement);
"Ex nunc=d&s maintenant, qui se dit d'une annulation
qui produit effet pour l'avenir" (E.t.j from the
present, refers to an annulment the effects of which
reach into the future).
21. UN Doc. A/CONF. 39/11 Add. 2 p. 84.
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Si la manifestation extferieure de l*a.ete
ne correspond & aucune realisation effective
et si sa chance de devenir effectif est minime,
l'adte n'a besoin dffttre annulfe. II est nul
ex officio, il est inexistant. La prenve de son
lnexistance n'incombe pas au sujet de droit qui
1*ignore, mais c'est d celui qui affirme son
caract^re effectif de prouver son existence.22
He further distinguishes actes nuls. by which is
meant t
...des actes juridiques dont un organe
compfetent de l'orde international dfeclare
qufIls ne sont pas en mesure de dfeployer des
effete dans le cadre de ce droit, et auxquels
il refuse toute reconnaissance. Contrairement
a l*acte infexistant, l*acte nul a done besoin
d'Stre constats dans une dlclaration constitutive
de sa nullitl. .«.L*acte nul-contrairement d
l'acte inexistant-dfeploie, par consequent, certains
effete provisoires. II est 1'expression de
1'effectivitfc, et il doit $tre annul&.23
Guggenheim classifies invalid acts into those of
absolute nullity, i.e. acts which are void ab initio and
OA
only require a declaration of nullity, and those of
22. Guggenheim, La validitfe et la nullitfe des actes
.luridiques inFernatlonaux. end.c. p. 'B.t.: If
the outward appearance of the act does not possess
any effectiveness and if the possibility of its being
effective Is minimal, then there is no need to annul
the act. It is null ex officio, it is non-existent.
The burden of proof of its non-existence does not rest
with the subject of law that does not recognize it;
rather it is up to those v/ho maintain Its effectiveness
to prove its existence.
23. Ibid.. pp. 207-8. E.t.: ...legal acts which the
competent State organ declares to have no legal effects
and which do not enjoy recognition. In contrast to
the non-existent act the void act requires a consti¬
tuent declaration of nullity... . In contrast to the
non-existent'; act, the void act exhibits in consequence
of this certain temporary effects. It is the expression
of effectiveness and has to be annulled,
24* Ibid.. p. 207 and 209.
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relative nullity, i.e. acts in which certain effects have
already been produced and in which it was not possible to
annul such acts immediately. Guggenheim adds:
La doctrine est aussi d1accord de ne pas
attribuer des effets rfetroactifs a l'annulation.
La nullitfe est ainsi une nullitfe ex nunc et non
ex tunc.25
Finally, Guggenheim distinguishes acts "originaire-
ment valables", in which the legal act was concluded in
a valid manner but which was later declared invalid because
of a violation of its provisions. He explains further:
Dans la pratique diplomatique Internationale,
cette dfenonciation prend souvent Inspect d'une
"annulation". Tel est le cas pour la dfenonciation
de 1'Accord originairement valable de Munich de
1938 par la Tchecoslovaquie et par certains de ses
signataires. ...26
Guggenheim sees as a consequence of faults of consent,
fraud, coercion and conclusion of a treaty in disregard of
constitutional restrictions only voidability and not,
however, absolute nullity. He describes after all the
Munich settlement as an instance of annulment of originally
valid acts and emphasizes that the Agreement was at first
27
considered by all the signatories as absolutely valid. '
25. Ibid.. p. 209. E.t.: The doctrine is also unanimous
in not allowing the nullity to act retrospectively.
The nullity is, therefore, a nullity ex nunc and not
ex tunc.
26. Ibid.. p. 240. E.t.: In international diplomatic
practice this cancellation often has the appearance
of a declaration of nullity. This is the case with
regard to the cancellation of the originally valid
Munich Agreement of 1938 by Czechoslovakia and
certain signatory states.
27. Guggenheim, Lehrbuch des Vblkerrechts. Bd. I,
p. 83-7 (87); by the same author (f.n.22), p. 242.
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Dahm emphasises that a treaty is invalid from the
very beginning if it contradicts mandatory norms of
international law or of international morals and,
consequently, also the ordre publique international.
However, one ought to use here strict standards. The
legal act of international law which originally became
void in this way would have to contradict not only in
its motive but also in its content mandatory international
28
law or moral law.
Delbez gives the following reasons to explain the
difference between absolute and relative nullity of acts
of international law in general, i.e., also of those
which form part of an international treaty:
Un acte est nul d'une nullitfe absolue,
quand un felfement essentiel d sa formation lui
fait dfefaut. De tels actes sont nuls ab initio
et les intferessfes peuvent soit les declarer
eux m&mes non valables, soit les faire annuler
pax un juge, auquel cas l'annulation est souvent
retroactive. D*autre part, ils sont nuls d
toujours et leur vice originaire n'est jamais
couvert par l'fecoulement du temps...; un acte
est entachd d'une nullitfe relative, quand il
femane d'un organe incompetent, repose sur une
erreur de fait ou presents chez un de ses
signataires un vice du consentement. ®e tels
actes ont re?u un commencement d'execution et
l'annulation qui intervient souvent longtemps
28. Dahm, Volkerrecht. Bd. 3, p. 59-60.
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aprds nfa pas d'effet r&troactif. II s'agit
done d'une nullitfe ex nunc et non pas ex
tunc. 29 ~~*
Just like Guggenheim, also Delbez was of the opinion
that originally the Munich Agreement came into being in a
valid way, and to support this opinion he cites the fact
that in the case of a breach of an oiiginally valid but
not properly carried out agreement, the compensation in
diplomatic practise was achieved through the annulment
(annulation) of the agreement, i.e., through the
restoration of the original conditions. This was the
case when Czechoslovakia and some of the signatory States
revoked the originally valid Munich Agreement of 1938 so
that the legal reason for the subsequent repudiation of
3o
the Agreement must not be seen in an ab initio nullity.
29. Delbez, Lea Prlncipes Gfenferaus du Droit International
Public, droit de la palx. droit prfeventif de la
guerre, droit de la guerre, -p. 5b-7. E.t.* An act is
void, absolutely void, if it lacks an essential
element for its formation. Such acts are void ab
Initio, and the parties can either declare them void
or have them annuled by a law-court, in which case
the nullity is often a retrospective one. On the
other hand, these acts remain permanently void, and
time will never be able to make good the original
defect. An act is of relative nullity if it emanates
from an organ lacking jurisdiction (ultra vires), is
based on an error of fact or if one of its signatories
displayed a lack of consent. The performance in cases
such as these has already begun, and the annulment,
which often takes place long afterwards, has no re¬
trospective power. It Is, thus, an ex nunc and not
5111 ex tunc nullity.




En rfealitfe, il semble que la distinction a
faire n'est pas tenement entre nullitfe absolue
ou nullitfe relative, mais entre le cas oil la
cause de nullitfe existait au moment de la
conclusion du trait & et celui oil la cause de
nullitb intervient au cours de son existence.
Dans le premier, la nullitfe doit avoir, dans la
mesure du possible, un effet rfetroactif, alors
que dans le deuxi£me cas le traitfe sera nul &
lfavenir.51
The cases of ex tunc nullity of international
treaties are set out in detail in Part V, section 2
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and
particularly in Articles 46 ("Internal law regarding
competence to conclude treaties"), 48 paragraph 1
("Error"), 49 ("Fraud"), 50 ("Corruption of a
representative of a State"), 51 ("Coercion of a
representative of a State"), 52 ("Coercion of a State
by the threat or use of force"), 53 ("Treaties
conflicting with a peremptory norm of general inter¬
national law (jus cogens) "), further, in section 3»
31. Cahier, Les caractferlstiques de la nullitfe en
droit international et tout particulidrement dans
Ta Convention de Vienne de 1969 sur le droit des
traitfes, end.c. p. 685. fe.t.i Actually, it seems
that one ought to distinguish not so much between
absolute and relative nullity, but between the
event which was the cause for the nullity at the
time the agreement was signed and the event on
which the cause for the nullity focused in the
period of its existence. In the first case, the
nullity must have acquired within the limits of
possibility a retrospective effect, while in the
second case the agreement is void for the future.
1 01 .
Article 64 ("Emergence of a new peremptory norm of
general international law (jus cogens) W), distinguishing
apparently between those void as a matter of course
(automatically) ("void", "without legal effect")
contained in Article 51 to 53 and 64, and those
contained in Article 46 ("may not invoke the fact, ...
unless") and in Articles 48 to 50 ("may invoke") which
may he contested by the State involved.
The grounds which can make a treaty void ex nunc
or which can suspend its execution are to be found in
Part V, section 3» Articles 54 to 62 ("termination",
"suspension").
A different placement of Article 39, paragraph 1,
sent. 2 as Articls 69t paragraph 1, sent. 1 of the
Convention which the French succeeded in imposing at
the Vienna negotiations obviously does not go beyond
a legal-dogmatic question of systematics.
According to Verosta, the effect of the French
request was to reduce in itself the extent of the
"52
automatic nullity of international treaties. In
draft Article 39t paragraph 1, sent. 2 one can read
"A treaty the invalidity of which is established
under the present articles, is void", whereas Article 69,
32. Verosta, Die Vertragsrechts-Konferenz der Verelnten
Nationen 1968/69 una die Wiener Konventlon uber das
UTecht tier Vertri-ge. loc.cit. p. 690.
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paragraph 1, sent. 1 of the Convention refers to the
"present Convention" and not to "present articles";
this, however, brings with it no decisive changes,
since the elements of all the treaties which are either
void, terminable or suspendable were taken over unchanged
from the draft and embodied into the Convention, namely
into the Articles of draft Articles 43, 48, 49 and 50 (46,
51, 52 and 53 of the Convention), except for a few
linguistic alterations or additions which are not relevant
in this context.
Rozakis writes:
...State practice may be deemed as having
developed some indications of the recognised
grounds upon which invalidity may be based;
but by no means does it provide for a complete
system of invalidity rules covering indisputable
consequences and procedure of invalidity as is the
case with the domestic legal order.
...the Vienna Convention has created a system of
rules on invalidity which, although bearing some
external similarities to the corresponding systems
of municipal orders, is invariably adjusted to the
needs and limitations of the international legal
order as it presently is, that is, without making
any substantive step toward changing it.33
Up to the time of the Convention on the law of treaties,
there was no comprehensive State practice in international
law with regard to the consequence of contractual defects
which under national law bring about the nullity of the
contract. The Convention in itself does not yet represent
valid international law, since, according to Article 84,
33. Rozakis, The Law on Invalidity of Treaties,
loc.cit. p. 151 (f.n. 3J.
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it only comes into force "on the thirtieth day following
the date of deposit of the thirty-fifth instrument of
ratification or accession". The provisions contained in
the Convention, therefore, are valid only if they form
part of existing international law even in the absence
of the Convention.
The view that the Convention became valid inter¬
national law merely because of its acceptance within
the body of the U.N. must, therefore, be rejected,
since Article 84 of the Convention proves that the
Convention itself makes no claim to validity in the
absence of ratification by a certain minimum number
of members. It is undisputed international law that
an agreement which stipulates its ratification is not
valid prior to such ratification. This principle is
interpreted by Article 4 of the Convention on the Law
of Treaties as meaning that
...the Convention applies only to treaties
which are concluded by States after the entry
into force of the present Convention with
regard to such States.
Relating to the important Part V of the Convention
(invalidity, termination and suspension of the operations
of treaties) Sinclair states:
34. UN Doc. A/CONP. 39/11/Add. 2, p. 290
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Part V of the Convention provoked lengthy
and seriou® debates at both sessions of the
Vienna conference. The reason is not far to
seek. The spelling out in conventional form
of a long series of separate and unrelated
grounds for the avoidance of treaties is a
disturbing phenomenon for the vast majority
of international lawyers, who see in the
principle pacta sunt servanda the principal
safeguard for the security of treaties and
other international transactions.35
b) The lack of Assent of the Czechoslovak
Government
i) Not a Negotiating Partner at the Conference
A prerequisite for the legal success of an
international treaty is the unanimous will of the
parties to be bound by it. This bond takes effect
basically - even if not exclusively - between the
parties.
Mac Nair writes:
In spite of the variety in its objects, it
is obvious that the treaty as a concept of
international law has been mainly indebted in
the course of its development to the agreement
or contract of private law. In the case of a
contract English law requires that there must
be 'a common intention of the parties to enter
into legal obligations, mutually communicated
expressly or impliedly', and will infer such an
intention *when parties enter into an agreement
which in other respects conforms to the rules
of law as to the formation of contracts36
35. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, p. 86.
36. Mac Nair, The Law of Treaties, at p. 6, with
reference io tlie case Rose and Prank Co. v.
I.R. Crompton and Brothers Limited, 1923
(see f.n. 1 at p. 6).
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Starke explains:
A treaty may be defined as an agreement whereby
two or more States establish or seek to
establish a relationship under international
law between themselves. So long as it attests
an agreement between States, any kind of
instrument or document may be a treaty
irrespective of the form with which the text
is clothed. Indeed, the term "treaty" may be
regarded ae nomen fienerallsalmum In international
law.•.37
Czechoslovakia had not been allowed to participate
in the negotiations among the Conference Powers on
September 29, 1938 and she had consequently no influence
whatsoever? on the contents of the Munich Agreement. It
was, therefore, impossible to bind her directly.
Treaties based on international law are agreements
made by international law subjects empowered to sign such
agreements whose aim is to create a legal bond in inter¬
national law. The basis for the validity of the treaty
under international law is not the declaration of intent
leading to its conclusion made by the legal subjects, but
the legal rule derived from international customary law:
pacta sunt lervanda.
"A treaty is a solemn compact between nations.
It possesses in ordinary the same essential
qualities as a contract between individuals,
enhanced by the weightier quality of the parties
and by the greater magnitude of the subject-
matter. To be valid, it imports a mutual
assent,"
37. Starke, Introductionto International Law, p. 336.
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"It need hardly be stated that the obligations
of a treaty are as binding upon nations as are
private contracts upon individuals. This principle
has been too often cited by publicists and enforced
by international decisions to need amplification
here,"
"It cannot be that good faith is less obligatory
upon nations than upon individuals in carrying out
agreements,"
"From the standpoint of the obligatory character
of international engagements, it is well known
that such engagements may be taken in the form of
treaties, conventions, declarations, agreements,
protocols,or exchange of notes,"
"Treaties of every kind, when made by the
competent authority, are as obligatory upon nations
as private contracts are binding upon individuals,,,
and to be kept with the most scrupulous good
faith."
"Pacta sunt servanda. ...an indisputable rule
of international law, is but an expression of the
principle of good faith which above all signifies
the keeping of faith, the pledged faith of nations
as well as that of individuals..."38
One differentiates in international law between
treaties in the strict sense, treaties, contracts (Vertr&ge)
and agreements, conventions (Vereihbarungen). An agreement
in the sense of "Vereinbarung" - the expression was coined
in 1899 by Professor Triepel - creates objective inter¬
national law, because on both sides it deals with the
same treaty contents. A treaty in the strict sense is
the arrangement of objects of law, which take into
consideration in various parts of the treaty conflicting
interests.
38. Cheng, General principles of law, pp. 112-3.
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Conventions differ from the "bilateral legal
transactions in that they arrange concrete affairs
and do not determine general abstract norms of
•zq
procedure or conduct.
With regard to the Munich Agreement, without
addressing the question of the liabilities created
thus for the participating parties, one refers to an
international law treaty in the strict sense of the term,
39. Delbez writes (f.n. 29)» p. 3131 "Be lien
contractuel a sa source dans un traitfe, traitfe-
contrat, crfeant une situation juridique subjective,
ou traitfe-loi, crdant une situation juridique
objective et institutionelle. Dans les deux cas,
et quelle que soit la difference entre les
situations crfefees, c'est un accord de volontfc
que se trouve d la source, proche ou lointaine,
de 1*obligation. C'est pourquoi la thfeorie
gdndrale des traitfes ignore presque compldtement
la distinction entre traitfes-lois et traitfes-
contrats et concerne aussi bien les uns que les
autres." E.t.t The contractual bond has its
origin in a contractual agreement, which gives
rise to a subjective legal situation, or in a
contract with the appearance of a statute which
gives rise to an objective and institutional
legal situation. Both cases - and whatever the
difference between the two situations created -
require unanimity of intent. This intent is to
be found at the source of the obligation, either
near or remote. That is the reason why the general
theory of treaties ignores almost completely the
difference between "laws of contract" and
"contractual agreements", and why it concerns
one as well as the other.
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because a concrete case was solved by means of
delineation of boundaries and cession of territory.
One should not take offence at the use of the expression
"agreement", which actually alludes to the second treaty
form.^0 This "agreement", for the development of legal
effects for and against a State, requires that it be
based on the consent of the parties involved,
Lauterpacht expresses this clearly and succinctly?
A treaty being a contract, mutual consent
of the Parties is necessary. ...International
treaties are agreements, of a contractual
character, between States, or organizations
of States, creating legal rights and obligations
between the Parties. Even before a Law of Nations,
in the modern sense of the term, was in existence,
treaties used to be concluded between States.41
40. This distinction which the International Court of
Justice observes in Article 38, paragraph 1 (a)?
"The Court ...shall apply.•.international
conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognised by the
contesting States", should not be exaggerated
in terms of actual practice. Strupp-Schlochauer,
Wbrterbuch dee Yblkerrechts. Bd. 3 p. 529 explains?
"Ob ein Vertrag Vertrag heisst Oder Abmachung,
Abkommen, Acte final, Protokoll, Deklaration, ist
vollkommen belanglos...Schwerwlegender erscheint
der Versuch einer Einteilung in Vereinbarungen
(traltfes-lols) und Vertrage (traitfes-contrats)."
E.t.? "It is of no consequence whether a treaty is
called treaty, agreement, arrangement, final act,
protocil, or declaration,...Much more difficult
appears to be the attempt at classification into
conventions and treaties."
41. Lauterpacht, International Law. Vol. I, p. 890,
877-8.
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Schwarzenberger termed consensus ad Idem one of
the constituent elements of an international law
treaty.*2
The Convention on the Law of Treaties pre-supposes
the necessity of consensus among treaty parties as self-
evident, as indicated in Articles 12-15, 17, where the
agreement of a State to be bound by a treaty is mentioned
Art
as a condition of the treaty being valid, No one
disputes the necessity of achieving consensus.
Draft Article 2, paragraph 1 (a) on the Law of
Treaties adopted by the International Law Commission
defined a "Treaty" as
an international agreement concluded
between States in written form and governed
by international law, whether embodied in a
single instrument or in two or more related
Instruments and whatever its particular
designation?
(e.g. treaty, convention, protocol, covenant, charter,
statute, act, declaration, concordat, exchange of notes,
agreed minute, memorandum of agreement, modus vivendi
or any appellation).
42. Schwarzenberger, A Manuel of International Law.
Vol. 1 p. 140.
"It is well established that in its treaty relations
a State cannot be bound without its consent...."
(I.C.J. Reports 1951» p. 21 (Genocide Convention,
Advisory Opinion, May 28, 1951); also cited in:
D.I.C.J. 1947-1958, p. 35).
43. UN Doc. CONF. 39/11/Add.2, pp. 290-1.
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The commentary to this provision explains:
The term "treaty" is used throughout the
draft articles as a generic term covering all
forms of international agreement in writing
concluded between States. Although the term
"treaty" in one sense connotes only the single
formal instrument, there also exist international
agreements, such as exchanges of notes, which are
not a single formal instrument, and yet are
certainly aggrements to which the law of treaties
applies. ...the question whether...the expression
"treaties" should be employed rather than
"international agreements" is a question of
terminology rather than of substance.^4"
Brierly wrote in his first report to the I.L.C.:
A treaty is an agreement .... the essence of
a "treaty" lies in the agreement or consensus
brought into existence by the act of its formal
conclusion. ...Not every agreement... is, however,
a treaty. ...within the meaning of the present
draft the use of term "treaty" is confined to
the connotation of such agreements between
international persons as establish relations
under international law (i.e., create rights or
obligations in international law) between the
parties.45
Parry explains:
Treaties...are binding because there is a rule
of customary international law to that effect.
They are not necessarily therefore a source of law
but often...a source of obligation under the
law.46
44. UN Doc. Ibid.. pp. 7-8; same text: Article 2,
paragraph 1 (a) of the Convention ("treaty"
means...etc.); see further Brownlie, Principles
of Public International Law, p. 487-8.
45. UN Doc. A/CN.4/23, loc.cit. p. 227.
46. Parry, The sources and evidences of international
law, p. 53.
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Since a representative of Czechoslovakia was not
present at the Munich Conference, they could not have
agreed to the results of the Conference. Czechoslovakia
was also not otherwise represented at the Conference by
any other Conference Power, for she had not authorized
either Prance or Great Britain to represent her.^ On
the contrary, in the note of September 21, 1938 addressed
to the British and French Governments, the Czechoslovak
Government explicitly declared that they fully expected
all details to be settled with them.^8
ii) The Role as a Third State
Furthermore, according to international law
treaties cannot impose obligations on third States.
This is clearly indicated by Article 34 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which says:
A treaty does not create either
obligations or rights for a third State
without its consent.49
47. It is possible in international law to have one
subject of international law represent another.
"States may appoint other states as agents for
various purposes, including the making of treaties"
(Brownlie (f.n.44), p. 515;.
48. Celovsky, Las Mlinchener Abkommen 1958. p. 371.
49. UN Loc. A/CONF.39/11/Add. 2, p. 294.
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As a logical consequence of the principle of
sovereignty, it was also earlier determined that a State
could not be made to incur obligations through a treaty
concluded between two other States without its express
consent.
The principle pacta tertiis nec nocent nec nrosunt
co
was valid for international law"^ to the effect that:
Treaties •. * impose no legal duties on
non-parties51 (without their consent).
This principle is widely recognized and the commentary
on the I.L.C. Draft Articles of the Daw of Treaties with
regard to Article 30 declares:
50. Lauterpacht (f.n.41) Vol. I, p. 894*
51. Sehwarzenberger (f.n.42), Vol. 1, p. 149.
In the Island of Palmas Case (Award of the Tribunal
of Arbitration, April 4, 1928, in (1928) R.I.A.A.
Vol. II pp. 831) Judge Huber said: "It appears further
to be evident that Treaties concluded by Spain with
third Powers recognizing her sovereignty over the
Philippines could not be binding upon the Netherlands
and, as such treaties do not mention the island in
dispute, they are not available even as indirect
evidence" (loc.cit. p. 850).
In another passage he stated: "...whatever may be
the right construction of a treaty, it cannot be
interpreted as disposing of the rights of independent
third Powers..." (loc.cit. p. 842.).
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...there appears to "be almost universal
agreement that in principle a treaty creates
neither obligations nor rights for third States
without their consent...There is abundant
evidence of the recognition of ths mile in State
practice and in the decisions of international
tribunals as well as in the writing of jurists.52
The Harvard Draft on the Law of Treaties stated in
Article 18:
A treaty may not impose obligations upon a
State which is not party thereto.
In the comment to this Article is explained:
The principle of international law according
to which treaties may not impose obligations
upon third States is in line with well-known
rules of Roman private law of contracts as
expressed in the maxims: Obligatio tertio non
contrahitur: Pacta non obligant nisi gentes inter
quas initial ffor States oiher than the parties, a
treaty is res inter alios acta, quae tertio nee
•prodest nec nocet. frhis general principle is found
in the modern municipal lav; of contracts of many
countries.53
52. In the first session of the United Nations Conference
on the Law of Treaties (1968) amendments to Draft
Article 30 were submitted to the Committee of the
Whole by Venezuela (UN Doc. A/CONF. 39/C.1/L 205/
Rev. 1). Venezuela proposed the following text
combine articles 30, 31, 32 and 33, in a single
article reading as follows: w1. Treaties do not
create obligations and rights for third States except
with their express consent and under the conditions
they establish. 2. The modification or revocation of
the rights and obligations referred to in the fore¬
going paragraph shall require the express consent of
the parties and of the third State, unless the treaty
otherwise provides or it clearly otherwise appears
from its nature and provisions" (UN Doc. A/CONF. 39/11,
Add. 2, p. 152). The Committee of the Whole initially
discussed Article 30 at its 35th meeting on April 23,
1968; the amendment of Venezuela was withdrawn (UN
Doc. A/CONF. 39/11 pp. 191-3).




There are difference of opinion as to whether there
are exceptions to the -pacta tertiis rule hut this
controversy only exists over the question whether a
treaty creates rights for third States and not whether
a treaty creates obligations for third States without
their consent. And with regard to the latter issue,
unanimity prevailed in the International Law Commission
during deliberations on the law of Treaties:
There was complete agreement amongst the
members that there is no exception in the case
of obligations; a treaty never by its own force
alone creates obligations for non-parties.54
In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (FRO- v.
Denmark; FRG v. Netherlands) the Judgement of February
20, 1969 states:
A treaty does not create rights or obligations
for a third State without its consent, but the
rules set forth in a treaty may become binding
upon a non-contracting State as customary rules
of international law.55
How a treaty can create obligations for a third
party is expressly indicated in Article 35 of the
Convention on the Law of Treaties. According to this
an obligation is created for a third party only
if the parties to the treaty intend the
provision to be the means of establishing the
obligation and the third State Expressly
accepts that obligation in writing.
54. UN Doc. A/CONF. 39/11/Add.2 p. 46.
55. I.C.J. Reports, 1969, p. 97.
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Article 31 of the I.L.C. final Draft Articles*^
expressed this in other words:
An obligation arises for a State from
a provision of a treaty to which it is
not a party if the parties intend the
provision to be a means of establishing
the obligation and the third State has
expressly accepted that obligation.
This is, however, not an exception to the general
rule, for as the International Law Commission during
its deliberations recognized as well, the subsequent
acceptance of an obligation by a third party creates,
in point of fact, a new treaty between the original
treaty parties and the third State.
In the legal sense, the obligation accepted by
the third party is not based on the original treaty
but rather on the second treaty to which thelfcird
State was a party.
That the third State would have to express its
acceptance of the obligation in writing was only later
included in the draft of the Law of Treaties presented
by the International Law Commission. Originally the
words "in writing" were not included in the proposal.
The requirement of the written declaration was first
56. Draft articles on the law of treaties with
commentaries, adopted by the International Law
Commission at its 18th Session, TO Doc. A/CONF.
39/11/Ada. 2, pp. 7-93; article 31: p. 47.
57. Ibid., p. 47.
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incorporated in the Convention on the Law of Treaties
Kg
and therefore was not valid earlier.J
In reality, therefore, when the provisions of
Article 35 were determined, it was not a question of
an exception to the general principle Pacta tertiis
nec nocent. nec orosunt but rather a special form of
the acceptance of a contractual obligation through
agreement with the treaty partners of another treaty.
An example of this was given by the Permanent
Court of International Justice in the case of the Free
Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex. The case
concerned the applicability of the Versailles Treaty to
Switzerland and the Court declared:
Mais...il est certain qu'en tout fetat
de cause 1'article 435 du Traitfc de
Versailles n'est opposable a la Suisse,
qui n'est pas partie a ce trait6, que dans la
mesure od. elle l'a elle-m&me accept6.59
58. In the second session of the United Nations
Conference on the Law of Treaties (1969) the
Republic of Vietnam submitted the amendment to
Article 31 (Article 35 of the Convention): "After
the words *that obligation' add the words 'in
writing', May 6, 1969 (UN Doc. A/CONF.39/L.25).
This proposal was not discussed in the Committee
of the Whole, but submitted to the Plenary
Conference by the Drafting Committee and adopted
on the 14th plenary meeting, May 7, 1969. (UN
Doc. CONF.39/11/Add.1, p. 59-60;.
59. E.t.: But...it is certain that, in any case,
Article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles is not
binding upon Switzerland, who was not a Party
to that Treaty, except to the extent to which
that country accepted it (P.C.I.J., Series A./B.
Fasc. No. 46, Judgement of June 7, 1932, p. 141).
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The French territory around Geneva (in particular
the "pays de Gex") belongs to Switzerland by
reason of an arrangement of the Congress of Vienna.
France attained in Article 435 of the Versailles
Treaty, to which Switzerland is not a party, the
approval of the treaty partners that a new arrangement
of the zones which do not any longer correspond to
present day relations should be a matter of concern
and agreement between France and Switzerland
exclusively. According to the compromise of
October 30, 1924 the Court was to decide whether
Article 435, paragraph 2 of the Versailles Treaty
annulled the arrangements over the Free Zones in
the Treaties of 1815/1816 and 1829 or rather served
to occasion their repeal. The Court decided on June
7» 1932 that Article 435 of the Versailles Treaty
neither annulled the above-mentioned arrangements
nor served to occasion their repeal.
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Other examples of exceptions to the rule that a
treaty betxveen two or more powers could not create
obligations for a third party cannot be viewed as
legitimate abrogations of the general principle.
For the most part it involves treaties which in
particular concern the pacification of a certain
territory or the use of a specific water-way. These
treaties are concluded between the powers particularly
interested in the territory or the water-way and lead
quickly to the establishment of common practice respected
by third powers as well. Indeed, international courts have
asserted the applicability of these treaties to third
states when disputes arose.
Thus, in this case it is not a question that a
treaty grants a non-party rights or duties, but rather
that the contents of a treaty concluded among several
States become part of customary international law and
in this manner only do obligations ensue for non-parties
IT 61
as well.
60. See Brownlie (f.n.44), p. 500-1.
61. The comment to article 18 of the Harvard Draft
Convention on the Law of Treaties explains:
While a treaty cannot create obligations binding
on States other than the parties, it is conceivable
that the failure of a third State to protest against
a treaty the conclusion of which has been notified
to it by one of the parties may give rise to at
least a moral duty on the part of the third State
to respect it, in the sense of refraining from doing
119
anything which would he incompatible with the
objects sought to be accomplished by the treaty,
and it is possible that the performance of this
duty might result in the acquisition of
corresponding rights for the third State, which
the parties would be bound to respect. ...But
recognition of the treaty by the third State must
be formal or manifested by conduct which indicates
an undoubted intention to recognize it. It is
necessary to emphasize... that such recognition
is not participation in the formation of the
treaty; it does not therefore make the third State
a party and does not produce the legal effects
which participation in the making of the treaty
produces.
According to some writers an exception to the
general principle that treaties cannot impose
obligations on third States is recognized in the
case of collective treaties in the nature of
"international settlements." Such treaties find
their justification not upon legal principles but
upon the acquiescence, of the States upon which
they are Imposed, or upon the ground that they are




Asa general rule a treaty may not impose
obligations or confer rights on third parties,
and indeed, many treaties expressly declare
that they are to be binding only on the parties.
This general principle, which is expressed in
the Latin maxim pacta tertiis nec nocent nec
prosunt finds support in the practice of States
and in the decisions of international tribunals.
The exceptions to it are as follows:...Treaties
effecting an international settlement or conferring
an international status on ports, water-ways, ect.
may reach out to States non-parties.62
Mac Nair explains:
The new feature which seems to be emerging is
this. While in general it is true that pacta tertiis
nec nocent nec prosunt. this maxim has certain
qualifications, and, in particular, two classes
of treaties have a law-creating effect beyond the
immediate parties to them which is recognized though
not yet well defined: (a) the first class consists
of treaties which form part of an international
settlement such as the treaties resulting from the
Congress of Vienna in 1815, the Treaty of Paris,
1856, and the treaties of peaceWtoldih concluded the
World War; (b) the second consists of treaties which
regulate the dedication to the world of some new
facility for transit or transport such as a new canal
or the right of navigation upon a river formerly
closed. It frequently happens that a treaty becomes
the basis of a rule of customary law, because all
the states which are concerned in its stipulations
have come to conform habitually with them under the
conviction that they are legally bound to do so.
In this case third states acquire rights and incur
obligations which were originally conferred and
imposed by treaty, but have come to be conferred
and imposed by a rule of law.63
62. Starke (f.n.37), p. 344.
63. Mac Nair, So-called State servitudes, loc.cit.
p. 122-3.
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Guggenheim holds to the theory that there are
treaties with "territorial statute" (Territorial-
statut), i.e., with an overwhelmingly local character,
which determine the relations of a certain territory
to such an extent that third parties as well are bound
by such treaties.^
This theory is very controversial, a fact
demonstrated particularly during the negotiations of
the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty between Great Britain and the
U.S. of 1901 and the Hay-Varilla Treaty between the U.S.
and Panama of 1903 which provided that the Canal should
be free and open to vessels of commerce and of war of
all nations.^
64. Guggenheim (f.n.27)» Bd. 1, p. 90,
65. "The canal shall be free and open to the vessels
of commerce and of war of all nations observing
the Rules, on terms of entire equality, so that
there shall be no discrimination against any such
nation, or its citizens or subjects, in respect of
the conditions or charges of traffic, or otherwise.
Such conditions and charges of traffic shall be
just and equitable" (Article III, Section 1 Hay-
Pauncefote Treaty. November 18, 1901, Nouveau Recueil
Gfenferal des Traites et autres actes relatifs aux
rapports de droit international, Tome XXX, pp. 631-3
(632). "The banal, when constructed, and the entrances
thereto shall be neutral in perpetuity, and shall be
opened upon the terms provided for by Section I of
Article three of, and in conformity with all the
stipulations of, the treaty entered into by the
Governments, of the United States and Great Britain
on November 18, 1903" (Article XVIII Hay-Varilla-
Treaty, Nouveau Recueil Gfenferal de Traitfes et autres
actes relatifs aux rapports de droit international,
Tome XXXI, pp. 599-608 (605).
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The question was whether third parties in this way-
received the right of passage, i.e., whether they could
claim rights from the treaty signed between the United
States and Great Britain.
A further question was whether the treaty partners
by means of a further treaty could abrogate the rights
of third parties without their approval. Lauterpacht
and Brownlie answer this question by contending that the
treaty powers can alter treaties without the approval of
third States if the treaty is not interpreted as an
66
offer to third powers which the third powers accepted.
In the case of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, however,
Lauterpacht indicates, with good reason, that contrary
to the intention of the treaty powers to make an offer
to third States, the fact speaks for itself
...that if the contracting parties had intended
to do so, they probably would have embodied a
stipulation in the treaty according to which the
third parties concerned could accede to it,67
Guggenheim*s therapy may be compared with the principle
of state servitudes. There are
those exceptional restrictions made by treaty
on the territorial supremacy of a State by which
a part or the whole of its territory is in a
limited way made perpetually to serve a certain
purpose or interest of another State...The majority
66. Lauterpacht (f.n.4i)» Vol. I, p. 927; Brownlie
(f.n.44), p. 500.
67. Lauterpacht, Ibid.. p. 928.
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of writers and the practice of States accept the
conception of State servitudes although they do
not agree upon its definition or extent...
Starke gives the following definition:
Under present practice, an international
servitude may he defined as an exceptional
restriction imposed by treaty on the territorial
sovereignty of a particular State whereby the
territory i of that State is put under conditions
or restrictions serving the interests of another
State;.-, ,,.Servitudes must be rights lnrem, that
is,attached to the territory under restriction,
and involving something to be done or something
that the State bound by the servitude must refrain
from doing on that territory. ...69
Other waiters are of the opinion that domestic
law analogies have caused more harm than good in this
sphere and consider that category to be useless and,
indeed, misleading.^0
Mac Nair writes:
To enumerate a list of territorial restrictions
and to call them servitudes proves nothing at
all.71
But he comes to the following conclusion:
68. Lauterpacht, Ibid.. p. 536.
69. Starke (f.n.37)» p. 203.
70. See Brownlie (f.n.44), pp. 13-4, 295-6;
Brierly, The Law of Nations, pp. 190-4,
71. Mac Nair (f.n.63), loc.cit. pp. 123.
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(a) International law recognizes the
existence of conventional restrictions upon
territory which differ in juridical nature
from the obligations in -personam normally
created by a treaty.
(b) The main guide as to the juridical
nature of any particular obligation must be
the intention of the parties to the instrument
creating it. Did they intend it to be permanent,
objective, and irrespective of changes of
sovereignty, or did they intend it to endure
only while the burdened and the benefiting
territories remained under the same sovereignties?
(c) When the treaty creating the restriction
is of the nature of an International Settlement
or of a dedication urbi et orbi of some natural
advantage or facility, the presumption is that
the territorial restrictions created by it are
intended to form part of the body of public
international law. If indeed, as some would
assert, they do not at once become so owing
to a legislative virtue to be attributed to such
treaties, they very soon become by tacit consent
a part of customary international law and thereupon
transcend the sphere of ordinary personal
obligations.
(d) The attempt to apply to these restrictions
the terminology and conceptions of the Roman law
of servitudes is a legacy of a state's system that
has passed away and will probably do more harm
than good.72
The jurisprudence of international tribunals has
not recognized the existence of servitudes.
In the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries arbitration'"^
the Permanent Court of Arbitration replied to the
American argument that the liberties of fishery being
accorded to the inhabitants of the United States "for
ever" acquire, by being in perpetuity and unilateral,
72. Ibid., p. 126.
73. UN R.I.A.A., Vol. XI, pp. 167-226.
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a character exempting them from local legislation,
in other words, would constitue an international
servitude in their favour over the territory of Great
Britain; that the doctrine of international servitudes
in the sense attributed to it in the American argument,
being but little suited to the principle of sovereignty
which prevails in States under a system of constitutional
government such as Great Britain and the United States
has found little, if any, support from modern publicists.
Because even if these liberties of fishery
constituted an international servitude, the
servitude would derogate from the sovereignty
of the servient State...in so far as the
exercise of rights of sovereignty by the
servient State would be contrary to the exercise
of the servitude right by the dominant State,74
In the Aaland Islands Case the question was whether
the neutralization and demilitarization laid down in the
treaty of Paris of 1856 concluded between Prance, Great
Britain and Russia was valid as well for the relations
between Sweden, not a treaty power and Finland, Russia's
successor as sovereign power over the Aaland Islands.
This question was decided in Sweden's favour by an
international committee of jurists appointed by the
Council of the League of Nations under Article 11 of the
Covenant, not however by reason of the Swedish argument
that the Convention of 1856 definitely created a real
servitude attaching to the territory of the Aalands
Islands.
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To the Swedish argument it was replied, that
the existence of international servitudes,
in the true technical sense of the term, is not
generally admitted.75
Therefore, the principle of state servitude cannot
76
he claimed as generally recognized international law.'
If a treaty creates a new State -Guggenheim mentions
the Krakau Republic created by the Congress of Vienna
in 1815 and the Free City of Danzig created by the Treaty
77
of Versailles' - then the territorial statute contained
in the treaty establishing the new State is inseparably
bound with the new State to the extent that this could
not at all exist without this statute. As soon as the
new State is proclaimed, it is automatically bound by
the statute.
There is also no exception to the principle that
78
no State can be bound by treaties of third parties,
75. See Mac Nair (f.n.63), p. 114.
76. The Convention on the Law of Treaties in Articles
34-38 arranged the question of the obligation of
third States by means of a treaty concluded without
their participation according to the principles set
forth (UN Doc•A/CONF.39/11/Add.2, p. 294).
77. Guggenheim (f.n.29), Bd. I, p. 91.
78. "A third State can, of course,... never incur an
obligation or become subject to a direct liability
by reason of a treaty, to which it is not a party -
that is to say, it can never be placed in this
position simply by reason of the treaty itself.
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for with the recognition of this exception the complete
79
sovereignty of the states affected ends.^
iii) Adjudication
Nor is the legal provision of adjudication applicable
in our case.
The doctrine of adjudication in international law
as a special legal basis for the acquisition of territory
is still very ambiguous and, as a consequence, the
It may, however, be placed in that position by its
own acts, in which case it becomes a consenting
party and there is no violation of the rule that
States can only be bound by their consent" (UN Doc.
A/CN.4/130, Y.B. I.L.C. i960, p. 90, Fifth Report
by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice).
79. Khashbat (Mongolia) said at the 35th meeting of the
Committee of the Whole of the United Nations
Conference on the Law of Treaties (April 23» 1968)
"that the principle...that agreements imposed neither
obligations nor rights upon third parties without
their consent, was much more important in inter¬
national law than in private law, because inter¬
national law governed the relations between
sovereign States. Article 30 (of the Draft) would
thus safeguard the sovereign rights of States"
(UN Doc. CONF.39/11, p. 191).
80. See Lauterpacht (f.n.41), Vol. 1. p. 546, f.n.1;
Delbez (f.n.29), p. 269; Starke (f.n.37), p. 157;
Wengler, Vblkerrecht Bd. II, p. 979; Seidl-
Hohenveldern. VSlkerrecht. p. 199; O'Connell,
International Law. Vol. "i. p. 483; Berber,
Lehrbuch des VoUcerrechts. Bd. 1, pp. 348: Dahm
(f.n.28;, Bd. 1 pp. 602; Brownlie (f.n.44), p. 127;
Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in Inter¬
national Law, p. 12-3.
128.
concept is never presented in the same manner in the
literature pertaining to this theme.
Whereas lauterpacht considers adjudication merely
as the allotment of territory by means of a judgement
81
of an international court, without distinguishing
whether the court reached its decision by reason of
purely legal prescriptions or ax aequo et bono.
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Delbez considers adjudication as the allotment of
territory by means of a community of States (Congress
of Vienna, Congress of Berlin, League of Nations, UN)
as well as by the decisions of international tribunals.
He distinguishes, however, between a declarative
adjudication which only recognizes that a territory
belongs to a State by reason of an existing legal title,
and an attributive adjudication which allots territory
to a State, which is dnly possible if the responsible
authority has the power to decide on the basis of equity,
Starke on the contrary considers adjudication merely
an "award by a Conference of States" and views this as
8*5





Wengler as well does not consider it advisable to
consider adjudication as the determination of boundaries
by an arbitral tribunal, but rather the allotment of
territory by means of third states or an international
organ.8**
Seidl-Hohenveldem describes adjudication as the
acquisition of territorial sovereignty by the parties
and therefore considers it a variant of the contractual
cession.8^ OfConnell lists arbitration awards and
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decisions of international courts as adjudication.
Berber differentiates between territorial allocation
by means of an arbitral tribunal,, court, and other
authorities in international law, whereby he obviously
07
attributes the name adjudication only to court decisions. '
Brownlie considers adjudication as a decision by a
judicial organ only, although he does not view this as
QQ
a reason for the acquisition of territory.
According to Ziehen, adjudication is the acquisition
of territory by award of an international law authority,







Wenn in einem gerichtlichen Streiterledigungs-
yerfahren einer Partei ein bestimmtes Gebiet zu-
erkannt wird, beruht die Entscheidung grundshtzlich
auf einer Prllfung, welcher der Parteien nach
geltendem VUlkerrecht ein Rechtstitel auf Erwerb
des umstrittenen Gebietes zusteht. Es handelt sich
insoweit um ein reines Peststellungsurteil. Der
Gebietserwerb ist hier nicht eine Polge des Urteils,
sondern des im Urteil festgestellten Reehtsanspruchs.
Das Urteil hat ausschlieselich deklaratorischen
Charakter.
Die Adjudikation ist hingegen ein selbst-
stahdiger Gebietserwerbstitel. Palls sie durch
gerichtliche Entscheidung ausgesprochen werden
soli, setzt sie daher die Befugnis des Gerichts 8q
zur Schaffung neuer Rechtsverh&ltnisse .., voraus. y
The distinction between decisions of the courts based
on law and decisions ex aequo et bono has been made in
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court,
where the law -based decisions of declarative character
by reason of paragraph 1 are compared with decisions ex
aequo et bono according to paragraph 2. Objections have
89. Ziehen, Vollendete Tatsachen bel Verletzung der
territorialen Unversehrtheit, p. 108. E.t.: it
in a settlement of conflictcourt process a
particular territory is awarded to one of the
parties, the decision reached is based fundamentally
on an examination as to which of the parties has a
legal title to the acquisition of the contested
territory according to international law. In this
regard It concerns a mere declatory judgement.
The acquisition of territory is, in this case,
not a consequence of the judgement but rather a
consequence of the claims of law in the judgement.
This judgement has an exclusively declarative
character.
The adjudication is, on the contrary, an independent
claim to the acquisition of territory. In the event
that it is proclaimed by means of a court decision,
it pre-supposes for that reason the authority of
the court to create a new legal relationship... .
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been raised against such a separation of decisions based
on law and on equity, as it has been indicated that rules
of law are often imprecise and no general agreement
encompasses them all. Therefore
...there often is room for wide differences
of opinion as to whether judges may have been
influenced in a decision by consideration of
what they conceived to be just and good.9o
It was to be discerned from the reasons presented
in the judgement, however, whether the court determines
that the winning side possesses a right to the disputed
territory according to international law or whether it
is based on considerations of ex aequo et bono.(With the
restriction that this can refer only to the awards of
international tribunals and not to the International
Oourt of Justice; the latter may decide ex aequo et bono
only if the parties agree so.) The reasons presented in
the judgement can therefore be decisive. Reasons, which
may have influenced the judges, but which are not
mentioned in the decision, are not to be taken into
consideration.
Jennings obviously makes this distinction as well
when he says:
In the case where an arbitration is given
power to determine frontiers, the decision may
itself, perhaps, be a truemode* ef acquisition of
territorial sovereignty.91
90. Moore, The Organization of the Permanent Court
of International Justice, loc.clt. p. 380-1.
91. Jennings (f.n.80), p. 13.
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If a court merely determines that the victorious
State possesses a legal claim to sovereignty over the
disputed territory, this judgement-notwithstanding its
significance as a conflict decision - cannot he seen as
the basis of the acquisition. The basis is rather the
legal claim. The territory is not acquired through the
judgement itself but rather on the basis of the reasons
qo
for acquisition presented by the court.
Actual adjudication takes place when an arbitral
tribunal, established by agreement between the contending
parties, decides not only according to rules of law but
also according to the points of view 4eauo et bono.
For Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice determines in paragraph 1 that the Court
decides by reason of the generally recognized sources
of international law. Paragraph 2 reads:
This provision shall not prejudice the power
of the court to decide a case ex aequo et bono,
if the parties agree thereto.
Therefore, it is not only necessary that the parties
agree to a decision by the court, but also that they
agree with a decision ex aequo et bono, so that the
International Court of Justice may render an equity
92. See Ziehen (f.n.89), p.108: Wengler (f.n,80),
Bd, II, p. 979> f.n.3; Delbez (f.n.29), p. 269;
Dahm (f.n.28), Bd. I, p. 602-3.
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decision.. If this special agreement is not forthcoming,
the court can decide according to law only.
The ...paragraph indicates the intention of
the States concurring in the establishment of the
Court,that, while predominantly a Court of Justice,
it should not be precluded from acting in a less
rigid capacity if the parties choose so to
authorise it.°*
Whereas through Article 38 of the Statute fl>r decisions
of the International Court of Justice it is expressly
prescribed that the parties had to have agreed to an
equity decision in order that such a decision be indeed
rendered, the same goes for arbitration.
Arbitration means the determination of a
difference between States through a legal
decision of one or more umpires or of a
tribunal, other than the International Court
of Justice, chosen by the parties. ...The treaty
of arbitration usually stipulates the principles
according to which the arbitrators have to give
their award. These principles are normally the
general rules of International Law, but if the
parties so desire they may be rules of equity. . ♦. *
This last principle is also represented in inter¬
national arbitral awards, as the British Government
as arbitrator in the Argentina-Chile Frontier Case
decided:
...since there was no Agreement between the
Parties calling for the application of special
rules or authorising the Arbiter to decide in
the character of a friendly mediator, Her
Majesty*s Government instructed the Court
93. Lauterpacht (f.n.41), Vol. II, p. 69.
94. Ibid., pp. 22, 24.
134.
on Article I (2) of the Compromiso, to reach
its conclusions on the Question put to it
"in accordance with the principles of inter¬
national law."95
If, therefore, an international court alone
according to rules of law allots a certain territory
to a party, this decision merely represents a confir¬
mation that this territory belongs to the party, a
confirmation based not on the decision of the court
but rather on the basis of the reasons for acquisition,
which the court in its decision identified.
If, however, an International court reaches an
equity decision ex aequo et bono, this is not a
confirmation but rather a formation judgement. Only
on the basis of this decision is the territory acquired
which did not belong to the State before.
The difference appears at first to be subtle and
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court
qg
of Justice has been assailed because of this difference.
But the difference follows clearly from the reasons of
the judgement depending on whether the court decided by
reason of considerations ex aequo et bono or only on the
basis of rules of law.^ But the acquisition of territory
95. UN R.I.A.A., Vol. XVI, p. 163, (Award: pp. 109-82).
96. Moore (f.n.90), pp. 380-1.
97. Kelsen writes: "The provision of Article 38,
paragraph 1 - which does not appear in the
corresponding Article of the Statute of the
Permanent Court of International Justice -
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by reason of a judgement which is based only on
considerations ex aequo et bono always occurs by reason
of mutual consent of the parties to such a decision, so
that each of the parties assumes that the disputed
territory belongs to it, although it agrees that the
court may award the territory to the other party if the
court so finds on the basis of ex aequo et bono. One
views this adjudication therefore, as a limited
cession.^®
Whoever submits to arbitration expresses thereby
as well his acceptance of any decision reached, even in
the event that this goes against him. This kind of
adjudication through arbitration has often occured in
international law, as for example the Papal Arbitration
of 1494 in the dispute between Spain and Portugal by
means of which the New World was divided between these
two States.
that it is the function of the Court to decide the
disputes submitted to it 'in accordance with inter¬
national law', is probably superfluous;...there
is certainly no objection to paragraph 2 of
Article 38, authorising the Court to decide
a case ex aequo et bono. if the parties agree
thereto..Since the principle of aecuo et bono
is a principle recognised in some legal systems
as a part of positive law, Article 38, paragraph
1c (the general principles of law recognised by
civilised nations) may endanger the application
of...the bonum et aequum principle" (The Law of
Nations, pp. 531-£, 534).
98. Wengler (f.n.80), Bd. II, p. 979 and f.n.3.
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However, this kind of adjudication is not
applicable in the case of the Munich Agreement, for
neither Germany nor Czechoslovakia was able to agree
on arbitration before the Conference convened. If
adjudication is to be employed vis-a-vis the Munich
Agreement, then it is a question of the third kind of
adjudication, i.e., decision by the great powers or
QQ
adjudication by an international Conference." It is
not at .all a question of adjudication in the real sense
of the term, but more a power-political decision,
reached after large-scale wars with complicated
territorial dislocations,
These forms of adjudication are often mentioned
in the literature on international law and numerous
cases pertaining thereto have been presented, in spite
of the fact that the right to transfer territory cannot
be established by means of this form of adjudication.
Especially pertinent in this regard are the decisions
of the Congress of Vienna, the Congress of Berlin,
The Versailles Peace Conference, those decisions reached
by the Allies during and at the end of the last war and
numerous other cases. Upon closer examination one
observes that in all these cases the States concerned
with adjudication submit to the regulations either because
99. Starke (f.n.37), p. 279.
1 37 e
of obligations assumed through treaties or because of
unconditional surrender.In this manner they have
101
agreed to the cession of the territory in question.
International law neither gives law-making
authority to the Great Powers nor may the Great Powers
claim to negotiate in representation of the society of
all States, for it has not been established that, and
by what means, such a power of representation shall be
102
bestowed on the Great Powers.
If the Interested parties to a territorial question
or the Great Powers themselves were to exercise the right
to dispose of the territory of smaller States, this
would mean that the principles of sovereignty, equality,
and the inviolability of territory, which have long been
accepted in international law and which have been
precisely defined in the Charter of the UK, would be
valid only for the Great Powers and not for the smaller
States. With regard to the important area of rr-voi'
100. Brownlie (f.n.44), p. 124; Wengler, Ibid.. p. 979
f.n«3, Bd. I, p. 246, 849, f # n . 2»
101. For Hatscheck-Strupp C'vbrterbuch. p. 7), there
exists one real case of an adjudication, the
award of Skutari to Albania by the Great Powers in
1913. Montenegro refused to adhere to this decision
and had to be forced to submit by international
intervention.
102. Brownlie (f.n.44), p. 126.
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territorial affiliation in international law, the law of
1 o^
the stronger would hold. ^
The frequently expressed view that the Munich
Agreement represented an adjudication*0^" is therefore
1 o"5
not convincing.
iv) The Declarations of Czechoslovakia of
September 21 and 30, 1938 and Its
Subsequent Conduct
The Czechoslovak view, however, that the Agreement
was reached without the participation of the Government
103. Ziehen (f.n.89), p. 114-5; Tunkin, Das VBlkerrecht
der Gegenwart. p. 156.
104. The thesis that the cession of the Sudetenland to
Germany represented a genuine territorial adjudication
is argued by Francois (Grondlignen van het Volkenrecht.
p. 461, Sohuschnigg (International law, p. 155) and
Dahm (f.n.28), Bd. 1 p. 603 (among others).
Added to our considerations is the fact that not
all interested parties participated in the Munich
ConferBBce, for the U.S., the U.S.S.R. as well as
Poland and Hungary did not participate in the
Conference.
1o5« Raschhofer, Die Sudetenfrage. p. 185» writes: "Das
Miinchener Abkommen war eineEntscheidung der vier
europhischen Grossmachte, die...eine Gebietsfrage
von gessmiteuropSischer Tragweite aufgriffen und ihrer
Entscheidung unterwarfen." E.t.: The Munich Agreement
represented a decision of the four European Great
Powers which took up a territorial problem of
European Importance and subjected it to their own
decision. (With this remark Raschhofer approaches
the principle of "collective territorial adjudication"
as defined by himself.)
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and was directed against Czechoslovakia1 is founded on
the historical misinterpretation that the solution of the
Sudeten question was restricted to the Agreement among the
four Conference Powers signed at Munich on September 29»
1938. The exact text of the agreement proves the
contrary.107
The Agreement concerning the transfer of Sudeten
German territory had in principle already been reached
before Munich. The conference itself was to deal
subsequently with the conditions and modalities of this
transfer. Thus, the Munich Agreement of September 29» 1938
considered by itself is a torso, merely a set of
regulations which are incomplete in themselves and which
leave the final decision to an International Commission.
The understanding mentioned in the Agreement of September
29» said to have been achieved earlier, refers to the
exohange of notes between Czechoslovakia, Great Britain
and Prance on September 19/21, 1938.
During negotiations concerning the Sudeten problem,
1 ofi
Great Britain and France acted primarily as mediators.
106. Krai, Das Abkommen von Miinchen 1938. p. 27.
107. Document No. 6, together with the Annex to the
Agreement and the Declarations.
108. Wright, The Munich Settlement and International
Law, loc.clt. p. 24-^.
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After the failure of Lord Runciman's talks in Prague the
British Prime Minister engaged in talks. The results of
his negotiations and private talks with Hitler were
communicated to the Czechoslovak Government via diplomatic
channels. Due to these mediations both parties in conflict
knew - and it also corresponded to their wishes - that the
respective declarations of each party were communicated
to the other. This becomes obvious in the letter the
British Prime Minister wrote to Hitler on September 23,
1938.109
Thus the declarations which were addressed to the
mediating Powers by the two parties in conflict were in
fact meant for each of the contesting States. This is also
the reason why the basic Czechoslovak consent to the
transfer of the Sudeten German territories to Germany
- this consent the Czechoslovak Government communicated
to the French and British Governments on September 21 -
1o9. The letter read as follows: "In my capacity as
intermediary, it is evidently now my duty...to
put your proposals before the Czechoslovak
Government.
Accordingly, I request Your Excellency to be
good enough to let me have a memorandum which
sets out these proposals, together with a map
showing the area proposed to be transferred,
subject to the result of the proposed plebiscite.
On receiving this memorandum I will at once
forward it to Prague and request the reply of the
Czechoslovak Government at the earliest possible
moment" (British White Paper, H.M.S.O., Cmd. 5847,
No. 5; Akten, Nr. 574, p. 712).
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has been considered evidence of the fact that an under¬
standing had been reached with Germany in the Agreement
of September, 29.
According to this interpretation it can be said
that through the mediation of the French and British
Governments the understanding of September 21, 1938
between the German Reich and Czechoslovakia was arrived
at in a legal fashion.
However, it must not be overlooked that at the
time of the Czechoslovak consent the two mediators as
well as Czechoslovakia had regarded this understanding
as the final solution of the Sudeten problem, and that
the Munich Conference had become necessary only because
Hitler uncompromisingly demanded German occupation of the
transferred territories by October 1, 1938. Thus it
was logical to assume that the transfer of the pre¬
dominantly German territories of Czechoslovakia to the
German Reich could be taken for granted and that the
Munich Conference itself had only to deal with the
modalities of the transfer.
This account of the immediate pre-history of the
Munich Agreement makes it clear why the Munich Conference
took place without the active participation of any
Czechoslovak representative. The participation of the
United Kingdom and France was due to their function as
mediators whereas Italy's participation, due to the
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intimate personal alliance between Hitler and Mussolini,
was tolerated by the other participants as a contribution
to a peaceful solution of the problem.
Nevertheless, it was assumed and considered a matter
of course that the Munich Agreement would need the formal
consent of the Prague Government before it could become
effective. It was however not expected that Prague would
reject the Agreement,
In the declaration of September 30, 1938 the
Czechoslovak Foreign Minister expressed the view that
Czechoslovakia^ participation in the Conference had been
confined to submission to the oppressve decisions of the
four Powers. Because of his ambiguous formulation
submit to the conditions of the Munich Agreement which
has come into being without Czechoslovakia and against
her") doubts arose during and after the war whether this
declaration could be regarded as an unequivocal consent
1 1 C%
to the Agreement of the preceding day. Not only
111
Kimminlch and other West German authors,
110.Kimminlch, Pas Mtlnchener Abkommen in der tschechoslo-
wakischen wlssenschaftliciien Llteratur selt dem
zwelten Weltkrleg, p. 13: Compare also his speech at
the symposium of the Institute of International Law
of the University of Kiel held on March 27/29, 1971,
Kimminich-Rumpf, Ostvertrage etc., p. 180.
111.Dahm (f.n.29), Bd. 1, p. 592, f.n,11j strupp~
Schlochauer (f.n.40), Bd. 2, p. 555J Seidl-Hohen-
veldern, Pao MHnchner Abkommen im Lichte des Prager
Yertrages"rvon 1973. loc.clt. p. 454.
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but also the Swiss Guggenheim and other distinguished
scholars112 interpreted the statement of the Prague
Government as unrestricted consent.
A different reading of the Declaration of September
30, 1938 is hardly possible as it is clearly expressed
that Czechoslovakia is ready to accept and to carry out
the agreement even though she had not participated in the
negotiations and her point of view had not been expressed.
However, the declaration does not contain the words
"consent" or "accept" but rather "submit". The use of
this word implies that the Government accepted only
because they saw themselves in a position of constraint.
This important issue of constraint or duress will be
discussed below. ^
The Czech scholars Krai and Zourek eschew a thorough
discussion of the Czechoslovak consent given in the
declaration of September 30, 1938. Krai explains*
In der Erkl&rung der Regierung, in der
sich diese dem MUnchner Diktat fiigt, wird
nachdrticklich hervorgehoben, dass die Ent-
scheidung ohne Beteiligung der Tschechoslowakei
und gegen diese getroffen worden war. Das
112. Guggenheim (f.n.22), p. 240; Marek, Identity and
Continuity of States in Public International Law.
. 285-4: Wright, loc.cit. p. 28* Taborsky. The""
zechoslovak Cause, pp. 8-9.
113. Paragraph 1d) of the present Part of the thesis.
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Abkommen von Miinchen 1st der Tschechoslowakei
This point of view, however, suggests that
Czechoslovakia had given an affirmative declaration
although this had taken place under compulsion. Zourek
on the other hand simplifies the whole problem when he
explains that Guggenheim's hypothesis, which maintains
that Czechoslovakia had given her consent to the Munich
agreement by the declaration of September 30, can be
refuted by pointing out that the agreement did not after
all represent a valid international treaty and could
only be considered a pseudo-legal document whose only
purpose had been to gloss over the international crime
115
of an offensive war. '
Zourek'tf further objection - which he bases on ,1us
cogens, pointing out that in his view due consideration
must be given also to international law which developed
after 1945 - that the Munich Agreement had violated the
11 6
principle of sovereignty and equality of States, can
be commented on as follows:
114. Krai (f.n.106), p. 27. E.t.: In the declaration of
the Government in which they submit to the diktat
of Munich, it is insisted that the decision had been
made without and against Czechoslovakia. It remains
a historical fact that the Munich Agreement had been
forced upon Czechoslovakia by the threat of war,
115. Zourek, Unrichtige Ansichten liber das Mttnchener
Abkommen. loc.cit. p. 45.
116. See f.n.6.
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The guideline for assessing according to international
law the Munich Agreement, its legal prerequisites and the
treaties that followed it, is the legal position as it
presented itself in 1938/39. In doing this, we naturally
agree with Zourek, since interference with the sovereignty
and equality of a State does represent a breach of inter¬
national law, though it does not violate the rules of
.jus cogens.
Seidl-Hohenfeldern writes:
Auf der Souver&nlt&t der Staaten beruht deren
souverane Gleichheit. #,.Es handelt sich hierbei
um., .Grieichheit vor dem Recht... (Die) Verpflich-
tung, dieses Recht...zu respektleren,..*geht
bedeutend welter als das Verbot der Anwendung ,
bezw. Androhung militarischer Gewalt gegen elnen
anderen Staat. ... Man bezeichnet diesenYerpfllchtung
...auch als Interventionsverbot...Diese Rechte...
haben...keine rechtliche Vorzugsstellung gegentiber
...(anderen) Yblkerrechtsregeln. Sie sind also kein
jus cogens.'''
Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Charter of the United
Nations speaks of respect for the principle of equal
rights; Article 2, paragraph 1 states that the Organisation
is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of
all its Members.
117. Seidl-Hohenveldern (f.n.80), p. 251, 253. E.t.:
Sovereign equality rests on the sovereignty of
States...It Is here a case of...equality before
the law...(The)duty to respect this right...goes
much further than a law prohibiting the use or
threat of military force against another State...
This duty...is also known as prohibited inter¬
ference. ..These rights...do not enjoy a pre¬
ferential position with regard to...(other) rules
of International law. Therefore, they cannot be
termed jus cogens.
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Sovereignty means that a State possesses sole power
over its subjects and its affairs.
Based on such premises, an agreement containing a
valid cession of part of a State's territory constitutes
an interference with the sovereign equality of Czechoslova¬
kia. The same applies in general to agreements concluded
voluntarily, hut which in those days did not constitute
a breach of international law!
It is unanimous that the actual Munich Agreement of
September 29, 1938, represented only a partial settlement
of thte whole Sudeten German problem, and its provisions do
not even represent the most relevant ones juridically.
The first section of the Munich settlement concerning
the Sudeten German question includes the fundamental
understanding that the problem should be solved by the
transfer of the territories with predominantly German
population to the German Reich. This had been agreed to
in the exchange of notes of September 19 and 21, 1938.
The second section, the Munich Agreement in its
more restricted sense, outlines the modalities and
prescriptions concerning the implementation of the
decision already made to form an International Commission
whose function would be to prepare a plebiscite and fix
the boundaries of the territories to be transferred to
Germany. Furthermore, Germany was permitted to begin
occupying certain territories.
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The last section of the provisions concerning the
question of the plebiscite (it was expected to conform
to the principles of the Saar plebiscite), the final
definition of the areas in which the plebiscite should
be held and the supervision of the transfer of the
designated territories had not yet been determined.
These questions were finally settled by direct negotiations
between the German and Czech delegates within the
Commission and led to the bilateral Agreement of
November 20, 1938 to which the Commission consented on
November 21, 1938.^ 8
In this Agreement the German and Czechoslovak
Governments declared that they would not hold a
plebiscite and would themselves determine the final
boundary between their States. In this manner the
Czechoslovak territory was transferred to Germany.
In spite of the provisions of the Munich Agreement
of September 29, 1938, the contesting parties were
obviously entitled to refrain from holding the
plebiscite. Article 39, sent. 1 of the Convention on
the Law of Treaties states that
a treaty mav be amended by agreement between
the parties.119
118. Documents (Germany) Ser. D, Vol. IV, pp. 164-5
(see Part I, f.n.52).
119. UN Doc. A/CONF.39/11/Add. 2, P. 294.
■
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This does not represent a new principle of international
law, for this idea has long "been accepted.120
Thus the arrangement of the Sudeten German question
was accepted in each separate stage of its development
"by the Czechoslovak Government. And by fulfilling the
obligations which were imposed upon them in the
settlements they gave further evidence of their consent.
The Czechoslovak Government evacuated the territories to
he transferred to the Reich, sent delegates to the
International Commission, and declared that they were
willing to co-operate within this Commission.
Furthermore, they dismissed all Sudeten Germans from
their armed forces and police units and pardoned all
121
Sudeten Germans imprisoned for political crimes.
Such a minute and detailed fulfillment of a treaty
122
clearly shows that it was considered binding.
120. Lauterpacht (f.n.41)» Vol. I, p. 937s "A treaty,
although concluded for ever or for a period of time
which has not yet expired, may nevertheless be
dissolved by mutual consent of the contracting
parties."
121. In accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4 of the
Godesberg Memorandum (Akten (Part I,f,n.39)»
Nr. 584, p. 724).
122. Raschhofer writes: "Das Mtinchener Abkommen ist durch
seine Durchftihrung, die mit der Ubergabe des Gebietes
an Deutschland begann und der Ziehung einer neuen
Grenze schloss, ein erftlllter Vertrag und damit ein
rechtskr&ftiges VSlkerrechtsinstrument geworden. Die
Feststellung der vertragserftillung traf der inter-
nationale Ausschuss am 21♦ November 1938: Unter
I
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Erftillung eines Vertrages 1st die "erschbpfende und
in der geschuldeten Weise bewirkte Leistung dessen,
was versprochen war zu verstehen. Da die rechtliche
Wirkung eines Vertrages gerade darin besteht, dass
er zur Ausftihrung der versprochenen Leistungen ver-
pflichtet, so erlisoht die Verpfliehtung, sobald die
Leistung bewirkt ist" (Anzilotti). Die Verpflichtung
bestand in dem Zusammenwirken der Signature bei der
tfbergabe und R&umung des Sudetengebietes auf der
Grundlage der Vereinbarungen vom 21. September und
der Ziehung der neuen Grenzlinie unter gleichberech-
tigter Teilnahme der Tschechoslowakei. Diese Verpflich¬
tung wurde erftillt. In diesem Sinne stellt das
Mtinchener Abkommen einen erftillten Vertrag dar. Die
Obertragung der Sudetengebiete wurde in der dort
vorgesehenen Weise durchgeftihrt, wobei statt der
Volksabstimmung elne zweiseitige deutsch-tscheche-
slowakische Regelung unter der zustimmenden Kennt-
nisnahme des internationalen Ausschusses erfolgte"
(Raschhofer (f.n.105)» p. 189).
E.t.i The Munich Agreement, through its
implementation which began with the cession of
territory to Germany and ended with the establishment
of a new boundary, v/as a performed treaty and thereby
became an instrument of international law with legal
effect. The fulfillment of the treaty was ascertained
by the International Commission on November 21, 1938i
by fulfillment of a treaty is meant the exhaustive
and effected execution of that which was promised.
As the legal effectiveness of a treaty depends on the
obligation and expires as soon as the service has been
effected. The obligation consisted in the co-operation
of the signatory powers during the cession and
evacuation of the Sudeten territory on the basis
of the agreements of September 21, and the
establishment of the new boundary with the full
participation of the Czechoslovak Government. This
obligation was fulfilled. In this respect the Munich
Agreement represents a consummated treaty. The
cession of the Sudeten territory was executed in the
foreseen manner, although instead of a plebiscite,
a bilateral German-Czechoslovak arrangement,
accepted by the International Commission ensued.
150.
Moreover, in the domestic arena a whole series of
decrees were promulgated, concerning the organization of
the courts and the new financial requirements, for
example, which were necessitated by the new delineation
of State boundaries. Of importance further was a decision
of the Permanent Committee of the National Assembly from
October 27, 1938 by which the number of parliamentary
mandates was decreased, reflecting the new situation
created by the revision of borders. This last action is
of particular significance because it did not arise from
any obligation resulting from the Munich Agreement but
rather was promulgated by an agent of the State without
any external intervention. This action of the Permanent
Committee and the subsequent approval of the decree by
the Parliament indicate that they felt bound by the Munich
12,5
Agreement.
123. The decrees were all approved by the Parliament
according to Article 54, paragraph 15 of the
Constitution. (Promulgation, December 6, 1938,
Law No. 320).
Singbartl, Das Mtinchener Abkommen und seine
Purchfuhrung. claims (loc.cit. n. 13) that in
the period from October 1938 to February 1939
about 50 government agreements and treaties were
concluded.
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c) The Fault of Disregard of the Constitution
i) The Legal Position
The Czechoslovak Government violated Article 64
of the Czechoslovak Constitution of February 29, 1920 by
1
accepting the Munich Agreement, * Article 64 provided!
Der Prasident der Republik vertritt den Staat
nach aussen, schliesst und ratlfiziert Inter¬
nationale Konventionen, Handelsvertr&ge, Ver-
trage, die dem Staat Oder den Btirgern irgend-
welche Lasten Oder Verpflichtungen auferlegen,
sei es in Bezug auf das Eigentum, sei es in persbn-
licher Hinsicht, insbesondere hinsichtlich milith-
rischer Lasten. Vertrage, die eine Verhnderung des
Staatsgebietes mit einbegreifen, bedtirfen der Zu-
stimmung der Nationalversammlung und werden in
Form eines Verfassungsgesetzes ^Article I des
Einfiihrungsgesetzes) erlassen.'2*
124. Michal, (f,n,6), loc.cit. p. 55.
125. Korkisch, Zur Frage der Welter^eltung des Munchener
Abkommens. loc.cit. p. 9^. H.t.i "^he President of
ihe Republic represents the State. He concludes
and ratifies treaties, international conventions,
commercial treaties which contain obligations and
responsibilities for the State or the citizens
thereof either with respect to their personal
property or to military obligations. Treaties
which conern territorial changes need the consent
of the National Assembly which is given in the form
of a constitutional law according to Article 1 of
the Introductory Law.
Transl. from the French text in Korkisch,
loc.cit.s "Le president de la R&publiquet repr&sente
1 'Eta^t & l^xterfeur; conclut et ratifie les
conventions Internationales, les trait&s commer-
ciaux, les traitfes imposant a l'Etat ou aux citoyens
des charges ou des obligations quelconques, soit de
proprifete, soit personnelles, et spfecialement des
charges militaires; les traitfes impliquant des
changements dans le territoire de l'Etat nfecessitent
le consentement de l'Assemblfee nationale. Quant au
changement de territoire de l'Etat, le consentement
de l'Assembl&e nationale est donnfe sous forme de
loi constitutionnelle (art. I de la loi prfeliminaire)".
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Article 1 of the Introductory Law in unison with
Article 33 of the Constitution required a majority of
three/fifths of all members in both houses for
126
constitutional and territorial changes.
The Notes of the Czechoslovak Government of
September 21, 1938 and September 30, 1938, the latter
containing the acceptance of the result® of the Munich
Conference, had,before they were passed on, indisputably
not received parliamentary oonsent.
Before the formulation of the rule in the Vienna
Convention as to whether the constitutional restrictions
imposed upon a government could exercise any restrictive
influence on the legality of an international treaty,
provided that the treaty itself had been connluded by
the body constitutionally empowered to do so,wassindicated,
that ...there is no absolute agreement as to
the international legal effect of constitutional
limitations on the treaty-making capacity of
States or constitutional restrictions or rules
as to its exercise, ...127
Three groups of opinions are represented, one of
which indicates that treaties concluded in violation
126. Korkisch, Ibid.
127. UN Doc. A/CN.4/23/YB. I.L.C. 1950, p. 230.
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of constitutional restrictions are not binding128 because
international law leaves it up to the States themselves
to decide which agencies of the State will represent it
1 29
in international legal transactions. ^ The opposing
opinion states that international law cannot be altered
130
by the municipal law of a State. ^ If a competent State
authority, as for example a Head of State or Foreign
Minister, delivered declarations on behalf of his country,
then it was not significant for the determination of
international obligations if this authority did not
observe the domestic restrictions of State municipal law.
128. Lauterpacht (f.n.41), Vol. I, p. 887.
129. Chailley, La nature juridique des traltfes inter-
nationaux. p. 180. writes: "...ce n'est pas audroit
ctes gens, mais au droit constitutibnnel en tant que
tel au'il appartient de determiner les regies de
competence et de procedure, sans 1*observation
desquelles un traitb ne pourra pas Stre considferfe
comme internationalement valide." E.t.: ...it is
not the concern of public international law, but
rather constitutional law, which is empowered to
determine the rules of competence and procedure,
without the regard for which a treaty cannot be
seen as internationally valid. See also Dahm (f.n.29)
Bd. 3, p. 23-30.
130. O'Connell (f.n.80). Vol. I, p. 239: "...the question
whether constitutional law is to have the decisive
voice in determining the international validity of
a treaty, or whether a State is bound by the
apparent authority of its agents, is one which only
international law and not municipal law can answer."
131. UN Doc. A/CONE.39/11/Add.2, pp.60-1j Ross, A Text¬
book of International Law. pp. 203-208: H.R.I.L.
(A.J.T.I. Vol. SuppI. (1935), pp. 709-10).
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Many writers, however, who defend the general
principle that the international validity and binding
force of treaties is determined by international law
and not by the law of the parties, and that therefore
constitutional provisions relative to the extent of
the treaty-making power and the manner of its exercise
do not, in general, have any international significance,
nevertheless admit that such essential provisions as
those which require the assent of the legislative chambers
cannot be disregarded without affecting the validity of
the treaty.
Sinclair explains;
In the main, doctrine is divided between
what may, for purposes of convenience, be
termed the constitutionalist and the inter¬
nationalist schools. Ihe constitutionalist
school holds that international law leaves
it to internal law to determine the organs
and procedures by which the consent of a State
to be bound by a treaty is formed and expressed,
and that violation of a prescription of internal
law renders void (or voidable) the expression of
a State*s consent to be bound. The inter¬
nationalist school bases itself upon the theory
that international law is concerned only with
the external manifestations of the expression
of a State's consent to be bound, and that the
act of an agent who is competent under inter¬
national law to bind the State and apparently
authorised to do so in the particular case binds
the State even if a prescription of internal law
has not been complied with.132
132. Sinclair (f.n.35),pp. 89-90.
155.
A third opinion assumes an intermediate position but
this however is interpreted differnntly. O'Connell
renounces a general rule and proceeds according to each
individual case, for example. He explains:
However, general statements are apt to
mislead, and much depends upon the conduct
of the parties.133
On the other hand in its commentary on its draft
article 43» the International law Commission in 1966
attempted to formulate a general rule.
According to them (other jurists) good faith
requires that only notorious constitutional
limitations with which other States can
reasonably be expected to acquaint themselves
should be taken into account.134
As a result of these opposing interpretations, it
cannot be said that one of these viewpoints has acquired
general acceptance and thereby the character of a
principle of international law. As Brownlie indicates,
111
...no single view can claim to be definitive.
In a particularly instructive international law case
-the East Greenland Case- the Permanent Court of Inter¬
national Justice concerned itself with this legal
116
question, J In this conflict Norway claimed a particular
133. O'Connell (f.n.80), Vol. 1 p. 241.
134. UN Doc. A/CONE.39/11/Add.2 p. 60.
135. Brownlie (f.n.44)» p. 494.
136. P.C.I.J. Ser. A/B No. 53, Legal Status of Eastern
Greenland, pp. 36y70.
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area of East Greenland, whereas Denmark insisted that it
enjoyed sovereignty over all of Greenland.
The Danish Government in a Statement of July 14,
1919 informed the Norwegian Foreign Minister:
Le Gouvernement danois s'est pendant plusieurs
ann&ss occupfe de la question d'obtenir la
reconnaissance de la souverainetfe du Danemark sur
tout le Groenland de toutes les Puissances
int&ressfees. ...Au cours les pourparlers aveo les
£tats-Unis d'Amferique... le Gouvernement danois
souleva cette question en ce qui concernait la
reconnaissance par le Gouvernement des 6tats Unis
et il obtient que celui-ci...donn&t une declaration
dans laquelle est dit que les £tat-Unis ne
s'opposeraient pas d ce que le Gouvernement danois
fetende & 1*ensemble du Groenland ses intfer£ts
politiques et feconomiques.
ie Gouvernement danois complait que le
Gouvernement norvfegien ne ferait pas de difficultfes
au sujet r&glement de cette affaire.
The Norwegian Foreign Minister (Ihlen) answered on
July 22, 1919 in an oral statement in whioh he made the
following remark:
J'ai dit aujourd'hui au ministre de Danemark
que le Gouvernement norvfegien ne ferait pas de
difficulty au sujet du reglement de cette affaire. 01
137. Statut juridiaue du Groenland, Rfeplique danoise-
Duplique norvegienne (legal status of Eastern
Greenland, Danish Reply.- Norvegian Rejoinder),
P.C.I.J., Ser.C. No. 63, p. 837).
E.t. of the Danish Statement: The Danish Government
has for some years past been anxious to obtain the
recognition of all the interested Powers of Denmark's
sovereignty over the whole of Greenland. ...During
the negotiations with the U.S.A. ...the Danish
Government raised this question in so far as concerns
recognition by the Government of the U.S.A., and it
succeeded in inducing the latter to agree that ...
it would...not object to the Danish Government
extending their political and economic interests to
the whole of Greenland. The Danish Government is
confident...that the Norwegian Government will not
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Nevertheless, the Norwegian Government raised the
objection that this declaration of the Norwegian Foreign
Mihlster could not be binding because according to the
Norwegian constitution he was not competent to give such
a declaration, The Court decided, however:
The Court considers it beyond all dispute that
a reply of this nature given by the Minister of
Foreign Affaires on behalf of his Government in
response to a request by the diplomatic represen¬
tative of a foreign Power, in regard to a question
falling within his province, is binding upon the
country to which the Minister belongs.138
The decision has all the more weight since all 12
regular members of the Court found for this judgement.
Of the two ad hoc Judges named by the interested Parties,
Anzilotti in his dissenting opinion shaved the view of
the other Judges on this issue and explained:
No arbitral or judicial decision relating
to the international competence of a Minister
for Foreign Affairs has been brought to the
knowledge of the court? nor has this question
been exhaustively treated by legal authorities.
In my opinion, it must be recognized that the
constant and general practice of States has been
to invest the Minister for Foreign Affairs -
the direct agent of the Chief of the State -
with authority to make statements on current
affairs for foreign diplomatic representatives,
make any difficulties in the settlement of this
Question.
E.t. of the Ihlen-Declaration: To-day I informed
the Danish Minister that the Norwegian Government
would not make any difficulties in the settlement
of this question (P.C.I.J. (f.n.136), p. 70).
138. P.C.I.J. (f.n.136), p. 71.
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and in particular to inform them as to the
attitude which the government in whose name
he speaks, will adopt in a given question.
Declarations of this kind are binding upon
the State.
As regards the question whether Norwegian
constitutional law authorized the Ministerfbr
Foreign Affairs to make the declaration, that
is a point which, in my opinion, does not concern
the Danish Government: it was Mr. Ihlen's duty
to refrain from giving his reply until he had
obtained any assent that might be requisite
under the Norwegian laws.139
The Eastern Greenland decision also influenced the
efforts of the United Nations to codify the Law of
treaties in international law. Although the Vienna
Convention came into existence long after the events
of 1938 and 1939, it can be of significance nevertheless
if it was supposed to represent a compilation of already
existing standards of law. Therefore, the efforts along
these lines have to be dealt with here, insofar as they
concern the question of constitutional restrictions.
The codification of the International Law of treaties
by the United Nations whose drafting fell within the scope
of the duties of the International Law Commission created
by the General Assembly, is based on Article 13# paragraph
1, section (a) of the Charter. In accordance with Its
Statute (annexed to General Resolution 174 (II) of
November 21, 1947), the International Law Commission
decided on its first session 1949 to undertake the
139. Ibid, .pp. 91-2.
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codification of the Law of Treaties (together with
Arbitral Procedure and the Regime of the High Seas)
as one of the three topics of international law.
The first expert v/ho reported, Brierly, presented
to the Commission a draft proposal as a basis for
discussion, article 4, paragraph 1 and 2 of which
statedi
The capacity of a State or international
organization to make treaties may be exercised
whatever organ or organs of that State or
organisation its constitution may provide.
In the absence of provision in its constitution
to the contrary, the capacity of a State to make
treaties is deemed to reside in the Head of the
State.141
Commenting on his suggestion, Brierly explained;
In view of the division of opinion as to the
international legal effect of restriction of
capacity to make treaties or of regulation of
it8 exercise in the constitutions of States, it
is open to the draftsman of a code of law of
treaties to take up any one of three attitudes
on the matter. ...It has been necessary, there¬
fore, to decide between the recognition and the
denial of the international legal significance
of constitutional self-limitation upon treaty-
making capacity. And, having regard to the
prevalence and notoriety of provisions in the
constitutions of States regulating the making
of treaties, and to the existence of similar
provisions in the constitutions of international
organizations, notably the Charter of the United
Nations, the former has been decided upon.142
140. UN Doc. A/CN.4/19, YB. I.L.C. 1950, p. 196.
141. UN Doc. A/CN.4/23, YB. I.L.C. 1950, p. 223.
142. UN Doc. A/CN.4/43, YB. I.L.C. 1951, pp. 70-3.
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In the following year the Special Rapporteur
suggested further provisions as an alternative to the
various hut here not relevant sections of his proposal.
The Commission tentatively accepted some provisions,
among them Article 2.
A Treaty becomes binding in relation to a
State by signature, ratification, accession
or any other means of expressing the will of
the State, in accordance with its constitutional
law and practice through an organ competent for
that purpose.143
The previous point of view was therefore retained.
In his third report of 1952 Brierly held to this
viewpoint in a relatively unaltered interpretation of
his Article 4, but, commenting on this, he mentioned the
doubts which had been raised against his opinion.
Brierly resigned from the Commission which then elected
Lauterpacht Special Rapporteur.
In his report of 1953 Lauterpacht declared!
The present report is intended primarily
as a formulation of existing law,145
but in his commentary on Article 11 of his
proposal, he wrote:
The paucity and the inconclusiveness of
the judicial and arbitral pronouncements on
the subject make it difficult to deduce
from them any rule of international law which
is calculated to provide a practical solution
to the problem involved. The present article
attempts a solution of that nature.'46
143. UN Doc.A/CN.4/L.28, pp. 73-4 (73), Ibid., p. 73.
144. UN Doc. A/CN.4/54, YB. I.L.C. 1953, pp. 51-2.
145. UN Doc. A/CN.4/63, YB. I.L.C. 1953, p. 90.
146. Ibid., p. 144.
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Once again it is expressed that Article 11 does not
represent a formulation of existing law, but rather
concerns the attempt to create a practical solution,
which is to say to create new international law.
Article 11, paragraph 1 and 2 which lauterpacht
suggested, reads;
1. A treaty is voidable, at the option of
the party concerned, if it has been entered
in disregard of the limitations of its
constitutional law and practice.
2. A contracting party may be deemed,
according to the circumstances of the case, to
have waived its right to assert the invalidity
of a treaty concluded in disregard of constitutional
limitations if for a prolonged period it has
failed to invoke the invalidity of the treaty
or if it has acted upon or obtained an advantage
from it.147
Commenting on this regulation, lauterpacht expressly
maintained;
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 11 are intended
to provide the qualifications necessary to render
the major rule just and reasonable. They take
into account, in paragraph 2, the possibility
that the State invoking the nullity of the treaty
on account of the disregard of constitutional
limitations may have tacitly accepted it by
acting upon it....148
Lauterpacht*s successor as Special Rapporteur was
Fitzmaurice who presented his own proposal on the law
of Treatles^^ which concerning the relevant question
at issue stated:
147. Ibid., p. 92.
148. Ibid., p. 144.
149. UN Doc. A/ON.4/101, YB. I.L.C. 1956, pp. 104
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Article 22. ...1. Except where made ad
referendum, a signature, which is the act of
the state, can only be effected...(b) by a person
having inherent capacity to bind the State by
virtue of his position or office as Head of State,
Prime Minister or Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Article 5. ...5. A State which has become
bound by a treaty in a regular and lawful manner,
is not absolved from carrying it out by reason
of any requirements of or lacunae in its law
or constitution ,..
Article 23. ...The provisions of Article 15 to
22 above are, wherever this is relevant, to be
read subject to the understanding, that the
unauthorized acts of an agent are always open
to validation on the part of his government,
by means of a specific confirmation, or by conduct
manifesting an unmistakable intention to adopt
them as its own.15o
Fitzmaurice's viewpoint presented again the
interpretation vis-a-vis the significance of the
constitutional restrictions which lauterpacht indicated
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was shared by a majority of writers. In relation to
subsequent validation of unauthorized acts according
to Article 23 of his proposal, Fitzmaurice said;
This is believed to be good law* and it
is certainly convenient practice.15^
Fitzmaurice's successor as Special Rapporteur,
Waldock, presented his initial report together with a
partial proposal, Article 4, paragraph 3, section (b)
of which said:
150. Ibid., pp. 111, 108, 112.
151. UN Doc. A/ON.4/63, Y.B. I.L.C., loc.cit..P. 142,
f.n. 94. ———
152. UN Doc. A/CN.4/101, Y.B. I.B.C., loc.cit., P« 120*
I
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Heads of State, Heads of Government and
Foreign Ministers have authority, ex officio,
to negotiate and authenticate a treaty on
"behalf of their State, and to sign, ratify,
accede to or accept a treaty on its behalf;
and they are not required to furnish any
evidence of specific authority to execute any
of these acts. 5?
In his commentary on this regulation, he said:
In the case of Foreign Ministers, the
inherent authority of the Minister to bind
his Government in negotiations with a foreign
Statewas expressly recognized by the Permanent
Court of International Justice in the Eastern
Greenland case...154
In his second report Waldock explained:
The present Special Rapporteur has based
his proposals upon the principle that the
declaration of a State's consent to a treaty
is binding upon that State, if made by an agent
ostensibly possessing authority under inter¬
national law to make the particular declaration
on behalf of his State. In doing so, he has been
guided primarily by the indications contained in
interhational jurisprudence and State practice. ...'55
The International Law Commission revised Sir Humphrey
Waldock's draft articles and published the new inter¬
pretation of the proposal, the relevant provisions
of which read:
153. UN Doc. A/CN.4/144, Y.B. I.L.C., 1962, p. 38.
154. Ibid.. p. 39.
155. UN Doc. A/CN.4/156 and Add. 1-3, Y.B. I.L.C.,
1963, p. 44.
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Article 4» para 2; In virtue of their
functions and without having to produce an
instrument of full powers, the following are
considered as representing their State:
(a1} Heads of State, Heads of Government and
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, for the purpose
of performing all acts relating to the
conclusion of a treaty;
(b) Heads of diplomatic missions, for the
purpose of adopting the text, of a treaty between
the accrediting State and the State to which they
are accredited.
(c) Representitives accredited by States to
an international conference or to an organ of
an international organization, for the purpose
of adopting the text of a treaty.
Article 4 (bis); An act relating to the
conclusion of a treaty performed by a person who
cannot be considered under Article 4 as representing
his State for that purpose is without legal effect
unless afterwards confirmed by the competent
authority of the State.
Article 31; A State may not invoke the fact
that its consent to be bound by a treaty has
been expressed in violation of a provision of
its internal law regarding competence to conclude
treaties as invalidating its consent unless that
violation of its internal law was manifest.156
The revised draft of the Law of Treaties was adopted
by the International Law Commission and presented to the
General Assembly with the recommendation to convene an
international conference of plenipotentiaries to study
the Commission's draft articles on the Law of Treaties
and to conclude a convention on the subject.
By means of Resolution 2166 (XXI) of December 5»
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1966, the General Assembly heeded this recommendation.
156. UN Doc. A/CN.4/L 117, pp. 4, 5; 18.
157. UN Doc. A/CONF. 39/11 p. XI. Revised draft articles:
UN Doc. A/CN.4/L 117 (July 13, 1966).
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The conference took place in Vienna in 1968 and 1969.
On May 22, 1969 the Convention on the Law of Treaties was
158
adopted. J At the same time two resolutions were accepted,
one of which was the Declaration on the Prohibition of
Military, Political or Economic Coercion in the
Conclusion of Treaties, in which it was stated:
The United Nations Conference on the Law of
Treaties ...Deploring the fact that in the past
States have sometimes been forced to conclude
treaties under pressure exerted in various forms
by other States, Desiring to ensure that in the
future no such pressure will be exerted in any
form by any State in connection with the
conclusion of a treaty...Solemnly condemns the
threat or use of pressure in any form, whether
military, political or economic, by any State in
order to coerce another State to perform any act
relating to the conclusion of a treaty in
violation of the principles of the sovereign
equality of States and freedom of consent,...
Decides that the present Declaration shall form
part of the Pinal Act of the Conference on the
Law of Treaties.159
In the draft presented to the Conference, under
Article 43 it was stated:
A State may not invoke the fact that its
consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed
in violation of a provision of its internal law
regarding competence to conclude treaties as
invalidating its consent unless that violation
of its internal law was manifest.1®°
Article 44 elaborated further, that specific
restrictions on the authority of the representative
of a State to express its consent to a treaty could be
158. UN Doc. A/CONF. 39/11
A/CONF.39/26).
159. UN Doc. A/CONF. 39/11
160. Ibid.. p. 59.
Add. 2, pp. 283-5 (UN Doc.
Add. 2, P. 285.
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claimed as a reason for invalidity if these restrictions
were brought to the knowledge of the other negotiating
1 61
States prior to his expressing such consent.
During the deliberations on draft Article 43 of the
1 69
proposal in the Committee of the Whole, Peru and the
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic presented the
proposal, accepted subsequently, whereby the words
"and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental
16 "3
importance" were added at the end of draft Article 43.
Iran's motion to deny Heads of State any right to appeal
to domestic restrictions in the conclusion of treaties
("If consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed
by a person authorized by the Head of State, a State may
not invoke the fact that its consent has been expressed
in violation of a provision of its internal law") had to
be recalled because It found no support.
Rather, the motion proposed by Great Britain^^ was
accepted whereby draft Article 43 is identical with
161. Ibid., p. 62.
162. Forty-third meeting of the Committee, UN Doc.
A/CONF. 39/11, pp. 238-46.
163. UN Doc. A/CONF. 39/C.1/L. 228 (Peru) and UN Doc.
A/CONF./39/0.1/1.228/Add. 1 (Ukrainian Soviet
Socialist Republic) and Ibid., p. 238.
164. UN Doc. A/CONF. 39/C.1/L.280} A/CONF.39/11 p. 240.
165. UN Doc. A/CONF. 39/C.1/L.274; UN Doc. A/CONF. 39/11,
p. 239.
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Article 46 paragraph 1 of the Convention, with an addition
in which the concept "manifest" was in paragraph 2 defined
as follows!
A violation is manifest, if it would he
objectively evident to any State conducting
itself in the matter in accordance with normal
practice and in good faith.
Further deliberation on this Article in the Committee
1 fifi
of the Whole did not bring any more changes.
The vote on the entire Convention on the Law of
Treaties during the final plenary session of the Conference
produced 79 votes in favour, 19 abstentions and one
opposing vote - that of France. Thus, the treaty text
was approved.
We arrive at the following conclusion:
Not only the completely conflicting judgements on the
questions of law in international law literature, the
opinions of the several Special Rapporteurs of the
International Law Commission, the different interpretations
of this question among the States of the Conference, but
also the obvious efforts of the Commission to find a
solution to this question of law leave no doubt that
because of this lack of an unequivocal opinion in State
practice, scholarly writings and jurisprudence on the
effect of constitutional restrictions on the validity




of treaties, no arrangement of this problem could be
discerned from existing international law when the
International law Commission started efforts to codify
the most important principles of the Law of Treaties.
In the year 1938 the legal situation was not different.
An international law should rather be first developed
and moulded in a form which corresponds to presentday
relations in the international community and which makes
168
possible efficient intercourse in international law.
Thus, at the time of the Munich Agreement it was
not a recognized principle of international law that the
lack of sanction of treaties by the internal organs of
States, as prescribed in the constitutions of these States,
prejudiced the treaties* validity.
It is also important to note that the acceptance of
the Munich Agreement by the Czechoslovak Government on
September 30, 1938 occured with the unanimous approval
of the responsible factions of the political parties and
after exhaustive consultation and debate in the appropriate
Committee under the chairmanship of the President of the
Republic. This is revealed by the official Communiqufe on
the Governmental deliberations of September 30, 1938.^^
168. Strupp-Schlochauer (f.n.40), Bd. 2, pp. 228-30,
235-6.
169. Spengler, Zur Frage des vblkerrechtlich gtiltigen
Zustanaekommens der deutsch-tectiechoslowakiscnen
(rrenzregelung von" 1938. p. 83. '
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The influence of this Committee is indicated by the
fact that the decisions of the party leaders belonging
to the Committee, in accordance with decisions of the
Czechoslovak Courts, were binding on every representative
under penalty of the loss of his mandate if he failed to
170
abide by them. Thus the Agreement of the party leaders
legally carried the same weight as the unanimous approval
of the Parliament.
It is also not the case that according to Czech law
at that time the approval of the Parliament was necessary
before a treaty could be concluded, because by reason of
the Czechoslovak law on the Defense of the State of
May 13, 1936 the President of the Republic and the
Government were authorized to issue emergency decree
for the regulation of extraordinary circumstances,
171
where otherwise a law could have been necessary. '
ii) Estoppel
The three parts of the whole Munich Settlement
including the exchange of notes from September 19/21,
1938, the Agreement of September 29, 1938 and the final
settlement, the German-Czechoslovak Agreement of November
170. Armbruster-Klein-Miinch-Veiter, Gutachten etc..
loc.tit. p. 13.
171. Spengler, Ibid, .pp. 80-1.
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20, 1938 as it was accepted by the International
Commission on November 21, 19381?2 have to be viewed
as one treaty because the first two parts, especially
the first part, would make little sense if read
separately. Independently, neither of these two parts
could have had any practical effect.
If one considers the three sections as a unified
treaty, then the Czechoslovak Parliament acceded to the
treaty of November 20, 1938 with the requisite
majority.1^"5 Even if one considers the three sections
separately, however, the lack of parliamentary approval
is remedied according to the principle of "estoppel1'.
This principle was developed in Anglo-American law
and has subsequently found world-wide recognition.^^
172. Strupp-Schlochauer (f.n.40), Bd. 2, pp. 554-5.
173. Kimminich-Rumpf (f.n.110), p. 180.
174. Mac Gibbon, Estoppel in International Law, loc.cit.
p. 468 writes* "...international judicial and
arbitral activity has provided substantial grounds
for the modern tendency to consider estoppel as one
of the "general principles of law recognized by
civilised nations." ...a State ought to be consistent
in its attitude to a given factual or legal
situation."
In the case concerning the Arbitral Award made
by the King of Spain on November 18, 1906, Honduras
v. Nicaragua (Judgment), (I.C.J. Reports 1960,
pp. 191-239) was stated:
"The objection on the grounds of good faith which
exists in almost all legal systems and which prevents
a party from profiting by its own misrepresentation
and which, in Anglo-Saxon law, is known as estoppel,
would be applicable in the present case if it were
proved that the action and behaviour of one of the
171.
The legal thought behind this principle was not however
unknown in the law of other States: there it was part
of the principle of "Treu und Glauben"^-' and in Anglo-
American law as well estoppel is grounded on
176
considerations of good faith. 1
Behind the principle of estoppel lie maxims such
177




What appears to be the common denominator
of the various aspects of estoppel .. •, is
the requirement that a State ought to maintain
towards a given factual or legal situation an
qttitude consistent with that which it was known
to have adopted with regard to the same
circumstances on previous occasions. At its
simplest, estoppel in international law reflects
the possible variations, in circumstances and
effects, of the underlying principle of consistency
which may be summed up in the maxim allegans
contraria non audiendus est.179
However, the doctrine*s usefulness is somewhat
limited due to the fact that either a general definition
is too vague or the concept is so refined and restricted
States caused the other State to place reliance upon
its acts of acquiescence and to believe in its
renunciation of its right to dispute the validity
of the award" (loc.clt. p. 222).
175. in English: "good faith".
176. Bowett, Estoppel before International Tribunals and
its Relation to Acquiescence, loc.clt. p. 176.
177. Mac Gibbon, loc.cit. p. 469.
178. Strupp-Schlochauer (f.n.40), Bd. "J.p.441.
179. Mac Gibbon (f.n.174), p. 512.
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that not all cases of estoppel are .covered by it.
Usually, scholarly writing and the decisions of tribunals
supply the particular kinds of estoppel that have become
known.
Above all else, recognition in international law
contains an estoppel element irrespective of whether a
constitutive or declaratory effect is attributed to
1 80
recognition. It is certainly understandable that the
recognition of conditions, facts and laws plays an
important role in the area of the principle of estoppel
regardless of whether one concedes to recognition a
1 81
constitutive or declaratory effect.
By granting recognition, they (the States)
do not undertake any commitment beyond not to
challenge in future whatever they have
previously acknowledged.182
In international judicial and arbitral decisions as
well an estoppel effect is conceded to such recognition.
In a decision of the Conciliation Commission, established
under Article 83 of the Treaty of Peace with Italy of
July 9» 1962^8-* the Commission said:
180. Mac Gibbon, Ibid., pp. 473-5.
181. Patel, Recognition in the Law of Nations, pp. 8-22.
182. Schwarzenberger, The Fundamental Principles of
International Law, losclt. p. 25^.
183. R.I.A.A., Vol. XVI, p. 219. ...la doctrine anglo-
saxone de 1'"estoppel" (the anglo-saxon doctrine
of "estoppel" (loc.cit. ).
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le Gouvernement italien n'a reconnu devant
aucun organe international que l'art. 78
par. 7 du Traitk de Paix §tait applicable &
l'ancienne colonie de la Somalie italienne.
Ce n'est que si une telle reconnaissance
avait ktk prononcfee, que la Commission de
Conciliation aurait fetfe en mesure d'examiner
1*applicability de 1'objection resultant du
principe de 1*"estoppel" (non concedit
venire contra factum proprium).184
Just as a State is precluded from contesting the
legal validity of a condition, a fact, or a law, because
the State itself in cognizance of all the essential
conditions had recognized this validity, so it cannot
free itself because of this from an international
obligation because of conduct which could render the
obligation void.^®^
After all, the conduct of the parties to a treaty
is also a basis for the application of the principle
186
of estoppel. Judge Alfaro gave a definition of this
184. E.t.i The Italian Government has not recognized
before any international organ that Article 78
paragraph 7 of the Treaty of Peace would be
applicable to the former Italian Colony Somali.
Only if such recognition had been expressed,
would the Commission of Conciliation have seen
itself in the position to examine the applicability
of the objection which results from the principle
of estoppel.
185. Mac Gibbon (f.n.174), p. 480 writes: "A State is
barred from pleading its own default as a
justification for avoiding its international
obligations." See also Bowett (f.n.176), pp.183.
186. "Many of the cases on estoppel by conduct
illustrate the simple principle that the law
will demand consistency in conduct where the
result of inconsistency would be to prejudice
another party" (Bowett, Ibid.. p. 186).
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in the case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear
(Cambodia v. Thailand):
Whatever term or terms be employed to
designate this principle such as it has been
applied in the international sphere, its
substance is always the same: inconsistency
between claims or allegations put forward
by a State, and its previous conduct in
connection therewith, is not admissible
(allegans contraria non audiendus est). Its
purpose is always the same: a State must not
be permitted to benefit by its own inconsistency
to the prejudice of another State (nemo potest
mutare consilium suum in alterius injuriam).
IPfortiori. the State must not be allowed to
benefit by its inconsistency when it is
through its own wrong or illegal act that
the other party has been deprived of its
right or prevented from exercising it (Nullus
commodum capere de sua injuria propria),
finally, the legal effect of the principle is
always the same: the party which by its
recognition, its representation, its declaration,
its conduct or its silence has maintained an
attitude manifestly contrary to the right it is
claiming before an international tribunal is
precluded from claiming that right (venire
contra factum proprium non valet).187
In the Argentina-Chile Frontier Case the arbitrator
stated in the award of December 9, 1966:
It seems clear...that there is in
international law a principle, which is
moreover a principle of substantive law and
not just a technical rule of evidence,
according to which "a State party to an
international litigation is bound by its
previous acts or attitude when they are in
contradiction with its claims in the litigation."...
187. I.C.J. Reports, 1962, Judgement, 15 June 1962
(pp.1-146;, separate opinion of Vice-president
Alfaro, loc.cit.. pp. 39-51 (40), p. 6;
I.C.J.Y.B., Mo. 28, p. 168;
See further: Eisemann, Petit Mahuel de la
jurisprudence de la cour international de justice,
PP. m-27.
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...This principle is designated by a number
of different terms, of which "estoppel" and
"preclusion" are the most common. But it is
clear that these terms are not to be understood
in quite the same sense as they are in municipal
law. With that qualification in mind this Court
will employ the term "estoppel".
In the Turkey-Irak Frontier Case the Court spoke of
the facts subsequent to the conclusion of the
Treaty...can only concern the Court in so far as
they are calculated to throw light on the
intention of the Parties at the time of the
conclusion of the Treaty,
and in the Corfu Channel Case (Merits) that
the subsequent attitude of the Parties shows
that it was not their intention...to preclude
the Court from fixing the amount of the
compensention.188
An Bowett concludes:
1. The rule of estoppel operates so as to
preclude a party from denying the truth of a
statement of fact made previously by that
party to another whereby that other has acted
to his detriment or the party making the
statement has secured some benefit: as such
the rule has been accepted by international
tribunals.
2. The rule of estoppel is distinguishable
both from the principle of 'res .judicata' and
the principle that, in cases of ambiguity in
the meaning of an agreement, the subsequent
conduct of the parties in carrying out the
agreement affords evidence of its meaning.
3. The forms in which estoppel can arise
are: ...(b) By Conduct.
188. The Argentina-Chile Frontier Case: R.I.A.A.
(f.n.95), p. 164j the Turkey-Irak-Frontier Case:
Publications of the P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 12,
Collection of Advisory opinions, p. 24; the Corfu-
Channel Case (Merits): I.C.J. Reports 1949* PP.
4-38, Judgement of April 9th, 1949, loc.cit. p. 25.
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4. The essentials of estoppel are:
(a) The statement of fact must be clear and
unambiguous.
(b) The statement of fact must be made
voluntarily, unconditionally, and must
be authorized,
(c) There must be reliance in good faith upon
the statement either to the detriment of the
party so relying on the statement or to the
advantage of the party making the statement.189
Although on the Continent the principle of estoppel
1 Qo
met with some reservation, y it has been able to so
establish itself in the decisions of international
tribunals that no doubt can exist any more with regard
to its binding force, Serveral authorities, like
191
Mac Gibbon, Bowett and Friede have examined the
principle of estoppel in view of the decisions of
international courts and other scientific sources;
they have unanimously come to the conclusion that the
principle of estoppel has validity in international law.
It is to be noted that Friede'svork appeared in 1935,
i.e., before the Munich Agreement.
The Convention on the Law of Treaties contains
certain regulations which can be considered consequences
of the principle of estoppel. Article 8 prescribes that
treaties concluded by a person not authorized to represent
189. Bowett (f.n.176), pp. 201-2.
190. Friede, Das Estoppel-Prinzin im VSlkerrecht, loc.cit.
p. 517-8; Berber (f.n.80;, fed. 1 p. 419; Strupp-
Schlochauer (f.n.111), Bd. 1, p. 441-2.
191. See Mac Gibbon (loc.cit. pp. 468-513; Bowett,
(f.n.176), pp. 176-202; Friede, Ibid., p. 517-45.
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a State for that purpose are without legal effect unless
afterwards confirmed by that State. In the commentary to
Article 7 of the Draft Article on the Law of Treaties
(Article 8 of the Convention) it says:
On the other hand, it seems equally clear
that, notwithstanding the representative's
original lack of authority, the State may
afterwards endorse his act and thereby
establish its consent to be bound by the
treaty. It will also be held to have done so
by implication if it invokes the provisions
of the treaty or otherwise acts in such a
way as to appear to treat the act of its
representative as effective.192
This commentary clearly indicates that Article 8
of the Convention also includes estoppel by subsequent
conduct♦
The Czechoslovak Parliament, by reason of the
ratification of the Treaty between the German Reich
and the Czechoslovak Republic on Questions of Nationality
and Option of November 20, 1938, by reason of the
conclusion of the German-Czechoslovak Treaty on the
final boundary of the same day, and finally be reason
of the acceptance of the German-Czechoslovak Declaration
on the Mutual Protection of the two peoples, whereby the
1Q1?
boundary treaty was passed with the requisite majority,
indicated beyond any reasonable doubt that it approved
192. UN Doc. A/CONP. 39/11/Add. 2 p.14.
193. Kimminich-Rumpf (f.n.110), p. 180.
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the over-all arrangement established between the German
194
Reich and the Czechoslovak Republic.
Thus the Czechoslovak Parliament and Government,
according to the principle of estoppel, forfeited the
right to appeal to the lack of parliamentary approval.
d) The Objection of Duress
When analysing the legal position, one may
certainly start from the assumption that at the conference
with the British Prime Minister, Hitler threatened to
solve the Sudeten German question by invading the
Sudeten German territory of Czechoslovakia, and that
this threat had come to the knowledge of the Czechoslovak
Government.
The vital question in international law posed by this
fact is how this situation should be resolved in the light
of international law as it stood in 1938. The answer must
clearly be that the threat of territorial occupation in
case of a Czechoslovak refusal to cede the Sudeten territo¬
ry uttered by the Reich's Government does not affect the
validity of the Munich Agreement, since the international
law in force at that time distinguished between duress
against a representative of a State and duress against a
194. Spengler (f.n.170), p. 76; Armbruster (f.n.171),
p. 14. See also f.n.123 of this Part of the thesis.
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contractual party. Only the former was considered
actionable. Based on the classical international law,
this concept corresponded -until the creation of the
United Nations- to the principle of the parties' freedom
of willj nor was it curtailed by the Pact of Paris,
though that particular principle had its origin in
the .1us ad bellum.
In point of fact until the formation of the United
Nations there was a general conviction that coercion
exercised by one State against another did not abrogate
a treaty doncluded under coercion. Me Nair writes:
The traditional opinion accepted by the
majority of writers has, at any rate until
recently, been that a treaty becomes and
remains binding upon a State in spite of the
fact that that State was acting under coercion
in concluding the treaty...195.
With regard to the British practice he says:
It Is believed that the United Kingdom has
at no time expressed any dissent from the
traditional doctrine that a treaty is not
rendered ipso facto void, or voidable by one
of the pariles, by reason of the fact that such
party was coerced by the other party into
concluding it...196
The legal position In such a case today is clear,
for Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United
Nations outlaws the threat of force in international
195. McNair (f.n.36) p. 207.
196. Ibid.. at p. 208.
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relations, and Article 52 of the Convention on the Law
197
of Treaties states: z"
A treaty is void if its conclusion has
been procured by the threat or use of force in
violation of the principles of international
law embodied in the Charter of the United
Nations.198
At the time of the Munich Agreement the United
Nations and the Charter did not yet exist nor did the
text of the Convention of the Law of Treaties.
The Commentary to Draft Article 49 (Article 52
of the Convention) the following explanation appears:
197. "The (Vienna) Convention (on the Law of Treaties)
states in simple and categorical terms (Art. 52)
that a treaty is void if its conclusion has been
procured by the threat or use of force in violation
of the principles of the UN Charter. It is perhaps
the boldest and most decisive innovation in the
history of the law of treaties. However, the Vienna
Convention does not define what constitutes a threat
or use of force in violation of the principles of
the Charter, nor is any authoritative definition
to be found elsewhere. This certainly would cast a
cloud of doubt over the legal standing of many
treaties against which claims of nullity may be
asserted on this ground" (Agrawala, Essay on the
Law of Treaties, p. xxxiii-iv).
198. In the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, U.K.v.Iceland,
Judgement: February 2, 1973 (I.C.J., Reports 1973»
pp. 1-45), the I.C.J, stated (loc.cit. p. 14):
There can be little doubt, as is implied in the
Charter of the United Nations and recognized in
Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, that under contemporary international law
an agreement concluded under the threat or use of
force is void. Also: FRG tf. Iceland (I.C.J, Reports




The traditional doctrine prior to the
Covenant of the League of Nations was that
the validity of a treaty was not affected
hy the fact that it had "been brought about
by the threat or use of force* However, this
doctrine was simply a reflection of the
general attitude of international law during
that era towards the legality of the use of
force for the settlement of international
disputes. With the Covenant and the Pact of
Paris there began to develop a strong body
of opinion which held that such treaties
should no longer be recognized as legally
valid. The endorsement of the criminality
of aggressive war in the Charters of the
Allied Military Tribunals for the trial of
the Axis war criminals, the clear-out
prohibition of the threat or use of force
in Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United
Nations, together with the practice of the
United Nations Itself, have reinforced and
consolidated this development in the law. The
Commission considers that these developments
justify the conclusion that the invalidity of
a treaty procured by the illegal threat or
use of force is a principle which is lex lata
in the international law of to-day. 195 "~~™
Rozakis points out, that the invalidity ground under
Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties
belongs to the category of "progressive development of
law". He writes further:
The law on invalidity existing before the
drafting of the Convention had not developed
rules dealing either with sanctions against
treaties whose conclusion resulted from a
direct coercion of a party... Article(s) 52
represent(s) a novelty in international law
introducing the public interest category of
grounds, thus indicating a gradual evolution
of the concern of States over the problems
of the international community and a certain
withdrawal of the prevailing individualism of
the past.2oo
199. UN Doc. A/CONP. 39/11/Add. 2 p. 66.
200. Rozakis (f.n.33), p. 155-6.
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He further states:
Article 52 introduces in the field of
positive international law a ground which
was formerly kept out of the law of invalidity:
the direct coercion of a State to conclude an
unwanted agreement.201
Sinclair expresses the same view when he states:
Article 52 gave rise to lengthy discussion at
the conference. The concept that a treaty may he
void if its conclusion has been procured by the
threat or use of force is of very recent origin.
She traditional doctrine was that a treaty is
not rendered null and void, or voidable at the
instance of one of the parties, by reason only of
the fact that such party was coerced by the other
party into concluding it, whether the coercion is
applied at the time of signature or of ratification
or at both times. It was accepted that treaties
procured by the threat or use of force were
morally questionable, but it was argued that
to place the stigma of nullity upon treaties
procured by the threat or use of force would
place in jeopardy all peace treaties entered
into on the conclusion of hostilities.2o2
Even Article 32 half sent. 1 of the Havard Draft (1935)
As the term is used in this Convention,
duress involves the employment of coercion
directed against the persons signing a treaty
on behalf of a State or against the persons
engaged in ratifying or acceding to a treaty
on behalf of a State;...
mentions relevantly only coercion committed against
persons.
The comment reads as follows:
201. Ibid.. p. 155, f.n. 11, "It is generally recognised
that compulsion exercised against a state...does not
render a treaty invalid" (Ross, Textbook of inter¬
national law, p. 21o).
202. Sinclair (f.n.35)» pp. 96-7.
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The term "duress" as used in this Convention
does not include the employment of force or
coercion by one State against another State
for the purpose of compelling the acceptance of
a treaty. The treaty-making representatives of
the latter State may as a result of its defeat
in war or the use of force against it, or as a
result of other circumstances.,.find themselves
under the necessity of giving their consent to
a treaty when they would not otherwise do so.
Such indirect compulsion is not, however,
"duress" as the term is used in this Convention.
It is true, that in recent years there has
been an increasing disposition among writers on
international law to callenge the traditional
view as to the right of one State to use force
against another State and to impose upon the
latter a treaty embodying such terms as the former
State may see fit to demand. Such writers
distinguish between the legitimate and the
Illegitimate use of force, or between its
justifiable and unjustifiable use, ... It is
the view of these writers that treaties imposed
under the former circumstances are valid and binding,
whereas the latter are not, or at least may be so
declared by a competent tribunal or authority. They
admit that the use of force or the threat of force
against a State may, in particular cases, be
justifiable, and therefore that a treaty obtained
as a result thereof is binding, unless the terms of
the treaty are in violation of international law.
On the other hand, it is contended that pressure
in the form of a war or threatened war would not
be justifiable if the war were one, for example,
which w as forbidden by the Covenant of the League
of Nations or the Briand-Kellogg-Pact, and a treaty
extorted as a result of such action would not be
binding on the party from which it was extorted.2o3
2o3. Harvard Draft, loc.cit. pp. 1148, 1152.
The Harvard Draft Convention on Rights and Duties
of States in Case of Aggression drawn up four
years later, however, provided in Article 4,
paragraph 3 (loc.cit. p. 1152-3) thats "A treaty
brought about by an aggressor's use of armed force
is voidable." It is now no longer possible to say
that coercion is limited to the contractual party
only.
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There are some authorities on international law,
though, who consider the principle of coercion against
the State through international law as existing already
at that time, and apply it also to the Sudeten
settlement. *
In the first edition of his bock published in 1937
Verdross writes:
Allgemein anerkannt ist..., dass ein
Staatsvertrag anfechtbar ist,wenn gegen die
Person des abschliessenden Staatsorgans Zwang
angewendet oder angedroht wurde, um sie zum
Abschluss des Vertrages zu bewegen.
Hingegen gehen die Meinungen iiber die
Bedeutung des gegen den anderen Staat aus-
geiibten Zwanges auseinander. Eine weitver-
breitete Lehre behauptet nhmlieh, dass ein
solcher Zwang nicht rechtserheblioh sei,...
Hingegen lehrt schon Grotius,,..dass...niemand
verpflichtet ist, einen Vertrag zu erftillen,
der durch eine ungerechte Drohung oder durch
eine Gewaltanwendung, die gegen die vereinbarte
Treue verstdsst, abgenotigt wurde. Auch bei
anderen aiteren Schriftstellern finden sich
Spuren dieser Auffassung (Vattel, Heffter),.. •
Bei der Dbsung dieses Problems ist davon
auszugehen, dass ein allgemeiner Vdlkerrechts-
satz, djer jeden Staatsvertrag, der durch eine
Drohung auferlegt wurde, ftir rechtsverbindlich
erkiaren wiirde, nicht nachweisbar ist. Die
Giiltigkeit solcher Staatsvertrage ist daher
nach den allgemeinen Hechtsgrundsatzen zu beurteilen.
2o4. See BrUgel, AP Bd. 16, 1965,pp. 764, 765J
Verdross, Quellen.pp.61.
Brownlie writes: "The events leading to the Munich
Agreement of September 29, 1938 and the acquiescence
of many states in the face of the successful use
of coercion cannot be reconciled either with any
legal obligation conoering non-recognition or with
the more fundamental obligations of the Covenant
and Kellogg-Briand Pact" (Brownlie, International
Daw and the Use of force by States, p. 415).
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Nach diesen, von alien Kulturstaaten anerkannten
GrundsStzen ist aber ein durch eine widerrecht-
liche Drohung erzwungener Vertrag anfechtbar.
Staatsvertrage, deren Zustandekommen mit einem
reehtserheblichen Willenomangel belastct ist, sind
jedooh nicht schlechthin ungiiltig (nichtig), sie
sind nur. ganz Oder teilweise, anfechtbar (ver-
niohtbar). Die Anfechtung eines solchen Vertrages
hat zunachst im diplomat!schen Wege zu er-
folgen.2o5
2o5. Verdross, Vblkerrecht. 1. Aufl., p. 87~8.
E.t.: It is generally recognized that an Inter¬
national treaty is voidable if duress was used
or threatened against the person of the contracting
State organ in order to force the latter into
concluding the Agreement.
There are divergent opinions, however, on the
meaning of the coercion exercised against the other
State. According to a widely-accepted doctrine, for
instance, such a coercion is irrelevant at law.
On the contrary Grotius tells.#,us that...nobody
is under an obligation to fulfill an agreement
extortet by means of an unfair threat or the use
of force which violate the agreed loyalty. Traces
of such a view can be detected also in other
writers of the past (Vattel, Heffter)... .
In the search for a solution to this problem
one must assume that it is not possible to prove
the existence of a general maxim of international
law which would declare every international treaty
imposed by threat as legally binding. The validity
of such international treaties, therefore, must be
judged in accordance with general legal principles.
According to these principles recognised by all
civilised nations, though, an agreement brought
about by an illegal threat is voidable.
International treaties whose conclusion is
encumbered with a legally relevant3ack of intent,
however, are not invalid (void) generally, they
are only voidable (quashable) wholly or in part.
Such a treaty must first be challenged through
diplomatic channels. (Relevant lack of intent,
e.g., coercion).
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Lauterpacht takes a conciliatory position. His
opinion is interesting because in the 5th edition of
his textbook (of 1937) he changed his previously held
views. Until the 4th edition (Vol. 1, at p. 711) he
considered any coercion not exercised against the person
of the negitiator himself as being insignificant in
international law. In his 5th edition (Vol. 1, at
p. 702) however, he takes note that the resolution of
the League of Nations Assembly of March 11, 1932 and the
Stimson Doctrine of January 7» 1932 undertook not to
recognise any treaty or agreement contradicting the League
of Nations Covenant or the Briand-Kellogg-Pact, and
Lauterpacht earlier amends his statement to the extent
of saying that coercion makes a treaty then null and void
when it is exercised during a war waged counter the
provisions of the League of Nations Covenant and the
Briand-Kellogg Pact. Should the war, however, not be in
violation of these instruments, or the belligerent country
not be bound by them, then the coercion is no impediment to
the validity of the treaty. Lauterpacht, thus, takes note
of the legal changes in the field of the law governing
warfare which these international agreements had brought
about, and he draws corresponding conclusions for the
validity of forcefully imposed treaties.
According to the statement made by Brierly before
the Hague Academy of International Law in 1936, a dictated
agreement ought to be just as valid as one concluded by
187.
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the parties of their own free will. In 1938 McNair
could not yet give Great Britain's official view concerning
the legal effect of an agreement which was at variance
with the Covenant of the League of Nations or the Kellogg
Pact and Rousseau saw only a reference point in the trend
2o7
expressed in the Stimson Doctrine in 1944.
Prom the Czechoslovak point of view Taborsky argues:
Taking everything together, we may say that
agreement has been reached tn two directions:
(a) Coercion exercised personally against
the physical organs which are negotiating (or
signing) international treaties, or which have
to ratify them, render such treaties invalid,
(b) Any other pressure which is exercised
besides that included under (a) does not vitiate
peace treaties... .
In other cases there prevails a notable
difference of opinion, the majority of inter¬
national authorities being on the whole against
the view that any pressure other than direct
personal coercion against those who axe
negotiating or ratifying treaties should be
considered as affecting the validity of inter¬
national treaties. There are, of course,
important voices in the other direction which,
for instancej do not recognize the validity of
treaties concluded under the threat of destruction
of, or forcible assault upon, a State which refuses
its assent to the conclusion of a treaty. There
are, furthermore, writers who maintain that all
agreements which are at variance with the fundamental
principles of international law and their undisputed
application are invalid or at least voidable.
206. Brierly, R&gles gfenferales du droit de la paix.
end.c. p. 203-8.
207. McNair, The Law of Treaties (1938). p. 1305
Roussaau. Principes gfenferaux du droit international
public. Tome I, p. 349.
i
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Finally, there are authors who, while
fundamentally allowing coercion (if it is not
a question of personal violence directed
against organs of the State) to be used in
connection with the conclusion of international
treaties, defend the view that so-called illegal
pressure (i.e., that which is exercised in
violation of some rule of internationallaw) is
not allowable, and sometimes consider treaties
as invalid on the ground of the illegalty of
their object. ...
In what light does the Czechoslovak acceptance
of the Munich Agreement appear to us to-day in
connection with the above considerations?
There was no question of personal coercion
being exercised against those who participated
in the act of acceptance....however, by...the
whole negotiations, which culminated In the
conclusion of the Munich Agreement and its
acceptance by Czechoslovakia...the Czechoslovak
State during the whole course of these
negotiations, and particularly in their final
phase, was under the most serious and immediate
threat of military attack. And the acceptance
both of the Anglo-French proposals of 19th
September, and of the Munich Agreement, was
effected only because...the alternative which
threatened was nothing less than destruction.
The German threat of a military invasion was
further in direct contradiction with the accepted
rules of international law, and this both in
respect of the Arbitration Treaty between
Czechoslovakia and Germany of 1925» according to
which the dispute should be resolved first of all
by the peaceful means referred to above, and of
the Briand-Kellogg-Pact of 1928, in which together
with other States Germany solemnly declared that
"she condemns resort to war for the determination
of international disputes, she renounced it as
an Instrument of her national policy" and
recognized "that the solution of all disputes
of whatever nature and origin can be sought only
by peaceful means."
According to the views of those who recognize
that a threat in terms of destruction and coercion
exercised in violation of the rules of international
law abolishes the validity of international agreements,
the Czechoslovak acceptance of the Munich Agreement
would thus be invalid. It must be stated, however,
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that the majority of international
authorities would probably not regard the
pressure which was exerted upon Czechoslovakia
at Munich as sufficient to render that
country's acceptance of it as invalid.2o8
Brosche cites in this connection the decision of
a Dutch court (Raad voor het Rechtsherstel) of June 29»
1956 in the matter Lienert and Klein v. Nederlandse
Beheersinstitut. In its ruling the court comes to the
conclusion that the treaty concluded by Germany and
Czechoslovakia in execution of the Munich Agreement of
November 20, 1938 is completely void in law, since it
came into being as a result of apparent unavoidable
and illegal coercion. Czechoslovakia signed the treaty
only after agreeing under protest to cede the Sudeten
territory following Germany's threat of war. Shis, though,
implies also the nullity of the Munich Agreement.
This decision has been criticised. It is thought too
dangerous to refer to a general nullity theory?
Die internationals Ordnung bedarf der Rechts-
sleherheit, die nicht dadurch gefbrdert wird,
dass die Gerichte einzelner Staaten von sich aus
Befugnisse in Anspruch nehmen, von fremden
M&chten geschlossene Vertrhge ...gegebenenfalls
ftir null und nichtig zu erkia.ren.2o9
208. Taborsky."Munich", the Vienna Arbitration and
International Law, loc.clt. on. 30-2.
209. Brosche, Zwang beim Abschluss vblkerrechtlicher
Vertrage, p. 119. E.t.s International order needs
legal security which cannot be promoted if courts
of individual countries claim the right possibly
to declare treaties concluded by foreign States...
null and void.
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The legal situation as it stood in 1958 wast
Although the League of Nations existed, the German Reich
had withdrawn from the League in 1953. The provisions of
the League of Nations Covenant therefore were no longer
applicable to Germany.^10 Moreover, the Covenant of the
League of Nations in general did not outlaw war, but
rather prescribed ways for the peaceful settlement of
disputes,However,the obligations under the Covenant
of the League of Nations fell with Germany's withdrawal
from the League. This notwithstanding, Great Britain,
210. In the Comment to Article 18 of the Harvard Draft
on the Law of Treaties is to be read:
"Article 17 of the Covenant of the League of
Nations has sometimes been interpreted as being
based on the theory that States which are not
Members of the League, and therefore not parties
to the Covenant, may nevertheless, in certain
cases, be subjected to the sanctions envisaged by
Article 16. Article 17 provides that, if a non-
member State refuses to accept the invitation of
the Council to assume the obligations of membership
for the purposes of a dispute between it and a
Member State and resorts to war against such Member,
the sanction provisions of Article 16 shall be
applicable as against it. But Anzilotti (1 Cours
de Droit International, Gidel trans*, 1929# p. 415),
correctly, it is believed, declares that such an
interpretation is without legal foundation.
Artiole 17# he says, may and must be interpreted
in a manner to reconcile it with the general
principle that a treaty cannot impose obligations
on States which are not parties to it" (loc.cit.
$. 921).
211. "Prior to the conclusion of the (Paris) Pact, war
constituted a legal remedy" (Lauterpacht (f.n.41),
Vol. II., p. 184).
191.
Prance and Italy Intervened In 1938 to settle the
German-Czechoslovak conflict without recourse to war.
This puts an end to the objection raised by Zourek
concerning the nullity of the Munich Agreement on the
ground of violation of Article 10 of the League
Covenant.212 This article guarantees territorial
o wnrership protection through members of the Federation
against foreign attack, and lays down an arbitration
procedure which could affect also non-members (Articles
15, 17 of the Covenant).
The resolutions based on Article 10 which were
passed by the League of Nations Assembly were binding
only on League of Nations members. They were thus binding -
in the case of the Munich Agreement - on Prance, Great
Britain and Italy. This, however, is outside the scope
of the present thesis which is solely concerned with the
validity of an agreement made between Czechoslovakia and
the German Reich. This agreement, though, did not affect
the objection raised by the League of Nations. Moreover,
It does not necessarily mean that treaties violating
Article 10 of the Statute were void. This is, in fact,
very unlikely, since a pure rule of procedure suoh as
this does not embody a nullity ground based on property
rights - not even Article 20 of the Covenant, which
212. See the text of f.n.3, paragraph 1 and Zourek's
essay in "Le Monde", April 4, 1968.
■
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oontains a legal obligation not to conclude agreements
21 *5
going counter to the Covenant. J
Since the Covenant of the League did not outlaw
war, the outlawing of war was striven for outside the
Covenant, This led to the signing of the Pact of Paris
for the renunciation of war on August 27» 1928. This Pact
condemns recourse to war for the solution of international
controversies. In Article II of the Pact the States agree
that the settlement or solution of all conflicts shall
never be sought except by pacific means.
In Lauterpacht's opinion this Pact permitted without
21A
restriction recourse to measures of force short of war. ^
Lauterpacht distinguishes between war, measures of force
short of war and an ultimatum. The distinguishing feature
of a measure of force short of war is, according to him,
that, although measures of force are also harmful measures ,
the actions of the contesting parties, as of third States,
are not considered measures of war and diplomatic and
economic relations continue, as do treaties between the
parties, With regard to an ultimatum, even If war is
threatened if it is refused, in Lauterpacht's view this
21 *>
is not to be interpreted as compulsion. J
213. Zur Problematik der Regeln der Streiterledigung unter
(femVbikerbund (On the problem concerning the settlement
of disputes under the League of Nations), Berber, Bd. 3
p. 51.
214. Lauterpacht, Ibid.. p. 185.
215. Lauterpacht (f.n.41), Vol. I, pp. 132-3.
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Although this interpretation is no longer valid
to-day in consequence of the regulations in Article 2,
paragraph 4 of the UN Charter, Lauterpacht*s view
predominated between the wars to the extent that it
greatly influenced the practice of Statesj war-like
conflicts were no longer considered "war" but rather
military reprisals.
Delbez writes:
Dans la Charte, les Etats renoncent a. la
menace ou & l'emploi de la force et le concent
de force est certainement beaucoup plus
extensif que celui de la guerre. Tombent ainsi
sous le coup de l'artlcle 2, paragraph 4,
toutes les manifestations possibles de la
violence, m&me celles qui sont considerfees
comme ne cr§ant pas juridiquement l'fetat de
guerre, telles les reprfesailles armies.
Compatibles avec le Pacte Briand-Kello&g,
elles ne le sont plus avec la Charte.216
The decisive point is, however, what the practice
of States was at this time. Immediately after the
conclusion of the Pact, there were a number of armed
conflicts between States and the only effect of the Pact
216, Delbez (f.n.38)» p. 399. E.t.: In the Chanter
the States renounced the use or threat of force
and the concept of force is certainly more
comprehensive than the concept of war. Included
under Article 2, paragraph 4 are all possible
manifestations of force, even those which legally
are not considered such, which contribute to a
State of war, as for example armed reprisals.
While they were consistent with the Kellogg-Briand
Pact, they are not any longer consistent with the
Charter.
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was that these conflicts were not considered "wars",
but rather police actions, reprisals and the like.
This was reflected in attitudes to the conquest of
Manchuria in 1931 by the Japanese,^1^ the conquest of
Ethiopia by Italy, the subjugation of the Baltic States
by the Soviet Union, different armed conflicts in South
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America, as well as the conflicts between Japan and
China dating from 1937*^^
The practice of avoiding the use of the term war
shows clearly that the States proceeded from the idea
that only war was outlawed by the Pact and not armed
intervention, not to mention the mere threat of such.
Tunkin maintains as well:
Es ist bekannt, dass die Kolonialmachte
es vorzogen, die von ihnen,».geftihrten Kriege
"milit&rpolitisehe Massnahmen", "Repressalien",
"bewaffnete Konflikte",.. zu nennen, um auf
217. Strupp-Schlochauer (f.n.40), Bd. 2 p. 371.
218. Brownlie, International law and the use of force
by Mates, pp. 77-8.„
219. It cannot be maintained that the Pact of Paris
changed the practice of States. Of course the
alleged practice of States in the sense of a ban
on the threat of force by means of the Kellogg
Pact is cited in the literature (see Brownlie,
Ibid., pp. 87*8), but it was really only that
States criticized the actions of other States
in international relations with reference to the
Pact of Paris, However, when it came down to actual
deeds and not just declarations, relations and
facts which arose as a consequence of the violation
of the ban on war were accepted by all parties, as
for example in the case of the Baltic countries.
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diese Weise zu dokumentieren, dass solche
Aktionen nicht unter den Geltungsbereich des
Pariser Paktes fallen.22o
And with regard to the threat of force, until the
establishment of the United Nations a generally held
belief did not exist that such a threat influenced the
validity of the measures adopted subsequently between the
State threatened and the State which issued the threat.
Even the Nuremberg Tribunal concerned itself with
the ban of war only and not with the threat of force.
Indeed, it was not until the creation of the United
Nations that the threat of force was also outlawed in
international law by reason of Article 2, paragraph 4
of the Charter.
Brownlie maintainst
The travaux prfeyaratoires (to Article II
of the Pact of Paris) indicate that the
conclusion of threats was not contemplated
as no mention is made of them.221
As a basis for his view that the threat of force
was also outlawed by the Kellogg-Pact, Zourek cites222
220. Tunkin (f.n.103), p. 161-2. E.t.i It is well-known
that the colonial powers preferred to call the
wars...led by them, "military-police actions",
"reprisals", "armed conflicts"...in order to
document the fact that such actions did not fall
under the scope of the Paris Pact.
221. Brownlie (f.n. 217)# p. 89.
222. Zourek (f.n.115)# p. 47.
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the Resolution of the League of Nations of March 11,
1932, which - * deolares that it is incumbent upon the
members of the League of Nations not to recognize any
situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about
by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations
22,5
or to the Pact of Paris. The Resolution has then a
double character! first, It appeals to the binding
character of the Pact of Paris, presents vis-d-vis the Pact
no further obligations, and is therefore only declaratory,
Secondly, it binds the League members to the Stimson-
Dootrine.
This doctrine takes its name from a note of UoS.
Secretary of State Stimson of January 7» 1932 to China
and Japan, in which the American Government expressed its
determination not to recognize any situation, treaty or
agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to
the League Covenant and the obligations of the Pact of
Paris of August 27, 1928.224
223. League of Nations, Official Journal, Special
Supplement No# 101, Vol. I, 1932, pp. 87-8,
224. The Note by the United States to China and Japan
runs as follows!
"In view of the present situation and of its own
rights and obligations therein, the American
Government deems it to be its duty to notify
both the Government of the Chinese Republic and
the Imperial Japanese Government that it cannot
admit the legality of any situation de facto
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nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or
agreement entered into between these governments,
or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty
rights of the United States or its citizens in
China, including those which relate to the
sovereignty, the independence or the territorial
and administrative integrity of the Republic of
China, or to the international policy relative to
China, commonly known as the Open Door Policy;
and that it does not intend to recognize any
situation, treaty, or agreement which may be
brought about by means contrary to the covenants
and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27,
1928, to which treaty both China and Japan, as well
as the United States, are parties" (A.J.I.L.
Vol. 26 (1932), p. 342).
See further Strupp-Schloehauer (f.n.40),
Bd. 3 P« 393-6 (394).
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The legal significance of the Stimson Doctrine is
225
disputable, J and under no circumstances could it create
obligations for non-members of the League, for the League
could not even create obligations for all the Member-
States without the consent of every Member. It should be
recalled that all the Great Powers were never Members of
the League at the same time. The U.S. was never a Member
at all, and Germany and Italy had left the League even
before the Soviet Union became a Member. Lauterpacht
assumes therefore, that the Stimson Doctrine bound only
226
those Member States which expressly agreed to it.
But even most of the States which accepted the doctrine
did not adhere to it, as they recognized Italy's conquest
of Ethiopia and the Soviet Union's acquisition of Latvia,
Lithuania and Estonia.
It can be concluded, therefore, that the Stimson
Doctrine did not establish any further obligations for
States.
Thus, in the literature of international law before
the Second World War the Munich Agreement was seen in the
main as valid. Markus, for example, bases his argument
225. See Wehberg, Die Stimson-Doktrin. loc.clt. p. 434-5J
Zimmer, GewalTsame territorlale Veranderungen und
ihre vdlkerrechtliche Legitimation, p. 19-20;
Bllfin&er. Die Stimson-Doktrin. p. 10-1.
226. Lauterpacht (f.n.41), Vol. I, p. 143-4.
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that the Treaty of March 15, 1939 was invalid on the
consideration that this treaty violated the Munich
227
Agreement. ' Taborsky writes:
It must be stated, however, that the
majority of international authorities would
probably not regard the pressure which was
exerted upon Czechoslovakia at Munich as
sifficient to render that country's
acceptance of it as invalid.228
Rousseau cites a whole series of reasons why the
Munich Agreement was invalid, but he never mentions any
229
legally relevant kind of pressure or duress. J Even
in 1942 Oassin considered the Munich Agreement as
thfeorfetiouement intacte.2^0
The attitude of the Member-States of the League of
Nations at this time gives a very good indication of the
accepted practice of States at the time of the Munich
Settlement. The United Kingdom and France, both as
mediators and as contracting Powers, participated in the
Munich Agreement and thereby expressed their conviction
that the conclusion of the Agreement in the done way was
227. Markus, Le traitfe germaro»tchfecoslovaque du 15 mars
1939 & la luminldre du droit international, end.c.
pp. 6^-4.
228. Taborsky (f.n.112), p. 16.
229. Rousseau, L'accord du Munich et le Droit international.
end,c. p. 107.
230. Cassin, La position international de la Tchfecoslovaqule.
loc.cit. ppT 61-2 C"theoretically intacte").
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valid, especially was the manner in which the German
demands layed down in the ©odesberg Memorandum were
realized viewed as a legitimate means of concluding
the treaty. A lot of States, in particular the world
Powers, to all Intents and purposes recognized the
validity of the Munich settlement in that, after the
agreement, they treated the former Czechoslovak citizens,
who had now become German, as Germans, e.g. recognized
their German passports as valid. Accordingly, the Munich
Agreement was welcomed by world public opinion as a
peaceful solution to the crisis situation.
The validity of the Munich Agreement thus was not
questioned by any State before the Second World War.
Because it cannot be established that at the time
of the Munich Agreement generally accepted international
law or the Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawed the threat of
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force in concluding a treaty, ^ authors such as Zourek
appeal not on the basis of a threat to use force but
rather on aggression committed when the Sudeten German
"Freikorps" undertook action on Czechoslovak territory
in arguing that the Munich Agreement was invalid. But
this thesis is not convincing, for it was never seriously
contended that the volunteer corps was a military threat
2%2
to Czechoslovakia. J
231. Brownlie (f.n.218), p. 404.
232. Kimminich (f.n.110), p. 16. But Zourek (f.n.115),
pv 46 writes:
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"Die Aggression gegen die Tschechoslowakei wurde
am 17. September 1938 eingeleitet, als Henlein
durch den reichsdeutschen Rundfunk auf Befehl
Hitler's den "Freikorps"-Truppen, die vom Reich,
ausgertistet und von Offizieren der Nazi-Wehrmacht
befehligt wurden, die Order zur Einleitung der
Kampfaktionen gegen die tschechoslowakische Republik
erteilte. In dieser Aktion muss daher eine Angriffs-
aktion des Reichs gegen die tschechoslowakische
Republik vorgenommen durch Vermittlung bewaffneter
Truppen der sudetendeutschen Partei erblickt werden,"
E.t.: The aggression against Czechoslovakia started
on September 17» 1938 when, by order of Hitler,
Henlein gave the "Preikorps" troops - who had been
equipped by the Reich and were led by officers of the
Nazi Wehrmacht - the order to begin combat actions
against the Czechoslovak Republic. This act must
therefore be seen as an act of aggression of the Reich
against the Czechoslovak Republic, executed through




Thus, it cannot be maintained that the Czechoslovak
Government agreed to the Munich Settlement as a result
of aggressive actions of the volunteer corps.Rather
the accusation can be made that the Reich took aggressive
actions against Czechoslovakia when forces of the
volunteer corps, armed on German territory, fought on
Czechoslovak soil. This means that the German Government
supported armed groups of Sudeten Germans, who at that
time were Czechoslovak citizens.
For more than fifty years, first in the League of
Nations and then within the scope of the United Nations,
it has been debated whether such practices constitute
aggression.
233. Zourek, Ibid.. p. 46-7.
234. The General Assembly of the UN addressing itself to
this important question created, in accordance with
Resolution 688(VII) adopted December 20, 1952, a
Special Committee on the Question of Defining
Aggression with the assignment to work out by 1954
relevant suggestions on this theme. After deliberations
in the General Assembly from November 23-29, 1954,
the matter was postponed until the 11th Session (1956),
in accordance with Resolution 895(1X0 from December 4,
1954. At this time the Special Committee delivered a
report* By means of Resolution 1181(XII) the General
Assembly resolved to authorize the Secretary General
to request that the new member-States take positions
on the matter and that the Special Committee continue
its work. A revised report was to have been delivered
at the 14th Session in 1959.
The General Assembly could not decide how to handle
this matter in the succeeding years and postponed
further deliberation on the matter, first until 1962
then until 1963. Even after this date it was felt
that discussion on aggression had not sufficiently
developed to allow any final settlement. Moreover,
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no member of the Special Committee, as foreseen,
moved to have the Committee convened earlier than
arranged for, including the entire period up to
1967. Nevertheless, Resolution 2160(XXI) of the
General Assembly adopted on November 30, 1966, which
called for strict adherence to the renunciation
of the threat and use of force in international
relations and the right of self-determination for all
countries, represented progress in the matter.
The question of the definition of aggression was
discussed once again at the full Assembly session in
1967. By means of Resolution 2330(XXII) adopted on
December 18, 1967 the General Assembly recognized the
widespread conviction of the need to expedite the
definition of aggression. After more than a decade,
work on the definition of aggression was resumed.
The Special Committee on the Question of
Defining Aggression was supposed to present a report
to the General Assembly at its 23rd session(l968).
The Committee, however, was not able to complete
its assignment until 1974. Finally in 1974 the
Special Committee presented a report to the General
Assembly which contained a Draft of the Definition
of Aggression accepted by the Committee. The General
Assembly conveyed the draft to the Sixth Committee
which recommended adoption to the full Assembly.
The report of the Special Committee was placed
on the agenda of the 29th Session of the General
Assembly.On December 14, 1974 the General Assembly
unanimously adopted the draft, without alteration,
at its 2319th meeting by means of Resolution 3314
(XXIX). See Resolutions, adopted by the GA during
its 29th session, Vol. I, pp. 142-4.
The question of the legal binding force of
General Assembly Resolutions such as this important
one, No. 3314 (XXIV) and of Declarations, in
particular, whether they can be recognized as a
factor in the process of forming customary inter¬
national law in the interpretation of Article 38,
paragraph lb), that is to say as "evidence of a
general practice", is a very debatable theme, since
the Charter does not grant legislative authority to
any organ of the United Nations. It is widely
accepted, of course, that the General Assembly does
not possess law-gLving power. However, many scholars
feel that there are circumstances which confer
authority on decisions of the General Assembly.
Asamoah, for example writes:
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"Admittedly, the Assembly is not empowered to
legislate but there are certain circumstances when
its decisions are authoritative. Moreover, the
Assembly is composed of States which are responsible
for the creation of international law. The Assembly
may act as a forum for agreement on legal principles.
Therefore, the circumstances of the adoption of a
declaration need careful examination before any
opinion on its significance can be given" (Asamoah,
The Legal Significance of the Declarations of the
General Assembly of the United Nations, n. 24).
According to Sloans
"There are circumstances under which a resolution
of the General Assembly produces important juridical
consequences and possesses binding legal force. As
a general rule, however, resolutions, for lack of
intention or of mandatory power in the Assembly, do
not create binding obligations in positive law...
Although a large majority supports the view that
most recommendations have no legal force, the opinion
also prevails that General Assembly recommendations
possess moral force and should, as such, exert great
influence.
Representatives in describing the effect of General
Assembly recommendations have used such phrases as
'moral force', 'moral authority', 'moral weight',
'moral power', 'moral judgement', 'moral obligation',
and 'morally binding'..." (See Sloan, The Binding
Force of a Recommendation of the General Assembly
of the United Nations, loc.cit. pp. 1-33).
D.H.N. Johnson emphasizes the moral and political
effect of resolutions: "There is also nothing to
prevent members incurring binding legal obligations
by the act of voting for resolutions in the General
Assembly, provided there is a clear intention to be
so bound. Recommendations of the General Assembly...
are not in themselves sources of law. Their value,
even as means for the determination of rules of
international law, depends upon the degree of
objectivity surrounding the circumstances in which
they were adopted..." (D.H.N. Johnson, The Effect
of Resolution of the United Nations, loc.cit. p. 121).
Generally it can be indicated that the Assembly
is not vested with legislative powers. Lauterpacht
(f.n.41), p. 426 writes: "...the General Assembly
is not endowed with effective powers of decision
in the fulfillment of the general functions entrusted
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If it took until the end of 1974 before the States
could agree on a definition of aggression. Certainly in
1938 it was not a belief of the international community
that the infiltration of armed bands, one of the most
disputed issues in the Special Committee for Defining
Aggression, was to be considered aggression according
to international law.
This is clear if one compares the first definition
proposal, submitted by the Soviet Union, and the
corresponding text in the Resolution adopted by the
General Assembly in 1974*
In the draft of the U.S.S.R., we read;
1, In an International conflict that State
shall be declared the attacker which first
commits one of the following acts..,f)support
of armed bands organized in its own territory
which Invade the territory of another State, or
refusal, on being requested by the invaded State,
to take In Its own territory any action within
its power to deny such bands any aid or
protection.235
The resolution adopted by the General Assembly on
December 4, 1974, maintains on the contrary, in
Article 3t
to it by the Charter")* However, although the
recommendations of the Assembly are not legally
binding, they provide an important instrument
for bringing the weight of world public opinion
to bear upon the Members of the United Nations."
235. UN Doc. GA OR (XII), Suppl. No. 16 (A/3574)
pp. 30-1, (A/AC. 77/L.4).
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Any of the following acts, regardless of a
declaration of war, shall subject to and in
accordance with the provisions of Article 2,
qualify as an act of aggression?..«g) the
sending by or on behalf of a State of armed
bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries,
which carry out acts of armed force against
another State of such gravity as to amount
to the acts listed above, or its substantial
involvement therein.236
. 3314 (XXIX), Ibid.. See further reports of the
Special Committeeon the Question of Defining
Aggression, March 11 - April 12, 1974, UN Doc.
GA OR 29th session, Suppl. No. 19 (A/9619).
Chairman? Mr. Bengt H.G.A. Bromes (Finland)
and UN Doc. A/9890, Report of the Sixth Committee,
Rapporteur? Mr. Joseph Sanders (Guyana),
December 6, 1974.
Acts of aggression:
(a.J The invasion or attack by the armed forces
of a State of the territory of another State, or
any military occupation, however temporary,
resulting from such invasion or attack, or any
annexation by the use of force of the territory
of another State or part thereof; (b) Bombardment
by the armed forces of a State against the
territory of another State oi the use of any
weapons by a State against the territory of another
State; (c; The blockade of the ports or coasts of
a State by the armed forces of another State; (d)
An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land,
sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of
another State; (e) The use of armed forces of one
State which are within the territory of another
State with the agreement of the receiving State,
in contravention of the conditions provided for in
the agreement or any extension of their presence
in such territory beyond the termination of the
agreement; (f) The action of a State in allowing
its territory which it has placed at the disposal
of another State, to be used by that other State
for perpetrating an act of aggression against a
third State; (g) The sending by or on behalf of a
State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force
against another State of such gravity as to amount
to the acts listed above, or its substantial
involvement therein (Res. 3314(|XXIX), loc.cit.).
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And in Article 7 it is indicated:
Nothing in this definition, and in particular
Article 3# could in any way prejudice the right
of self-determination, freedom and independence,
as derived from the Charter, of people forcibly
deprived of that right and referred to in the
Declaration on Principles of International Law
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
among States in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations, particularly peoples under
colonial and racist regimes or other forms of
alien domination} nor the right of these peoples
to struggle to that end and to seek and reosLve
support, in accordance with the principles of the
Charter and in conformity with the above-mentioned
declaration,237
The definition of aggression, accepted on all sides,
proceeds from the belief that subjugated peoples, who
are held in subjugation against their will and the right
of self-determination, may free themselves and to this
2^58
end enlist the support of third States. ^
237. Mr. Kolesnic (Union of Soviet Socialist Republic)
stressed (in the Special Committee) with regard to
article 3...paragraph (g),..(that) there was a certain
connexion between that paragraph and article 7. His
delegation attached great weight to the fact, that
not a single delegation.*.had expressed opposition
to the right of peoples to self-determination (UN
Doc. GA OR 29th Session, Suppl, No, 16, A/9619,
pp. 36-7).
238. "Das Recht auf freie Entscheidung Uber den politischen
Status, insbesondere auf politische UnabMngigkeit,
bedeutet, dass die Vblker das Recht haben, ihr
Schicksal selbstandig oder gemeinsam mit anderen
TUlkern und Nationen...zu gestalten." See Arzinger,
Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Gegenwart. p. 229.
E.t.: The right to decide freely with regard to
political status, in particular political independence
means...that the people have the right to construct
their own destiny independently or together with
other poeples or nations by means of a sovereign
State.
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The struggle of oppressed peoples for self-
determination is centuries old, a struggle which found
a good deal of support in world public opinion. The Greek
war for independence 1821-1829, the Polish uprising 1830-
1831, and the Hungarian rebellion of 1848 found
substantial support, for instance. However,
\intil recently the majority of Western jurists
assumed or asserted that the principle had no legal
content, being an ill-defined concept of policy
and morality.239
In Germany the right of self-determination had often
been discussed as a result of Woodrow Wilson's 14 Points.
239. Brownlie (f.n.44), p. 483.
Mtinch, in Ostvertr&ge und Neues Jus Cogens, in:
OstyertrsLge. Berlin-Status. Miinchener Abkommen.
Bezlehungen zwlschen der BRD und der DDR. Vertrage
und Diskussionen elnes Symposiums.veranstaltet vom
Tnstliut filr Internationales Rechx an der Universltat
Kiel. Z7.-29. Marz 1971. P. 111-2. writes* "Das
^elbstbestimmungsrecht der Volker wird im Ublichen
Handapparat des VUlkerrechtlers noch als blosses
politisches Prinzip, nicht als Reohtssatz angesehen.
...Das Schrifttum des Ostblocks vertritt es schon
lange als Rechtssatz..•.. Die Praxis der Dekoloniali-
sierung, die Entschliessungen der Vereinten N^tionen,
besonders 1514 (XV) und die Aufnahme in die Art. 1 der
beiden Menschenrechtskonventionen der Vereinten
Nationen bestatigen ...es."
E.t.i The right of self-determination of peoples
is still regarded by the scientific international law
practice as a political principle and not as a legal
prescription. Scholars from the East Block represent
it since a long time as a legal principle.... The
practice of decolonization, the resolutions of the
UN-particularly 1514(XV)- and its Inclusion in
Article 1 of both Human Rights Conventions of the
UN...confirm this view.
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These 14 Points and thereby the right of self-determination
were supposed to provide the basis for the peace concluded
a ja
at the end of the First World War. It was a political
slogan before Hitler came to power and was subsequently
used by him to good advantage. The Covenant of the league
of Nations did not contain the right of self-determihation.
The Charter of the UN mentions in Article 1 and in
Article 55 the right of self-determination of peoples and
as a consequence the practice of United Nations organs has
established the principle as a part of the law of the
United Nations.
240. The American President originally intended to
incorporate the principles of the right to self-
determination in the Charter of the League of
Nations. Self-determination was also included
in Article III of the Covenant drafted by Wilson.
However, he gave up his territorial revisions
clause, and it is not known whether other States
pressured him into doing this. At any event,
Article 10 of the league Charter contains nothing
about the principle of self-determination.
241. Article 1 states* The purposes of the United
Nations ares...2. To develop friendly relations
among nations based on respect for the principle
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,
and to take other appropriate measures to
strengthen universal peace; and Article 55 sums
up this reference in the following manner: "With
a view to the creation of conditions of stability
and well-being.,.based on respect for the principle
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,
the United Nations shall promote..."
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In Resolution 637 A (VII) of December 16, 1952 the
General Assembly recommended that the members of the UN
uphold the principle of self-determination for all peoples
and nations. In the Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 1514 (XV)
of December 14, 1960, the GeneralAssembly declared that all
peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue
of that right they freely determine their political status
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development.
The Declaration regards the principle of
self-determination as a part of the obligations
stemmihg frog the Charter, and Is not a
*recommendation*, but is in the form of an
authoritative interpretation of the Charter. ...
However, a number of governments continue to
deny that it exists as a legal principle.242
One is no longer able to dispute the character of
the right of self-determination as a genuine legal
principle especially since the General Assembly In 1966
adopted Resolution 2189 (XXI) of December 13» 1966 in
which it noted with deep regret that six years after the
adoption of the Declaration 1514 (XV) of December 1960
many territories were still under colonial domination,
and deplored the negative attitude of certain colonial
242. Brownlie (f.n.44), p. 484; see also Pawcett, The
New Nations in International Law and Diplomacy,
pi 245; Wright. The Role of International Law in
the Elimination of War. P. 28.
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powers which refused to recognize the right of colonial
OA"*
peoples to self-determination. ^
Furthermore, the General Assembly reaffirmed its
recognition of the legitimacy of the struggle of the
peoples under colonial rule to exercise the right of
self-determination.
The most important and possibly the most decisive
step in the realization of the principle of self-
determination was taken in the passage of both texts
on Human Rights in the Annex to Resolution 2200 (XXI)
of December 16, 1966 with the title: 'International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights.'^4 In both Covenants Article 1,
243. UN Doc.A/RES/637(VII) A, The right of peoples and
nations to self-determination, GA OR (VII), Suppl.
No. 20 (2361), p. 26; A/RES/1514(XV), Declaration
on the granting of independence to colonial countries
and peoples, GA OR (XV), Suppl. No. 16 (A/4684),
p. 67; A/RES/2189(XXI), Implementation of the
Declaration on the granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples, GA OR (XXI), Suppl.
No. 16 (A/6316), p. 5.
244. Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, 21st
Session GA OR, Suppl. No. 16 (A/6316), pp. 49-60.
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sent. 1 expressly states:
All peoples have the right to self-
determination.
This then is made more precise in Article 1,
paragraph 1, sent. 2 and paragraph 2 of the texts (of
both Conventions) with the appeal to the parties to the
Covenants to bring about the realization of the right of
self-determination in conformity with the provisions of
24.
the Charter of the United Nations. J
For Miinch the conception of self-determination receives
further substance by reason of the authoritative
Resolution 242 (1967) of the Security Council on Palestine
of November 22, 1967 in which is emphasized
the inadmissibility of the acquisition
of territory by war.246
245. With the law of November 15» 1973 (Law Gazette II,
p. 1533)# the German Parliament approved the Inter¬
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights with
reservations (not taken into account here), and with
the law of November 23# 1973 (Law Gazette II, p. 1569)
the Parliament approved the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights without
reservations (text of the Covenants:pp. 1534-55#
1570-82). Berlin (west): "With the following
declaration...: The Convention(s) shall also to apply
to Berlin (West) with effect from the date on which
(they) enter(s) into force for the Federal Republic
of Germany, except as far as Allied rights and
responsibilities are affected" (Multilateral Treaties
in respect of which the Secretary-General performs
depositary functions, List of Signatures, Ratifications,
Accessions, etd. as at December 31# 1974# UN Doc.
ST/LEG/SER7D/8, pp. 95,90).
246. Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council,
1967, SC OR 1967 (XXII), UN Doc. S/INF/22/Rev. 2,
p. 8-9.
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Mtinch feels that the offence against the right of
self-determination is to be found in the case of Palestine
as well as all the former German eastern territories. He
maintains that the Security Council would find that
indigenous population of Palestine had a right to a
referendum. ^'
This opinion voiced by Mttnch at the Kiel Symposium
in 1971» at which Scheuner and Menzel also participated,
remains controversial, however.
In conclusion it can be said that the principle of
self-determination has been accepted for some time but
not recognized as a legal principle under international
law; however, by reason of the UN Charter and the
subsequent interpretation of this by the General Assembly,
self-determination has become a legal principle under the
Charter of the United Nations with the overwhelming support
of the Member-States.
But in the year 1938 self-determination was only
a political principle*^® and it was therefore not a
247. See Ostvertrage-Berlin-Status. Mtinchener Abkommen.
Beziehungen zwischen der BRD und der DDR.pp. 112.
T5TT Z
248. A telegram circulated by WeizsScker on October 3»
1938 stated with regard to the Munich Agreement;
"Zum ersten Mai in der Geschichte ist es gelungen,
auf friedlichem Wege eine Grenzrevision im Sinne des
Selbstbestimmungsrechts der Vdlker zu erreichen"
(ADAP, IV, p. 20). E.t.: For the first time in
history a boundary revision has been accomplished
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repudiation of international law when the Czechoslovak
Government addressed simultaneously to the British and
French Governments an official note which rejected the
suggestion of carrying out a plebiscite in the
territories in question and thereafter imposed martial
2aq
law in the area of the Sudetenland. J
With regard th the activities of Henlein's volunteer
corps it can be said that from the standpoint of public
international law and the legal statute and definition of
aggression one has to assume that at the time of the Munich
Agreement no stricter obligations existed for the States
than required by Article 3g) of the definition in
Resolution 3314 (XXIX), that the formation of bands reached
a certain scale.
in a peaceful manner in the spirit of the right of
self-determination of nations.
Schwarzenberger writes: "The success of the German
move in Austria invited repetition in Czechoslovakia.
...Again the principle of self-determination served
as a handy/ pretext. Whatever merit this principle
may possesses, Hitler was hardly entitled to base any
claim on this product of ^liberal thinking"...(Power
Politics, p. 283).
249. Starke writes (1967): "The right of self-determination
of peoples.,.has been expressly recognised by the
United Nations. ...Notwithstanding denials that such
a right of self-determination exists, it must be
acknowledged that latterly there has been wider
general recognition of the right. ...Prior to 1958,
it could be said that customary international law
conferred no right upon dependant peoples or entitles
to statehood, although exceptionally(some)such ad hoc




Just this condition* however, was not met by the
Sudeten German "Freikorp8M, for during the negotiations
at that time they were not mentioned once because of the
insignificant role they played.
Even if one were to apply today's definition of
aggression to the relations at that time, the formation
of the "Freikorps" would not have represented an act
of aggression. Their actions did not constitute aggression
against Czechoslovakia for which the German Reich could be
held responsible, and they were not regarded as such by
the Powers involved, as the subsequent events demonstrated.
The opposing view would maintain that the German Reich had
already begun a war of aggression against Czechoslovakia
in the second half of September 1938.2"50 This inter¬
pretation, however, is not entertained seriously by anyone.
250. See Kimminich (f.n.110), p. 17.
The French historian Pierre George, however,
considers it as proved that already from 1935 onwards
there existed a Joint "Pan-germanic" campaign waged
from Berlin and NUrnberg against the Czechoslovak'-.
Government and the State by the Reich and the Sudeten
German Party on Henlein (Le Probldme allemand en
Tchfecoslovaaule 1919-1946. pp. 51 J. He goes on to say:
"The course oj^ everyday politios gives the impression
of a perfectly organised play in which the roles have
been exactly distributed between the Third Reich and
the Sudeten German Party. All the young men belonging
to the Pan-germanic group and led by men of the
Sudeten German Party, came to Germany to undergo
military training." (E.t.),
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Also Zourek's reference to the Arbitration Agreement
made between the German Reich and CzechoSlovakia2^ in
accordance with Annex E of the Treaty of Locarno of
October 16, 19252'2 does not alter this legal position.
This was inherently a Non-Aggression Pact which, from the
point of view of international law, was on the same footing
as the Pact of Paris.
If Prance, as Zourek further states,2**' neglected
its duties as an ally towards Czechoslovaka by urging the
latter to enter into the Munich Agreement, then it is a
matter which concerned only those countries, though it was
suited to provide a ground for the nullity of the Munich
Agreement.
Inasmuch as there was a dispute over an arbitration
clause, it was up to the parties thereby affected, namely
Czechoslovakia, to turn to the Permanent Commission
(Article 6 of the Annex E). In its Note of September 20,
1938 to Great Britain and Prance, Czechoslovakia referred
to arbitration, but dropped the matter after Great Britain,
in its reply, expressed the view that It was highly unlike¬
ly that the German Reich would accept such a proposal.
251. Reference is made to the text (para 2) to f.n.4.
252. Law Gazette 1925 II, PP. 975 (pp. 1003-9).
253. Zourek, Ibid., (f.n.3).
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Nevertheless the Nuremberg Military Tribunal under
Control Council law No. 10, stated in the "Ministries
Case:"
On 16 October 1925* Germany entered into
a treaty with Czechoslovakia Article I of part 1
of which provided that all disputes of any kind
between Germany and Czechoslovakia, which may
not be possible to settle amicably by normal
means of diplomacy, should be submitted for
decision either to an arbitral tribunal or to
the Permanent Court of International Justice,
and it was agreed that the disputes referred
to include those mentioned in Article XIII of
the Covenant of the League of Nations.254
Spengler writes:
Schwieriger ist...die Prage zu beantworten,
ob die Mtinchner Regelung einen Verstoss gegen
den in Locarno abgeschlossenen deutsch-tschechos-
lowakischen Schiedsvertrag vom 16.10.1925 darstellt.
In diesem Vertrag hatten sich Deutschland und
die CSR verpflichtet, alle geeigneten Streitffhlle
zwischen ihnen entweder einem Schiedsgericht Oder
dem Sthndigen Internationalen Gerichtshof zur Ent-
scheidung vorzulegen (Art. 1). Dabei nahm der
Vertrag diejenigen Streifalle von der Regelung
aus, die einer richterlichen oder schiedsrichter-
lichen Entscheidung nicht zughnglich waren, sowie
diejjenigen, die aus Tatsachen herriihrten, die
bereits vor Abschluss des Schiedsvertrages ent-
standen waren.
Nach Art. 1 konnte eine Entscheidung durch
Richterspruch nur verlangt werden, wenn ein
Streit tiber ein Recht vorlag. Darum handelte es
sich jedoch im Palle der Sudetenkrise unzweifel-
haft nicht, denn die rechtliche GUltigkeit der
bis dahin bestehenden deutsch-tschechoslowakischen
Grenze wurde von Deutschland nicht in Prage gestellt.
254* "Ministries Case", Trials of War Criminals before
the Nuremberg Military tribunals under Control
Council Law So. 10. Vol. HV. n. ^25.
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Es ging vielmehr um die Durchsetzung der politischen
Forderung auf Revision der deutsch-tschechoslowa-
kischen Grenzen.
Whhrend derartige politische Streitfragen gemass
Art. 3» Abs. 3 des Vertrages zwischen Deutschland,
Belgien, Frankreich, Grossbritannien and Italien
vom 16.10.1925 einer Vergleichskommission zu unter-
breiten waren, die bei Nichteinversthndnis auch nur
einer Streitpartei mit der vorgeschlagenen Regelung
die Angelegenheit an denVblkerbundsrat abzugeben
hatte, der dann nach Art. 15 VBS t&tig wurde, er-
forderte der deutsch-tscheohoslowakische Sohieds-
vertrag noch eine Art Vorverfahren.
Die hier massgebliche Spezialregelung des Art. 17
ordnete an, dass die stSndige Vergleichskommission
erst dann um eine Entscheidung ersucht werden durfte,
wenn vorher alle diplomatischen Mittel ausgeschbpft
wurden (giitliche Lbsung auf gewbhnlichem diploma-
tischem Wege).
Gerade darum handelte es sicn aber bei der
britishh-franzbsischsn Vermittlungsaktion, deren
Hbhepunkt die Mtinehner Konferenz war, auf der es
gelang, Deutschland im wesentlichen auf die Lbsung
festzulegen, die die CSR am 21. September 1938
bereits akzeptiert hatte. In diesem Sinne ist auoh
die positive Bewertung der britisGh-franzbsischr-
italienishhen Vermittlungsaktion und der Mtlnchner
Konferenz durch den Vblkerbund zu verstehen.255
255. Spengler, Zur Frage des vblkerreohtlich gtlltigen
Zustandekommens der deutsch~tsc^echoslowakiscnenITrenzregeluhg von 1938. x>. 135-6. E.t.: A somewhat
more difficult question to answer is whether the
Munich settlement represents a violation of the
German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Agreement of
October 16, 1925 signed at Locarno. ...
In this agreement Germany and the CSR had under¬
taken to submit for decision all suitable disputes
arising between them to the Arbitration Tribunal or
the Permanent International Court (Art. 1). Rot
included in the agreement are disputes which were
outside the Jurisdiction of a judicial or arbitration
decision and those based on facts which took place
prior to the signing of the Arbitration Agreement.
219
According to Article 1 a decision by way of
judicial ruling could only be requested if the
dispute concerned a right. In the instance of the
Sudeten crisis this was certainly not the case,
since Germany had not questioned the legal validity
of the German-Czechoslovak frontier existing up to
that time. At issue, rather, was the imposition of
the political demand for the revision of the German-
Czechoslovak frontiers.
While according to Article 3# paragraph 3 of the
Agreement of October 16, 1925 made between Germany,
Belgium, France, Great Britain and Italy such
political disputes had to be submitted to an
Arbitration Commission - which in case of dissent
of just one party to the dispute with the suggested
settlement had to forward the matter to the Council
of the League of Nations which, in turn, could deal
with it under Article 15 of the CLN - the German-
Czechoslovak Arbitration Agreement required in
addition a kind of preliminary procedure.
The special provision of Article 17 applicable
here specified that a decision could be sought only
then from the Permanent Arbitration Commission when
first all diplomatic possibilities had been exhausted
(friendly solution through normal diplomatic channels).
The British-French efforts of mediation
represented exactly such a procedure. The culminating
point of such efforts was the Munich Conference which
succeeded essentially in binding Germany to the
solution already accepted by the CSR on September 21-,
1938. Also the positive estimation given by the League
of Nations to the British-French-Italian efforts of
mediation must be seen in this context.
I
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e) The Argument of Conspiracy Against Peace as a
Special Reason for the Nullity of the Agreement
Brownlie writes:
Since the latter half of the nineteenth
century it has been generally recognized that
there aire acts or omissions for which inter¬
national law imposes criminal responsibility
on individuals and for which punishment may be
imposed, either by properly empowered inter¬
national tribunals or by national courts and
military tribunals. These tribunals exercise
an international jurisdiction by reason of the
law applied and the constitution of the tribunal,
or, in the case of national courts, by reason of
the law applied and the nature of jurisdiction
(the exercise of which is justified by inter¬
national law).256
This possible ground of nullity, which must be
exclusively judged by the criteria of Article 6a) of the
Charter of the International Military Tribunal in the
Annex of the Agreement for the procecution and punishment
of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis of
August 8, 1946 which runs as follows:
The following acts, or any of them, are crimes
coming within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal
for which there shall be individual responsibility:
a) Crimes against peace: Namely, planning,
preparation, initiation or waging of a war of
aggression, or a war in violation of inter¬
national treaties, agreements or assurances,
256. Brownlie (f.n.44), p. 454; see further Starke
(f.n.37), pp. 58-9; O'Connell (f.n.80), Vol. 2,
pp. 817-8; Delbez (f.n.30), p. 398; Lauterpacht
(f.n.41), Vol. 1, p. 341-2; Schwarzenberger (f.n.42),
Vol. 1 pp. 183-4; Vol. 2 pp. 607-10; Quadri,
Dlrltto Internazionale Pubblico. pp. 421.
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or participation in a common plan or
conspiracy for the accomplishment of any
of the foregoing.257
The International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg
established in its Judgement of October 1, 1946, the
facts that
...the conference of the November 5» 1937
made it quite plain that the seizure of
Czechoslovakia by Germany had been definitely
decided upon, ...the only question remaining
was the selection of the suitable moment to do
it.
Further, that
the discussions between Hitler and the
defendant Keitel with regard to "Case Green"
^>n the April 21, 1938) were showing quite
clearly that the preparations for the attack
on Czechoslovakia were being fully considered.
Finally, that
Hitler ordered (on the May 28, 1938) that
preparations should be made for military
action against Czechoslovakia by the October 2,
and from then onwards to the plan invade
Czechoslovakia was constantly under review;
and that
257. United Nations Treaty Series No. 279. The Agreement
was originally signed by the United States, France,
the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, and came
into force for those parties upon signature. It was
subsequently adhered to, prior to the Nuremberg
Trial, by nineteen states: Greece, Denmark, Yugoslavia,
the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Belgium,
Ethiopia, Australia, Honduras, Norway, Panama,
Luxembourg, Haiti, New Zealand, India, Venezuela,
Uruguay and Paraguay (Mueller-Wise, pp. 227-38).
The Agreement is technically still in force (Ibid.,
p. 227).
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on the May 3» 1938 a directive signed by
Hitler declared his unalterable decision to
smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the
near future.258
Basing himself on these findings Zourek draws the
conclusion that, as a void international agreement drawn
up only in a pseudo-legal form, the Munich Agreement was
meant simply to cover up the international crime of the
PRO
Nazi conspiracy against peace.
This view must be contradicted inasmuch as the Munich
Agreement must in no way be considered a pseudo-legal
document.
If Zourek had applied this view to the later Hacha
Agreement of March 15» 1939 then one would have accepted
this definition despite certain reservation; not so,
however, in the case of the Munich Agreement which was
concluded in the proper form of an international treaty
by the European powers with the consent of Czechoslovakia,
and which does not suffer from any defects that could
justify such criticism.
The objection raised by Zourek with regard to the
legal characterisation of the Munich Agreement must be
rejected on the ground that it represents a polemical and
factually unjustified attack against the Agreement. As far
258. Nazi Cons-piracy and Aggression. Opinion and
judgement, pp. 24-5.
259. Unrichtlge Anslchten liber das Miinchener Abkommen
von 1938. -p. 45.
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as the ground for the nullity referred to by Zourek is
concerned, namely the conspiracy against the peace
(complot,...conspiration des nazis contre la paix),
two equally important questions must be pointed out;
firstly, what did the International Military Tribunal
of Nuremberg recognise as constituting a conspiracy
against the peace on the part of some of the accused,
and secondly, what causal connection exists between the
Munich Agreement and the latter's anti-peace activities.
Although the indictment concerning crimes against the
peace had been based strictly on Art. 6a) of the Charter
of the International Military Tribunal, the Court came
to the conclusion that the conspiracy only applied to
the crime of aggressive war.^®
Quincy Wright writes in this connection:
The Tribunal found that the conspiracy
charge could apply only to the crime of aggressive
war, although in the indictment it had been
applied to all the offences named in the Charter.
The prosecution had treated the final paragraph of
J&rticle 6 as an independent crime but the Tribunal
held that this paragraph was "designed to establish
the responsibility of persons participating in a
commom plan," that is, it was intended to include
accomplices as well as principals in each crime,
not to add a crime of conspiracy. Consequently,
the Tribunal considered the conspiracy charge on
the basis of Article 6, paragraph (a), which makes
"participation in a commom plan or conspiracy - for
the accomplishment" of aggressive war a crime. This
260. Das Urteil von Ntlrnberg. p. 96.
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crime9 however, differs little from "planning and
preparation" of aggressive war. The evidence
showed that concrete plans to make aggressive
war were made as early as November 5, 1937.
Consequently persons aware of and aiding in these
plans after that date were guilty of the
conspiracy charge, The prosecution's theory
that "any significant participation in the affairs
of the Nazi party or government is evidence of a
participation in a conspiracy that is in itself
criminal" was rejected.261
This means, then, that the Court took not even the
occupation of the Sudetenland by the German Reich to be
the actual criminal act against the peace, and that it
found those persons guilty who had personally partaken
in a complete plan of aggression against Czechoslovakia,
and, further, that the Court certainly did not consider
any other event that occured prior to October 1, 1938 -
especially the signing of the Munich Agreement - as an
act against the peace which could provide the basis for
an ex tunc nullity of the Agreement.
Though published before the Nuremberg Judgement was
delivered, Control Council Law No. 10 of December 20,
1945 and Count One of the indictments thereunder (e.g. the
indictsments in U.S.;% v. Weiszacker (Ministries Case,
Vol. XII, p. 20) and U.S. v. Krauch (I.G. Farben Case,
Vol. VII, p. 14), provided consequently for the punishment
of participation in planning, preparing, or initiating the
261. Wright. The law of the Nuremberg Trial, loc.cit
p. 272.
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invasions of ...the Sudetenland, and the remainder of
Czechoslovakia in March 1939 as crimes against peace
262
and not merely as part of the conspiracy.
Strupp-Schlochauer states:
Als Rechtsgrundlage ftir die in Deutschland
von den einzelnen Besetzungsmachten durchzu-
fuhrenden Kriegsverbrecherprozesse wurde das
Kontrollratsgesetz Nr. 10 vom 20.12.1945...
erlassen, das dem Statut des Internationalen
Milit&rgerichtshofs nachgebildet 1st, aber...
bemerkenswerte Abweichungen enthalt: in den
Tatbestand des Verbrechens gegen daaFrieden
wurden nunmehr auch "Einf&lle"263 (in andere
Lftnder) einbezogen, um die Annexionen Oster-
reichs und der Tschechoslowakei bestrafen zu
konnen. ...264
In both oases the defendants were accused of having
misused their standing and positions in the economy,
finance and industry until the end of the war by
participating in the Initiation of invasions of other
countries and in wars of aggression in violation of
international laws and treaties, including but not limited
262. Brownlie, (f.n.217) p. 211—2j Text of the law:
J.O.F. 1945, pp. 84-8. German translation in v.
Knierim. Ntirnbere. Rechtliche und menschliche Pro¬
blems, p. 5^-4.
263. French: "Dfeclenchement d'invasion".
264. Strupp-Schlochauer (f.n.40), Bd, 2, p. 640. E.t.:
Law No. 10 of December 20, 1945.•.passed by the Control
Council was used as the legal basis for the War
Crimes Trials which were to be staged by each occupying
Power. This law was fashioned after the Statute of the
International Military Court, but contains notable
differences: the crimes against the peace now
included "invasions" (of other countries) in order
to make the annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia
a punishable offence.
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to planning, preparation, initiation and waging of wars
of aggression, and wars in violation of international
treaties, agreements, and assurances, and specifically
in the case of Czechoslovakia, beginning with the invasion
of October 1 , 1938.*^ jjje Court concurred with this when
bringing in a verdict of 'guilty'. Thus, it is the
occupation of the Sudeten territories on October 1, 1938
that becomes the centrepoint of the indictment and the
subject of the judgement, and not the Munich Agreement
itself which, as far as the Court was concerned, had been
of no great importance to the issue of conspiracy against
the peace.
But in the case U.S. v. Krauch the Judgement states
that s
To depart from the concept that only major
war criminals - that is, those persons in the
policial, military and industrial fields, for
example, who were responsible for the formulation
and execution of policies - may be held liable for
waging wars of aggression would lead far afield...
265. "IGr Parben Case", Trials of War Criminals before
the Nuremberg Military Tribunal under Control
6ouncll law No. Vol. VIll t>. io46i "All ihe
defendants acting through the instrumentality of
Parben and otherwise...participated in the planning,
preparation, initiating, and waging of wars of
aggression and invasions of other countries...
2. The invasions and wars of aggression were as
follows...against Czechoslovakia, October 1, 1938
and March 15, 1939..."
266. Ibid.. Vol. VII, pp. 14-5; Vol. XII pp. 20-1;
To17 XIV pp. 323-5, 865.
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The defendants now before us were neither high
public officials in the civil government nor
high military officers. Their participation was
that of followers and not leaders. If we lower
the standard of participation to include them,
it is difficult to find a logical place to draw
a line between the guilty and the innocent among
the great mass of German people.267
In the further question of a causal connection
between the Munich Agreement and crimes against the peace
is indisputable, that the International Military Tribunal
has doubtlessly elaborated the pre-conditions of a
systematic aggressive scheme against Czechoslovakia.
The "Case Green" document, too, contains such a multitude
of detailed facts and military data that one is led to
the conclusion that in the Munich Agreement the conspiracy
against the peace suffered only the temporary setback of
268
a predetermined future course of events, thereby
becoming part of the actual act of aggression.
This, however, must be contradicted, since such a
causal connection which is supposed to represent the basis
of the important ex tunc nullity ground, does not exist.
It is thus the problem of causality which is of prime
importance in this issue and which must give an affirmative
answer to the question - if Zourek would be right: that it
267. Brownlie (f.n.262), p. 204-5.
268. Strupp-Schlochauer (f.n.40), Bd. 2, p. 555 point
out that soon the Munich Agreement ceased to being
a means of saving and stabilising European peace,
and became a short-term means of stopping Hitler's
strive for expansion.
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was the Munich Agreement itself and not its accompanying
factors, particularly the occupation of the Sudeten
territories on October 1, 1938, which contributed to the
conspiracy against the peace. In international law not
enough importance is attached to the question of causality.
The German jurist Bothe mentions this in connection with
the Law of Treaties, and draws a very appropriate comparison
between coercion when concluding a treaty, and a success
that goes counter to international law.
He writes!
Attention must further be drawn to a problem
of causality which was generally overlooked in
the debates concerning art. 49. When is the
conclusion of a treaty "procured" by the threat
or use of force? Is any conclusion "procured"
by coercion for which the use or threat of
force constitutes a cause, i.e., any conclusion
which would not have occured if there had not
been a use or threat of force? It is clear that
a treaty comes under the rule of art. 49 if the
coercion is directly intended to bring about
the treaty, e.g., if a treaty is concluded by
a State giving way to the threat that forde
will be exercised against it if it does not
consent to the proposed treaty. But if a treaty
is concluded between two States to clear up a
situation brought about by the illegal use of
force of one of them, it is not obvious that
such a treaty is "procured" by coercion although
the coercion is a cause of the treaty, i.e.,
although the treaty would not have occurred
without that coercion. This treaty may be fair
regulation of the tension existing between the
States, which does not leave the aggressor any
unjust advantage. In this case It is difficult
to see why the treaty should be void. On the
other hand, the treaty may be aimed at reserving
to an aggressor the fruits of his illegal attack.
In this case, it seems to be just to consider
the treaty as void. A solution of this problem
must be found In a reasonable and restrictive
interpretation of the word "procure", which
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interpretation may tentatively be circumscribed
as follows: A treaty is only procured by coercion
if the use or threat of force is directly intended
to bring about the treaty or if the treaty is
aimed at maintaining a situation which was created
by an illegal use of force. But it seems to be
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to formulate
a really precise and satisfactory solution to this
problem of causality.269
In consequence of the foregoing considerations the
conclusion is justified that in any case the Munich
Agreement does not constitute, even in the opinion of
the judges at Nuremberg, part of Hitler's plan against
Czechoslovakia, but an interruption of his plans not
foreseen by Hitler and occasioned by the interference
of the Franco-British statesmen.^'0
"Case Green" relates to Hitler's plan for military
aggression against Czechoslovakia. Indisputably, the
plan consisted in using an incident in Czechoslovakia
as the pretext for military action to exterminate her.
Hitler's behaviour during the negotiations with Mr.
Chamberlain in Berchtesgaden and Godesberg indicates
that he had decided to realize his plan of a military
action against Czechoslovakia with the aim of completely
destroying the State.
It is entirely due to the efforts of the British
Prime Minister that the realization of this plan was
269. Bothe, Consequences of the Prohibition of the
Use of Force, loc. cit. n. 515.
270. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Opinion and Judgement,
p. 25-7.
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delayed for a period of half a year. According to Schacht's
testimony before the International Military Tribunal of
Nuremberg, Hitler said of Prime Minister Chamberlain, he
271
had delayed his march into Prague. '
The Munich Agreement was not part of the war plans
of the Reioh but represents a temporary deviation from
them. In fact^ the Nuremberg Judgement determined that
Hitler's plans must have been altered in September 1938
272
after the Conference of Munich. ' It was not until the
271?
Spring of 1939 that Hitler was able to realize his plans.
271. International Military Tribunal. Vol. XII, p. 580;
IHmmlnlch. loc.cit. p. 14 f.n.13.
272. Das Urteil von Nilrnberg. p. 53.
273. Under General Assembly resolution 177(11) of
November 21, 1947 paragraph (a), the International
Law Commission was directed to "formulate the
principles of international law recognized in the
Charter of the Nttrnberg Tribunal and in the judgement
of the Tribunal
In pursuance of this resolution of the General
Assembly, the Commission undertook a preliminary
consideration of the subject at its first session.
In the course of this consideration the question
arose as to whether or not the Commission should
ascertain to what extent the principles contained
in the Charter and judgement constituted principles
of international law. The conelusion was that since
the Ntirnberg principles had been affirmed by the
General Assembly, the task entrusted to the Commission
by paragraph (a; of resolution 177(11) was not to
express any appreciation of these principles as
principles of internationallaw but merely to formulate
them. This conclusion was set forth in paragraph 26
of the Report of the Commission on its first session,
which Report was approved by the General Assembly in
1949. Mr. Jean Spiropoulos was appointed Special
Rapporteur to continue the work of the Commission
on the subject and to present a Report at its second
session.
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At the session under review, Mr. Spiropoulos
presented his Report (A/CN.4/22) which the Commission
considered at its 44th to 49th and '54"kh meetings.On the
basis of this Report * the Commission adopted a
formulation of the principles of international law
which were recognized in the Charter of the Ntirnberg
Tribunal and in the judgement of the Tribunal. ...
(UN Doc.A/1 316, loc.clt. p. 13).
The formulation of principle VI by the Commission
was:
The crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as
crimes under international law:
a. Crimes against peace:
(i) Planning, preparation, initiation or waging
of a war of aggression or a war in violation of
international treaties, agreements or assurances;
(ii) Participation in a common plan or conspiracy
for the accomplishment of any of the acts mentioned
under (i).
The Report included the following comment to this
prindple VI:
"The Tribunal made a general statement to the
effect that its Charter was "the expression of inter-
national law existing at the time of its creation".
• • *
The Charter of the Niirnberg Tribunal did not
contain any definition of "war of aggression", nor
was there any such definition in the judgement of the
Tribunal. It was by reviewing the historical events
before and during the war that it found that certain
of the defendants planned and waged aggressive wars
against twelve nations and were therefore guilty of
a series of crimes. ...
The terms "planning" and "preparation" of a war
of aggression were considered by the Tribunal as
comprising all the stages in the bringing about of
a war of aggression from the planning to the actual
initiation of the war. In view of that, the Tribunal
did not make any clear distinction between planning
and preparation. As stated in the judgement, "planning
and preparation are essential to the making of war".
• • •
The meaning of the expression "waging of a war of
aggression" was discussed in the Commission during
the consideration of the definition of "crimes against
peace". ...
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A legal notion of the Charter to which the
defence objected was the one concerning "conspiracy".
The Tribunal recognized that "conspiracy is not
defined in the Charter". However, it stated the
meaning of the term, though only in a restricted
way. "But in the opinion of the Tribunal", it was
said in the judgement, "the conspiracy must be
clearly outlined in its criminal purpose. ..."
The Tribunal must examine whether a concrete
plan to wage war existed, and determine the
participants in that concrete plan" (loc.clt.
pp. 13-4).
On July 28, 1954 the International Law Commission
adopted a Draft Code of Offences against the Peace
and Security of Mankind (UN Doc. GA (OR), IX, Suppl.9
(A/2692), pp. 11-2).
The respective provisions (Article 2 of the draft)
run as follows:
The following acts are offences against the peace:
• • •
(1) Any act of aggression, including the
employment of armed force by the authorities of
a State for any purpose other than national or
collective self-defence or in pursuance of a decision
or recommendation of a competent organ of the United
Nations.
(2) Any threat by the authorities of a State
to resort to an act of aggression against another
State.
(3) The preparation by the authorities of a State
of the employment of armed force against another
State for any purpose other than national or
collective self-defence or in pursuance of a
decision or recommendation of a competent organ
of the United Nations.
(4) The organization, or the encouragement of
the organization, by the authorities of a State,
of armed bands within its territory or any other
territory for incursions into the territory of
another State, or the toleration of the organization
of such bands in its own territory, as a base of
operations or as a point of departure for incursions
into the territory of another State, as well as
direct participation in or support of such incursions.
(5) The undertaking or encouragement by the
authorities of a State of activities calculated to
foment civil strife in another State, or the
toleration by the authorities of a State of organized
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activities calculated to foment civil strife in
another State.
(6) She undertaking or encouragement by the
authorities of a State of terrorist activities in
another State, or the toleration by the authorities
of a State of organized activities calculated to
carry out terrorist acts in another State.
(7) Acts by the authorities of a State in
violation of its obligations under a treaty which
is designed to ensure international peace and
security by means of restrictions or limitations on
armaments, or on military training, or on fortifica¬
tions. or of other restrictions of the same character.
(8) The annexation by the authorities of a State
of territory belonging to another State, by means of
acts contrary to international law.
(9) The intervention by the authorities of a State
in the internal or external affairs of another State,
by means of coercive measures of an economic or
political character in order to force its will and
thereby obtain advantages of any kind. ...
(13; Acts whioh constitutei
(i; Conspiracy to commit any of the offences
defined in the preceding paragraphs of this article;
or
(ii) Direct incitement to commit any of the
offences defined in the preceding paragraphs of
this article; or
(iii) Complicity in the commission of any of
the offences defined in the preceding paragraphs
of this article; or
(iv) Attempts to commit any of the offences defined
in the preceding paragraphs of this article.
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f) The Objection of Frau<J2?4
When Hitler annexed Czechoslovakia after promising
275
to guarantee her existence, he incurred the reproach
of fraud in concluding the treaty because even at the time
of its conclusion Germany did not intend to observe
it.276
As with contracts in private law, error and fraud
also appear in international lav/ though in this sphere
they are much less common. Fraud, for example, is almost
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unknown in international law. '
274. The International Law Commission gave the following
comment to draft Article 46 of the Convention on the
Law of Treaties (Art. 49 of the Convention): "Fraud
is a concept found in most systems of law, but the
scope of the concept is not the same in all systems.
In international law, the paucity of precedents means
that there is little guidance to be; found either in
practice or in the jurisprudence of international
tribunals as to the scope to be given to the concept.
In these circumstances, the Commission considered
whether it should attempt to define fraud in the law
of treaties. The Commission concluded, however, that
it would suffice to formulate the general concept of
fraud applicable in the law of treaties and to leave
its precise scope to be worked out in practice and
in the decisions of international tribunals" (UN Doc.
A/CONF.39/11/Add. 2, p. 64).
275. Document No. 6 (Annex to the Agreement).
276. Ort, in Kimminich (f.n.110), p. 76.
277. Oraison, Le dol dans la conclusion des traitfes.
end.c. p. 6>1^J Guggenheim (f.n.21/), Bd. 1 p. 84, 86.
"Examples of fraud as a ground for vitiating consent
to be bound by a treaty are rare, if not non¬
existent, in States practice.... The (International
Law) Commission in their commentary to Article 49
were unable to cite a single instance of fraud. ..."
(Sinclair (f.n.35), p. 93).
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The Convention on the Law of Treaties deals with
error and fraud in articles 48 and 49 without defining
them.*^8
As to what constitutes error in the sense
of a vice du consentement in the making of
treaties, writers on international law are
not entirely in agreement.279
With regard to fraud it is said:
Certain of the rules of municipal law as
to what constitutes fraud in the making of
contracts would seem to he, in the main,
applicable in the case of treaties (induces)
as a result of fraud.28o
We remember that the corresponding Article 31 of
the Harvard Research did also not give a definition of
"fraud". In the comment is stated:
Article 31 does not attempt to define the
term "fraud" or indicate in any way the essential
elements which give an act a fraudulent character.
Under this article that task is left to the
international tribunal or authority before which
the party alleging the employment of fraud must
bring the question in order to obtain a declaration
of nullity. There is, however, a general agreement
among Jurists as to the essential characteristics
of fraudulent conduct. It may be said that its
distinguishing characteristic is that the act was
done with a wilful intent to deceive another.
Certain of the miles of municipal law as
to what constitutes fraud in the making of
contracts would seem to be, in the main, applicable
in the case of treaties induced as a result of fraud.
278. UN Doc. A/CONF.39/11/Add. 2, p. 295-6.
279. Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties,
loc.clt. p. 1129.
280. Ibid.. p. 1145.
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One of these miles is that while wilful
misrepresentation, that is, statements made
with the knowledge that they are false, and
made for the purpose of deceiving another and
of inducing him to enter into a contract,
always constitutes fraud, innocent misrepresentation,
that is, a misstatement of facts not known to be
false, is not. The former is always sufficient
reason for the avoidance of a contract; the latter
may vitiate a contract when the misrepresentation
is material or important but it never constitutes
ground for an action ex delicto. In fact it is
really error and not fraud.281
According to a decision handed down by the Supreme
Court of Germany (RG), the intention of a contracting
party not to observe a treaty does also in the field of
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public law not invalidate the treaty. This is, as well,
a generally accepted principle of law. The Permanent Court
of International Justice has decided that one party's
misinterpretation of the further intentions of the other
party does not affect the validity of the treaty.This
is also applicable if one contracting party secretly
281. Ibid., p. 1145.
282. RGZ Bd. 147 p. 36 (40).
283. P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B No. 53 (Legal Status of Eastern
Greenland), p. 71i "Norway has objected that the
Danish Government's intention to extend the monopoly
rfegime to the whole of Greenland was not mentioned
in the Danish request of July 14tb, 1919, as is
alleged to have been done at a later date in the
communications addressed to the interested Powers
in 1920 and 1921; and it is argued that if the
Norwegian Government had been warned of this intention,
the declaration of the Minister for Foreign Affairs
would have been in the negative; and that, in
consequence, the declaration, though unconditional
and definitive in form, cannot be relied on against
Norway.
The Court cannot admit this objection."
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decides not to observe the treaty. This does not entail
fraud but a mental reservation which does not affect the
validity of the treaty.
Dahm writes J
...der geheime Vorbehalt (ist) auch im
Vblkerrecht nicht zu beachten. Wenn z. B. ein
Staat ein Gebiet ftir einen l&ngeren Zeitraum
mit dem Hintergedanken in Pacht nimmt, es nach
dem Ablauf der Pachtzeit ftir sich zu behalten,
so ist gleichwohl der Pachtvertrag zustandgekommen.
.♦.Wenn eine Partei bewusst etwas anderes erkiart,
als sie will, so muss sie sich auch beim Wort
nehmen lassen.284
It does not come within the scope of mental reservation,
when the Judgement of the International Military Tribunal
in Nuremberg statesi
That Hitler never intended to adhere to the
Munich Agreement is shown by the fact that a
little later he asked the defendant Keitel for
information with regard to the military force
which in his opinion would be required to break
all Czech resistance in Bohemia and Moravia. 285
In ancient times contracting States always tried
to defend themselves against intentional breaking of
treaties by ceremoniously confirming the treaties with
an oath or by the exchange of hostages. In modern times
284. Dahm (f.n.28), Bd. 3 p. 38.
E.t.i ...the 'hidden' proviso (must) be ignored also
in international law. When, for example, a State
takes out a leasehold interest in a territory for
a longer period of time with the intention at the
back of its mind of keeping it even after expiration
of the lease, a lease has nevertheless been concluded.
...If a party intentionally makes a statement which
is at variance with its true intentions, then that
statement must be taken at its face value.
285. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, p. 27.
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the occupation of territory (e.g. in the Treaties of
Versailles of 1871 and 1919)» pledges (in the Dawes
Agreement of 1924) or guarantees by third powers were
286
used for this purpose. In any case the mental
reservation not to observe the treaty is not taken
into account.
Hitler's intention to break the Munich Agreement
is shown by his failure to guarantee the existence of
Czechoslovakia.
The Annex to the Munich Agreement was signed by
the four Conference Powers. The acceptance of the results
of the Munich Conference by Czechoslovakia was obviously
extended to the Annex as well, particularly because this
benefited Czechoslovakia and Czechoslovakia did not
exclude any part of the conference results in its
acceptance ot its terms. The formal requisites of a
treaty were therefore met.whethe* and what kind of
contractual obligations were incurred by reason of the
Annex depends entirely on the interpretation of its
contents.
According to Paragraph 6 of the proposals of
September 19, 1938 the British and French Governments
offered to give the Czechoslovak Government in the
event of the cession of the predominantly German
286. Lauterpacht (f.n.41), Vol. I pp. 930-32
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territories to Germany, a general guarantee against an
unprovoked attack in place of Prance's still existing
treaty commitment to Czechoslovakia. This offer was
confirmed in the Annex to the Munich Agreement. Under
#o circumstances can the interpretation be drawn from
this wording that a guarantee had already been given.
Taborsky however thinks that there would be a non¬
fulfillment of a pledge of guarantee. He explains:
The Anglo-French proposals of 19th
September, 1939, have already referred in
Point 6 to the safeguarding of Czechoslovakia
by a common pledge of guarantee against any
unprovoked aggression. .••
The Czechoslovak Government accepted the
Anglo-French proposals expressly emphasizing
the fact that it accepted them as a whole
from which the principle of guarantee must not
be detached. In acknowledging the Munich
Agreement it accepted the offer of a guarantee
by Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy,
and at that moment the obligation undoubtedly
fell upon all four States to guarantee the
new Czechoslovak frontiers: upon Great Britain
and France immediately, upon Germany and Italy
after the conclusion of the Vienna Arbitration,
by which the question of the Hungarian minority
(that of the Polish had already been resolved
earlier) was definitely decided, ...
All the conditions for carrying out the
guarantee were fulfilled by at the latest,
shall we say, th6 end of 1938, and this fact was
emphasized by the Czechoslovak Government not
only to the Western Powers but also to Germany.
• • •
Germany's hesitation did not free the other
signatories of the Agreement from their
obligations. The German refusal to provide
the promised guarantee to Czechoslovakia did
not, of course, free the other signatories of
the Agreement. ...The non-fulfillment of
"Munich" gave Czechoslovakia the right of
cancellation. ...
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There is no doubt that the promise of a
guarantee was...an essential. The Anglo-French
proposals of 19th September, 1938, were
certainly accepted by the Czechoslovak
Government with an express declaration
of the fact that they were accepted as a
whole, from which the principle of guarantee
must not be detached. That in accepting these
proposals, as well as the Munich Agreement
which replaced and supplemented them, the
Czechoslovak Government had chiefly in mind
(and therefore considered as an essential) the
promise of a guarantee is evident also from
other "Munich" documents, particular from the
reply.....regarding the Godesberg Memorandum,287
Blumenwitz states in this connection:
Als ein...auch theoretisch schwer lbsbares
Problem erscheint die Nichterftillung des
Mtinchner Abkommens im weiteren Sinne durcb
das Deutsche Reich und die sich hieraus fttr
die Gebietstibertragung im Herbst 1938 ergebenden
rechtlichen Konsequenzen. Im Vordergrund steht
hierbei die Nichterftillung der Garantiezusage.
...Verstosse gegen die im Herbst getroffenen
Vereinbarungen sind heute in ihren wesentlichen
Punkten unbestritten. Strittig erscheint in
erster Linie, ob die im Annex zum Mtinchner
Abkommen enthaltene Garantiezusage mit der
Grenzregelung selbst in einem inneren Zusammen-
hang steht. ...Das Ntirnberger Milit&rtribunal
nahm...aufgrund des ihm vorliegenden Akten-
materials deutscherseits eine arglistige
Thuschung an, da die deutsche Regierung von
vornherein nicht daran gedacht habe, das in
der 1• Zusatzerklarung zum Mtinchner Abkommen
angektindigte Garantieversprechen beziiglich der
neuen Grenzen der Tscheohoslowakei einzulbsen.
Objektiv betrachtet, dtirfte jedoch der Nachweis
eines dolus malus im hierftir allein entBcheidenden
Zeitpuhkt des vertragsschlusses sehr schwerfallen,
so dass das Nichterftillen der Garantiezusage wohl
eher im Zusammenhang mit der Nichterfiillung des
Miinchner Abkommens durch das Deutsche Reich zu
sehen ist.288
287. Taborsky (f.n.206),pp. 33-5.
288. Blumenwitz, Zur Nichtigkeit des Mtinchener Abkommens
vom 29. September 193^. loc.cit. p. 82. 86. E.t.:
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The non-fulfillment in the wider sense of the
Munich Agreement on the part of the German Reich
and the legal consequences ensuing therefrom for
the territorial transfer in the autumn of 1938
appears to be a problem whose solution is difficult
to achieve even theoretically. In this connection,
the non-fulfillment of the promise of guarantee
assumes a prime position...
There is no dispute today regarding the main
points of the violations of the accords arrived
at in the autumn. There is disagreement, however,
on whether the promise of guarantee contained in
the annex to the Munich Agreement is related
internally with the border settlement...
On the basis of the evidence at its disposal,
the Nuremberg Military Tribunal took the view that
Germany had committed a fraudulent deception,
since right from the beginning the German Government
had not had the intention of keeping its promise of
guarantee relating to the new Czechoslovak frontiers
contained in the first supplementary statement to
the Munich Agreement. Looking at it objectively,
though, it should be extremely difficult to prove
the existence of a dolus malus at the time the
agreement was concluded - which in this case
represents the decisive factor. Thus, the non¬
fulfillment of the promise of guarantee must
surely be looked at in connection with the non¬
fulfillment of the Munich Agreement on the part
of the German Reich,
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However, one must contradict Blumenwitz "because
the Nuremberg Judgement does not contain expressis
verbis such a reservation, A fraudulent deception
of the contractual parties should be assumed in
connection with the failure to make a statement of
guarantee. Blumenwitz also fails to give a corresponding
citation from the judgement.
Spangler explains:
Zur BegrUndung der These, dass die Nicht-
erfiillung der Garantiezusagen auf das rechts-
wirksame Zustandekommen der Grenzneuregelung
ohne Binfluss gewesen sei, wird vor allem auf
die von den tibrigen MUnchner Vereinbarungen
gesonderte schriftliche Niederlegung in einem
Annex zum Mlinchner Abkommen hingewiesen.
Hieraus - und aus der Tatsache, dass die
Zusatzvereinbarung ebenso wie der eigentliche
Yertragstext und die drei weiteren Annexe jeweils
von alien vier Regierungschefs gesondert unter-
zeichnet und mit Orts- und Datumsangaben versehen
wurden, wird gefolgert, dass nach dem Willen der
Unterzeichner die Gebietsabtretung als solche
eine in sich geschlossene Abmachung darstellen
sollte und auch die aufschiebend bedingte deutsche
Garantiezusage nicht etwa als Gegenteistung
Deutschlands aufzufassen sei. Anders sei jedoch
die Garantiezusage Grossbritanniens und Frankreichs
zu beurteilen, da die CSR ihre Einverstandnis-
erklarung vom 21. September 1938 nur unter der
Yoraussetzung gegeben habe, dass Grossbritannien
und Frankreich den Fortbestand der OSR als Yblker-
rechtssubjekt garantierten.
Diese Bedingung habe aber Deutschland nicht
binden kdnnen, da das anglo-franzdsische Garantie-
Angebot bereits vor der MUnchner Zusammenkunft
an die tschechoslowakische Regierung gerichtet
gewesen sei.
FUr die hier erbrterte Auffassung kbnnte
ausser der Uusserlichen Trennung des Zusatz-
abkommens vom eigentlichen MUnchner Abkommen
und der gesonderten Unterzeichnung auch das
Argument angefUhrt werden, dass man sich anderen-
falls wohl auf eine Garantie seitens Deutschlands
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beschr&nkt h&ttej denn die tibrigen Garantie-
versprechen h&tten ohnehin nie Gegenleistung
sein konnen. ...289
289. Spexigler (f.n.255),pp. 152-3. S.t.i To support
the thesis that the non-fulfillment of the promise
of guarantee had no effect on the legally valid
formation of the new frontier settlement, reference
is made above all to the note contained in the
annex to the Munich Agreement but which was written
on a separate occasion from the Munich accord.
Prom this and from the fact that the four Heads
of Government affixed their signature, date and
place in each case independently to the supplementary
agreement as well as to the actual text of the
agreement and to the three additional annexes one
can conclude that the signatories intended the
territorial cession to represent a separate agreement,
and the German promise of guarantee not to be taken
as Germany*s performance. The guarantee pledge given
by Great Britain and Prance, though, must be judged
differently, because the CSR made its declaration
of consent of September 21, 1938 solely on the
condition that Great Britain and France guaranteed
the continued existence of the CSR as an international
law subject.
This condition, though, could not have been
binding on Germany, because the Anglo-French ©ffer
of guarantee was tendered to the Czechoslovak
Government prior to the Munich conference.
As a further argument to support the view expressed
here, apart from the physical separation of the
supplementary accord from the actual Munich Agreement
and the separate signing, one could mention that,
alternatively, one would have restricted (oneself
to the guarantee on the part of Germany, since the
other guarantee pledges could, in any case, never
have represented a performance. ...
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The legal situation was on September 19, 1938
as follows:
The status of the potential guarantee could have
been no higher than that of an offer, since it had not
been determined whether* Czechoslovakia would accept the
Anglo-French suggestions with regard to the cession of
territory. The British Government did not have any
reason to grant such a guarantee at this time, for
the most part because they did not have any treaty
commitments to Czechoslovakia, and because they concerned
themselves, in this crisis, with avoiding involvement
in war. If it was clearly a question of an offer on
September 19, 1938, then the arrangement in the Annex
to the Munich Agreement that Great Britain and France
stand by the offer of that date; more to construe than
an "offer" is perfectly understandable; the other
questions arise in reference to the legal nature of
this offer.
In international law there is an "offer" in the
juridical sense which may take on the character of a
contract if a declaration of acceptance is made by the
OQo
nation addressed. J As in private law, however, it must
be a clear and complete treaty proposal, which by means
of a declaration of acceptance of the other party leads
29o. Suy, Les actes juridiques unilatferaux en droit
international public,, p. 30: Pfluger. Die ein-
seitigen Rechtsgescliafte im VBlkerrecht. pp. 105.
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to the intended legal transaction, for the Czechoslovak
Government did not declare anything more than its simple
acceptance.
However, if one examines the wording of the offer
of September 19, 1938 and that of the Annex, it follows
that neither the literal sense nor the conditions indicate
that this was a question of a guarantee obligation which
could become effecitve simply through the declaration of
acceptance of the Czechoslovak Government.
In the suggestion of September 19, 1938 the point was
that both Great Britain and Prance wanted to join in a
guarantee as a means of replacing the treaties which
contained reciprocal military obligations. A prerequisite
was that other States also gave guarantees which could
be acceded toi it was a further condition that the
treaties providing for military obligations would be
replaced, a development which could only occur by means
of a formal agreement.
To begin with, it cannot be assumed that Germany
and Italy wanted to undertake such an obligation, although
Great Britain and Prance did not commit themselves to
the guarantee. The wording of paragraph 2 of the Annex
clearly indicates that in Munich a guarantee by German^"
and Italy was still not declared,for it clearly says
that the guarantee would be given only after the question
of the Polish and Hungarian minorities had been solved.
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What kind of guarantee it was supposed to he is not
mentioned at all. Therefore there does not exist any
ascertainable implication of a future German-Italian
guarantee* If reference is made to paragraph 1 of the
Annex because of the implication of the intended
guarantee, account has to be taken of the non-obligatory
character of this paragraph as well,
It became evident that no-one perceived the
declarations in the Annex as a binding guarantee by reason
of the negotiations which were conducted in the beginning
of 1939 between the Conference Powers. As the French
Ambassador in Prague reported on February 7» 1939 to the
French Government:
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangdres
m*a rappelfe que le Gouvernement tchfecoslovaque
attendait que les Puissances de Munich prfecisent
les conditions dans lesquelles elles envisage-
aient de donner la garantie Internationale dont
la France et l'Angleterre avaient parlfe dds le
mois de septembre,291
Ihe French Embassy in Berlin directed to the German
Foreign Minister on February 8, 1939 a Note Verbale with
the following content:
291. Toynbee, loc.cit.pp. 41-2. E.t.: The Foreign Minister
reminded me that the Czechoslovak Government expects
the Munich powers to indicate the conditions under
which they propose to give the international
guarantee which France and England have spoken
about since September.
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Aux termes de l'annexe 110.1 a l'accord
signfe a. Munich le 29 septembre 1938, les
Gouvernements allemand et italien se sont
dfeclarfes disposes d s'associer i. une garantie
Internationale des nouvelles fronti&res de
l'Etat tchfecoslovaque contre toute aggression
non provoqufee, lorsqu'aurait fetfe rfeglie la
question des minoritfes polonaise et hongroise
en Tchfecoslovaquie.
Se rfefferant a cette declaration, ainsi
qu'aux indications r&cemment donnfees d Rome
par M. Mussolini au Premier Ministre
britannique quant aux conditions pr&alables
auxquelles le Gouvernement italien subordonnerait,
en ce qui le concerne, la prise en consideration
de 1*octroi de cette garantie, le Gouvernement
fran^ais, soucieux de donner une suite effective
& tout6s les dispositions de 1'accord de Munich,
attacherait du prix d connaitre les vues du
Gouvernement du Reich sur la question de la
garantie visfee par ledit accord.292
In the response of the German Foreign Ministry of
February 28, 1939 the Reich Government; declared that
before the guarantee could take effect they would need
292. Ibid,. pp. 42-3. E.t.: According to
the wording of the Annex No. 1 to the Agreement of
Munich of September 29, 1938, the German and Italian
Governments declared themselves prepared to Join an
international guarantee of the new boundaries of
Czechoslovakia against any unprovoked aggression,
if the question of the Polish and Hungarian minorities
in Czechoslovakia had been settled. In reference to
this declaration and the notice which Sig. Mussolini
recently gave to the British Prime Minister in Rome
in relation to the conditions under which the
Italian Government would undertake this guarantee,
the French Government, concerned as it is to realize
all the arrangements of the Munich Agreement, would
appreciate it if the Reich's Government made known
its position with regard to this guarantee.
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to await a clearing-up of the domestic situation in
Czechoslovakia, since Poland and Hungary still had
differences with Czechoslovakia.
Thus it follows all the Conference Powers and
Czechoslovakia, in terms of interpretation of the Annex,
were of the view that through the signing of the Annex
and its acceptance by Czechoslovakia a guarantee still
had not been produced and that a further agreement over
the conditions under which such a guarantee would be
realized in the future would have to be consummated.
Whether one wants to perceive in the Annex a mere
declaration of political intention without binding legal
effect, or a legally binding provisional agreement which
obligated the treaty powers to conclude a guarantee
treaty, is not important for the significance of the
question of guarantee. The Conference Powers, as the
above-mentioned documents indicate, negotiated over the
granting of the guarantees none of the powers refused to
grant this: none, however, had done this by March 15, 1939,
because the negotiations had not yet been concluded.
Thus up to March 15, 1939 there was no violation of
obligations ascribed to the Annex to the Agreement. At
the same time, the documents cited clearly indicate that
293. Ibid., pp. 43-6
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the entire Munich Agreement was treated as valid by all
294
the signatory powers and Czechoslovakia.
The objection of fraud is therefore eliminated as a
reason for the nullity of the Munich Agreement "from the
beginning."
g) Closing Remarks
Completed actions play a great role in international
law.2^-* While the Stimson Doctrine stems from the rule
296
ex inuria ius non oritur. J the principle of effectiveness
has its origins in the rule ex factis ius oritur.
294. In the "Ministries Case" the Nuremberg Military
Tribunal finds obviously - but not convincingly -
fraud in the following passagei "Germany's possession
of the Sudetenland was the result of an International
agreement. That Hitler had not the intention to abide
by It and that his assurance to England, France, and
Czechoslovakia that this was the end of his terri¬
torial aims were false, there can be no doubts"
(Vol. XIV p. 343).
295. Seidl-Hohenveldern writes: "In seinem Bestreben, das
Zusammenleben der Vblkerrechtssubjekte auf eine
realistische Basis zu stellen, misst das Vblkerrecht
der "normativen Kraft des Faktischen" grbssere Bedeu-
tung bei, als das innerstaatllche Recht"(f.n.80,
p. 305). E.t.j In its efforts to place the co¬
existence of the subjects of international law on a
more realistic basis, international law attributes
greater significance to the "normative power of the
component parts" than domestic law. See also Bilfinger,
Vollendete Tatsachen und Vblkerrecht, Z.f.aus.offentl.
i.u.Vft., Bd. 1$ U$$3/S4)pp. 453, 477-81.
296. Tucker, The Principle of Effectiveness in Inter¬
national Law, loc.cit. -p.
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Mac Gibbon explains:
Acquiescence operates in the sphere to
which the maxim ex injuria jus non oritur is
least applicable, that is where the vindication
of a claim or course of action depends on the
consent of the States affected. The presumption
of consent which may be raised by silence is
strengthened in proportion to the length of
the period during which the silence is maintained
...Acquiescence is restrictively interpreted.297
Schwarzenberger confines acquiescence to a special
type of unilateral act:
(Other) types of unilateral acts... of
hardly lees general significance (as e.g.
recognition and reservation) are...acquiescence.
Tacit consent cannot be presumed. Thus,
acquiescence may be inferred only if, in good
faith, any other interpretation of silence is
impossible.298
The history and development of international law
have shown that neither of these two principles (Stimson
Doctrine and acquiescence) has been given complete effect
in international life. A complete realization of the
first principle back to the origins of every subject of
international law would have as a consequence irreparable
confusion and the abrogation of all foundations of law.
On the other hand an unrestricted realization of the
second principle would contribute to the destruction
297. Mac Gibbon, The Scope of acquiescence in Inter¬
national law', loc.clt. p. 143.
298. Schwarzenberger (f.n.42), Vol. 1 p. 160.
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of international law, because then States would need
only to effect faits accomplls2^ j_n order to have their
actions acquire legal justification if the parties
affected by the fait accompli failed to react. Therefore
it is necessary for the law to find a mean between these
two extremes which can be sanctioned legally.
Generally, in international law effectiveness
assumes significance in two areas. On the one hand,
where the demands of subjects of international law are
based on definite facts, the principle of effectiveness
becomes valid for these facts, i.e., a State which claims
sovereignty over a particular territory must effectively
control this territory in its entirety.
On the other hand
illegal activity may produce valid results
by the operation of prescription, acquiescence,
and estappelv3oo
In international law acquiescence has proved to be
a useful means to reconcile actual situations in which
there is doubt whether they are founded in accordance
with the prescriptions of international law.
Acquiescence, in the accepted dictionary
sense of tacit agreement or consent, is
essentially a negative concept. ...it is ...
the inaction of a State which is facet with a
299. Strupp-Schlochauer (f.n.40), Bd. 1 p. 411.
300. Brownlie (f.n.44)» p. 415.
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situation constituting a threat to or infringement
of its rights* it is not intended to connote the
forms in which a State may signify its consent or
approval in positive fashion. Acquiescence thus
takes the form of silence or absence of protest
in circumstances which generally call for a
positive reaction signifying an objection.3o1
Tucker attributes to acquiescence the same value
without using this designation, when he says:
What nonrecognition does imply in this
instance, if anything, is the denial of the
existence of a general rule of international
lav/ that effective control of a territory by
a government constitutes sovereignty over the
territory (or as some writers prefer to say-
does not result in a valid title) if this control
has been established illegally.3o2
•5o^
Also Krueger and de Visscher^ see the connection
between the principle of effectiveness and the recognition
or nonrecognition of actual facts.
The Convention on the Law of Treaties recognizes as
well in Article 45 acquiescence as a law-evoking fact,'0^
301. Mac Gibbon (f.n.297)# p. 143.
302. Tucker (f.n,296), loc.clt. p. 42.
303. Krueger, Las Prlnzlu der Effektlvltat, Oder: tlber
die besondere Wlrkllciikeitsnahe des Vblkerrechts.
loc.cit. p. 281; de Visscher. Observations sur
I'effectivltfe en droit international public. "
end.c.on. 6o5-4.
304. Rozakis writes: "The text of article 45» alinea (b)
embodies the well-known anglo-amerlcan principle of
acquiescence which seems to have been transposed into
international law (loc.cit. p. 159)t -But it is true,
that the principle of acquiescence existed before the
Convention was given as a legal standard in this
scope.
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when it determines that
a State may no longer invoke a ground for
invalidating, terminating...of a treaty,...
if. after becoming aware of the facts:...
(b) it must be reason of its conduct be
considered as having acquiesced in the validity
of the treaty or in its maintenance in force
or in operation, as the case may be.3o5
305. UN Doc.A/CONF.39/11/Add. 2, p. 295; text of
paragraph (b) means estoppel by subsequent conduct.
"It is of course a general principle of inter¬
national law that the subsequent conduct of the
parties to a bilateral - or a multilateral -
instrument may throw light on the intention of the
parties at the time the instrument was entered into
and thus may provide a legitimate criterion of inter¬
pretation" (The Case Law of the International Court,
vol. iv—a, pTTTTT
Sinclair explains (loc.cit.p. 88): "Article 45
is to prohibit a State from claiming that a treaty
is invalid on grounds of lack of competence,
restrictions on authority to express consent, error,
fraud or corruption, or from seeking to terminate or
suspend the operation of a treaty on grounds of
material breach or fundamental change of circum¬
stances if, after becoming aware of the facts, the
State has expressly agreed that the treaty is valid
or must, by reason of its conduct, be considered as
having acquiesced in the validity of the treaty or
its maintenance in force or in operation. It should
be noted that there are differences between the
principle of acquiescence and the operation of estoppel,
although the effect may, in particular circumstances,
be very similar. But where acquiescence is an element
in the establishment of title to territory by
prescription, what must be proved is the acquiescence
of States generally, or at least those States
adversely affected by the claim. By way of contrast,
estoppel is a matter of adjectival, rather than
substantive?.f law and accordingly the effect of a
true estoppel is confined to the parties. It is also
relevant that estoppel is a concept of general
application, the essential aim of which is to preclude
a party from benefiting by his own inconsistency to
the detriment of another party who has in good faith
relied upon a representation of fact made by the
former party.
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The Commentary to the corresponding draft
Article 42 states:
The foundation of the principle that a party
is not permitted to benefit from its own
inconsistencies is essentially good faith
in their dealings (allegans contraria non
fudiendue est). The relevance of this principlen international law is gen rally admitted. ...
The principle has a particular importance in the
law of treaties. ...
Sub-paragraph (b) provides that a right to
invoke a ground of invalidity, termination, etc.
shall also be no longer exercisable if after
becoming aware of the facts a State's conduct has
been such that it must be considered as having
acquiesced, as the case may be, in the validity
of the treaty or its maintenance in force or in
operation. In such a case the State is not
permitted to take up a legal position which is in
contradiction with the position which its own
previous conduct must have led to the other
parties to suppose, that it had taken up with
respect to the validity, maintenance in force
or maintenance in operation of the treaty.3o6
In the case of the Munich Agreement the aid of
acquiescence is not necessary, since the most important
States of the world, through their conduct when the
treaty was concluded, as well as during its execution
and particularly through their treatment of the former
Czechoslovak citizens, who as a result of the Agreement
had become Germans, considered the Agreement valid until
March 15, 1939.
3o6. UN Doc.A/CONP.39/11/Add. 2, p. 59.
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2) The Consideration of the Nullity "ex nunc"
of the Agreement
By the annexation of the rest of Czechoslovakia in
the middle of March 1959 Hitler undertook an action, which
could not be justified either politically or legally.
While hitherto he had claimed only territories with
predominantely German population for the German Reich
with reference to the right of self-determination, by
the annexation of Bohemia and Moravia he annexed two
territories incontestably inhabited by Czechs.
He attempted to give the impression of legality
when, on March 15, 1939* he forced President Hacha of
the Czechoslovak Republic to sign a treaty in which
Germany assumed the protection of the people of Czechoslo¬
vakia.^0*^ The Nuremberg Military Tribunal was able to
prove that the consent of President Hacha had been
307. Document No. 9.
It must be remarked that the treaty was included
in the registry of the Political Department of the
Foreign Office under the listed heading and
received the designation: "Treaties Czechoslovakia
No, 3", but was not published in the Law Gazette
of the Reich (usually in Part II in accordance with
the "Bekanntmachung" in Law Gazette Part I, 1922,
p. 232).
Article 45, paragraph 3 provided that treaties
with foreign countries needed the assent of the
Reichstag (Reich's Diet) as far as they referred to
objects of legislation of the Reich, with the
consequence that an analogous law of ratification
had to be enacted and published. But under a law
of March 24, 1933 (Law Gazette I p. 141), the
so-called 'Ermachtigungsgesetz" (Enabling Act),
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these provisions were modified, so that these
treaties did not need the assent of the
legislative bodies. In this way the constitutional
requirement of the participation of the Reichstag
was expressly removed, notwithstanding that through
the introduction of the so-called "Ptihrer Principle"
large segments of the Weimar Constitution were
nullified and no specific regulation existed which
indicated whether and which ordinances of the Weimar
Constitution were still valid.
According to National Socialist theory, the
"Ptihrer" as supreme law-giver, was in the position
to nullify any legal or constitutional rule. There¬
fore, the treaty could not be invalidated on the
grounds of non-compliance with German domestic law.
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obtained by force and was, therefore, void.'®®
The treaty is cited in a few matters!
Es wurde Hacha eroffnet, dass, falls er
ein Abkommen liber die sofortige Einverleibung
des tschechischen Volkes in das Deutsche Reich
unterzeichne, Bdhmen und Mahren vor der Zer-
stbrung gerettet wtirden. Es wurde ihm mitgeteilt,
dass die deutschen Truppen bereits Marschbefehle
erhalten hatten und dass jeder Widerstand gewalt-
sam gebrochen werden wlirde. Der Angeklagte Gbring
fligte die Drohung hinzu, dass er Prag vollst&ndig
aus der Luft zerstbren werde. Vor diese schreck-
liche Wahl gestellt, unterzeichneten Hacha und
sein Aussenminister das erforderliche Abkommen...
und Hitler und Ribbentrop gaben ihre Unterschriften
im Namen Deutschlands.
Then:
Gbring war einer der ftinf bedeutenden Fiihrer,
die an der Hossbach-Konferenz vom 5.11.1937 teil-
nahmen, und er wohnte den anderen bedeutsamen
Konferenzen bei, die in diesem Urteil bereits
erbrtert wurden, ...In der Nacht vor dem Einfall
in die Tschechoslowakei und der Aufsaugung Bbhmen
und Mahrens drohte er bei einer Konferenz zwischen
Hitler und dem President en Hacha, Prag mit Boinben
zu bewerfen, falls Hacha nicht nachgebe. Diese
Drohung gab er in seiner Zeugenaussage zu.
Further:
Ribbentrop war...bei der Besprechung vom 14. und
15.3. zugegen, bei der Hitler durch Androhung einer
Invasion den PrSsidenten Hacha dazu zwang, der
Besetzung der Tschechoslowakei durch die Deutschen
zuzustimmen.
308. A.J.I.L. Vol. 41 (1947), pp. 172 (325). See also
Delbez (f.n.29), p. 320.
258.
Moreoveri
Keitel...der Chef des OKW war bei den Unter-
handlungen zwischen Hitler und Hacha, die mit
der Kapitulation des letzteren endeten, zugegen.
Finally:
...am 18,3.1939 wurde v. Neurat zum Reichs-
protektor von BShmen und Mahren ernannt. Bdhmen
und Mahren wurden durch milit&rische Streitkrafte
besetzt. Haohas Zustimmung, die ihm ja unter Zwang
abgendtigt worden war, kann nicht als Rechtfertigung
dieser Besetzung ahgesehen werden. 309
309., Das Urteil von Niirnberg, pp. 54-5, 172-3, 182, 186,
255. E.t.j Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, pp. 27,
108, 114, 116, 160j A.J.I.L. (f.n. 308), pp. 197,
272-3, 278, 281, 325t
The proposal was made to Hacha that if he would
sign an agreement consenting to the incorporation of
the Czech people in the German Reich at once, Bohemia
and Moravia would be saved from destruction. He
was informed that German troops had already received
orders to march and that any resistance would be
broken with physical force. The defendant Goering
added the threat that he would destroy Pragua
completely from the air. Faced by this dreadful
alternative, Hacha and his Foreign Minister put
their signature to the necessary agreement..., and
Hitler and Ribbentrop signed on behalf of Germany...,
Goering was one of the five important leaders present
at the Hossbaeh Conference on November 5* 1937, and
he attended the other important conferences already
discussed. ...The night before the invasion of
Czechoslovakia and the absorption of Bohemia and
Moravia, at a conference with Hitler and President
Hacha he threatened to bomb Pragua if Hacha did not
submit. This threat he admitted in his testimony,
,..Ribbentrop.».was present at the conference of
March 14/15, 1939 at which Hitler, by threats of
invasion, compelled President Hacha to consent to
the German occupation of Czechoslovakia, ...Keltel
...the OKW Chief attended Hitler's negotiations with
Hacha when the latter surrendered. ...Ton Neurath
was appointed Reich Protector for 3ohemia and Moravia
on March 18, 1939. Bohemia and Moravia were occupied
by Military force. Hacha's consent, obtained as it




This Article (namely Art. 32 of the
Harvard Research on Treaties concerning
"Duress") is followed by a full comment
upon the relevant literature and upon
certain political incidents in which
the matter came under discussion? to
which must now be added the shocking
case of coercion applied by the Hitler
German Government to Dr. Hacha, the
President Cf Czechoslovakia, in March 1939
in order to compel him to sign the Agreement
of 15 March 1939 with Hitler.31o
Brosche rightly points out that the treaty of
March 15» 1939, which in the literature is so often
described as a terrifying example of an imposed conclusion
of a treaty, was, in fact, concluded under duress, but he
cannot bring himself to acknowledge that the reason for
the nullity of this treaty was the massive pressure
exercised against President Hacha, A record of the meeting
between Hitler and Hacha read out at the Ntirnberg Trial
shows that no duress was exercised against the Czechoslovak
delegation, and that the negotiators were actually treated
with exceptional politeness. Consequently, the duress
which caused the treaty to be concluded was directed against
the State and not against the State representatives, since
Hacha signed the treaty in order to avert any harm that
might have arisen from the German threat to destroy Prague
*1 A
and other places in the rest of Czechoslovaida.
310. Mc Nair (f.n.195), p. 208.
311. Brosche (f.n.207)» P. 11o-1.
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Also Seidl-Hohenveldern endorses this view. He
critisises the above-mentioned decision of the Nuremberg
Military Tribunal on the ground that the duress
exercised had not consisted in a threat against the
person of the President but against the State (the threat
. *4 2
of bombardment).
This view must be contradicted. The fact that the
Czech negotiators yielded to German demands must be
attributed simply to the predicament of the Czech negotiators
beingpressed by the German demands, and not to the "duress
against the State itself".
Nevertheless, the Comment to Draft Article 48 of the
Convention dn the Law of Treaties runs as follows!
It is true that in some instances it may
not be possible to distinguish completely
between coercion of a Head of State or Minister
as a means of coercing the State itself and
coercion of them in their personal capacities.
For example, something like third-degree methods
of pressure were employed in 1939ibr the purpose
of extracting the signatures of President Hacha
and the Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia to
a treaty creating a German protectorate over
Bohemia and Moravia, as well as the gravest
threats against their State. Nevertheless, the
two forms of coercion, although they may
sometimes be combined, are, from a legal point
of view, somewhat different; the Commission has
accordingly placed them in separate articles.313
312. Seidl-Hohenveldern (f.n.80), p. 86.
313. UN Doc. CONF.39/11/Add. 2, p. 65.
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Germany's deception did not fool anyone. The
Czechoslovak Constitution did certainly not allow the
President of the State to transfer the State entrusted
to him to a foreign Power without the assent of
Parliament and Government. Therefore, there is no doubt
that Hacha lacked the authority to deliver the rest of
Czechoslovakia to the German Reich and the "Agreement"
314
between Hitler and Hacha v/as for this reason invalid.
With regard to Article 46 paragraph 1 of the
Convention on the Law of Treaties
...unless that violation was manifest
and concerned a rule of its internal, law of
fundamental importance.
and according to the Commentaries to the draft of the
31 3
corresponding Article 43, adopted by the International
Law Commission, it would be hard to imagine a case in which
the violation of national law would be more manifest and
would concern a rule of more fundamental importance than
314. See Brownlie (f.n.44), p. 494; Lauterpacht (f.n.41),
Vol. I, p. 884; Mc Nair (f.n.36), p. 60-1.
315. ...the rule embodied in the article is that, fchen
the violation of internal law regarding competence
to conclude treaties would be objectively evident
to any ^tate dealing with the matter normally and
in good faith, the consent to the treaty purported
to be given on behalf of the State may be repudiated
(UN Doc. A/CONP. 39/11/Add. 2 p. 62).
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the cession of the Czech National State to Hitler.
At first eight, there does not seem to be any-
decisive and substantial difference - with regard to
the constitutional limitation of a State organ to
dispose of state territory - between the Czech
Declarations of September 21 and 30, 1938, ceding the
Sudeten territory, and Hacha's decision of March 15, 1939.
Dahm's view on the legal content of the two above-mentioned
legal acts of 1938 and 1939 is, thus, not greatly at
variance when he states!
Im Jahre 1938 setzte der President der
tschechischen Republik das Miinchener Abkommen
ohne Ermachtigung durch die Nationalversammlung
in Kraft. Da das Abkommen aber die Grenzen des
Staates verhnderte, so hatte die National¬
versammlung zustimmen mttssen. Eine noch welter-
gehende Entscheidung traf der Staatsprhsident
Hacha am 15.3.1939, als er die Entscheidung tiber
das Schicksal seines Volkes der Ptlhrung des
Eeutschen Reiches tlberliess.316
A substantial difference between the two legal acts,
though, may be seen in the fact that in September 1938 a
type of emergency parliament in the form of a committee,
representing the responsible factions of the political
parties, was formed. Shis committee actively assisted the
President - who according to the law of May 13» 1936 enjoyed
316. Dahm (f.n. 28), Bd. 3, p. 22; E.t.i In 1938 the
President of the Czechoslovak Republic enacted the
Munich Agreement without being empowered to do so
by the National Assembly. However, since the Agreement
changed the country's frontiers, the consent of the
National Assembly should have been obtained. President
Hacha made an even more farreaching decision on March
15» 1939 when he left the destiny of his people to be
decided by the leadership of the German Reich.
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greater freedom of action in international acta in the
presence of "extraordinary circumstances" - in his
decision-making; whereas the Hacha Agreement never even
reached this stage at all.
Moreover, one cannot escape the fact that by
concluding the Hacha Agreement, the German Reich infringed
in a clear and "manifest" way Czech constitutional rules,
in violation of the definition of the present Article 46,
paragraph 2 of the Convention on the Law of Treaties; the
same cannot be said of the Munich Agreement.
The argument can be taken a step further by putting
the question in the negative, namely if the German Reich,
as contractual party to the agreements, would have had to
refer to the Agreement in order legally to substantiate a
certain legal position, could it have been accused, in such
a case, of violating the principles of good faith. In the
case of the Munich Agreement such a breach of trust and good
faith must certainly be discounted Just as much as it must be
emphatically confirmed in the case of the Hacha Agreement.
It may also be said that the Hahha Agreement represen¬
ted exactly the extreme opposite of what the International
Law Commission had been afraid of when - in the sphere of
constitutional limitations - it recognised only those
nullity grounds of international treaties which had a
certain effect. In this connection, a commentary to the
draft of Article 43 of the Convention says:
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...the majority of the diplomatic
incidents in which States have invoked
their constitutional requirements as a
ground of invalidity have been cases
in which for quite other reasons they
have desired to escape from their
obligations under the treaty. Where a
Government has genuinely found itself
in constitutional difficulties after
concluding a treaty and has raised the
matter promptly, it appears normally to
be able to get the constitutional obstacle
removed by internal action and to obtain
any necessary indulgence in the meanwhile
from the other parties. Confronted with a
challenge under national law of the
constitutional validity of a treaty, a
Government will normally seek to regularize
its position under the treaty by taking
appropriate action in the domestic or
international sphere.*17
But the invalidity of the arrangement signed by
Hacha is more evident for another reason.
According to international law, coercion exercised
against a representative of a State in the conclusion
of a treaty nullifies the treaty."^® Hitler's "agreement"
with Hacha is even regarded as a test case for such
personal coercion against a representative of a
State.'^
317. UN Doc. A/CONP.39/11/Add. 2 p. 62.
318. McNair (f.n.36), p. 207; O'Connell (f.n.80)^ Vol. 1,
p. 261; Lauterpacht (f.n.41), Vol. I, p. 891;
Brownlie (f.n.44), p. 495.
319. O'Connell, Ibid.: McNair, Ibid.. p. 208.
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The Nuremberg Judgement determined that:
Hacha's consent, obtained as it was by
duress, cannot be considered as Justifying
the occupation.32o
Moreover, the extent of the pressure exerted on
Hacha is demonstrated by the faot that Sudeten Germans
living in the rest of Czechoslovakia rose in sunns and
at the same time Slovakia was separated from the
State.321
There exists little controversy over the invalidity
of the Hitler-Hacha Agreement as well as the illegality
according to international law of the annexation of the
rest of Czechoslovakia. From the point of view of the
British Government and that of the federal Republic of
Germstny the reason the Munich Agreement became invalid
was because of this violation of international law.
The British declaration of March 17, 1939 stated that
the events of the past few days were a complete
repudiation of the Munich Agreement.322 And the note of
320. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, p. 160; JudicialDecisions" A.J.I.L.. x>. 325: See also Berber (f.n.80),
Ml U p. 438.
321. Kempner, loo.olt.: "Meissner sagtei "Hitler und seine
Leute haben diese Situation zweifellos ausgenutzt
und in diesem Sinn kann man auch von einem gewissen
Druck sprechen." E.t.: Meissner said: Hitler and his
men undoubtedly exploited this situation and in this
sense one can speak of a certain pressure.
322. Marcus writes: "1) Le traitfe est en effet en con¬
tradiction avec une autre traite que le Reich
allemand a conclu, & peine six mois auparavant,
avec la Grande-Bretagne, la France et 1'Italic... .
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D'aprds lee autorit&s les plus compfetantes du Droit
international, au cas de conflit entre deux traitfes,
conclus par un m§me Etat avec des co-contractants
diff&rents, le plus rfecent est d consid&rer comme
nul. 2) Le representant de la Rfepubllque tchfecos-
lovaque a signfe le traitfe de Berlin sous la menace.
3) La conclusion du traitfe de Berlin a eu lieu en
violation de la Constitution tchfecoslovaque. ...
En effet, le sens de Constitution et ses dispositions
concernant la conclusion des traitfes internationaux
ne permet pas au chef de l'Etat de conclure des
trait&s par lesquels 1'existence de l'Etat en tant
qu'Etat souverain est supprimfee" (Le Tra.itfe germano-
tchfecoslovaque du 15 mars 1939 d laTlumlere du droit
international, end.c. pp. 653-»4. 663).
E.t.j 1) In relation to its validity the treaty
stands in contradiction to another treaty, namely
that which Germany concluded with Great Britain,
France and Italy just 6 months previously.... In the
view of leading authorities, the one last concluded
is to "be considered void, even if it has been concluded
by the same State with another treaty partner. 2) The
representative of Czechoslovakia signed the Treaty of
Berlin under pressure, 3) The conclusion of the Berlin
treaty was in violation of the Czechoslovak constitution
...In fact, neither the spirit of the constitution
nor its prescriptions which concern the conclusion
of international treaties, permit the Head of State
to conclude treaties through which the sovereignty of
a State as well as its existence is eliminated.
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August 5» 1942 to the Czechoslovak Government-in-exile
stated that Germany had deliberately destroyed the
•tp7)
arrangements concerning Czechoslovakia reached in 1938.
2?he German note to Czechoslovakia of March 25, 1966
declared that the Munich Agreement was disrupted by
Hitler*>'2^ All this can only mean that the Munich
Agreement was invalidated by the events of the middle
of March, 1939.
When Czechoslovakia acceded to the German demands
for cession of the territories inhabited predominantly
by Germans, she hoped to maintain the independence of her
remaining territories, and there is no doubt that it
was the prevailing view that Germany, after the transfer
of the predominantly German territories, would leave the
remaining Czechoslovak territories untouched and grant the
promised guarantee with regard to the Czechoslovak
possessory title.
It is a principle of international law that a material
breach of a treaty by one party gives all the parties to
the treaty the right to terminate the treaty; the only
debate concerns whether each breach of the treaty is
sufficient for its termination."52"5
325. Carlyle, loc.cit.. p. 317-8.
524. Staatslexikon, X. Bd. col. 688.
325. See Lauterpacht (f.n.41). Vol. I, p. 947; McNair
(f.n.36), pp. 474-84; O'Connell (f.n.80), Vol. I,
pp. 284-6.
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For our purposes this difference of opinion is
important, since the British Government explained
through its Ambassador in Berlin that there was not
only a simple violation of the treaty by Germany, but
a "complete repudiation of the Munich Agreement"2^
Thus, it is expressed that because of Hitler's behaviour,
the basic meaning of the agreement was destroyed.
The difference between "violation of a provision"
and a "repudiation of the treaty" is outlined in
Article 60, paragraph 3 of the Convention of the Law
of Treaties,
There among other things it says;
3. A material breach of a treaty, for the
purpose of this article, consists ins (&) a
repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by
the present Convention; or (b) the violation
of a provision essential to the accomplishment
of the object or purpose of the treaty,327
Thus, in principle the repudiation of a treaty is
to be viewed as a material breach of that treaty whereas
in the case of a violation of a provision other factors
introduced in the text have to be considereds one needs
to determine whether the violated provision, in reference
to the object and purpose of the treaty, represents a
material breach of the treaty.
326. Toynbee, loo.clt. p. 71; Pergler, The Munioh
"Repudiation'', loc.cit. pp. 308-9.
327. UN Doc. A/CONF.11/Add• 2, p. 297.
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In the commentary to the corresponding draft
Article 57 of the International Law Commission, it
states:
Clearly, an unjustified repudiation of the
treaty - a repudiation not sanctioned...would
automatically constitute a material breach of
the treaty;...The other and more general form
of material breach is that in sub-paragraph
(b)...328
Thus it is clearly expressed that the repudiation of
a treaty, in reference to its legal significance, is not
to be considered a reason for terminating the treaty.
The termination of a treaty is effected by a
declaration from the State concerned with the violation
of a treaty to the State responsible for the violation.
This question is settled today by means of Article 65#
paragraph 1, sent. 1 and Article 67, paragraph 1 of the
Convention which state:
1. A party which, under the provision of
the present Convention invokes ...a ground for
impeaching the validity of a treaty, terminating
it, ...must notify the other parties of its
claim;,. . (65/1)
The notification must be made in writing.(67/1)
Article 70 describes the consequences of a termination
of a treaty as follows:
1. ...the termination of a treaty under its
rovisions or in accordance with the present
onvention:...releases the parties from any
obligation further to perform the treaty.*3o
328. Ibid., p. 75.
329. Ibid., p. 298
330. Ibid.
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Waldock formulated in his report to the I.1.0.
of 1966 the consequences of the abrogation of a treaty
as follows:
...the lawful termination of a treaty
shall...release the parties from any obligation
further to apply the treaty...331
In essence, this point of view corresponds to the
general principle of international law in this matter,
which Schlochauer formulates as follows:
Eine Partei, die einen ^ertragsbruch seitens
des Vertragspartners geltend macht, kann selbst
vom Yertrag zurticktreten. Der Rticktritt wird
unter solchen Umstanden zur Sanktion. Die Recht-
m&ssigkeit eines solcheiiRiicktritts hsingt davon
ab, ob der Vertrag vom anderen Partner tatsaehlich
verletzt wurde.33Z
Although there exists little doubt that the German
Reich repudiated the Munich Agreement, it is difficult
nonetheless to determine exactly when the treaty was
terminated.
In so far as Czechoslovakia was involved in this
question, this State had been eliminated as a subject
of international law and was accordingly unable to express
such a termination. After Czechoslovakia was restored she
331. Sixth report on the law of Treaties by Sir Humphrey
Waldock, Special Rapporteur, UU Doc. A/CN.4/186.
p. 57.
332. Strupp-Schlochauer (f.n.40), Bd. 3, p. 539. E.t.: A
party which accepts the termination of a treaty by
its treaty partner, can release itself from the
treaty. This abrogation is under these conditions a
sanction. The legality of such an abrogation depends
on whether the treaty was violated by the other
partner.
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found herself in a state of war with Germany. A state
of war existed between Germany and the United Kingdom
was well after the breach of the treaty. Therefore, a
formal notification of the termination of the treaty
was precluded by these developments although the
relevant British, French, and Italian positions were
known to the Reich during the war.'"
It is difficult to determine exactly when the
treaty became invalid. A treaty which is broken first
becomes invalid when the State concerned with the
violation of the treaty decides to renounce it. The
State may also decide to continue the treaty.'" The
Federal Republic never did refer to the fact that the
termination of the Munich Agreement was never officially
communicated. On the contrary, she explained in her reply
to the comment of the federal Council during the debate
on the German-Czechoslovak treaty*
Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland hat •..
niemals bestritten, dass das Mlinchener
Abkommen durch die wahrend des Zweiten
Weltkrieges von Grossbritannien, Frankreich
und Italian abgegebenen ErklSrungen seine
333. Korkisch, loc.cit. pp. 83-8; 99-105.
334. Lauterpacht (f.n.41), Vol. I p. 947 ("...that it is
for the injured party to consider for itself whether
violation of a treaty...justifies its cancellation.").
McNair (f.n.36), p. 553 ("...the other party may prefer




Thus, opinion is unanimous that the Munich
Agreement became invalid because of these declarations
made by the Allies.
However, a distinction must be made between
provisions already performed and those not yet performed
in such subsequent invalidtation of treaties.
Mc Nair writes:
In so far as the provisions of a treaty
have already been executed and have had
their effect before the termination, they
have passed beyond the sphere of the
operation of the terminationi something
has been done; for instance, territory has
been ceded, persons or movables have been
surrendered, and in many cases new rights
and statuses have been created which,
although they owe their origin to the
treaty, have acquired an existence independent
of it; the termination cannot affect them.336
This principle is also expressed in Article 60,
paragraph 1 of the Convention on the Law of Treaties,
which provides that
a material breach of a bilateral treaty
by one of the parties entitles the other to
invoke the breach as a reason for terminating
the treaty or suspending its operation in whole
or in part.337
335. BT-Drucksache 7/1832, p. 19. E.t.: The Federal
Republic of Germany...has never denied that the
Munich Agreement lost its original legality by
the declarations of Great Britain, France and
Italy In the course of the Second World War.
336. McNair (f.n.36), p. 531.
337. UB Doc. A/CONF. 39/11/Add. 2, p. 297.
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The Convention expresses nothing hut the codification
of these rules. Accordingly, the legal positions created
by the Munich regulations, especially those stemming from
the Czechoslovak cession of territory, the change of
nationality, and the legal situation of private corporations
and public companies were not eo ipso revised.
Without the agreements embodied in the German-
Czechoslovak Treaty of 1973# the status of the ceded
territory and the nationality of the inhabitants taken
over by the Czechoslovak Government would also have
changed in accordance with the principle of effectiveness
through an alteration of relations; i.e., conquest of
these territories by the allied forces and their cession
to the Czechoslovak State. The treaty between Bonn and
Prague has, as will be explained, established an
arrangement which corresponds to the above-mentioned
maxims of law.
Part III
The Model for Settlement offered in the
German-Czechoslovak Treaty of 1975 1
1) The Basio Conception of the Treaty
The viewpoint of the Czechoslovak Government that
the Munich Agreement had "been invalid from the beginning
and their insistence that this opinion be expressed in
a treaty concerning mutual relations long prevented the
normalization of relations between the two countries.
1. In the case, file number 1 BvQ 5/74 of the Federal
Constitutional Court (see Part I, f.n.91» paragraphs
8 and 9) the complainant argued that the treaty
prevented him, as sole individual or together with
others, from bringing claims for the recovery of
Sudeten German territory. Moreover as owner of a
landed estate in this territory he claimed that the
treaty represented a violation of the guarantee of
property under the constitution.
The Federal Constitutional Court in its decision
of July 11, 1974 (see Part I, f.n.9 at p. 73) stated
that the treaty with the CSSR contained no provision
which might restrict the complainant's freedoms of
opinion and association. Inasmuch as he feared the
definitive loss of his property by the coming into
force of the treaty, it was pertinent to observe that
up till now he had not been in any position to exercise
his rights in this matter. In the considered political
opinion of the competent authorities, to delay the
coming into force of an important international treaty
was not justifiable.
Concerning this oase, it must be remarked that the
legal remedy of the complainant was nearly exclusively
restricted to the claim that the conclusion of the
treaty violated basic rights under constitutional law
(Articles 93 para 1 No. 4a CL, 90 para 1 LFCC).
In this connection, however, it must be pointed out,
that the Federal Constitutional Court has sought in an
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extensive judgement to improve the legal position
of the individual with regard to his right of
challenge. The standing of the individual to raise
questions of constitutionality - the limits of which
are prescribed by Article 93 para 1 No. 4a CL,
Article 90 para 1 LF0X5 - has been liberalized by
the decisions of the Court with regard to the
requirement to show infringement of a material right,
Sedes materiae here is first Art. 2 para 1 CL:
"Jeder hat das Recht auf die freie Entfaltung
seiner PersiJnlichkeit, soweit er nicht die Rechte
anderer verletzt und nicht gegen die verfassungs-
m&ssige Ordnung Oder das Sittengesetz verstbsst"
(Everyone has the right to the free expression of
his personality provided he does not violate the
rights of others, the constitutional order, or moral
laws). That provision is procedurally covered by
Art, 93 para 1 No. 4a CL, Art. 90 para 1 LFCC.
Art. 2 para 1 CL was interpreted at an early
stage by decisions of the Federal Constitutional
Court as incorporating rights in addition to the
express language of the statute so as to make it
a comprehensive right supplementing the other
individual constitutional rights (cf., e.g.,
BVerfGE 13, 290 (296); 19, 206(225); this rule can
claim in the widest sense to be unencumbered by
considerations of unconstitutionality (BVerfGE 9,
83(88): 19, 206(215); 253(257); 29, 402(408);
33, 44(48).
According to Art. 2 para 1 CL, this comprehensive
right may only be restricted by a law which conforms
to the "constitutional order". Viewed from a procedural
aspect this means: anybody bringing a suit raising a
question of constitutionality can claim that a law
limiting his rights arising out of Art. 2 para 1 CL
does not belong to the constitutional order, since
it contravenes,, in form and substance, individual
constitutional rules (not mentioned in Art. 93 para 1
No. 4a CL, Art. 90 para 1 LFCC) or general constitutional
principles (BVerfGE 6, 32(41); 10, 89(99); 21, 54(59).
In the present case just as in the proceeding on the
merits (see Part I, f.n. 91, paragraph 12 at p. 73;
paragraph 1t below and the decision of theTFCC listed
in the addendum of the thesis at pp. 462-742, however,
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the Federal Constitutional Court could not allow such
a liberal interpretation because it was of the opinion
that the treaty did not impinge on any express legal
position of the complainants.
Notwithstanding this, only such treaty clauses of
international law can be converted into binding
national law by an act of ratification which -
according to national laws - have all the necessary
prerequisites to create rights and obligations; the
text, purpose and content of the contractual clause
must be capable of creating legal effects, as a
national statutory regulation would, if the citizen
is to be legally bound by it (BVerfGE 29, 348, 360).
Only such contractual clauses which comprise definite
executable legal principles are thus part of the
national body of law in the sense that the individual
could himself be immediately and directly legally
affected.
A general examination of the treaty with Czechoslo¬
vakia to determine its constitutionality, which was
conducted by the Federal Constitutional Court in the
case of the Treaty on the Basis of Relations between
the Federal .Republic of Germany and the German Demo¬
cratic Republic of December 21, 1972, the so-called
Basic Treaty (law Gazette 1973 II, pp. 421, 423, E.t.i
in: Documentation Relating to the Federal Government's
Policy of Dfetente, pp. 71-4) did not take place. In
principle only (in our cases theoretically), the
Federal Government itself, or a government of a
Federal State or a group of at least one-third of
the representatives of the Federal Diet (Article 93
No. 2 CL, Article 13 No. 6 in connection with Article
76 No. 1 1FCC) were authorized to set in motion such
a procedure.
With its decree of January 25, 1977 the First
Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court hate
rejected the complaints of unconstitutionality
joined together for the purpose of a collective
decision.
The decree also issued by the First Senate is
completely in alignment with the decision of the
Court relating to the laws securing assent to the
Treaties of Moscow and Warsaw (Federal Constitutional
Court 40, 141-79) as far as questions of principle
with respect to the constitutional possibility of
examining the treaties bound by international law
is concerned, treaties which are of a highly
political nature inasmuch as they deal with individual
legal positions.
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The fact that the Court "based its decision
on the Treaties of Moscow and Warsaw became public
knowledge almost immediately.
The Court expressly refers to this decision
without repeating the guiding principles contained
in it, so that it appears highly appropriate to refer
to these governing principles in connection with the
examination of the decision taken by the Court on
the German-Czechoslovak Treaty.
In that cases (Treaties FRG/U.S.S.R.; FRG/
People's Republic of Poland) the Court held that:
"1. Die VertrSge von Moskau und Warschau (Ost-
vertrage) haben hochpolitischen Gharakter; sie regeln
die allgemeinen politischen Beziehungen der Bundes-
republik Deutschland zur Sowjetunion und zu Polen.
Verfassungsbeschwerden gegen die Zustimmungs-
gesetze zu diesen Vertragen, die auf die Verletzung
der Art. 14 GG (guarantee of ownership, guarantee
of succession, principles of expropriation),
16 (deprivation of citizenship, extradition, right
of asylum), 6 (protection of the family) gesttitzt
werden, sind unzulhssig. (The texts contained in
brackets are those of the authors).
2. Die Zustimmungsgesetze zu den Ostvertr&gen,
ebenso wie diese Vertrage selbst, begrUnden keine
unmittelbaren Verhaltenspflichten Einzelner. Sie
sind auch nicht geeignet, in anderer Weise grund-
rechtlich geschiitzte individuelle Rechtspositionen
unmittelbar zu verschlehhtern. Sie schmhlern keine
Vermdgensrechtej sie bewirken keinen Verlust der
deutschen Staatsangehbrigkeit; sie beeintrachtigen
nicht die Bemiihungen urn Zusammenfiihrung getrennter
Pamilien.
3. Verfassungsbeschwerden gegen Zustimmungsgesetze
zu vblkerrechtlichen Vertr&gen mit allgemeinen poli¬
tischen Inhalt wie den Ostvertrhgen sind unzulSssig,
wenn mit ihnen die verfassungsgerichtliche Fest-
stellung erstrebt wird, bei den Vertragsverhandlungen
h&tte eine bestimmte sachliche Regelung zugunsten der
Beschwerdefhhrer erreicht werden nrfissen und der Ab-
schluss des Vertrages ohne diese Regelung habe die
"Unwirksamkeit des ganzen Vertrages zur Folge"
(BVerfGE 40, 141-779 (141 ).
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E.t.j 1. The Treaties with Moscow and Warsaw (the
Ostvertrage) are of a highly political nature;
they govern the general political relations of the
Federal Republic of Germany with the Soviet Union
and Poland.
Suits challenging the constitutionality of the
ratification of these treaties and which rely on
a breach of Art. 14, 16, 6 GL are inadmissible.
2. The laws securing assent to the Ostvertrage,
like the treaties themselves, create no direct legal
duties for the individual. Neither do they have the
power to prejudice directly in any other way
individual legal standings protected by the
constitution. They do not restrict any property
rights; they do not cause the loss of German
nationality; they do not hamper the efforts to
reunite separated families.
3* Constitutional complaints against laws securing
assent to treaties of public international law of a
highly political nature like the Ostvertrfige, are
inadmissible if their sole purpose is to obtain a
Constitutional Court ruling declaring that a more
concrete settlement in favour of the complainants
should have been reached during the treaty negotiations,
and that the conclusion of such an agreement without
such a settlement makes the entire treaty void.
Shortly after the completion of the thesis the
rOasons of the still unpublished decision by the
Federal Constitutional Court of January 25, 1977
became officially available to the author. Our
analysis of the German-Czechoslovak Normalization
Treaty would be incomplete, if we had not added in
an addendum the decision in its exact wording.
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It took sometime for it to be recognized in Germany
that this Czechoslovak desire was rooted in the psycholo¬
gical shock which the Munich adjustments had caused. The
same psychological motive explains why Czechoslovakia
(unlike the other Eastern States, which do not consider
the Federal Republic identical with the Reich) demanded
a declaration on the Munich Agreement which from the
Czechoslovak standpoint is a res inter alios acta for the
Federal Republic. This fact, on the one hand, and the
domestic situation in the Federal Republic, on the other
hand, explain why complete agreement among the contracting
parties over the question of the initial nullity of the
Munich Agreement or its subsequent voidness was impossible.
Certainly, the Federal Republic considers herself the
successor to the German Reich and, thus, was not at all
prevented from taking a position on the Munich Agreement.
Nevertheless, the interpretation of the Munich Agreement
making it void from the beginning could not be brought into
harmony with the legaL position of the Federal Republic
2
on this question, not only because Great Britain as a
signatory power maintained that the Treaty was originally
valid, but also because of the very effective pressure
2. Kimminich, Die Aussagen des Prager Vertrages zum
Munchener Afekommen in vblkerrecntlicher Sicht.
loc.cit.. pp. 22—6i Kimrolnich-Rumnf. Qstvertrage etc.
p. 181.
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exercised "by the groups most affected, the expellees and
their officials in the Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft
(Sudeten German Fellowship).*
Akehurst states clearlyt
West Germany*s freedom of manoeuvre has
"been limited by domestic political considerations.
Most of the German-speaking inhabitants of
Czechoslovakia (including the Sudetenland) were
expelled by Czechoslovakia in 1945, and many of
them settled in West Germany. These refugees,
supported by other refugees from the Oder-Neisse
territories and elsewhere, formed a powerful
pressure group, and it may be partly because
of the influence of this pressure group that the
West German government has never admitted that
the Munich agreement was void ab initio.4
Consequently there was no other possibility but
to leave open the question whether the Munich Agreement
was void from the beginning or became invalid later,
if both States did not want to destroy the prospects
for the normalization of relations in the future. The
possibility for compromise existed, however, because there
3. On July 14» 1973 the so-called Federal Assembly
of the Organisation of Sudeten German Exiles
approved a declaration of the Sudeten German
Council to the "Treaty on Mutual Relations between
the Federal Republic of Germany and the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic". The two Sudeten German organs,
which had convened on the same day, instituted court
proceedings against the Treaty, on the grounds that
it endangers the legal position not only of the
Sudeten Germans but of all the German people and that
it by passes the still unsolved problems of the
lingering Sudeten issue (FAZ, July 15, 1973).




was general agreement about the nullity of the Agreement,
indicated by the declaration of the Federal Republic of
March 25, 1966,^ and because the Czechoslovak Government
was willing not to seek further advantages in spite of
their interpretation of the Agreement,
Although the opposing views were carefully preserved
through treaty provisions, the outstanding differences
were not exaggerated. Thus, Article I of the Treaty
indicates that both parties to the present Treaty consider
the Munich Agreement of September 29» 1938 void. This
formulation leaves open the question whether the
contracting parties were also parties to the Munich
Agreement and, further, the question as to what legal
position was adopted by each of the parties relative to
the Agreement.
In the relations between the Federal Republic and
Czechoslovakia (and not erga omnes) the Agreement of
September 29» 1938 is considered void without consideration
of the Munich Conference Powers' attitude toward the
Agreement or previously expressed legal opinions. Further¬
more, it is mentioned when the treaty became invalid.
There is also nothing said about the legal significance
of the declaration of the Czechoslovak Government on
5. Staatslexikon, X. Bd. col. 688; see Part I, f.n.80
of this thesis.
282,
September 30, 1938 and the execution of the agreement
by the transfer of the Sudeten-Germany territory to the
Reich.6
Weigand writes in his analysis:
Die Wendung (in Artikel I) "als nichtig
betrachten" macht den Willen der Parteien
deutlich, tiber die Ungtiltigkeit des Miinchener
Abkommens nach eigenen Bedtirfnissen autonom
zu bestimmen und sie nicht einer allgemeinen
abstrakten Norm des Vblkerrechts zu unterwerfen.
Demzufolge geben die Vertragspartner hier nicht
lediglich deklaratorisch eine unbeeinflussbare
Rechtsfolge wieder. Vielmehr ordnen sie selbst
konstitutiv Rechtsfolgen fiir ihre Zwecke an.
Weder die deutsche noch die tschechoslowakische
Nichtigkeitsthese wird besthtigt. Eine generelle
Aussage bleibt dahingestellt. Man hat sich ent-
sprechend den Erfordernissen und im Rahmen eines
konkreten Vertrages geeinigt.
Referring to the formulation "as provided by this
treaty", he states:
Neben dem "Ob" behielten sich die Bundes-
republik und die Tschechoslowakei auch das
"Wie" der Nichtigkeit zur Entscheidung vor.
Gegenstand und Ausmass einer modifizierten
Nichtigkeit sind dem Vertrag selbst zu ent-
nehmen.
Art. II des Vertrages schliesat alle die-
^enigen rechtlichen Polgerungen aus, die aus
einer absoluten Nichttgkeit des Mtlnchener
Abkommens gezogen werdea kcinnten und fUr die
Bundesrepublik inakzeptabel gewesen waren.
6. v. Richthofen, Per Vertrag zwischen Bonn und Prag.
loo.cit., pp. 4-6; Denkschrift der Bundesregierung
zum Yer'i'rag. BT-Drucksache 7/1832, G.d.B., p. 14.
I
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The author gives this oomment "with regard to
their mutual relations":
Endlich haben die Parteien eine Abrede ge-
troffen hinsichtlich der Erstreckung ihrer
Ungiiltigkeitsvereinbarung.
Die Einigkeit bezieht sich ausdrticklich nur
auf das gegenseitige Verh&ltnis und l&sst die
Position anderer Staaten unbertthrt.
Gegentiber den weiteren Signataren des
multilateralen Miinchener Abkommens, Gross-
britannien, Frankreich und Italien, besteht
gar keine Alternative.'
7. Weigand, Per Yertrag liber die gegenseitigen Beziehungen
zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland unci der
Tschechoslowaklgchen Sozialistischen Republik vom
11. Pezember 1975 - Eine vblkerrechtliche Analyse,
p. 6&-9. E.t.: The phrase (in article I) 'to consider
as void* gives a clear indication of the intention of
the parties to determine independently, as the need
arises, the nullity of the Munich Agreement and not
to subject it to the general abstract rule of inter¬
national law. Thus, the contracting parties are not
simply making a declaration concerning the influence-
ability of a legal effect. On the contrary, they
themselves basically set out legal effects for their
own ends.
Neither the German nor the Czechoslovak nullity
theory is being confirmed. A general statement is
left wanting. An agreement corresponding to the
exigencies was reached within the scope of an actual
treaty.
Besides the •if', the Federal Republic and
Czechoslovakia reserved themselves also the decision
of the 'how* with regard to the question of nullity.
The object and extent of a modified nullity may be
deduced' from the treaty itBelf.
Article II of the treaty excludes all those legal
consequences which could ensue from the nullity of
the Munich Agreement, and which would have been un¬
acceptable to the Federal Republic.
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The parties have at last reached an under¬
standing concerning the extent of their agreement
on the question of nullity.
The agreement refers expressly only to the
mutual relationship, leaving the position of
other countries untouched.
No alternative exists with regard to the other




Trois observations s'imposent ici. II s'agit
d'une formule vague et tr&s "felastique" qui ne
prend pas position sur le fond: hullitfe ab
initio, nullitfe absolue ou nullitfe relative.
II y a bien annulation mais sans qu'une limite
dans le temps soit pr&cisfee. En second lieu,
la nullitfe vise les relations mutuelles germano-
tchfecoslovaques uniquement...chaque Etat fetant
libre de s'en tenir d sa propre interpretation...
En troisi&me lieu, la nullite est rfeglementfee,
e'est-d-dire subordonnfee d certaines conditions
qui font l'objet de 1*article 2 et de documents
annexes.®
Frowein takes the view that faced with the treaty's
concrete provisions, all arguments derived from an
Q
abstract interpretation of nullity must be excluded.
It is now necessary to go into consider the most
important legal points of the Treaty are:
8. Colard, Le traitfe de normalisation germano-
tchfecoslovaque du 11 dfecembre 197^. end.c."
p. 674. E.t.» Three observations suggestthemselves:
It is a matter of a very vague and very "elastic"
formula, which takes no position on: nullity ab
initio, absolute nullity or relative nullity,
ft is, on the contrary, an annulment, but without
defining a limit in time. In the second place,
the nullity aims solely at German-Czechoslovak
mutual relations. ...Each State has reserved to
itself freedom to maintain its own interpretation
(of the treaty)...Thirdly the nullity is regulated
i.e. subordinated to particular conditions which are
the object of Article 2 and the documents in the
annex.
9. Prowein, Zuro Begriff und den Polgen defy Nichtigkeit
von Vertragen im Yolkerrecht. loc.cit. t>. 115.
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Article I of the Treaty, whose extent becomes
apparent only after detailed examination, contains
a sufficient safeguard against the theory of the ab
initio nullity of the Munich Agreement, The first Buch
safeguard lies in the fact that in this Article the
parties jointly declare that the Munich Agreement is
to be considered null and void. The legal position is
thus left open, and it is pointed out that the joint
decision concerning the nullity of the Agreement relates
to the future. Moreover* the designated date, i.e*
of September 29» 1938 (on which France, Great Britain,
Italy and Germany signed the actual Agreement concerning
the conditions and modality of the cession of the Sudeten
territories) makes it evident that the previous legal acts,
such as the French and British exchange of notes with
Prague and the later German-Czechoslovak treaties
concerning the transfer of sovereignty, are not included.
The formulation "with regard to their mutual relations"
makes it plain that the declaration of nullity of the
Agreement is strictly bilateral and that it does not
affect the legal position of other signatories. The
fourth restriction is to be seen in the formulation that
the Agreement is null and void as provided by this treaty.
Furthermore, the Treaty fails to mention either the
incompatibility of the Munich Agreement with the territorial
ownership guarantee contained in Article 10 of the league
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of Nations Covenant, nor the guarantee with respect to
the remainder of Czechoslovakia promised, but not actually
delivered, by the German Reich in a supplementary
agreement to the Munich Agreement. The Treaty also fails
to mention what some authors have read into the Nuremberg
Judgement, namely that the reason for the nullity lay in
Hitler's lack of intention to observe the agreement.
Czechoslovakia's principal argument for the Agreement's
"invalidity" from the beginning is mentioned in the
preamble to the Treaty,1^ both parties recognizing that the
10. The preamble - an integral part of the treaty-
goes beyond the usual political-ideological
character of a preface. Its legal importance must
also be classed higher than as if it were just a
medium for interpreting the treaty. The preamble,
rather, has opened up the convincing possibility
of seeing article 1 of the treaty in the proper
respective.
Also ^lumenwitz refers to it aptly when he states:
"In der tschechoslowakischen Vertragsinterpretation
nimmt die in Abs. 3 der Pr&ambel erfolgte gemeinsame
Verurteilung des Mtlnchner Abkommens als Gewaltakt
eine Schltisselrolle ein" (Blumenwitz, Zur Nichtigkeit
des Mtinchener Abkommens vom 29. Sentember 1958 -
Analyse der Nichtigkeitsformel und ihre recrrulichen
Konsequenzen. Jahrouoh 197^. p. 182). E.t.t
In the Czechoslovak interpretation of the treaty,
the joint condemnation of the Munich Agreement as an
act of force contained in paragraph 3 of the preamble,
assumes a key position.
The Federal Government, nevertheless, exercised
the utmost discretion when declaring in its
memorandum to the treaty (BT-Notice 77/74 of
January 25» 1974, p. 11) that the preamble contained
nothing more than a pure statement of fact.
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Munich Agreement of September 29» 1938 was imposed
on the Czechoslovak Republic by the National-Socialist
regime under the threat of force.
The Czechoslovak point of view that the Munich
Agreement was concluded without Czechoslovakia's
participation is also taken into consideration, but
reference is made only to the Agreement of September 29,
1938, i.e. the Munich Agreement in the restricted sense.
^hat the Agreement was concluded without the participation
1 1
of Czechoslovakia cannot be disputed.
11. Bretton, in Les nfegociations germano-tchfecoslovaaue
sur 1''accord de Munich du 29 septembre 1938.(end.o.
p. 208-9) wholly supports the solution to the nullity
question contained in the normalization treaty when
he writesj "Si l'on comprend bien que des considerations
politiques justifient que cet accord (de Munich)
puisse Itre dfeclarfe inexistant, il n'en demeure pas
moins qu'on ne peut faire abstraction de la portee
d'une simulation retroactive de ses consequences
juridiques. ...c'est au nom du realisme que (par)
les negociateurs ouest-allemands.•.un compromis
a pu etre trouvfe, ...en faisant valoir, que oet
accord (de Munich) & £tfe eiabore sans sa participation
(celle de la Tchecoslovaquie) et centre sa volonte."
E.t.» If it is to be understood that political
considerations would have justified this agreement
(of Munich) being declared non-existent, then, by
the same token, one would have been inclined to
undertake a retrospective annulment with all its
legal consequences. ...it is a credit to reality
that the West German negotiators...were able to
work out a compromise formula, ...which showed that
this agreement (of Munich) was elaborated without
their (the Czechs) participation and against their
will.
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The German legal position, however, is based on the
British-Prench-CzechoSlovak arrangements of September
19 and 21, 1938 on the Czechoslovak submission of
September 30, 1938, and, finally, on the negotiations
within the International Commission and the subsequent
fulfillment of the terms of the Munich Agreement. The
Treaty concluded in 1973 does not mention these
incontestable facts.
^he Czechoslovak standpoint, though, is taken
into account by reason of the recognition that the
Munich Agreement is void and by the acknowledgment
of the two principal reasons by which Czechoslovakia
supports her argument of "invalidity from the
beginning"•
Thus, it appears that the German position is
compromised. The results of the negotiations of September
19 and 21, 1938 between Prance, Great Britain and
Czechoslovakia and the actual situation prevailing
after September 29, 1938, for example, are not mentioned.
However, the German interests are embodied in Article II
of the Treaty, where all juridical inferences logically
following from the thesis of the Munich Agreement's
12
voidness "from the beginning" are yprecluded. In this
12. v. Richthofen (f.n.6), p. 47; Eurona-Archiv. 1974,
D 57.
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manner, the Czechoslovak argument of invalidity ex tunc
loses force. Both parties have agreed that the legal
effects are the same no matter when the Munich Agreement
became invalid.
To this end Article II, paragraph 1 provides that:
the treaty shall not affect the legal
effects on natural or legal persons of the
law as applied in the period between September
30, 1938 and May 9, 1945.
It provides further (paragraph 2) that,
...the treaty shall not affect the nationality
of living or deceased persons ensuing from the
legal system of either of the two Contracting
Parties.
And finally (paragraph 3)»
the,..treaty, together with its declarations
on the Munich Agreement, shall not constitute
any legal basis for material claims by the
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and its natural
and legal persons.
Weigand points out:
Hoheitsakte, von deutschen Behdrden im
Sudetenland zwischen dem 30. September 1938
und Kriegsende vollzogen, behalten gemass
Art. II Abs. 1 des ...Vertrages ihre Gtiltigkeit.
Den in den Wehrdienst und sonstigen dffent-
lichen und Staatsdienst des Deutschen Reiches
eingegliederten Sudetendeutschen kann nicht
Landesverrat und Kollaboration mit der deutschen
Besatzungsmacht vorgeworfen werden.
Auch die in jener Zeit ergangenen Straf- und
privatrechtlichen Gerichtsurteile und - beschltSsse
bleiben nach wie vor irreversibel.
Eine "RUckabwicklung" all dieser Rechts-
wirkungen ware schon aus praktischen Grtinden
unvorstellbar und wtirde zu untiberbrUckbaren
Schwierigkeiten filhren.
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Dasselbe gilt in besonderem Masse fiir
Sachverhalte auf dem Gebiete des Personen-
standswesens.
Die nachtrhgliche UngUltigkeit z.B. einer
nach deutschem Recht geschlossenen Ehe hatte
in der Kegel aussesordentlich weltreichende
Konsequenzen u.a. ftir Yerwandtschaftsverhaltnisse
und bis hin zu erbrechtlichen Pragen, Sie wttrde
eine Welle von Polgeerscheinungen ausldsen.
Festgeftigte familienrechtliche Bande wlirden ohne
tieferen Sinn zerstbrt, allgemeine Verwirrung ge-
stiftet.13
With regard to the Treaty provisions, it can be
confirmed that the objective of the Bederal Government
to settle the problems of the past, in particular the
issues arising from the Munich Agreement, in a manner
13. Weigand (f.n.7)» p. 77. E.t.: According to Article
II para 1 of the ...treaty acts of sovereignty
committed by German authorities on Sudeten territory
between September 30, 1938 and the end of the war,
remain valid,
Sudeten Germans who joined the army or were
engaged in other public or governmental services
of the German Reich, cannot be accused of treason
or collaborating with the German occupation forces.
Also all those criminal and civil judgements and
court decisions given during that time remain
unchanged.
A ♦reversal* of all these legal effects would be
unimaginable simply for praotioal reasons, and
would lead to insurmountable difficulties.
The same can be said with particular reference
to questions concerning people's status.
The subsequent nullity of, e.g., a marriage
concluded under German law would have wide-ranging
consequences, among others, for family relationships
and questions of inheritance. It would trigger off a
series of side-effects. Solid family ties would be
senselessly destroyed, and general confusion would
ensue.
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which allowed for the defence of the vested interests of
1 A
both parties, was achieved. *
1 F>
The objections of the Federal Council J with regard
to the settlement reached in the Treaty concerning the
invalidity of the Munich Agreement are not supportable.
As a rebuttal of the argument that West Germany's interests
were not sufficiently taken into account, it must be
emphasized that no deliberate attempt was made to reconcile
all outstanding differences between the two Parties in order
to salvage the Agreement. Each State has disclaimed that
1 6
its legal standpoint was incorporated into the treaty.
Instead, the contracting Parties left for the future the
resolution of any problems resulting from the Munich
17
Agreement. '
The Minister of Foreign Affairs stated at the
meeting of the Federal Council on March 8, 1974*
14. BT-Drucksache 7/1832, G.d.B. of March 20, 1974, p. 1.
15. Anlage (enclosure) 2, BT-Drucksache 7/1832,
Gid.B., p. 18.
16. For further information see the Statement of the
Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs in his report
concerning the 9oth meeting of the German FD, March
27, 1974 (BT-Drucksache 7/1832, Tz. 6007C).
17. Anlage (enclosure) 3» BT-Drucksache 7/1832,
G.d.B. p. 19.
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Der Vertrag 1st in die Zukunft gerichtet.
Wo er auf schwerwiegende Rechtsfragen einer
unheilvollen Vergangenheit eingeht, sucht er
nicht die Geschichte Mitteleuropas neu zu
schrei"ben. Vielmehr wurde hier unausweichliche
Aufraumungsarbeit geleistet.18
The contracting parties agreed (not exoressls
verbis) on a legal position which in principle existed
in international law* In this way the German legal
standpoint was sufficiently protected. The explicit
recognition that the invalidity of the Munich Agreement
arose after its conclusion was therefore unnecessary.
Further, the criticism of the Federal Council that
the preamble of the Treaty made reference only to the
fact that the Munich Agreement was forced upon Czechoslo¬
vakia by threat of force, but was silent on the fact that
the right of self-determination was refused to the Sudeten
Germans, did not result in the rejection of the Treaty as
a whole. The federal Government rightfully emphasized, in
refuting this objection, that the aim of the Treaty was
not to demonstrate chronologically the causes and effects
of the development of German-Czechoslovak relations. The
18. Bundesrat (FC), Bericht (report) of the 4o2^ meeting
(8.3.1974), BR-Drucksache, Tz. 60 C, D. E.t.s This
treaty is directed to the future. Where it concerns
the difficult legal questions of a past full of
calamity, it does not try to write anew the history
of Central Europe. Rather, the parties concentrated
on solving current problems.
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Government did not find it necessary to point out
that the refusal of self-determination for the Sudeten
Germans did not represent the beginning of German-
Czechoslovak relations; rather, this development was
preceded by centuries of suppression of the Czech people
by the Germans and Magyars in the Danubian Monarchy.
Finally, the federal Council saw in the formula
with the wording, that the determined intention
to put an end once and for all to the
disastrous past in their relations, especially
in connection with the Second World War, which
has Inflicted immeasurable suffering on the
peoples of Europe,
an interpretation which justified the expulsion of the
Sudeten Gentians and the confiscation of their property*
The Council felt that a clarification was necesnary to
the effect that the rights of the expellees would not be
affected by the Treaty and that a final arrangement still
had to be made.
Thus, the representative of the CDU/CSU party
explained during the debate concerning the veto of the
Feddral Council in July 10, 1974-1
Die damalige Bundesregierung wird jeden-
falls den schwerwiegenden Vorwurf nicht ent-
kraften kbnnen, dass sie kein Wort in den
Vertrag selbst hineingebracht hat, mit dem
auch die Vblkerredhtsverletzungen der Ver-
treibung von mehr als dreieinhalb Millionen
Menschen angesprochen ware. ...Leider aber
wissen wir, dass das Verschweigen der Ver-
treibung der Sudetendeutschen aus ihrer
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angestammten Beimat als eine Legitimierung
nicht nur verstanden werden kbnnte, sondern
jenseits der Grenze auch so verstanden wird.19
This interpretation of the legal situation hy the
opposition leaders can not he approved. Two neighbouring
peoples who inflicted sufferings on one another for a
millenium cannot achieve peace so long as they continue
to enumerate the injustice of the past. They must turn
over a new leaf. Certainly, when it is expressed in the
Treaty that both States want to overcome the burden of the
past, this cannot be interpreted to mean that the
contracting parties approve of all that happened in the
past. It is not in the spirit of new relations between
these two countries to accuse one another of atrocities,
especially since such atrocities were committed on both
sides.^
19. BT-Drucksache 7/2325, Tz. 7638 B, C.
E.t.i The former Federal Government will in any
case not be able to refute the accusation that
they failed to mention in the Treaty the violation
of provisions of international law resulting from
the expulsion of more than three and a half million
people.».Unfortunately we know that silence on the
question of expulsion of the Sudeten-Germans from
their ancestral domicile can not only be, but on
the other side of the border also is understood
as a legitimation of this expulsion.
20. In the name of the Federal Government the Parliamen¬
tary State Secretary in the German Foreign Office,
®err Moersch, explained that the Federal Government
believed that the historical settling of accounts
would achieve nothing (BT-Drucksache 7/1013). This
was in response to an inquiry from a member of the
Parliament, Herr Becher (CDU/CSU) whether the Federal
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The Federal Council's reproach that the Treaty did
not mention concessions made by the German side is false,
since no unilateral concessions were expressed. If the
Federal Government recognize, as they do, the present
invalidity of the Munich Agreement they simply concur in
an opinion shared by all States in the world. This does
not constitute a concession. The recognition of the fact
that the Munich Agreement was forced upon Czechoslovakia
by threat of force is also not a concession but merely the
recognition of an incontestable historical truth. Finally,
the resolve to overcome the past is not a unilateral but a
mutual concession* The treaty gives both peoples the
21
opportunity to begin anew their relations. The alter¬
native to such a settlement would have been the revenge-
fulness which led to the massacres in Czechoslovakia (on
both sides) during and after the war. This is precisely
the feeling that has to be eliminated.
Government had demanded from the Czechoslovak
Government no list of persons who were responsible
for ...mass executions and other crimes...during
the period of expulsion. Moersch said,if we had
demanded the publication of such a list of names,
we could not resist a counterclaim for a corresponding
list of names for proceedings within the competence
of the German side until 1945.
21. Bericht und Antrag des AuswSrtigen Ausschusses des
Bundestages (Report and motion of the Foreign
Committee of the FD), BT-Drucksache 7/2270, p. 5.
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The legal question of the invalidity of the Munich
Agreement ab initio or ex nunc, thus, did not find in
the Treaty of 1973 a pure juridical solution (in the
22
sense of dogmatic clearness) but a practical answer
22. Seidl-Hohenveldern appropriately writes: "Schlttssig
lasst sich weder die These des CSSR von der ex tunc
Nichtigkeit noch die der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
von der anfanglichen GUltigkeit eines erst spater
ungUltig gewordenen Miinchener Abkommens beweisen.
tlber den Zeitpunkt dieser, also mbglicherweise erst
spater eingetretenen Ungiiltigkeit besteht Unklarheit.
Trat sie mit der Unmbglichmachung der Erftillung des
Garantieversprechens bei der Besetzung der Rest-
Tschechoslowakel im Mhrz 1939 ein oder mit der Fest-
legung der in Austibung der obersten Regierungsgewalt
in Deutschland handelnden Allilerten auf die deutschen
Grenzen nach dem Stande vom 31. Dezember 1937 in der
Berliner Erklarung vom 5. Juni 1945 - Oder gar erst
mit der Regierungserkl&rung der Regierung Kiesinger
1966, dass "das unter Androhung von Gewalt zustande
fekommene Mtinchener Abkommen nicht mehr giiltlg ist"Seidl-Hohenveldern, Das MUnchener Abkommen im Lichte
des Prager Vertrages von 1973. loc.clt. p. 457).
E.t.: There is no definite proof to support either
Czechoslovakia's thesis of the ex tunc nullity, nor
that of West Germany according to which the Munich
Agreement was initially valid until it became null
and void at a later date. There is uncertainty
concerning the point in time at which the nullity
may subsequently have set in. Did it set in when
the promised guarantee could not be fulfilled due
to the occupation of the remaining Czechoslovak
territory in March 1939# or when in the Berlin
Declaration of June 5, 1945 the Allies - who were
exercising the supreme governing authority in Germany-
changed the German frontiers to what they were on
December 31# 1937; or did it set in as late as 1966
with the Government Declaration of the Kiesinger
Government which read that "the Munich Agreement




which does not burden the relations of the two States.
Therefore, the contracting states came to terms over the
most sensitive part of the Agreement.
Blumenwitz arrives at the following conclusion:
Dass der Regelung der Nichtigkeit des
Mttnchner Abkommens...im deutsch-tscheehoslo-
wakischen Vertrag*..eine ganz hervorragende
Bedeutung zukommt, ergibt sich bereits aus der
Pr&ambel... Ftir die rechtliche Bewertung der
hier anstehenden Frage ist...Art. I des Ver-
trages sedes materiae. Ftir die Bundesrepublik
ergibt sich hieraus folgender Rechtsstandpunkt:
1. Das Mtinchner Abkommen vom 29* September
1938 hat in Verbindung mit weiteren vblkerrecht-
lichen Akten zunachst zu einer vblkerrechtlich
wirksamen Abtretung der Sudetengebiete an das
Deutsche Reich geftihrt, das bis zum 9. Mai 1945
die Gebietshoheit iiber dieses Gebiet austibte.
2. Durch welchen vblkerrechtlichen Akt die
Gebietshoheit auf den neu konstituierten
tschechoslowakischen Staat zurtickfiel und ob
der durch den Vertrag vom 11. Dezember 1973
bestatigte Besitzstand noch einer weiteren
vblkerrechtlichen legitimierung bedarf, bleibt
wie bei den tibrigen Ostvertragen offen.
Von ganz entBcheidender Bedeutung ist...die
Beschrhnkung der Nichtigkeit in Art. I des Ver-
trages auf die gegenseitigen Beziehungen der
beiden Vertragsstaaten. Die grundsStzlieh gegen-
tiber jederman wirkende Nichtigkeit wird nur im
23. In spite of the Czechoslovak standpoint of voidness
ab initio. Article II, paragraph 2 of the Treaty
determines that the nullity of the Munich Agreement
shall affect the legal effects of natural or legal
persons of the law as applied in the period between
September 30, 1938 and May 9, 1945. In spite of the
nullity of the treaty, actions of the German organs
of state vis-a-vis natural or legal persons are
valid by reason of the contractual cession of
territories, excluding the effects of measures
which both contracting parties deem to be void
owing to their incompatibility with the fundamental
principles of justice.
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Hinblick auf die Beziehungen Bundesrepublik/
CSSR klargestellt...Aus der Beschrhnkung
der Nichtigkeft auf die gegenseitigen Be¬
ziehungen lasst sich auch allgemein das Gebot
zur restriktiven Auslegung der Nichtigkeits-
formel ableiten. Dies ergibt sich auch daraus,
dass das Miinchner Abkommen auch in den gegen¬
seitigen Beziehungen der Vertragsparteien nicht
schlechthin, sondern nur "nach Massgabe dieses
Vertrages" nichtig sein soli.24
Jahrbuch 1975* p. 245-6.
E.t.i That it is possible to deduce already
from the preamble*..that special importance must be
attached to the provision concerning the nullity of
the Munich Agreement contained in the German-
Czechoslovak treaty. Sedes materiae for the legal
assessment of the issue which, has arisen here is
...Article 1 of the Treaty. For the Federal Republic
of Germany this gives rise to the following legal
standpoint t
1. The Munich Agreement iCom September t9» 1938
-together with other acts of international law- at
first caused the Sudeten territories to be effectively
(in the eyes of international law) transferred to the
German Reich which exercised its sovereignty over
this territory until May 9, 1945.
2. The question of which act of international law
returned the territorial sovereignty of the newly
formed Czechoslovak state and whether the ownership
status confirmed by the treaty of December 11, 1973
requires a further legitimation of international law,
remains, as in the case of the other East Treaties
(Ostvertrage), an open one.
Of decisive importance is...that in Article 1 of
the treaty the nullity is limited to the mutual
relations of the two signatories. The nullity, which
is basically effective vis-a-vis all persons, is
clarified only as regards the relations Federal
Republic/Czechoslovakia...From the limitation of
the nullity one can also deduce the general rule
for interpreting the nullity formula. This is due
to the fact that also what concerns the mutual
relations of the parties to the treaty, the Munich
Agreement is supposed to be void only "under the
present treaty" and not in general.
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or
Raschhofer v emphasizes that the relative view
of nullity, as agreed upon in the treaty, allows each
party to adhere to opposite legal interpretation of the
Munich Agreement.
The memorandum forwarded by the Federal Government
to the Federal Diet and the Federal Council states:
Diese tfbereinkunft stellt nicht die von
der CSSR ursprtinglich geforderte Erklhrung
der UngUltigkeit des Mtinchner Abkommens von
Anfang an mit alien sich daraus ergebenden
Konsequenzen dar. Und welter: Es wird weder
festgestellt, noch von der Bundesregierung
Deutechland anerkannt, dass das Miinchner
Abkommen nichtig Oder von Anfang an ungtiltig
gewesen sei, vielmehr bringen bereits die Worte
"sind tibereingekommen" und "betrachten als
nichtig" zum Ausdruck, dass die gefundene
tibereinkunft lediglich auf die beiden Vertrags-
partner bezogen sind und dass sie nicht zurtick-
wirkt, sondern ftir die Zukunft vom Tage des
Inkrafttretens des Vertrages an gelten wird.26
25. Raschhofer, Der deutsch-»tscheohoslowakische
Normalisierungsvertrag. loc.clt. p. 136.
26. BR-Drucksache (Government publication) 77/74,
January 25, 1974, p. 11.
E.t.i This agreement does not represent the
statement originally demanded by Czechoslovakia
declaring the Munich Agreement void right from
the beginning, with all the ensuing consequences.
Furthermore:neither does the German Federal
Government acknowledge, nor does it state, that
the Munich Agreement was void or void from the
very beginning. On the contrary, the words "have
agreed" and "consider as void" rather express
that the understanding reached affects only the
two parties to the Treaty, and that Its effect
is not retrospective but valid for the future
from the date of the treaty coming into force.
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Chnoupek, the Czechoslovak Prime Minister
declared in June 1973:
The main political and legal importance
of the treaty lies in the fact that it
confirms that the frontier territories,
taken away by force from Czechoslovakia,
legally never belonged to the German
Reich. li27
Even if one wanted to see therein under the
contracting parties a fs^r-reaching dissent of legal
nature concerning form and substance of nullity of the
Munich Agreement, it would have no particular meaning,
since the parties put the legal effects of the void
legal transaction into a concrete form by means of other
provisions, especially in Article II of the Treaty.
The following articles of the Treaty are also of
far-reaching importance.
In Article III of the Treaty the contracting parties
bind themselves to observe the aims and principles
v
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. Since
both the CSSR and the Federal Republic are Member-States
28
of the UN, this obligation is binding in any case.
After all, this general obligation becomes an additional,
namely a contractualf obligation between the partners as
well by reason of Article III.
27. Rude Pravo of June 21, 1973 (Bretton, end.c. p. 197).
28. Dahm, VSlkerrecht. Bd. 2, p. 357? Strupp-Sehlochauer,
Wbrterbuch des Tolkerrechts. Bd. 3, p. 500.
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This could be termed a ease of concurrent claims
between a multilateral treaty, in the form of the
United Nations Charter, and a bilateral treaty, as
the one signed by the parties. It is comparable to
concurrent treaties recognized in international law,
i.e., the meeting of provisions contained in inter¬
national treaties concluded by a subject of inter¬
national law with the same subject of International
law or with a different subject of international law,
and which refer to the same subject-matter.
Article 17 of the treaty embodies a regulation which
guarantee the common frontier of the two States and which
excludes any territorial claims of the Federal Republic
2q
against the OSSR or vice versa. v
29. Professor MUnch stated during the symposium of the
University of Kiel 1972 (see Kimminich-Rumpf, loc.
cit. p. 109-113)* "Die in Wien geschlossene Konvention
iiber das Recht der Vertr&ge vom 23* Mai 1969 erkennt
an, dass es zwingendes VUlkerrecht gibt, an dem die
Giiltlgkeit vdlkerrechtlicher Vertrhge zu messen 1st.
Vertr&ge, die gegen zwingendes Recht verstossen haben,
ab initio nichtig (Art. 53); VertrSge, die mit
spater entstandenem zwingendem Recht kollidieren,
werden nichtig (Art. 64).
Dieser Vertragsrechtskonvention mUsste in der
Betrachtung der OstvertrM.ge nicht gedacht werden,
wenn sie lediglich auf zukttnftige Vertr&ge anwendbar
ware. Denn es 1st anzunehmen, dass die Ostvertrage...
eher in Kraft treten als die Vertragsrechtskonvention
• • •
Aber wle alle Kodifikationstexte schliesst dieser
nicht die Mdglichkeit aus, seine Bestimmungen als
hlteres Vblkerrecht anzusehen. Sein Art. 4 behalt
sogar ausdrllcklich die Mbglichkeit vor, die Regeln
unabhangig von der Konvention auf Vertrage anzu-
wenden. ...
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Die Partner der Ostvertrage sind der Lehre vom
zwingendem VSlkerrecht verbunden, und deshalb hat
sie in ihren Beziehungen eine besondere Bedeutung... .
Wir haben es bei unserem Thema...zu tun mit...
der Selbstbestiramung der Bevblkerung im Falle einer
Orenzahderung. ...
Die Ostvertrhge verstossen gegen dieses Selbst-
bestimmungsrecht, weil die.;.in die Ostgebiete
gehbrige, durch kriegsrechtswidrige Vertreibung
und Fernhaltung nur de facto abwesende Bevblkerung
nicht zu der Losreissung von Deutschland gehbrt
wird."
E.t.t The Convention on the Law of Treaties,
which ended in Vienna on May 23, 1969, recognises
that there exists international jus cogens which
must serve as the yardstick when determining the
validity of international treaties. Agreements
which go counter to jus cogens are void ab initio
(Art. 53)} agreements conflicting with later jus
cogens become void (Art. 64).
When considering the Ostvertrage, this convention
on treaty law ought not to be referred to if it is
solely applicable to future treaties, since one goes
from the assumption that the Ostvertrage.,.come into
effect prior to the convention on treaty flaw, .•.
However, like all codification texts, the latter
does not exclude the possibility of treating its
stipulations as older international law. Its Art, 4
reserves even the possibility of applying the rules
to treaties independently from considerations arising
from the convention.
The parties to the Ostvertrage are bound by the
doctrine of international _jua_jang£ns, giving it a
particular meaning in their relations. We are dealing
in our case...with the self-determination...of the
people in the event of a change in the frontiers....
The Ostvertrage violate the right to self-
determination because, due to their unlawful
expulsion and prevention from returning, the
simply de facto absent people are not given a
hearing by Germany with regard to the enforced
separation.
Professor Mtinch comes to the conclusion that the
frontier clauses of the Ostvertrage violate the right
to self-determination of the people concerned and
recognise an annexation which violates international
law.
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Under both aspects they are confronted by jus
cogens. The result thereof is the voidness of the
treaties in the sphere of international law (loc.
cit. p. 113).
In the discussion (loc.cit. p. 156) Professor
Men»el replied:
"Sie haben...behauptet, wenn die Ostvertrhge
ratifiziert sein werden und wenn dann die Wiener
Vertragskonvention mit der jus cogens-Klausel in
Geltung tritt und auch die hunaesrepublik sie
ratifiziert haben wird, dann wiirde sich rtick-
wirkend die Mbglichkeit ergeben, die Territorial-
klauseln der Ostvertrage wieder zu beseitigen,
well sie gegen jenes .1us cogens verstiessen. Und
sie haben erkennen lassen, dass noch ganz andere
"Vertrage dann nichtig werden wtirden. Es hatte fast
den Anschein, als wollten Sie mit Hilfe der jus-
cogens-Kennzeichnung des SelbstbestimmungsrecKfs
die territorialen Entscheidungen der letzten 100...
Jahre rtickgangig machen. ...Das wird nicht geschehen,
auch nicht gegentiber den Ostvertr&gen. Man braucht
sich nicht einmal auszumalen, wie das Selbst-
bestimmungsrecht praktisch riickwirkend angewendet
werden soil, um in der Uberzeugung besthtigt zu
werdenI Dies wird sich nicht ereignen."
E.t.J You...have stated that once the Ostvertrage
have been ratified, and the Vienna treaty convention
with its jus cogens clause has come into force, and
the Federal Republic has also ratified them, there
would then be a retrospective possibility to have
the territorial clauses in the Ostvertrage removed
on the grounds that they infringe the jus cogens.
You have, further, indicated that this would cause
other treaties to become void. It would almost
appear as if you were trying to rescind the territorial
settlements of the last 1oo...years with the aid of
the ,1us cogens label on the rights to self-determina¬
tion. ...This will not happen, not with regard to the
Ostvertrhge either. It is not even necessary to
Imagine how the right to self-determination should be
retrospectively applied in practice in order to be
confirmed in one's belief: this will not happen.
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The centuries-long quarrel between Germans and
Czechs is settled by Article IV in which Germany
renounces the claim to territory which was for
centuries inhabited by Germans. Although the Federal
Republic of Germany has not sanctioned the expulsion
of her ethnic groups from their ancestral domains,
she has accepted the situation created by the expulsion
of the Germans, and Czechoslovakia has been relieved
of her most pressing problem. It must be pointed out
that Article IV precludes only the territorial claims
of the Federal Republic herself and not the claims
of the expellees with regard to their private real-
estate (especially in the Sudetenland) or with regard
to compensation for its confiscation. This provision
is not to be read as legitimizing expulsion or
expropriation.
Finally, in Article V the contracting parties agree
that expansion of their co-operation in the realms of
economics, science, culture, environmental protection,
sports, transportation and other areas will benefit their
common interest. The importance of this Article depends
on the States* efforts to fulfill it. Presently, it is
merely a proposal to which both parties have voiced
assent.
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2) The Settlement of Problems Resultant from
the Basic Conception of the Treaty
a) Questions concerning Nationality
General principles of the law of nationality are:
1. It is for each State to determine under
its own law who are its nationals. This law shall
he recognised hy other States in so far as it is
consistent with international conventions, inter¬
national custom, and the principles of law
generally recognised with regard to nationality.
2. Any question as to whether a person
possesses the nationality of a particular State
shall be determined in accordance with the law
of that State.
3. A person having two or more nationalities
may be regarded as its national by each of the
States whose nationality he possesses.3o
When a territory passes from one State to another,
the question of the change of nationality arises. The modern
trend is to regulate this question by special provision.
Under international law the nationals of the State which
cedes territory who live in the territory ceded become
eo Ipso citizens of the State to which the territory is
ceded.^
30. See Draft Convention on certain questions Relating
to the conflict of Nationality Laws, The Hague 1930
(League of Nations Doc. C.24. M 13. 1931. V.,
Articles 1-3).
31. Lauterpacht, International Law. Vol. I, p. 551.
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Accordingly the citizens in the local territory lose
in principle their old nationality and acquire inao jure
the new nationality of the acquirement State. General
State practice has introduced three legal institutes which
seem suitable to mitigate the transition for the persons
concerned. For one thing, in some cases a plebiscite of
the population concerned is provided, which can be agreed
upon by the contracting States from case to case. Frequently
possibilities of option are created in order to give those
nationals who want to remain faithful to the old State the
opportunity to opt for its citizenship. Regarding persons
remained in the local territory who did not opt and who
then regularly emigrate, there are frequently provisions for
the protection of minorities as for example laid down in the
Agreement of the Allied and Associated Powers with
Czechoslovakia of September 10, 1919."^
Brownlie explains:
When a state succession occurs, the affected
population normally will automatically acquire the
nationality of the successor state. However,
liberal sentiment and the influence of the
principle of self-determination have led some
writers to assert a right of option. It is
certainly true that many treaties of cession
provide rights of option, but their existence
may militate against the view that general inter¬
national law recognizes such a right.33
32. See Part I, f.n.6 of the thesis.
33. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law.
2d ed., p. 34-0.
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The United Nation's draft Conventions on the
elimination of future statelessness, respectively on
the reduction of future statelessness of 1954 state in
their identical articles 10:
1• Every treaty providing for the transfer
of a territory shall include provisions for
ensuring that, subject to the exercise of the
right of option, the inhabitants of that
territory shall not become stateless.
2. In the absence of such provisions, a State
to which territory is transferred, or which
otherwise acquires territory, or a new State
formed on territory previously belonging to
another State or States, shall confer its
nationality upon the inhabitants of such territory
unless they retain their former nationality by
option or otherwise or have or acquire another
nationality.34
The questions of nationality with regard to the
inhabitants of Czechoslovakia rank among the most complex.
By virtue of the Munich Agreement territories were
handed over to the Reich which were populated predominantly
by Germans but in which there were also Czechs and Slovaks.
By the annexation of the rest of Czechoslovakia in March
1939, Czech nationals who were considered members of the
German race obtained German nationality. When Czechoslovakia
was restored at the end of the war, the Czechoslovak
Government was not willing to restore Czechoslovak nationality
to those persons who had become citizens of the Reich; on the
34. UN Doc. A/2693, pp. 3-7.
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contrary the Government expelled more than three million
of these inhabitants. Neither the German Reich nor
Czechoslovakia with regard to the triple change of territory
contented itself with the afore-mentioned principle of
international law but, rather, settled the questions of
nationality by statutes or agreements. In general terms
at least, these problems must be disoussed.
The questions of citizenship which derived from the
Munich Agreement of 1938 were settled in the Treaty between
the German Reich and the Czechoslovak Republic on Questions
of Nationality and Option of November 20, 1938.^ This
Agreement did not deal with the ethnic affiliation of the
population living there, but concerned itself with deter¬
mining those born in the ceded territory before January 1,
1910; further those descended from persons who were born
there before that date and, finally those who had lost
their German citizenship on January 10, 1920, including
their descendants; finally wives of persons to fchom the
provisions of the Treaty clould be applied.
By virtue of this Agreement all segments of the
established population of the ceded territory became German
nationals, including the indigenous Czechoslovak minority.
35. Document No. 7. Even before this Treaty became
effective, Hitler, by means of the Law on the Reunion
of the Sudeten-German Territories with the German
Reich (Document No. 8), had stated the principle that
the old-established inhabitants of these territories
were German citizens.
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However, under Article 3 of the Treaty they were allowed
to opt for Czechoslovak nationality. Conversely, a right
of option for German nationality was conceded to the ethnic
Germans who remained Czechoslovak nationals, especially to
the German minority in the rest of Czechoslovakia.
In the acquisition of German citizenship ethnic
affiliation was decisive only for those Czechoslovaks
who, on October 10, 1938, had had their residence outside
the former Czechoslovak territory. They acquired German
citizenship only if they forfeited their Czechoslovak
citizenship and if they were ethnic Germans who on this
day possessed the right of domicile in a Sudeten German
community.Furthermore, the German Government could
request that non-ethnic Germans, who under the Treaty
retained Czechoslovak citizenship (especially those Czechs
and Slovaks who had immigrated into the ceded territory
after January 1, 1910), leave the German Reich within three
months. Likewise, the Czechoslovak Government could request
that ethnic Germans, who possessed Czechoslovak citizenship
and had immigrated into Czechoslovakia after this date,
leave Czechoslovakia within three months, whereupon they
could lose Czechoslovak citizenship.
This settlement was in accordance with international
37
law recognized at that time.
36. Schmied, Das Staatsangehdrlgkeitsrecht der
Tschechoslowakei. p. 23.
37. Lauterpacht (f.n.31), Vol. I, pp. 552-4? O'Connell,
International Law. Vol. I pp. 454-5.
311.
When Hitler annexed the remaining territory of
Bohemia and Moravia, and Slovakia became a separate
State, he deviated from his racial program by incorporating
non-German peoples into the ^erman Reich. But he was not
willing to grant the same rights to the Czechs as to
Germans. Article II of the Decree on the Protectorate of
Bohemia and Moravia provides, that
inhabitants of the Protectorate of German
race shall become German nationals and German
citizens in accordance with the provisions of
the Reich Citizenship Law of September 15»
1935. ...The remaining inhabitants of Bohemia
and Moravia shall be nationals of the Protectorate
of Bohemia and Moravian.. .38
The citizenship of the Protectorate was something
quite new, something between German nationality and a
nationality sui generis. Since the Protectorate was a part
of the German Reich, the citizens of the Protectorate were
as a consequence German nationals, thus citizens of the
Reich as opposed to foreigners. But within the Reich
discrimination existed, for the citizens of the Protectorate
did not possess all the rights of German citizens.'^
These questions were settled in the German Decree of
April 20, 1939 (Law Gazette 1939 I p. 815)^ together with
the Circular of the Minister of the Interior of the Reich
38. Document No. 10.
39. Schmied (f.n.36), p. 26; Jellinek, Per automatische
Brwerb und Yerlust der Staatsangehbrigkeit durch
volkerrechtllche Vorgelnge. p. 167.
40. Document No. 13.
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of May 25, 193941 and Decree of June 6, 194142 together
with the Circular of the Minister of the Interior of
October 15, 1941.43
It later seemed opportune for the National Socialist
regime to extend the settlement of November 1938. By the
Decree of April 20, 1939 all ethnic Germans, who had
possessed Czechoslovak citizenship, acquired German
citizenship, effective from March 16, 1939, in so far as
they had not already acquired it by reason of the treaty
arrangements of November 20, 1938. Only the Germans in
Slovakia and Ruthenia were excluded. The circular of the
Minister of the Interior of the Reich of May 25, 1939
determined that with regard to the Sudeten Germans the
change of citizenship did not depend on their affiliation
to any people or race.
The decree of June 6, 1941, as supplemented by the
above circular, stipulates that persons of German ethnic
origin cannot be protectorate subjects. Moreover,
regulations were brought out dealing with the German
nationality of persons marrying a protectorate subject,
of persons already married as at March 16, 1939, and of
41t Ministerial Journal of the Reich, Internal Affairs,
p. 1253.
42. law Gazette 1941 I, p. 308.
43. lec.cit. 1941, P. 1837.
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offspring of these marriages. The latter automatically
acquired German nationality at birth.
In 1945, when the restoration of Czechoslovakia
resulted from the conquest of Ruthenia, Slovakia and
finally Bohemia and Moravia by Soviet forces,the
Czechoslovak Government-in-exile, which had been
recognized by the Allies at the beginning of the war,
became the "Privisional Government of the revived CSR"
In their first session of April 5, 1945 in Kosice, in
Eastern Slovakia, they issued the Statute of Kosice which
established that the ethnic Germans who possessed
Czechoslovak citizenship previously would not reerover
Czechoslovak citizenship but would be deported. The
Government developed the thesis that the Czechoslovak
State in its boundaries of January 1, 1938 had continued
to exist even after the events of 1939, and that during
4.6
this period it was unable only to transact business.
44. Schmied, Ibid.■ p. 30.
45. Ibid.
46. Taborsky writes* "...the recognition of the Czechoslovak
Government...raised, of course, the important question
of juridical continuity. Is the Czechoslovak State (for
the representation of which in the international sphere
there was created and officially recognized in July,
1940, a Provisional Czechoslovak Government with the
President of the Republic, Dr. E. Benes, as its Head)
to be considered as a continuation - from the stand¬
point of international law - of the Czechoslovak Republic
which was territorially truncated as a result of the
Munich agreement of September, 1938, and in March, 1939,
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incorporated partly in the Greater German Reich and
partly (as far as Sub-Carpathian Russia and a part
of Eastern Slovakia are concerned) in Hungary?
Are both these States from the standpoint of inter¬
national law one and the same entity and Inter¬
national Person, one and the same subject of
international rights and obligations?
There can be no doubt of the fact that the answer
must be in the affirmative. ...(through) the illegal
use of force by Germany and Hungary the Czechoslovak
State did not disappear; its legal existence continued.
The Czechoslovak legations in the States which did not
recognize the actual state of affairs brought about in
March, 1939, continued even after March 14, 1939, in
their official diplomatic representation of the
Republic.
It is, further, a universally recognized rule of
international law that the recognition or nowrecognition
of a change in the headship of a State, in the composition
of its government or in the form of government as well
as the recognition or non-recognition of a change in
the title of a State or a curtailment of its territory
does not in any way effect recognition, and the inter¬
national legal existence of the State itself and does
not make it lose its character as an International
Person and as a rightful member of an international
society of States. Formal contact with the government
of the States (Dominions) which recognized the Provisio¬
nal Czechoslovak Government was effected - in addition
to the direct contact between the Heads of these
States and Cabinet Ministers - through the Heads of
the appropriate missions abroad, which have in such
States (Dominions) been accredited as official
representatives of the Czechoslovak Republic, and which
have as such continued uninterruptedly to represent the
interests of the Czechoslovak State through the whole
period of the interregnum from March 15, 1939, when the
Government of Hacha came under the power of Germany,
to 21st July, 1940, when the new Czechoslovak Government
of Dr. Benes was first recognized" (The Czechoslovak
Cause, pp. 91-2).
Schwarzenberger writes: "The Sudetenland had never
been part of Germany" (Power Politics, p. 457). But
there is no further explanation of this standpoint.
I
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The provisions of the law in force before the Munich
Agreement were regarded as being effective even after
this date.^
The theory that the Czech State continued to exist
even after the German occupation in the middle of March
1939 contradicts historical facts as well as the principle
4.8
of effectiveness iri international law, and cannot be
supported. But this thesis was enforced only with regard
to the ethnic Czechs or Slovaks; it was not applied to the
persons who became German citizens by the annexation of
Czechoslovakia, although according to Czechoslovak law
existing before the Conference of Munich ethnic Germans
who were Czechoslovak citizens would regain Czechoslovak
citizenship after 1945.^
Contrary to the Czechoslovak thesis, the Czechoslovak
State perished on March 15# 1939 because it had lost its
independence and was incorporated into the German Reich.
A state ceases to be an international person
when it ceases to exist.5©
47. Schmled (f.n.36), p. 31; Jellinek (f.n.39), p. 166;
Wagner, Per Prager Vertrag als Schlusstein der
bilateraTen Ost-politik. pp. 66.
48. Brownlie. Principles of Public International Law.
p. 415; O'flonnell U.n.37), Vol. I p. ;
Lauterpacht (f.n.31). Vol. I, pp. 155-6.
49. Hilf, lie tschechoslowakische Porderung auf Unftulfcia-
keit des MUnchner Abkommens ab initio, loc.clt7 p?845.
50. Lauterpacht (f.n.31), Vol. I p. 155.
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With regard to this question, Koerber writes:
Das Sudetengebiet ist aufgrund eines
vdlkerrechtlich wirksamen Vertrages (Miinchener
Abkommen im weiteren Sinn) rechtswirksam von
Deutschland und in Erfiillung des Abkommens dem
Reich eingegliedert worden.
Die Grenzfestsetzung zwischen Deutschland und
der Tschechoslowakischen Republik, die sogenannten
Nachmtinchener Grenzen, wurde durch die M&rz-
ereignisse 1939* den Untergang der Tschecho-
Slowakischen Republik und die Errichtung des
Reichsprotektorats Bbhmen und Mahren weder zum
Vor- noch zum Nachteil des Deutschen Reiches be-
einflusst. Deutschland hat keine territoriale
Souver&nitht iiber das als Protektorat Bbhmen und
M&hren bezeichnete Gebiet erworben, das heisst
eine rechtswirksame Verschlebung der Nachmtinchener
Reichsgrenzen ist nicht eingetreten, denn es war
keine vdlkerrechtliche Willenseinigung tiber die
Inbesitznahme BShmens und Mhhrens zwischen
Deutschland und der Tschechoslowakei zustande-
gekommen (und) das Deutsche Reich hat sich liber
das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der tschechischen Nation
hinweggesetzt und die bedeutendsten M&chte haben
unverziiglich gegen die deutsche Massnahme protestiert.
...Die Slowakei ist durch Sezession aus der Tschecho-
slowakischen Republik ausgeschieden und als souverhner
Staat VSlkerrechtssubjJekt geworden. Die Karpatho-
Ukralne (Ruthenia) wurde als Teil des tschecho-
slowakischen Staates von Ungarn annektiert.51
KBrber, Die Annexion der Resttschechoslowakei. p. 202,
83. E.t.i The Sudeten territory, by reason of an inter¬
nationally valid treaty (Munich. .Agreement in the
broadest sense) has been assimilated into the Reich
by Germany legally and in fulfillment of the Agreement.
The delineation of the boundary between Germany and
Czechoslovakia, the so-called post-Munich boundary,
was by reason of the events of March 1939, the
elimination of the Czechoslovak Republic and the
establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and
Moravia, neither to the advantage nor to the dis¬
advantage of Germany. Germany possessed no territorial
sovereignty over this area, designated as the Protec¬
torate, which meant that a legal dislocation of the
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post-Munich boundary did not ensue, for there
was no agreement between Germany and Czechoslovakia
over the possession of Bohemia and Moravia (and) the
German Reich disregarded the right of self-
determination of the Czechoslovak nation and the
most important Powers protested immediately against
the German measures*** By means of seoession, Slovakia
was separated from Czechoslovakia and became, as a
sovereign State, a subject of international law* The
Carpatho-Ukraine (Ruthenia) was »,.annexed by Hungary.
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Thus, the present day Czechoslovak Republic is in
error in adhering to the view that the Czechoslovak State
never ceased to exist legally but rather endured. The
foundation for this view, i.e. that the Munich Agreement
was void ab initio and the annexation of the rest of
Czechoslovakia on March 15, 1939 was contrary to inter¬
national law, is not enough, since illegality alone is
not sufficient to have allowed the Czechoslovak State to
endure as a subject of international law. The unrestricted
use of the principle ex injuria ius non oritur would
undoubtly lead to a still further disparity between the
actual state of international affairs and the legal state
of affairs.
Although from March 15, 1939 until 1940 neither an
independent Czechoslovak State nor any organ which could
have represented such a State existed, Marek finds the
basis for the legal continuity of Czechoslovakia in the
CO
principle ex injuria ius non oritur^ .
In spite of the importance of this principle, Marek
does not support its unrestricted use but rather establishes
a compromise between the principle of effectiveness on the
one hand and the ex injuria principle on the other hand.
52. Marek, Identity and Continuity of States in
Public International Law, pp. 311-6: 327-30.
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In other words, a certain amount of
finality, a consolidation of the new
effective situation is required for the
normative pressure of facts to prevail
against the inherent legality of the
system...The effectiveness of the illegal
act must be final beyond doubt und every
reasonable chance of a restitutio ad
Integrum must be excluded.
Both, Fiedler and Ch. Rousseau agree with this
view.^
However, Marek's thesis has not found unanimous
acceptance. Brownlie declares:
Unfortunately the general categories of
'continuity* and 'state succession*, and the
assumption of a neat distinction between them,
only make a difficult subject more confused
by masking the variations of circumstance and
the complexities of the legal problems which
arise in practice, ...what occurred on liberation
was restoration, re-establishment of the former
state.55
Marek*s thesis presumes that the disappearance of
a State by reason of illegal annexation does not have
as a consequence its immediate legal extinction. Rather,
Marek argues, a condition is created initially which
allows the state to endure legally and actually if the
annexation is made retrogressive. If the annexation is
not made retrogressive and every reasonable chance of a
restitutio ad Integrum is excluded, then the condition
53. Ibid,, p. 329.
54. Fiedler, Staatskontinuitat und Yerfassungsrecht
sprechung. p. 29: Rousseau. Prlncipes de droit
international public. Tome I» pp. 373.
55. Brownlie (f.n.48), pp. 77-8.
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which initially set in - which allowed the state to
endure - ends. One refers to this temporary condition
between the actual disappearance of a state and its
restoration as suspension.
As soon as Czechoslovakia was restored, when the
territory of the former Czechoslovak State was conquered
by the Soviet Union and entrusted to a Provisional
Czechoslovak Government, this Government regarded all
37
former citizens of the Protectorate as nationals. Since
the Presidential Decree of August 2, 1945 established
that former Czechoslovak citizens who were ethnic Germans
56. A case worthy of attention is that of Austria.
According to official Austrian State practice and
Austrian domestic law and principles of inter¬
national law, the Republic of Austria did not
disappear through the "Anschluss" with Germany in
1938 but rather continued to exist as a subject of
international law. The consequence of this is the
uninterrupted identiy and continuity of Austria
as the same State during the time of its inclusion
in the German Reich (see Adamovich-Spanner, Handbuch
des dsterreichischen Verfassungsrechts. 5. Auf1.,
p. 39;.
These writers talk of the restoration of Austria's
ability of act by reason of the "Declaration on
Austria" which the Great Powers published at the
Moscow Conference, of Foreign Ministers on November 1,
1943. See also Seidl-Hohenfeldern, Vblkerrecht.
pp. 192, 241 and the literature cited by the authors.
57. See further Jellinek (f.n.39)» p. 170.
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and had acquired German citizenship by the laws of a
foreign occupying power would lose Czechoslovak
CO
citizenship, this provision contradicts the thesis
of voidance of all statutes of the occupying powers,
for, if the German statutes during the period when
Czechoslovakia was subjugated had no legality, then
also the concession of German citizenship to Czechoslovak
citizens was void.
In spite of this, the acquisition of German
citizenship was used to support the deportation of these
Germans as "undesirable aliens". The reason was not the
acquisition of a foreign citizenship but merely German
nationality. Evidence thereof is produced by the provision
in Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Decree of August 2, 1945
that Czechoslovak citizens who were ethnic Germans but had
not acquired German citizenship would also lose Czechoslovak
citizenship (e.g. ethnic Germans in Slovakia).
In reality the Government of Czechoslovakia decided to
solve by force and in a barbarous manner the problem of
minorities in Czechoslovakia by expelling the German living
there. Since it was certainly not expedient to allow these
expelleos to retain Czechoslovak cltitzenship, they were
stripped of it. This deoision, however, was merely a
consequence of the primary goal to deport the Germans.
58, Document No, 18,
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In Article 3 of the Decree of August 2, 1945 Germans
who lost Czechoslovak citizenship were conceded the right
to petition for its restoration within six months. This
provision remained without any practical significance. More
than three million Germans were exiled and had no
possibility of making use of this provision. Only a
comparatively small number of Germans remained, including
specialists who were indispensable to the State or close
relatives of native citizens. But these people also made
no use of the possibility of option.
Thereupon on November 29, 1949 a provision was
issued by the Government which made it possible for the
ethnic Germans who had remained in Czechoslovakia to
petition for their lost Czechoslovak citizenship. Since
this offer was not accepted either, in spite of the time
extension, Czechoslovak citizenship was conferred on all
ethnic Germans regardless of their own personal desires
by reason of the Statute of April 24, 1953. In this context,
£1
Schmied speaks of compulsory naturalization.
59. The PAZ of June 22, 1973 mentions a number of
125,000.
60. Document No. 19.
61. Document No. 20; Schmied (f.n.36), p. 43.
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The attitude of the CSSR regarding the compulsory
naturalization of the Germans remained in its territory
presents a contradiction of ruling principles of public
international law in this field, because the nationality
is a relationship between the individual and the State
characterized by public rights and obligations, and can be
described as membership in the State.
Starke writes:
Rationality is the most frequent and sometimes
the only link between an individual and a State,
ensuring that effect be given to that individual's
rights and obligations at international law. It may
be defined as the status of membership of the
collectivity of individuals whose acts, decisions,
and policy are vouchsafed through the legal concept
of the State representing those individuals.62
It results from this that one cannot compulsorily
burden a person with this legal relationship.
Strupp-Schlochauer state:
Dartiber, dass die Ermessensfreiheit jedes
Einzelstaates bei der Vergebung seiner Staats-
angehbrigkeit nicht grenzenlos ist, ...bestehen.••
keine Zweifel..., als geboten betrachtet werden...
das Verbot der Aufzwingung der Staatsangehbrigkeit
Also for Makarov the Imposed acquirement of nationality
is out of question:
62. Starke, Introduction to International Law, p. 290.
63. Strupp-Schlochauer (f.n.28), Bd. 3» p. 325.
E.t.: There are...no doubts about the fact that the
liberty of discretion of each individual state is
not unlimited,...the prohibition of the imposition
of the citizenship can be considered imperative... .
324.
...ein Erwerb bei dem der Betroffene keine
Willenserklarung abgegeben hat, weder direkt
noch indirekt.64
Hudson writesi
Naturalization must be based on an explicit
voluntary act of the individual or a person
acting on its behalf.65
Greig points aut:
Naturalization is the method adopted for
admitting foreign nationals voluntarily to
citizenship.66
Brownlie explains:
The analogue of deprivation of nationality
is provided by the cases described as compulsory
change of nationality and "collective naturalization".
...tribunals have occasionally stated...that inter¬
national law does not permit compulsory change of
nationality. The United States, the United Kingdom,
France and other states have often protested
against "forced naturalization provisions.♦.".67
The draft of the Harvard Law School (Article 15)
reads (in extracts) as follows:
...a state may not naturalize a person.••
without the consent of such person.68
64. Makarov, Deutsohea Staatsangehbrlgkeitsrecht. p. 386.
E.t.: ...an acquirement where the person concerned has
not given a declaration of intent, neither directly
nor indirectly.
65. UN Doc. A/CN.4/50, Nationality, including Statelessness,
Report of Manley 0. Hudson, Special Rapporteur,
February 21, 1952, YB. I.L.O. 1952, Vol. II, p. 8.
66. Greig, International Law, p. 377.
67. Brownlie (f.n.48), p. 331-2.
68. Draft Conventions and comments on nationality,
responsibility of statesfbr injuries to aliens, and
Territorial waters, prepyed by the research in
international law of The Harvard Law School. Suppl. to
the A.J.I.L., Vol. 23, Special Number, April, 1929,
p. 53.
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The comment points out, that
...this article expresses a general rule that
a state cannot properly naturalize aliens without
their consent. ...the general principle thatinot
state is free to acquire the allegiance of natural
persons without their consent is believed to be
generally recognized. ...The "consent" mentioned
in this article means express consent or an act
which in itself shows unquestionable the desire
and intention of a person to take the nationality
of a state.69
A convincing source of law concerning this question
is Law No. 12 of the Allied High Commission for Germany,
November 17, 1949 ("Nullity of certain provisions of
national-socialist legislation on nationality"), which
states that the compulsory conferment of the German
nationality to French and Luxemburgian citizens by the
legislation of the Reich was legally ineffective from
the very beginning:
Whereas for purposes of annexation the
National-Socialist Government enacted legislation
imposing German nationality on persons or groups
of persons in breach of the principles of the Law
of Nations and certain of these provisions affect
nationals of France and of Luxembourg, the Council
of the Allied High Commission enacts as follows:
To the extent that the Reich GQfdinance of
23 August 1942 (RGB1. I, p. 533) and the Ftihrer's
Decree of 19 May 1943 (RGB1. I, p. 315) purport
to confer German nationality compulsorily on
nationals of France and of Luxembourg such
Ordinance and Decree are hereby declared to have
been null and void.7o
69. Ibid.. pp. 53-5.
70. Official Gazette of the Allied High Commission for
Germany 1949, November 21, 1949, No. . 4, pp. 29-30
(30).
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In an interpretation of this Law by the Allied High
Commission it was stated that any conferment of the German
nationality as a result of the decree of August 23, 1942
was to be regarded as compulsory transfer. The inter-
71
pretation was binding on the German authorities.'
Czechoslovakia^ behaviour with regard to the
compulsory naturalization of the remaining Germans
contradicts especially Article 15, paragraph 2 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and
proclaimed by General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III) of
December 10, 1948, which states;
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
nationality nor denied the right to change his
nationality.72
But according to most legal authorities in international
law, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has no
binding force.
0 * ConneH writes *
As a legal document the Universal Declaration
is of doubtful significance. Even Its architects
appear to have regarded it as no more than a
Statement of principles in the political realm,
or at best enjoying no more legal authority
71. Massfeller, Das deutsche Staatsangehbrigkeitsrecht.
p. 413.
72. UN Doo. ST/HR/1, Human Rights, a compilation of
international instruments of the Uniibed Nation
no. 1-3 (£): Berber. Volkerrecht.ItokumentensammlunK.
Bd. I pp. 917-23 (920*n
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than any other recommendation of the General
Assembly. As an elaboration of Articles 55 and
56 of the United Nations Charter, it does,
however, have some Juridical character, even if
the machinery for rendering it effective is
unpromising, though not non-existent.73
It must be added further that Czechoslovakia had
not consented to the Declaration of Human Rights but
had abstained from voting.
In spite of this widespread legal point of view one
can however hardly say that the prohibition of compulsory
naturalization has so far gained acceptance as generally
binding principle of public international law, with the
consequence that the Sudeten Germans remained in the CSSR
and now of Czechoslovak nationality, would have a
legitimate right to esoape the compulsorily conferred
citizenship.
The compulsory naturalization of the Germans still
living today in Czechoslovakia, therefore, is valid
according to Czechoslovak law. On the other hand German
law does not recognize the loss of citizenship by compulsory
naturalization. Persons naturalized in a compulsory manner
73. O'Connell (f.n*37)» Vol, II, pp. 821-2), See further
Lauterpacht (f.n.31)» Vol, I, p. 745; Berber,
Lehrbuch des VUlkerrechts. Bd. I p. 32, 373;
±)ahm (f.n,28) Bd. I pp. 427.
74. See Schmied (f.n.36), p. 44, f.n.1
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by another State retain German citizenship according to
German law and are referred to as 'sujets mixtes*'^
(double nationals).
It was impossible for either Government to regard the
other*s actions as legal. On this point there was only one
way to reach an aacord, and that was to disregard the past
77
and provide for the future.'' To this end Article II,
paragraph 2 of the Treaty statess
The present Treaty shall not affect the
nationality of living or deceased persons
ensuing from the legal system of either of
the two Contracting Parties.
Questions of nationality in German law were arranged
by Article 116, paragraph 1 of the Constitutional Law of
the Federal Republic, the Federal Law of May 19, 1953
(Law concerning the affairs of expellees and refugees) and
the Federal Statute of February 22, 1955. In principle all
75. Schmied, Ibid.. p. 44.
76. The Judgement of April 6, 1955 in the Nottebohm Case
stated on page 21: "When one State has conferred its
nationality upon an individual and another State has
conferred its own nationality on the same person, it
may occur that each of these States, considering itself
to have acted in the exercise of its domestic jurisdic¬
tion, adheres to its own view and bases itself thereon
in:i»o far as its own actions are concerned. In so
doing, each State remains within the limits of its
domestic jurisdiction" (D.D.I.C.J. 1947-1958, p. 100).
77. See speech given by Foreign Minister Scheel at the
90th session of the Federal Diet, March 27, 1974
(BT-Druoksache 7/1832, Tz. 6037, A, B).
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ethnic German expellee from Czechoslovakia became citizens
of the Federal Republic of Germany. To avoid recapitulation,
reference is made to documents No. 4 (with annotation) and
No. 5.
The Treaty of December 11, 1973 provides that citizen¬
ship remains unchanged. This implies that the Germans deported
from Czechoslovakia after the war lost Czechoslovak citizen¬
ship, but retained German citizenship. The Germans v/ho were
not deported und who in accordance with German law acquired
German citizenship as a consequence of the annexation of
Czechoslovakia possess German citizenship in accordance with
German law and Czechoslovak citizenship in accordance with
Czechoslovak law. Those Germans who did not acquire German
citizenship after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1939*
e.g. those who lived in autonomous Slovakia, possess Czechos¬
lovak citizenship only.
b) Material Claims
If the Munich Agreement was void from the beginning,
the occupation of Czechoslovakia and all other actions of
German authorities within the territory of the former
Czechoslovak State were without legal effect and therefore
unlawful. The annexation of the remaining provinces of
Czechoslovakia in 1939 was an illegal act.
An essential consequence of such a violation of inter-
330
national law is the subsequent obligation to pay
damages.^®
The same principle is applicable to violations of
international law committed by the Czechoslovak State
after the war: expulsion of the Sudeten Germans and the
complete expropriation of their goods and chattels.
These measures were without any legal basis and were
inconsistent with the agreements protecting minorities
which the Czechoslovak Republic had concluded on
September 10, 1919 with Great Britain, the United




International wrongs may be divided into two
principal categories for the purpose of analysis
of reparation - moral and material. The former
sire those which affect the dignity of the State
and thereby impair the harmony of international
relations. The latter are those which occasion
loss of property or suffering and inconvenience
to individuals.Frequently the two are associtated,
and this explains why two forms of reparation may
be ordered for a single event. In addition,
remedies may be regarded as strictly compensatory
or as penal, or as partly compensatory and partly
penal.
78. lauterpacht (f.n.3l)» Vol. I p. 352; Delbez, Les
Princines G&nferaux du Droit International Public.
p. 354; fl'flonnell (f.n.T?), Vol. 11 pp. 126?M3.
79. See Part I, f.n.6 of this thesis; Hilf, Die
tschechoslowakische Forderung auf Ungtiltigkelt
des Munchner Abkommens ab initio, loc.cit. p.855.
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...Reparation may take the following formes
••restitutio in Integrum..., compensation...,
penal damages..., annulment... ... apology...,
abstract declarations of rights and wrongs...,
affirmation of rights.80
Lauterpacht writes:
An international delinquency is any injury to
another State... committed by a State in violation
of an international legal duty...
The principal legal consequences of an inter¬
national delinquency are reparation of the moral
and material wrong done. The merits and the
conditions of the special cases are.,.different.
...The only rule which is unanimously recognised
...is that out of an international delinquency
arises the right for the wronged State to request
from the delinquent State the performance of such
acts are necessary for reparation of the wrong
done.81
Schwarzenberger explains:
In International law, the duty to make
reparation means the obligation to re-establish,
as far as possible, the state of affairs as it
would probably have existed had the international
tort not been committed. The particular function
of this rule is to assist in the restoration of
the legal equilibrium which has been disturbed
by the commission of an international tort.
Thus, in the first place, reparation takes the
form of restitution in kind. If this is not
possible, two subsidiary forms of reparation
are available: satisfaction and compensation.
Satisfaction is any non-monetary form of reparation
which falls short of restitution in kind. A formal
apology or condemnation of an act by an inter¬
national tribunal illustrates this type of reparation.
For the rest, there is only monetary compensation
as a substitute for the impossible restoration of
the status quo ante.82
80. 0»Connell (f.n.37), Vol. II, pp. 1203-8.
81. Lauterpacht (f.n.31), Vol. I, pp. 338; 352-3.
82. Schwarzenberger, A Manual of International Law.
Vol. 1, p. 169.
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The Czechoslovak insistence on defining the Munich
Agreement as void ab initio was seen by a number of
German groups as an effort to provide a legal basis for
material claims for reparation. Such reparation demands
were rejected by the Federal Republic, however, on the
grounds that the regulation of any demand for reparations
had to be reserved to a general treaty of peace among the
parties of World War II. The German Government made this
standpoint clear during the London Conference of February
28 - August 8, 1952, with the result that Article 5»
paragraph 2 of the Agreement on German External Debts,
concluded in London on February 27, 1953, decided that
all claims arising out of the Second
World War by countries which were at war
against or were occupied by Germany during
that war, and by nationals of such countries
against the Reich and agencies of the Reich,
including costs of German occupation...shall
be deferred until the final settlement of the
problem of reparation.85
Of course, this Agreement is not applicable to
Czechoslovakia since the Czechoslovak Government did not
accede to it. Nevertheless, during the negotiations with
Czechoslovakia the standpoint of the Federal Republic
remained the same: Germany refused to discuss any problem
of such material claims.8^ This position was taken by the
83. Gurski, Das Abkommen iiber deutsche Auslandsschulden.
p. 173 in Kiehnscherf. Die Regelung der deutschen
Auslandsschulden. im Rahmen intcrnationaler Vertrage.
p. $1; Text of the Agreement: Law Gazette II, 1953,
pp. 331-3.
84. BT-Drucksache 7/1434, January 24, 1974, Tz. 4824 D.
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then Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Herr Scheel,
on March 27, 1974 in response to a question during a
debate in the Federal Diet.8"5 It is also explicitly-
expressed in Article II» paragraph 3 of the Treaty, in
which it is stated that
the .,. Treaty together with its declarations
on the Munich Agreement, shall not constitute any
legal basis for material claims by the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic or its natural and legal persons.
German material claims are also not mentioned.
Throughout the Treaty no circumstances are mentioned
which could be used to substantiate German demands. Thus,
it can be argued that the Treaty makes no provision for
claims for damages. This was also the official point of
view of the Federal Republic expressed in reply to the
opinion of the Federal Councils
Bestehende Rechte gehen durch den Vertrag
niemanden verloren. Ausserdem ist klargestellt,
dass aub dem Vertrag von tsohechoslowakischer
Seite keine materiellen Ansprtiche abgeleitet
werden kbnnen.86
At this stage, Seidl-Hohenveldern amalgamates the
mutual compensation claims of the parties to the treaty
with those of their respective nationals against the other
85. BT-Drucksache 7/1832, Tz. 6038 A-C.
86. BT-Drucksache 7/1832, G.d.B. p. 20; E.t.s Nobody
loses existing rights by the treaty, It is also
made clear that no material claims can be deduced
from the treaty which would benefit the Czechoslovak
side.
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signatory State, in this case of German nationals against
Czechoslovakia for loss or property following their
expulsion. He states:
Wenn die CSSR unter Berufunr auf die latsache,
dass auch nach dem Wortlaut des Prager Vertrages
die Erhebung von Reparationsansprtichen aus anderen
Griinden als aus denen der Nichtigkeit des Mtlnchener
Abkommens zulassig sei, solche ReparationsansprUche
stellen sollte, stellt sich zwangslhufig die Gegen-
rechnung mit den Sach- und Personenschaden, die
Personen deutscher Volkszugehbrigkeit wegen dieser
ihrer Volkszugehdrigkeit in der Tschechoslowakei
zugeftigt worden sind. Sowohl dieser deutsche Ent-
scMdigungsanspruch als auch der tschechoslowakische
Entschadigungsanspruch bewegen sich in astronomischen
Hbhen, die aber in der Richtung leicht herauf- oder
herabgesetzt werden kbnnen. Jeder Versuch einer
Konkretisierung wirft so zahlreiche Begriindungs-
und Berechnungsprobleme auf, dass es naheliegend
und gewiss auch vertretbar ist, dem Beispiel des
seinerzeitigen sowjetischen Yorschlags eines Friedens-
vertrages mit Deutschland zu folgen und auf gegen-
seitige Entschhdigungsansprtiche zu verzichten. Eine
solche gegenseitige pauschale Aufrechnung wtfrde dann
allerdings zur Folge haben, dass den betroffenen
Deutschen daraus ein Aufopferungsanspruch gegen die
Bundesrepublik Deutschland erwachsen wUrde.87
87. Das MtLnchener Abkommen im Lichte des Prager Vertrages
loc.cit. p. 467-8, i.t*: Should Czechoslovakia make
reparation claims by relying on the fact that, accor¬
ding to the text of the Prague Treaty, reparation
claims may be based on other grounds than on the
nullity of the Munich Agreement, then it is inevitable
that a counterclaim should be made for damage to
property and personal injuries suffered in Czechoslo¬
vakia by German nationals because of their nationality.
Both the German and the Czechoslovak indemnity claims
are of enormous proportions, but can be adjusted either
upwards or downwards.
Any attempt at a definition raises many questions
of substantiation and calculation which make it
reasonable and advisable to follow the suggestion
of a peace treaty with Germany made at that time by
the Soviet Union and to renounce to mutual3-compensation
claims. Such a general settlement, however, would also
cause a claim based on self-sacrifice to arise against
the Federal Republic of Germany on behalf of all those
Germans affected by it.
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c) Humanitarian Questions and Questions of
Legal Prosecution
By the maintenance of the citizenship regulations
in the legal codes of both countries many German people
who remained within the territory of Czechoslovakia
retained Czechoslovak citizenship. A substantial number
of them, however, wanted to leave the CSSR and immigrate
into the Federal Republic of Germany. It is of great concern
to the Federal Republic that the desire of these Germans is
granted. The main problem is that these persons became
citizens of the CSSR in consequence of Czechoslovak
legislation, and it can be argued that emigration is a
matter of domestic jurisdiction.
Lauterpacht writes on this question:
Emigration is in fact entirely a matter of
internal legislation of the different States... .
The Law of Nations does not, as yet, grant a
right of emigration to every individual,
although it is frequently maintained that it
is a 'natural* right of every individual to
emigrate from his own state. It is a moral right
which could fittingly find a place in any inter¬
national recognition of the Rights of Man.88
Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of
December 12, 1948 recognizes the right of emigration in
Article 13, paragraph 2, it has, as we know, no binding
go
authority per se. ^
88. Lauterpacht (f.n.31)# Vol. I, pp. 647-8.
89. Ibid.. p. 745. It is uncontested that a Declaration
is not binding per se. but such a Declaration may
reflect emergent customary international law (see
Part I, f.n. 234, para 7-11 at p. 204).
■
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No binding authority has also the UN Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the General
Assembly on December 16, 1966, ratified by Czechoslovakia,
90
but not yet in force, whose Article 12 runs as follows?
90. "It will be recalled that the two draft International
Covenants on Human Rights - on Civil and Political
Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights -
prepared by the Commission on Human Rights, had been
under consideration by the General Assembly since 1954.
By the end of 1963, the Assembly's Third (Social,
Humanitarian and Cultural) Committee had adopted the
preamble and all of the general articles of both
Covenants. It had also adopted additional provisions.
...Provisions relating to measures of implementation
and final clauses were still to be adopted.
Work on the draft Covenants could not be continued
in 1964 at the Assembly's nineteenth session, owing
to the special circumstances then prevailing. At the
Assembly's twentieth session, in 1965, the Third
Committee was unable to consider the draft Covenants
because df its heavy agenda, and the assembly decided
to defer their further consideration until its twenty-
first session in 1966.
At the Session, the Third Committee completed the
drafting of the two Covenants by adopting articles
relating to measures of implementation and final
clauses of the draft Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, and the draft Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, as well as by adopting provisions
for an Optinal Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. It also adopted draft resolutions on
publicizing the Covenants and on the establishment of
national commissions on human rights.
After considering the various proposals and amend¬
ments before it, the Third Committee adopted the two
Covenants unanimously, that on Civil and Political
Rights having been adopted by roll call. The Optional
Protocol to the draft Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights was adopted in the Committee by a roll-call vote
of 59 to 2, with 32 abstentions. ...
The General Assembly unanimously adopted the Third
Committee's recommendation as a whole by a recorded vote
of 1o4 to 0, when it adopted resoltuion 2200 A (XXI) on
December 16, 1966. In separate votes, the Assembly
adopted: the Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural
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1. Everyone lawfully within the territory
of a State shall, within that territory, have
the right to liberty of movement and freedom
to choose his residence,
2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country,
including his own,
3. The above-mentioned rights shall not be
subject to any restrictions except those which
are provided by law, are necessary to protect
national security, public order (ordre public),
public health or morals or the rights and freedoms
of others, and are consistent with the other
rights recognized in the present Covenant.
4. Ho one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the
right to enter his own country.91
Thus, according to international law, Czechoslovakia
has no obligation to permit her nationals to emigrate to
the Federal Republic of Germany.
Of course the possibility did exist to impose an
obligation on Czechoslovakia in the Treaty, Indeed, such
obligations were set down in many treaties after World
92
War I, but Czechoslovakia obviously was not prepared
to undertake such an unconditional obligation. These Germans
Rights by a recorded vote of 105 to 0; the Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights by a recorded vote of
106 to 0; and the Optional Protocol to the Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights by a recorded vote of
66 to 2, with 38 abstentions" (UN YB. 1966, p. 406).
91. UN Res. 2200 A (XXI), 16 December 1966 with Annex,
UN YB. 1966, pp. 419-33 (425). The Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights called for freedom of movement.
... (loc.clt. p. 407).
92. Ibid., p. 648, note 2.
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who became CzechoSlovaks simply by Statute were badly
needed as specialists in manufacturing or craft industries
and to have lost these persons would have placed enormous
strains on the Czechoslovak economy. ^ A general obligation
of the Prague Government to allow all remaining Germans to
emigrate could not be obtained. For that reason the question
of emigration was not dealt with in the Treaty but in an
Exchange of betters. The technical difference between
integration of a provision in the text of a treaty or in the
text of an exchange of letters is not important in inter¬
national law:
The Law of Nations does not prescribe any
particular form in which international
negotiations must be conducted. Such negotiations
may, therefore, take place viva yoce. or through
the exchange of written representaiions and
arguments, or both.9#
Article 2, paragraph 1 (a) of the Convention on the
Law of Treaties prescribes:
.•."treaty" means an international agreement
concluded between States in written form..."
This is not at all to suggest, however, that oral
agreements are without binding force. In the draft articles
on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries adopted by the
International Law Commission at its IS"11*1 session it is
stated:
93. SZ of August 10, 1973.
94. Lauterpacht (f,n.31)» Vol. I, p. 868.
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The restriction oh the use of the term "treaty"
in the draft articles to international agreements
expressed in writing is not intended to deny the
legal force of oral agreements under international
law or to imply that some of the principles
contained in later parts of the Commission's draft
articles on the law of treaties may not have
relevance,in regard to oral agreements. But the
term "treaty" is commonly used as denoting an
agreement in written form.95
Thus, the Convention did not change anything on the
existing freedom of form for agreements under inter¬
national law; it determined merely that orally concluded
agreements cannot he considered treaties.
An exchange of letters, however, meets the condition
of form for a treaty expressly provided for in Article
Qg
13 of the Convention on the Law of Treaties. Indeed,
an exchange of letters reflects well established law
and practice.
Moreover, the contracting parties included the
wording of the agreement in the exchange of letters which
Q7
was subsequently ratified and published. ' Thus, all formal
95. UN Doc. A/CONF. 39/11/Add. 2, p. 9.
96. Ibid., p. 291.
97. Law Gazette II, 1974 pp. 989» 993, 996.
The Parties agreed:
1. Within the framework of their efforts to develop
mutual relations, the Government of the Federal Republic
of Germany and the Government of the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic will give attention to the Humani¬
tarian questions.
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preconditions of validity of the agreement in the exchange
QO
of letters binding under international law are met.
In section 1 of the exchanged letters both parties
bind themselves to give attention to humanitarian questions.
Considering the fact that both peoples in the past committed
2. The Czechoslovak side has declared that the
competent Czechoslovak authorities will, in accordance
with the laws and regulations applicable in the Czecho¬
slovak Socialist Republic, give sympathetic consideration
to applications by Czechoslovak citizens who, on account
of their German nationality, wish to emigrate to the
Federal Republic of Germany.
The German side has declared that, in accordance with
the laws and regulations applicable in the Federal
Republic of Germany, persons of Czech or Slovak
nationality who so desire may emigrate to the Czecho¬
slovak Socialist Republic.
3. Neither Government objects to the German Red Cross
and the Czechoslovak Red Cross furthering the settlement
of the above-mentioned questions.
4* The two Governments will further develop travel
between the two countries, including visits by relatives.
5. The two Governments will examine possibilities
of technical improvements of travel, including expedited
clearance at the border-crossing points as well as the
opening of additional crossing-points.
6. The contents of this exchange of letters will
also be applied analogously to Berlin (West), consistent
with the Quadripartite Agreement of 3 September 1971, in
accordance with established procedures (Press and
Information Office of the FG, pp. 12-3).
98. Brown, 3).J. (Public International Law.) p. 177) writess
"Whenever States treat with one another, and in so far
as they reach any agreement, their dealings constitute
some kind of treaty. When the terms of the arrangement
contain one or more promises, intended to be binding,
the treaty is a oontract which the promisor must per¬
form. As there need be no consideration moving to the
promisor, a unilateral promise made by one State to
another, which is intended to be binding, is a contract."
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the gravest of crimes against humanity, the mutual promise
to give attention to humanitarian questions cannot be
underrated.
With regard to the emigration of ethnic German citizens
of Czechoslovakia, the Prague Government in section 2 declares
that the competent Czechoslovak authorities will, in accordance
with the laws and regulations applicable in the CSSR, give
sympathetic consideration to applications by Czechoslovak
citizens who wish to emigrate to Germany because of their
German nationality.
During the presentation of the bill to the Plenum of
QQ
the Federal Dlet^ the opposition maintained with regard
to these promises that, from the Czechoslovak side, each
obligation was so vague that it could not be fulfilled.
Although this is not a legitimate criticism, German emigration
in the future will depend at least on the good will and also
on the good faith of Czechoslovak authorities.
The facilitation of travel between both countries,
agreed to under sections 4 and 5 of the exchange of letters,
will be easier to realize since both States have a vested
economic interest in its development.
In addition to the Exchange of Letters on Humanitarian
Questions, especially those concerning emigration, the
Czechoslovak Government also Issued anUnilateral Letter
99. BT-Drucksache 7/2270, p. 24
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on Criminal Prosecution, published with the Treaty.^00 In
this declaration the Federal Government is informed that of
all punishable acts committed between 1938 and 1945, according
to Czechoslovak law only those acts may be prosecuted which
carry the death penatly and which are considered war crimes
or crimes against humanity within the meaning of Article 6
(b) and (c) of the Statute of the International Military
Tribunal of Nuremberg. All other crimes are subject to
statutory limitation. In the report ana the bill to the
Committee of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Diet this letter
is characterized as an unilateral document binding the
CSSR.101
100. Law Gazette II, pp. 989, 997; Wittmann, Auslepings-
probleme um den deutsch-tschechoBlowaklschen Vertrag.loc.oilt. pp. 37-&.
101. BT-l>rucksache 7/2270, p. 13. E.t, of the letter:
"On the occasion of the signing today of the Treaty
on Mutual Relations between the Federal Republic of
Germany and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, I
have the honour to inform you of the following on
behalf of the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist
Republic:
Of the punishable offences committed between 1938
and 1945# now only such acts may still be prosecuted
under applicable Czechoslovak law as are punishable
under Czechoslovak criminal law, carry the death
penatly and at the same time answer the characteristics
of war crimes or crimes against humanity within the
meaning of Article 6 (b) and (c) of the Statute of the
International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg, Offences
of that kind are not subject to statutory limitation.
In all other cases criminal prosecution became subject
to statutory limitation not later than 1965. This
situation is not in any way changed by the present
Treaty" (Press and Information Office of the GFRG,
P. 15).
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The legal question to be answered is whether such a
unilateral declaration binds the State which makes it.
The one-sided legal transaction is a familiar device in
international law. Examples of such legal transactions are
the recognition of States and Governments, protests against
a violation of international law or, as is the case here,
the unilateral obligation promised by one State vis-a-vis
another State. Unilateral legal transactions include also
declarations of legal intent. As such they need tc be
received, but not necessarily accepted.
The Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties does not
mention the unilateral legal transaction in international
law since it considers itself an organ of treaty law only;
nevertheless it does not exclude the legal existence of
unilateral obligatory declarations of intent by competent
subjects of international law. And for our purposes, a
whole series of prescriptions of the Convention can be
referred to, namely the interpretation and determination
of the formal and diplomatic methods of conduct of competent
organs of State during the deliverance or acceptance of a
unilateral obligatory legal act.
One of the leading authorities on the unilateral legal
transaction in international law, Suy explains;
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Notre thSse est la suivante! les promesses
purement unilatferales ('actes...qui ne nfecessitent
pas 1*intervention d'une autre manifestation de
volontfe pour produire des effets juridiques',
end.c. pp. 113-4) existent en droit international
"Bi'en qu'elles soient trds rares. Oette raretfe
s'explique facilement fetant donnfe qu'aucun Etat
ne se pr§te de on gr6 a faire des concessions
spontanea et gratuites, La detection de ces promesses
purement unilat&rales exige un effort de recherche
minutieus.,.
...Une fois la puretfe de l'unilatferalitfe
fetablie, il faudra porter, notre attention sur
une question d»interpretation tr£s delicate:
cette d&claration de volontfe constitute-t-elle
une promesse, ou n'est elle pas jiutdt une
renonciation ou une reconnaissance ou encore
une simple confirmation.1o2
1o2. Suy, Les Actes Juridiques unilateraux en droit
international public, p. 111.
E.t.j Our main principle is the following!
There is in public international law that purely-
unilateral promise, an act which does not necessitate
the evocation of another declaration of intent in
order to call forth legal consequences, although
these kinds of acts occur infrequently. This
infrequency is easily explained by the fact that
no itate is prepared of its own free will to make
concessions spontaneously and 'Without cost. The
determination of a purely unilateral promise demands
therefore a careful and painstaking investigation...
If the genuineness of the unilateral promise is
determined, then we have to direct our attention
to a very fine question of interpretation, namely
whether this declaration of intent represents a
promise or whether it is not really a question of a
renunciation or a recognition or even a simple
confirmation.
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Suy comes to the conclusion that the validity of a
unilateral act is to he considered obligatory, if the
State delivering the declaration meets the following:
c6te des conditions gfenferalement requises
pour la validitfe des actes juridiques (capacity
juridique du sujet, volontfe non vici&e, objet
approprife).•.(les) conditions...comme suit: 1°, la
volontfe de nromettre; 2°, la publicity de la
promesse.1°*
Suy cites the following remark made by Professor
de Visscher in a public session of the International
Court of Justice on September 15, 1960:
Les Etats doivent savoir que la vie inter¬
nationals requlert la sfecuritfe et que pour
cette raison il ne leur est pas permis de
revenir sur leurs propres declarations lorsque
celles-ci ont d&terminfe un autre Etat d leur
accorder confiance et credit.1o4
Balladore Pallieri explains:
Come d in facoltd dei soggetti inter-
nazionali di estinguere con una loro dichiarazione
unilaterale di vlonti un loro diritto (rinuncia),
cosi e in loro facoltd di far sorgere nel medisimo
modo a loro carico un dovere giuridico (promessa).
Ibid., p. 149. E*t.: Apart from the general
conditions which are necessary for the validity of
a legal act (the legal capacity of the subject,
freedom of will, suitable object)...the...following
conditions (are required): 1« the will to make a
promise; 2, the publication of the promise.
1°4. Ibid.. p. 152. E.t.: States have to realize that
international life demands security and for this
reason it is not permissible for them to go back
on their own declarations, if these occasioned
another State to grant them trust and credence.
3*6.
La promessa da parte di un soggetto di
seguire una data linea di condotta, d
impegnativa, e fa sorgere l'ohbligo che 11
soggetto dichiara di assumere. Occorre
tuttavia da parte del soggetto che promette,
la volontd di impegnarsi, e sono qui da
ripetere le iftedisime osservazioni svolte a
proposito dei trattati internazionli, ove
avevamo awertito quanto rigoroso sla l*ordine
internazionale a questo riguardo , e come la
volontd di impegnarsi debba sussistere "ben
chiara e hen precisa affinchd l*obbligo abbia
origins.1o5
On the one hand, the unilateral declaratory act has
to be distinguished from a purely political declaration1
of intent without binding legal effect, and on the other
hand from a declaratory act which requires a corresponding
declaration to secure a legal effect (for example, treaty
offer and treaty acceptance, or treaty offer and treaty
rejection). By themselves these declarations have no
105. Balladore Pallieri, Dirltto Internazionale Pubblico.
pp. 325-6. E.t.i In the same way that international
bodies have the power to extinguish their rights by
way of unilateral declaratory act (renunciation), in
the same way have they the power to create by the same
process a legal obligation (promise). A party*s promise
to act in a certain way has a binding effect, thus
creating the obligation which the party has declared
to undertake. However, it is necessary for the promise
to have the will to be bound. At this point we would
like to repeat the same comment made with reference to
international treaties. In this comment we had warned
of how strict international law in this regard is, and
how the will to be bound should be quite clear and
precise in order to provide the obligation with an
origin.
106. SjJrensen, Prlncipes de Droit International Public,
p. 58.
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significance and are, therefore, not independent, unilateral
legal transactions, but rather parts of a bi-lateral or
multi-lateral legal transaction, i.e., a treaty.
In crrder to distinguish a genuine unilateral obligatory
declaration from a declaration which is part of a treaty, it
is necessary to observe whether, according to objective law,
a single declaratory act is sufficient to occasion the
desired legal effect.
"Ein einseitiges Yblkerrechtsgeschaft liegt
...vor, wenn nach objectivem Recht eine einzige
Willenserklarung gentigt, urn die gewUnschten
Rechtswirkungen eintreten zu lessen. Grund-
satzlich 1st daher nicht massgebend, ob im
einzelnen Pall mehrere Willenserklarungen
abgegeben werden, sondern der Umstand, dass
eine einzige WillenserklMrung zur Erzeugung der
Rechtswirkungen ausreicht. Wenn nun zufhllig
mehrere Willenserklhrungen, die sich inhaltlich
decken und aufeinander bezogen sind, vorgenommen
werden, eine einzige aber von ihnen gentigen wUrde,
urn die gewUnschten Rechtsfolgen nach sich zu Ziehen,
so waren die anderen Willensakte UberflUssig und in
Bezug auf dlese Rechtsfolge irrelevant, so dass das
Gesch&ft einseitig bliebe.w1o8
107. Pfluger, Die elnseitigen Rechtsgeschafte im YBlkerrecht.
pp. 34j Bialladore Pallieri (f.nV 1o*>), p. 3^5.
108. Pfluger, Ibid.. p. 34. E.t.i A unilateral legal act
of international law exists when, according to
objective law, a single declaratory act is necessary
in order to bring about the desired legal effects.
The crucial factor, therefore, is basically not the
fact that in a particular case a number of declaratory
acts have taken place, but that a single declaratory
act suffices to give rise to the legal effects.
Should several declaratory acts be accidentally
performed, whose contents correspond and which refer
to one another, and just one of them would be sufficient
to produce the desired legal effects, then the other
declaratory acts would be superfluous and, with regard
to these legal effects, irrelevant, so that the legal
act would remain unilateral.
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Pfluger further explains;
Der Ausdruck Oder die Form, in die eine
Willenserklarung gekleidet ist, kann nicht
dartiber entscheiden, ob ein konkreter Tat-
bestand ein einseitiges Oder ein zweiseitiges
Rechtsgesch&ft ist, 1o9
If, aocording to these characteristics, a unilateral
declaration exists, then it is binding if the circumstances
reveal that more than a diplomatic assurance was intended.^10
With respect to all three documents (exchange of letters
and one-sided declaration), we arrive at the following
result;
Since the letters on the extension of Articles II and V
to Berlin (West) and on Humanitarian Questions were trans¬
mitted by the German side to Czechoslovakia and returned
by Czechoslovakia with the same wording and were ratified
together with the treaty, this exchange of letters is
obviously considered part of the treaty and has, therefore,
the same force as if the exchange had been a part of the
treaty itself.
109. Pfluger, Ibid.. p. 35.
E.t.i The expression or form in which a declaratory
act is couched, cannot determine whether concrete
factual findings represent a unilateral or a
bilateral legal transaction.
110. Garner. The international binding force of unilateral
oral declarations. A.J.I.I,.. Vol. 27 tmi). o.
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This standpoint is taken also "by Kimminich. In
Article V of the treaty itself he thinks he can recognise
the legal basis for the treaty-type character of the
statements contained in the exchange of letters when he
writess
Art. V des Prager Vertrages enth&lt wichtige
AbsichtserklMrungen zur weiteren Entwicklung der
deutsch-tschechoslowaklschen Beziehungen. Eine
materiellrechtliche Regelung ist in ihm nicht
enthalten. Jedoch sind im Zusammenhang mit Art. V
des Prager Yertrages zwei Briefwechsel zwischen
der Bundearepublik Deutschland und der CSSR zu
beachten, die im Unterzelchnungsprotokoll vom
11. Dezember 1973 aufgeftlhrt werden und damit
Bestandteil des gesamten Vertragswerks sind. Der
eine Briefwechsel betrifft "humanitare Pragen",
d.h. insbesondere die Prage der Ausreise deutscher
VolkszugehBriger aus der CSSR in die Bundes-
republik Deutschland. ...Der andere Briefwechsel
betrifft die Einbeziehung von Berlin (West) in
das *ertragwwerk.111
The legal position is different with regard to the
Unilateral Czechoslovak Letter on Criminal Prosecution.
111. Kimminich, Per Prager Vertrag, loc.cit.. p. 66.
E.t.; Art. V of the Prague treaty embodies important
statements of intent with regard to the further
development of German-Czechoslovak relations. It
does not contain any material-legal provision.
However, in connection with Art. V of the Prague
Treaty, two exchanges of letters between the Federal
Republic of Germany and Czechoslovakia must be noted
which are referred to in the signed protocol dated
December 11, 1973 and, therefore, become integral
part of the treaty. One exchange of letters deals with
"humanitarian questions", i.e., especially the
question concerning the emigration of people of German
ethnic origin from Czechoslovakia to the Federal
Republic of Germany. ...The other exchange of letters
deals with the Inclusion of Berlin (West) in the
treaty.
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This letter did not realize the aspects described above
of a one-sided legal transaction. It merely informed the
Federal Government of Czechoslovakia^ legal position and
therefore did not create any obligation.The letter is
nevertheless an instrument of quasi-legal relevance since
Czechoslovakia bound herself by own official information,
i.e. the Czechoslovak authorities may not interpret their
legal position in the question of criminal prosecution of
punishable offences committed between 1938 and 194-5 in any
other way, nor can they alter her legal position by
legislative measures.
112. This notwithstanding, that unilateral declarations
can create legal obligations is an accepted principle,
most recently expressed by the International Court of
Justice in the Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v.
France) of December 20, 1974.
"The Court must...form its own view of the meaning
and scope intended by the author of a unilateral
declaration which may create a legal obligation...
In announcing that the 1974 series of atmospheric
tests would be the last, the French Government conveyed
to the world at large, including the Applicant, its
intention effectively to terminate these tests.... The
validity of these statements and their legal consequences
must be considered within...the confidence and trust
which are so essential in the relations among States....
The objects of these statements are clear and they
were addressed to the international community as a
whole, and the Court holds that they constitute an




Most of the treaties which the Federal Republic
of Germany concludes with the States of the West are
applicable to Berlin (West) as well. She also represents
Berlin (west) in international law through her diplomatic
missions in these States. The States of the Eastern Bloc
do not accept this. Therefore, during the negotiations,
113
the mentioned crises arose over the question of Berlin
the German Government denied that West Berlin be covered
by the Treaty with Czechoslovakia and juristic and natural
persons of West Berlin to be represented by the consular
mission of the Federal Republic.
The aim of the Federal Government was duly to comply
with the request of the Federal Constitutional Court
-contained in its ruling on the Basic Treaty with the
German Democratic Republic- by demanding full consular
representation of West Berlin. Thus, the organs acting
for the Federal Government are basically obliged to insist
on the inclusion of Berlin (West) in any agreement or treaty
whose context allows them to be extended to include the
State of Berlin (West) and its citizens, and also to sign
any such agreement or treaty only if there is no curtailment
of the legal status of Berlin (West) and its citizens, as
113. See Part I at pp. 68-9 and f.n.90 of this thesis.
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delineated by the provisions of the Constitution - but
subject to the Allies1 proviso regarding Berlin, and in
accordance with the Four-Power Agreement of September 3,
1971.1U
Finally, a quite unsatisfactory compromise was
reached with the exchange of the notes of November 23/27,
4 4 C
1973 and the exchange of letters on the extension of
Articles II and V of the Treaty to Berlin (West),^1^ The
text of the notes exchanged on November 23/27* 1973 confirms
that agreement was reached only on the principle of a
provision concerning the question of cooperation in legal
matters, leaving details thereof to be elaborated in later
negotiations, as is the case with regard to Moscow, too.
As emphasised by both parties in the German-Czechoslovak
exchange of notes, these negotiations are not to start
until after diplomatic relations are re-established.
In all the agreements concerning the establishment of
diplomatic relations, the Federal Government had up to
this point made its right to representation of Berlin (West)
a pre-condition of the re-establishment of relations. In
the case of Poland, it was thought that it might be sufficient
114. BVerfGE 36,1.
115. See Part I, f.n.90 of this thesis.
116. Law Gazette II, p. 994.
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to refer mutually to the Berlin Agreement. ®ut when in
practice it turned out that the Polieh Government refused
to allows the legal business of West Berlin courts to be
dealt with through German consulates, the German Foreign
Office decided from then on to make other agreements on the
establishment of diplomatic relations totally dependent on
the settlement first of the question of consular re¬
presentation. 2?he West German Government had in fact
demanded this, basing itself on international conventions,
especially Article 5 of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations of 1963 - which expressly provides that juridical
117
persons shall also enjoy consular protection. '
117. "Consular functions consist in...protecting in the
receiving State the interests of the sending State
and of its nationals, both individuals and bodies
corporate, within the limits permitted by international
law..." (UN Doc. A/CONF. 25/12, April 23, 1963).
Blumenwitz writes in this connection* "Bei der
Anwendung der zitierten Vorschrift auf die Rechtslage
Westberlins ergeben sich einmal Schwierigkeiten aus
der Tatsache, dass die Wiener Konvention tiber konsula-
rische Beziehungen zwischen den Signatarstaaten des
ViermSchte-Abkommens vom 3. September 1971 nicht gilt,
zum anderen, dass in der (allerdings umstrittenen)
Regelung im Viermhchte-Abkommen eine Spezialregelung
gesehen werden kann, die gegebenenfalls Art. 5 der
Wiener Konvention und dem darin enthaltenen allgemeinen
Vblkerrechtsgrundsatz vorgehen wiirde"(Jahrbuch 1975,
p. 196, f.n. 130).
E.t.: When applying the cited provision to the legal
position of West Berlin, difficulties arise, first cf
all, from the fact that the Vienna Convention on Consu¬
lar relations does not apply as between the signatory
states of the Four Power Agreement of September 3, 1971}
secondly, from the fact that the provision (the subject
of controversy) contained in the Four Power Agreement
may be regarded as a special provision which, in turn,
would possibly take precedence over Art. 5 of the Vienna
Convention and the general principle of international
law contained therein.
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But the Czechoslovak Government opposed it, and the Federal
Government had to give in. She question of legal cooperation
should be resolved not in the wake of Berlin's representation
through Bonn, but in the same way as any other bilateral
issue. She issue of legal assistance has on March 15» 1977
not yet been regulated in a treaty with Csechoslovakia.
Meanwhile, legal assistance but only in civil or commercial
matters concerning Czechoslovakia is being handled in the
same way as it was prior to establishing diplomatic relations.
German as well as Czechoslovak applications for legal
assistance are made through the Czechoslovak Military Mission
of Berlin (West), based on Articles 8-16 (Letters rogatory),
118
of the Convention relating to civil procedure,March 1,1954.
Mutual legal assistance in criminal matters takes place
without contractual regulation and is connected with
difficulties.
Because of Berlin, the Treaty itself was only able to
achieve that Article IX of the Treaty, in accordance with
the Quadripartite Agreement of September 3» 1971 applied
118. Haager Obereinkommen Uber den Zivllprozess, Law Gazette
1958 II p. 577. French texts Convention relative A la
procedure civile. Falte A la Haye, le 1er mars 1954.
E.t.i Convention relating to civil procedure. Lone at
the Hague, on Maroh 1, 1954; United Nations Treaty
Series, Treaties and international agreements registered
or filed and recorded with the Secretariat of the United
Nations, Vol. 286 (1958) pp. 265-289.
Article 8 of the Convention (loc.cit. p. 271) runs as
follows; "In civil or commercial matters, the judicial
authority of one contracting State may, in conformity
with the provisions of its legislation, communicate by
letter rogatory with the competent authority of another
contracting State, in order to request that it carry out,
within its limits of its jurisdiction, either an in¬
vestigation or some other form of judicial act."
Information was also given to the author by the
German Foreign Office (file number 214-507-E);.
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also to West Berlin and that both parties would negotiate
further in each individual case with regard to the
extension of other treaties to Berlin (West) within the
meaning of Article V, This regulation is consistent with
the Quadripartite Agreement.
Although the Treaty itself does not deal direotly
with the consular representation of the inhabitants of
West Berlin* this question was brought to a close in
connection with the establishment of diplomatic relations
between the Federal Republic and the CSSR.1^
119. Erkl&rung des Bundesaussenministers vor dem Bundes¬
tag (explanation of the Federal Minister for Foreign
Affairs before the FD), March 27, 1974 (BR-Drucksache
7/1832, Tz. 7/6008 B). The Minister stated:
"Zun&chst m&chte ich feststellen, dass die konsu-
larische Betreuung unserer Mitbtirger aus Berlin durch
die Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der Tschechoslowakei
nicht Gegenstand des Vertrages ist. Diese Frage
stellte sich...im Zusammenhang mit der Aufnahme
diplomatischer Beziehungen.•.die...inzwischen erfolgt
ist."
E.t.: To begin with I must observe that the
consular representation of our co-citizens from
Berlin through the Federal Republic of Germany in
Czechoslovakia is not the subject of the treaty.
This issue is related to the establishment of diplomatic
relations...which has already taken place.
This declaration means that by establishing diplomatic
relations in anticipation of the Treaty of Normalisation,
section 2a) of Sohedule IV of the Quadripartite
Agreement on Berlin has oome into force. According to
this provision, the Federal Republic of Germany is
empowered to carry out consular duties for people
permanently resident in the West sectors of Berlin.
I
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The Federal Council's criticism of the exchange of
letters on West Berlin is largely unfounded, The representa¬
tive of Bavaria made the criticism that the applicability of
subsequent treaties to West Berlin had to be negotiated in¬
dividually. But it is legally impossible to provide that
treaties concluded in the future will apply as well to West
Berlin, since the assent of the West Berlin authorities is
necessary in each individual case.^ Moreover, the Constitu-
121
tlon of the Federal Republic does not apply to Berlin.
The criticism of the Federal Council during the 409th
session of July 1, 1974* that the total consular re¬
presentation of West Berlin by the federal Republic was not
122
confirmed by the German Czechoslovak Treaty, seems un¬
founded as well, because it was not possible to obtain a
better arrangement. It is a fact that the Quadripartite
Agreement on Berlin does not mention legal persons, with
the consequence that different interpretations on this point
between the Federal Republic and the States of the Eastern
Bloc arose. As long as these different interpretations are
not settled by an agreement between the Federal Republic and
the Soviet Union there is litte hope that an agreement with
1 215
Czechoslovakia on this question can be reached.
120. Strupp-Schlochauer (f.n.28), Bd. 1, p. 183.
121. Berber (f.n.62), Bd. I, p. 126.
122. BR-Drucksache 490 (new), tn. 301 D.
123. Paragraph 2 lit. a) of the Communication from the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
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to the Governments of the French Republic, the
United Kingdom and the United States of America
in Annex IY B of the Quadripartite Agreement
prescribes* "Provided that matters of security
and status are not affected, for its part it will
raise no objection to*...The performance by the
Federal Republic of Germany of consular service
for permanent residents of the Western Sectors of
Berlin" (Documentation Relating to the federal
Government's Policy of D&tente, p. 105),
Even Carstens, an acknowledged University Lecturer
in Public Law, (former Parliamentary Leader of the
CDU-CSU faction in the German Federal Diet, and since
December 1976 President of the Federal Diet), starts
from the presupposition that the Four Power Agreement
covers only the consular representation of natural
persons through the Federal Republic when he states
that the consular representation of West Berlin
citizens falls under the foreign policy competence
of the Federal Republic (Carstens, Zur Interpretation
der Berlin-Regelung von 1971. loc.cit, p. 78j.
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3) Significance and shortcomings of the Treaty
The Federal Chancellor, Herr Brandt, said on December
11, 1973 in Prague:
Der Yertrag, den wir heute gemeinsam unter-
zeichnet haben, und unsere Gesprhche sind
Ausdruck des politischen Willens, mit der
Normal!sierung und welteren Entwicklung der
Beziehungen zwischen unseren landern zugleich
auch den Frieden in Europa zu festigen. Beldes,
der Vertrag und das politische Ziel, gehbren
zusammen. Sie bilden eine Einheit.
Machen wir uns jedoch nichts vor: Tief ein-
gewurzeltes Misstrauen lbsst sich nicht von
heute auf morgen ttberwinden. Eg regt sich immer
wieder, und keiner weiss, wie lange noch. Das 124.
macht unsere gemeinsame Aufgabe um so wichtiger. 4
For centuries Bohemia and Moravia were territories
where Germans and Czechs lived side by side. Even before
the idea of nationalism played a role there were bloody
disturbances between the two peoples. After the French
Revolution the problem of nationalities in these territories
became acute, and the atmosphere was poisoned more and more
by the actions of the Government of Austria-Hungary and of
124. Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, p. 50.
E.t.t The Treaty we have jointly signed today, and
our discussions, are also an expression of the
political will, together with the normalizing and
further development of the relations between our
countries, at the same time to strengthen peace in
Europe. Both -the Treaty and the political will-
are interconnected. They constitute a single entity.
However, do not let us harbour any illusions.
Deeply rooted distrust cannot be overcome over¬
night. It springs up time and again, and no one knows
for how long it will continue to do so. This makes our
joint task all the more important (Press and Information
Office of the FG, p. 36).
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the Czechoslovak Government after World War I to secure
the domination of one nationality over the other. The
only solution to the problem of nationalities might
have been to grant far-reaching autonomy in domestic
affairs and to pursue a neutralist course in foreign
affairs.
The territorial separation of both nationalities did
not result in a humanitarian solution of the problem,
because the two nationalities were not separated into
two distinct territories. On the contrary, they lived
together as a mixed population since for centuries they
had belonged to the same state. Consequently, a territorial
separation had to be accompanied by the evacuation of the
respective minority group from each of the territories.
This necessarily meant hardship and suffering for many
people.
The ethnic German population of Czechoslovakia
numbering more than 3 million was expelled from the
territory of Czechoslovakia with the exception of a
comparatively small number of Germans who were allowed
to remain. This put an enormous strain on relations between
the twoiStates.
These expellees in the "Charter of the Expellees"
appealed to their right to their homeland (Recht auf die
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Heimat ).^2^ The resolution contained a demand for the
acquisition of German nationality on the basis of equality
until these people were allowed to return to their home-
1127
land, demands for a nationalities law ' and an appeal
to the moral responsibility of nations to solve their
128
expellee problems.
125. This was passed on August 5» 1950 by the Central
Committee of expelled Germans and the United Group of
East Germans, in Cannstatt» Germany (J.f.I.R. 3» 1954,
p. 181).
126. 'Wir haben unsere Heimat verloren.. .Wir ftlhlen una
berufen zu verlangen, dass das Recht auf die Heimat
als eines der...Grundrechte der Menschheit anerkannt
und verwirklicht wird. Solange dieses Recht fUr uns
nicht verwirklicht ist...fordern wir,.,.gleiches Recht
als Staatsbiirger, nicht nur vor dem Gesetz, sondern
auch in der Wirklichkeit des Alltages" (loc.clt.
Preamble and No. 1). E.t.i We have lost our homeland...
We feel called upon to demand that the "3*ight to the
homeland" be recognized and realized as one of the
fundamental human rights. As long as this right has
not been realized for us...we demand...the same rights
as citizens, not only legally, but also in the reality
of everyday living.
127. "...Einbau aller Heimatvertriebenen in das leben dee
Deutschen Volkes". (loc.oit. No. 3). E.t.I...assimili—
ation of all expellees in the life of the German people.
128. "Die Vblker der Welt sollen ihre Mitverantwortung am
Schicksal der Heimatvertriebenen empfinden,...sollen
handeln, wie es ihrem Gewissen entspricht. Die Vblker
mtissen anerkennen, dass das Schicksal der deutschen
Heimatvertriebenen...ein Weltproblem ist, dessen Lbsung
hbchste sittliche Verantwortung und Verpflichtung...
erfordert" (loc.cit. No. 4). E.t.i The peoples of the
world should realize their responsibility for the fate
of the expellees,...should deal with this problem as
their conscience diotates. The peoples must realize
that the fate of the German expellees is a world problem,
whose solution demands the highest moral responsibility
and obligation.
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To be sure, international law does not recognize a
'right to a homeland'. Strupp-Schlochauer considers it as
a most difficult one to determine legally, and one would
129
have to agree with this point of view. ^
129. Strupp-Schlochauer (f.n.28), Bd. 2, p. 506-7.
BUlck (Das Recht auf Heimat). loc.cit. p. 74) writes:
"Die Stellungnahme der internationalen Wissenschaft zur
Umsiedlung und zum Recht auf die Heimat spiegelt im
Grunde nur die Entwicklung wider, in die der gesamte
vblkerrechtliche Minderheitenschutz seit dem Ende des
zweiten Weltkrieges geraten ist. In der westlichen Welt
beginnt er, sich in einem allgemeinen individual!stisch-
humanit&ren Diskriminierungsverbot aufzulosen. Das Recht
der Minderheiten, ihre nationalen, religibsen und kultu-
rellen Eigenarten und Uberlieferungen als selbst&ndige
Gruppen positiv zu entfalten, das nocfc einen wesentlichen
Bestandteil der Schutzvertrage nach dem ersten Weltkrieg
gebildet hatte, verschwindet heute hinter den allgemeinen
Menschenrechten mit ihrem bloss negativen Schutz gegen
willkiirliche Eingriffe in die persSnliche Freiheit des
Einzelnen. FUr den Gedanken der Sesshaftigkeit einer
Volksgruppe in ihrem angestammten Siedlungs- und Kultur-
raum, ihrer Heimat, ist in dieser Begriffswelt kein
Platz."
E.t.: The attitude of international learned circles
with regard to the question of resettlement and the
right to one's native land only reflects the develop¬
ment that since the Second World War has influenced the
whole of international law concerning the protection of
minorities. In the Western World the latter is beginning
to dissolve itself into a general individualistic-
humanitarian ban against all discrimination. The right
of minorities to develop their own national, religious
and cultural individuality and heritage as independent
groups - a right which after the Seeond World War made
up a considerable proportion of the agreements of
protectorates - today disappears behind the general
rights of man with their negative safeguard against
arbitrary interference with the personal liberties of
the individual. The concept of an ethnic group being
entitled to reside in its land of origin - its native
country - has no place in this world of clichfes.
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She true historical importance of the German
Czechoslovak Treaty is that the Federal Republic accepted
the solution of the problem of nationalities in Czecho¬
slovakia created by the expulsion, and renounced any
territorial claims against Czechoslovakia (Article IY of
the Treaty), Thus, the solution of the problem of the
Germans in Czechoslovakia effected by force in 1945# is
acknowledged as final and irrevocable, removing one of the
most serious controversies of Central Europe, The Czechs*
realization that they pursued the solution of the question
of nationalities in a most inhumane manner and their
consequent fear of revenge, have poisoned for years German
Czechoslovak relations. The elimination of this incrimination
through the German acceptance of the solution of the Sudeten
problem was a concession by the Federal Republic which was
not reciprocated by the Czech Government, insofar as the
question of emigration of the remaining Germans in the CSSR
is concerned.
If a solution to the German-Czech problem of
nationality were to have been found, it would have had to
have been all-encompassing and included those Germans still
living in Czechoslovakia,
Czechoslovakia, having undertaken the solution of the
Sudeten problem by expelling more than three million Germans
and demanding that the Federal Republic accept this expulsion,
3635.
cannot refuse morally to allow the remaining Germans to
emigrate.
The problem of nationalities will not be finally
solved until all Germans who want to emigrate are allowed
to do so. The opposition justly reproached the federal
Government for not defending the German position on this
matter more forcefully. Needless to say, a policy which
strives for a total solution to the problem of nationalities
must grant the right of emigrate to the Germans still
residing in Czechoslovakia.
However, this defect can be remedied by Czechoslovakia's
complete compliance with paragraph 2 of the exchange of
letters on humanitarian questions.
The solution to the problem of the Munich Agreement
represents a positive compromise. Certainly, the Treaty makes
it possible for the CSSR to assert onee again the contention
that the Munich Agreement had been void from the beginning.
This appears to be merely a face-saving device, however,
since all juridical consequences resulting from the ex tunc
invalidity of the Munich Agreement are excluded by the
Treaty.
With regard to the success in overcoming the problem
of nationalities and all other problems which have arisen
since 1938, the remaining sections of the Treaty are of less
importance since they deal with day-to-day questions. They
are reflective of the policy of d&tente and serve to enhance
364,
the development of eoonomic relations. Ihese provisions of
the Sreaty embodied in the framework of the new East-West
relationship will be realized to the extent that the policy
of dfetente succeeds. In any event, the Federal Republic has
made a contribution to dfetente by recognizing definitively
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Gesetz
zu dem Vertrag vom 11. Dezember 1973 iiber die gegenseitigen Beziehungen
zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
und der Tschechoslowakischen Sozialistischen Republik
Vom 12. Juli 1974
Der Bundestag hat das folgende Gesetz beschlos-
sen:
Artikel 1
Dem in Prag am 11. Dezember 1973 unterzeich-
neten Vertrag iiber die gegenseitigen Beziehungen
zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der
Tschechoslowakischen Sozialistischen Republik ein-
schiieBIich der dazugehorigen Briefwechsel vom
selben Tage
— fiber die Erstreckung der Geltung des Artikels II
des Vertrages und der Vertrage, die sich aus der
Verwirklichung des Artikels V des Vertrages
ergeben werden, auf Berlin (West),
— iiber die Regelung humanitarer Fragen,
wird zugestimmt. Der Vertrag, die beiden Brief¬
wechsel sowie der Brief der Regierung der Tsche¬
choslowakischen Sozialistischen Republik fiber Fra¬
gen der Strafverfolgung werden nachstehend ver-
offentlicht.
Artikel 2
Dieses Gesetz gilt, soweit die Regelungen des
Vertragswerks fur das Land Berlin gelten, auch im
Land Berlin, sofern das Land Berlin die Anwenclung
dieses Gesetzes feststellt.
Artikel 3
(1) Dieses Gesetz tritt am Tage nach seiner Ver-
kiindung in Kraft.
(2) Der Tag, an dem der Vertrag nach seinem
Artikel VI in Kraft tritt, ist im Bundesgesetzblatt
bekanntzugeben.
Die verfassungsmafligen Rechte des Bundesrates
sind gewahrt.
Das vorstehende Gesetz wird hiermit verkiindet.
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BundesgesetzblaU, Jahrgang 1974, Teil II
Vertrag
liber die gegenseitigen Beziehungen
zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
und der Tschechoslowakischen Sozialistischen Repubiik
Smlouva
o vzajemnych vztazich
mezi Spolkovou republikou Nemecka
a Ceskoslovenskou socialistickou republikou
Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland
und
die Tschechoslowakische Sozialistische Repubiik —
IN DER HISTORISCHEN ERKENNTNIS, daB das har-
monische Zusammenleben der Volker in Europa ein Er-
fordernis des Friedens bildet,
IN DEM FESTEN WILLEN, ein fur allemal mit der
unheilvollen Vergangenheit in ihren Beziehungen eiri
Ends zu machen, vor allem im Zusammenhang mit dem
Z-.veiten Weltkrieg, der den europaischen Volkern uner-
meSliche Leiden zugefiigt hat,
ANERKENNEND, daB das Miinchener Abkommen vom
25. September 1938 der Tschechoslowakischen Repubiik
durch das nationalsozialistische Regime unter Androhung
von Gewalt aufgezwungen wtirde,
ANGE5ICHTS DER TATSACHE, daB in beiden Landern
eine neue Generation herangewachsen ist, die ein Recht
auf eine gesicherte friedliche Zukunft hat,
IN DER ABSICHT, dauerhafte Grundlagen fur die Ent-
wicklung gutnachbarlicher Beziehungen zu schaffen,
IN DEM BESTREBEN, den Frieden und die Sicherheit in
Europa zu festigen,
IN DER UBERZEUGUNG, daB die friedliche Zusammen-
arbeit auf der Grundlage der Ziele und Grundsatze der
Charta der Vereinten Nationen dem Wunsche der Volker
sowie dera Interesse des Friedens in der Welt entspricht —-
sind wie folgt iibereingekommen:
A r t i k e 1 I
D;e Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die Tschechoslo¬




pouceny historii, ze mir vyzaduje harmonicke souziti
narodu Evropy,
v pevne villi jednou provzdy skoncovat s neblahou
minulosti ve svych vztazich, predevsim v souvislosti s
druhou svetovou valkou, ktera prinesla nezmeme utrapy
evropskym narodum,
uznavajice, ze mnichovska dohoda z 29. zari 1938 byla
Ceskoslovenske republice vnucena nacistickym rezimem
pod hrozbou sily,
uvedomujice si, ze v obou zemich vyrostla nova ge-
nerace, ktera ma pravo na zajistenou mirovou budouc-
nost,
vedenv limyslem vytvorit trvale zaklady pro rozvoj
dobrych sousedskych vztahu,
ve snaze upevnit mir a bezpecnost v Evrope,
presvedceny, ze mirova spoluprace na zaklade cilu a
zasad Cliarty Organizace spojenych narodu odpovida tuz-
bam narodu a zajmum miru ve svete,
se dohodly takto:
Clanek I
Spolkova republika Nemecka a Ceskoslovenska socia-
listicka republika povazuji mnichovskou dohodu z 29. zafi
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ner Abkonimen vom 29. September 1933 im Hinblick auf
ihre gegenseitigen Beziehungen nach MaBgabe dieses
Vertrages a!s nichtig.
Artikel II
(1) Dieser Vertrag beruhxt nicht die Rechtswirkungen,
die sich in bezug au; naturliche oaer juristisdie Personen
aus dem in der Zeit vom 30. September 1938 bis zum
9. Mai 1S45 angewendeten Recht ergsben.
Ausgenommen hiervon sind die Auswirkungen von
MaBnahmen, die beide veriragsschlieBende Parteien we-
gen ihrer Unvereinbarkeit rait den fundainentalen Prinzi-
pien der Gerechtigkelt als nichtig betraditen.
(2) Dieser Vertrag la3t die sica aus der Rechtsordnung
jeder der beiden Vertragsparteien ergebende Staatsan-
gehorigkeit lebender and verstorbener Personen un-
beriihrt.
(3j Dieser Vertrag bildet xnit seinen Erklanmgen iiber
das Mundiener Abkommen keine Rechtsgrundlage liir
materielle Aaspriidie der Tschechoslowakisdien Sozialisti-
sdren Republik und ibrer natiirlidien und juristischen
Personen.
Artikel HI
(1) Die Bundesrepublik Dentschland und die Tschecho-
slowakische Sozialistiscbe Republik lassen sich in ihren
gegenseitigen Beziehungen sowie in Fragen der Gewahr-
leistung der Sicherheit in Ehropa und in der Welt von
den Zielen und Grundsatzen. die in der C'narta der Ver-
einten Nationen niedergelegt sind, leiten.
(2) DemgernaB vrerden sie entspredrend den Artikeln 1
und 2 der Caarta der Vereinten Nationen alle ihre Streit-
fragen ausschlieBlich mit friediichen Mitteln Ibsen und
sich. in Fragen, die die europaische und Internationale
Sicherheit beruhren, sowie in ihren gegenseitigen Bezie¬
hungen der Drohung rait Gewalt oder der Anwendung
von Gewalt enthalten.
1938 vzhledem ke svym vzajemnym vztahum podle teto
Smlouvy za nulitnl.
Clanek II
(1) Tato Smlouva se nedotyka pravnlch ticinku, klere
vyplyvajl vuci fyzickym nebo pravnickym osobam z
prava pouziteho v dobe od 30. zari 1938 do 9. kvetna 1945.
Vynaty z toho jsou uclnky opatreni, ktere obe smluvni
strany povazuji pro jejich neslucitelnost se zakladnimi
zasadami spravedlnosti za nulitni.
(2) Tato Smlouva ponechava nedotcenu statni prislus-
nost zijicich a zemrelych osob, ktera vyplyva z pravniho
radu kazde z obou smluvnich stran.
(3) Tato Smlouva netvorl svymi prohlasenlmi o mni-
chovske dohode pravni zakladnu pro materialni naroky
Ceskoslovenske socialisticke republiky a jejidi fyzickych
a pravnickych osob.
Clanek III
(1) Spolkova republika Nemecka a Ceskoslovenska so-
cialisticka republika se rldl ve svych vzajemnych vztazich
i v otazkach zajisteni bezpecnosti v Evrope a ve svete cili
a zasadami zakotvenymi v Charte Organizace spojenych
narodu.
(2) V souladu s tim budou podle clanku 1 a 2 Charty
Organizace spojenych narodu resit vsechny sve spory
vylucne mlrovymi prostredky a vystrihajl se hrozby silou
nebo pouzitl sily v otazkach, ktere se tykajl evropske a
svetove bezpecnosti, jakoz i ve svych vzajemnych vzta¬
zich.
Artikel IV
(1) In Ubereinstixnrnung mit den vorstehenden Zielen
und Grundsatzen bekrattigec die Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land und die Tschechosiowakiscbe Sozialistische Republik
die Unverletzlichkeit ihrer gexneinsarnen Grenze jetzt und
in der Zukuaft und verpfiichten sich gegenseitig zur un-
eingesdirankien Acfaiung ihrer territorialen Integritat.
(2) Sie erkiaren, da3 sie gegeneinander keinerlei Ge-
bietsanspruche haben und soiche auch in Zukunft nicht
erheben. werden.
Artikel V
(1) Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die Tschecho-
slowakische Sozialistisdie Republik werden weitere
Schritte zur umfassenden Entwicklung ihrer gegenseitigen
Beziehungen uaternehrnen.
(2) Sie stimmea darin uberein, daB eine Erweiterung
ihrer nadibarschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit auf den Gebie-
ten der Wirtsdiaft, der Wissenscfaaft, der wissenschaftlich-
technischen Beziehungen. der Kultur, des Umweltschutzes,
des Sports, des Verkehrs und ihrer sonstigen Beziehun¬
gen in ihrem beiderseiUgen Interesse liegt.
Artikel VI
Dieser Vertrag becari der Ratiiikation und tritt am
Tage des Austausches.der Ratifikationsurkunden in Kraft,
der in Bonn stattfinder. soli.
Clanek IV
(1) Spolkova republika Nemecka a Ceskoslovenska so-
cialisticka republika v souladu s vyse uvedenymi clli a
zasadami potvrzujl neporusitelnost svych spolecnych hra-
nic nynl i v budoucnu a vzajemne se zavazuji neomezene
respektovat svou uzemnl celistvost.
(2) Prohlasuji, ze nemajl vuci sobe zadne uzemni na¬
roky a nebudou takove naroky vznaset ani v budoucnu.
Clanek V
(1) Spolkova republika Nemecka a Ceskoslovenska so-
cialisticka republika podniknou dalsi kroky k sirokeinu
rozvoji svych vzajemnych vztahu.
(2) Jsou zajedno v torn, ze rozsirenl jejich sousedske
spoluprace v oblasti hospodarstvi, vedy, vedeckotech-
nickych styku, kultury, ochrany prostredi, sportu, dopravy
a jinych styku je v zajmu obou stran.
Clanek VI
Tato Smlouva podleha ratifikaci a vstoupi v platnost
dnem vymeny ratilikacnidi listin, ktera ma byt provedena
v Bonnu.
368.
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ZL" URKUND DESSEN' haben die 3evoIlmachtigten der
Yertragsparteien diesen Vertrag unierschrieben.
GESCHEHEN zu Prag arn 11. Dezember 73 in zwei
Ursdiriften, jeae in deutscher und tschechischer Sprache,
wobei jeder Wortlaut gleidiermaBen verbindlich ist.
Na dukaz toho zmocnenci smluvnich stran tutoSmlouvu
podepsali.
Dano v Praze dne 11. prosince 73 ve dvou vyhotovenich,
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Sehr geehrter Heir Minister,
ich habe die Ehre, im Namen der Regierung der Bun-
desrepublik Deutschland das in den Verhandlungen er-
zielte Einvernehmen dariiber zu bestatigen, daO die Gel-
tung des Artikels II des heute unterzeichneten Vertrages
iiber die gegenseitigen Beziehungen zwiscben der Bundes-
republik Deutschland und der Tschechoslovakischen Sozia-
listischen Republik entsprechend dem Viennachte-Abkoin-
rnen vom 3. September 1971 in Ubereinstimmung mit den
festgelegten Verfahren auf Berlin (West) erstreckt wird.
Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die Tschecho-
slowakische Sozialistische Republik nehmen In Aussicnt,
die Erstreckung der Vertriige, die sich aus der Verwirk-'
lic'nung des Artikels V dieses Vertrages ergeben werden,
entsprechend dem Viermcichte-Abkommen vom 3. Septem¬
ber 1971 in Ubereinstimmung mit den festgelegten Ver¬
fahren auf Berlin (West) in jedem einzelnen Falle zu
vereinbaren.
Ich bitte Sie, mir Ihr Einvernehmen hiermit zu bestati¬
gen.




mam cest jmenem vlady Spolkove republiky Nemecka
potvrdit shodu dosazenou v jednanich, ze platnost clan-
ku II dnes podepsane Smlouvy o vzajemnych vztazich
mezi Spolkovou republikou Nemecka a Ceskoslovenskou
socialistickou republikou bude rozsirena podle Ctyrstran-
ne dohody z 3. zari 1971 v souladu se stanovenymi proce-
durami na Berlin (Zapadni).
Spolkova republika Nemecka a Ceskoslovenska socia-
listicka republika hodlaji sjednavat v kazdem jednptlivem
pripade rozsireni smluv, ktere vyplynou z realizace
cianku V teto Smlouvy, na Berlin (Zapadni) podle Ctyf-
stranne dohody z 3. zari 1971 v souladu se stanovenymi
procedurami.
Prosim, abyste mi s timto pdtvrdil Vas souhlas.
Prijmete, pane ministre, projev me hluboke ucty.
Walter ScheelWalter Scheel
An den
Minister fur Auswartige Angelegenheiten
der Tscfaechoslowakisdien Sozialistischen Republik
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Sohr gee'nrter Herr Minister,
ich habe die Ehre, im Namen der Regierung der Tsche-
choslowakischen Soziaiistischen Republik den Empfang
Ihres Briefes vora heutigen Tnge zu bestatigen, der fol-
genden Wortiaut hat:
,Ich habe die Ehre, im Namen der Regierung der Bun-
desrepub'tik Deutscbiand das in den Verhandlungen er-
zielte Einvemefcmen dariiber zu bestatigen, da3 die Gel-
tung des Artikels II des heute unterzeichneten Verirages
iiber die gegenseitigen Beziehungen zwischen der Bundes-
republik Deutsch.land und der Tschechoslowakischen Sozia¬
iistischen Republik entsprechend dem Viermachte-Abkom-
men vom 3. September 197! in Ubereinstimmung mit den
festgelegten Verfahren auf Berlin (West) erstreckt vrird.
Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die Tschechoslo-
wakische Sozialistische Republik nehmen in Aussicht, die
Erstreckung der Vertrage, die sich aus der Venvirklichung
des Artikels V dieses Vertrages ergeben werden. ent-
sprechend dem Viennachte-Abkommen vom 3. September
1971 in Ubereinstimmung mit den festgelegten Verfahren
auf Berlin (West) in jedem einzelnen Falle zu verein-
baren.
Ich bitte Sie, mir Ihr Einvernehmen hiermit zu be¬
statigen."
Die Regierung der Tschechoslowakischen Soziaiistischen
Republik 1st damit einverstanden.
Genehmigen Sie, Herr Minister, die Versicherung mei-
ner ausgezeicnnetsten Hocfaachtung.
B. Chnoupek
Vazeny pane spolkovy ministre,
mam cost potvrdit jmenem vlady Ceskoslovenske
socialisticke republiky prijem Vaseho dopisu z dnesniho
dne, ktery ma toto zneni:
«Mam cest jmenem vlady Spolkove republiky Nemecka
potvrdit shodu dosazenou v jednanich, ze platnost clanku il
dnes podepsane Smlouvy o vzajemnych vztazich mezi
Spolkovou republikou Nemecka a Ceskoslovenskou socia-
listickou republikou bude rozsirena podle Ctyrstranne
dohody z 3. zari 1971 v souladu se stanovenymi proce-
durami na Berlin (Zapadni).
Spolkova republika Nemecka a Ceskoslovenska socia-
listicka republika hodlaji sjednavat v kazdem jednotlivem
pripade rozsireni smluv, ktere vyplynou z realizace clan¬
ku V teto Smlouvy, na Berlin (Zapadni) podle Ctyrstranne
dohody z 3. zarf 1971 v souladu se stanovenymi proce-
durami.
Prosim Vas, abyste mi s timto potvrdil Vas souhlas».
Vlada Ceskoslovenske socialisticke republiky s tim
souhlasi.
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Sehr geehrter Her: Minister,
ini Zusammenhang ait car heutigen Unterzeichuung
des Vertrages ilber cie gegenseitigen Beziehungen zwi-
schen der Bundesrepuciik Deutschland und der Tschecho-
slowakischen Sozialistischen Republik habe ich die Ehre,
Ihnen unter Bezugnahme auf Art. V dieses Vertrages mit-
zuteilen, ,da3 bei den Vertragsverhandlungen Uberein-
stimmung in folgenden Fragen erzielt worden ist:
1. Im Rahmen ihier 3enru.bun.gen ura die Entwicklung der
gegenseitigen Beziehungen verden die Regierung der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die Regierung der
Tschechoslowakischen Soziallstiscfaen Republik den
hurnanitaren Fragen Aufmerksarnkeit zuwenden.
2. Die tschechoslowakische Seite hat erklart, daB die zu-
standigen tsdiechoslowakischen Stellen Antrage tsche-
choslowakischer Burger, die auf Grund ihrer deutschen
Nationalitat die Aussiedlung in die Bundesrepublik
Deutsciiland wunsdrert, im Einklang mit den in der
Tschechoslowakischen Soziaiistischen Republik gelten-
den Gesetzen und Rechtsvorschriften wohlwollend
beurteilen werden.
Die deutsche Seite hat erkiart, daB in Dbereinstimmung
mit den in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland geltenden
Gesetzen und Rethtsvorschriften Personen tschechischer
oder slowakischer Nationalitat, die dies wiinschen, in
die Tschedioslowakisdie Sozialistisciie Republik aus-
siedeln konnexu
3. Es gibt keine Einwaade seitens der beiden Regierun-
gen, daB das Deutsche Rote Kreuz und das Tschecho-
slowakische Rote Kreuz die Losung der oben erwahn-
ten Fragen fordem.
4. Beide Regierungen wercea den Reiseverkehr zwischen
den beiden Landera weiterentwidceln, einschlieBlich
^ der Verwandtenbesuche.
5. Beide Regierungen werden Moglidrkeiten technischer
Verbesserungen im Seiseverkehr priifen, einschlieBlich
einer ztigigen Abfertigung an den Grenziibergangs-
stellen sowie der Erofmung weiterer Grenztibergange.
6. Der Inhalt dieses Briefwechsels wird sinngemiiB ent-
sprecbend dem Viermachte-Abkommen vom 3. Septem¬
ber 1971 in Ubereinstirnmung mit den festgelegten Ver-
fahren auch auf Berlin (West) angewandt.
Ich bitte Sie, mir den Inhalt dieses Briefes zu besta-
tigen.
Genenmigen Sie, Herr Minister, die Versidierung
meiner ausgezeidmelsten Hcchachtung.
Vazeny pane ministre,
v souvislosti s dnesnim podpisem Smlouvy o vzajem-
nych vztazidr mezi Spolkovou republikou Nemecka a
Ceskoslovenskou socialistickou republikou mam cest suelit
Vam s odvolanim na clanek V tetq Smlouvy, ze bylo
dosazeno pri smluvnidi jednanlch shody v techto otazkach:
1. V ramci svych snah o rozvoj vzajemnych vztahu budou
venovat vlada Spolkove republiky Nemecka a vlada
Ceskoslovenske socialisticke republiky pozornost huma-
nitnlm otazkam.
2. Ceskoslovenska strana prohlasila, ze prlslusna cesko¬
slovenska mista budou blahovolne posuzovat v souladu
se zakony a pravnimi predpisy, platnymi v Cesko¬
slovenske socialisticke republice, zadosti ceskoslo-
venskych obcanu, kteri si na zaklade sve nemecke
narodnosti preji vystehovat se do Spolkove republiky
Nemecka.
Nemecka strana prohlasila, ze v souladu se zakony a
pravnimi predpisy, platnymi ve Spolkove republice
Nemecka, mohou osoby ceske ci slovenske narodnosti,
ktere si to preji, vystehovat se do Ceskoslovenske
socialisticke republiky.
3. Ze strany obou vlad neni namitek proti tomu, aby
Nemecky cerveny krlz a Ceskoslovensky cerveny kHz
napomahaly reseni vyse zmmenych otazek.
4. Obe vlady budou dale rozvljet cestovnl ruth mezi
obema zememi vcetne navstev prlbuznych.
5. Obe vlady budou zkoumat moznosti technickych
zlepseni v cestovnlm ruchu, vcetne plynuleho odbavo-
vani na hranicnich prechodech, jakoz i otevrenl dalsidi
hranicnicb prechodu.
6. Obsah techto vymenenych dopisu bude die sveho
smyslu aplikovan podle Ctyrstranne dohody z 3. zarl
1971, v souladu se stanovenymi procedurami tez na
Berlin (Zapadni).
Prosim Vas, abyste mi potvrdil obsah tohoto dopisu.
Prijmete, velevazeny pane ministre, projev me hluboke
uctv.
Walter Scheel Walter Scheel
An den
Minister fur Auswartige Angelegenheiten
der Tschethoslowakischen Sozialistischen Republik
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Sehr geehrter Heir Minister,
ich habe die Ehre, im Namen der Regierung der
Tschedroslowaklschen Sozialistiscuen Republik den Emp-
fang Ihres Briefes vom heutigen Tags zu besiaiigen, der
fcigenden Wor'.IauLhat:
„Ini Zusamnenhang mit der heutigen Unterzeiciinung
des Vertrages uber die gegenseitigen. Beziehungen zwi-
schea der Buadesrepublik Deutschiand und der Tschecho-
slowakischen Soziaiistischen Republik babe ieh die Ehre,
Ihaen unter Bezugnahme auf Art. V dieses Vertrages rait-
zuteilen, dab bei den Vertragsverhandlungen Uberein-
stimmung in folgenden Fragen erzieit worden 1st:
1. Im Rakmen Lhrer Bemuhungen um die Entwiddung der
gegenseitigen Beziehungen werden die Regierung der
Bundesrepubiik Deutschiand und die Regierung der
Tschechoslowakischen Sozialisiischen Republik den bu¬
rn anitaren Fragen Aunnerksamkeit zuwenden.
2. Die tscheraoslowakische Seite hat erklart, dab die
zustandigen tschechoslowakischen Stellen Antrage
tschechoslowakischer Burger, die auf Grand ihxer
deutschen Nationalitat die Aussiedlung in die Bundes¬
repubiik Deutschiand vrunschen, im Einklang mit den
in der Tscbechoslowakischen Soziaiistischen Republik
geltenden Gesetzen und Rechtsvorschriiten wonlwol-
!end benrteilen werden.
Die deutsche Seite hat erklart, dab in Ubereinstim-
mung mit den in der 3undesrepublik Deutsrhland gel¬
tenden Gesetzen und Rechtsvorscbriiten Personen
tschechischer oder slowakischer Nationalitat, die dies
wunschen, in die Tschechoslowakische Soziaiistisdie
Republik aussiecein koanen.
3. Hs gibt keine Hnwande seitens der beiden Regierun-
gen, dab das Deutsche Rote Kreuz und das Tsckecho-
slowakische Rote Kreuz die Losung der oben erwahn-
ten Fragen iordern.
4. Beide Regierangen werden den Reiseverkehr zwischen
den beiden Landera weiterentwickeln. einschlieSlich
der Verwandtenbesucbe.
5. Beide Regierungen werden Moglichkeiten technischer
Verbesserangen im Reiseverkehr prufen. emschlieQlich
einer zugigen Abfertigung an den Grenztibergangsstel-
len sowie der Erorfnung weiterer Grenziioergange.
6. Der Inhalt dieses Brieiwechsels wird siangema.3 ent-
sprechend dem Viennechte-Abkommen vom 3. Septem¬
ber 1971 in Cbereinstimmung mit den festgeieg-en Ver-
iahren auch aui Berlin (West) angewandt.
Ich bitte Sie, mir den Inhalt dieses Briefes zu besta-
tigen."
Die Regierung der Tschechoslowakischen Sozialistischen
Repubiik 1st darnit einverstanaen.
Genehmigen Sie, Herr Minister, die Versicherung
meiner ausgezeichnetsten Hochachlung.
Vazenv pane spolkovy ministre,
mam cest potvrdit jmenem vlady Ceskoslovenske socia¬
listicke republiky prijem Vaseho dopisu z dnesniho dne,
ktery ma toto zneni:
« V souvisiosti s dnesnim podpisem Smlouvy o vzajem-
nych vztazich mezi Spolkovou republikou Nernecka a
Ceskoslovenskou socialistickou republikou mam cest
sdelit Vam s odvolanim na clanek V teto Smlouvy, ze
bylo dosazeno pri smluvnich jednanich shody v techto
otazkach:
1. V ramci svych snab o rozvoj vzajemnych vztahu budou
venovat vlada Spolkove republiky Nemecka a vlada
Ceskoslovenske socialisticke republiky pozornost hu-
manitnim otazkam.
2. Ceskoslovenska strana prohlasila, ze prlslusna cesko¬
slovenska mista budou blahovolne posuzovat v souladu
se zakony a pravnimi predpisy, platnymi v Cesko¬
slovenske socialisticke republice, zAdosti ceskoslo-
venskych obcanu, kteri si na zaklade sve nemecke
narodnosti preji vystehovat se do Spolkove republiky
Nemedca.
Nemeeka strana prohlasila, ze v souladu se zakony a
pravnimi predpisy, platnymi ve Spolkove republice
Nemedca, mohou osoby ceske ci slovenske narodnosti,
ktere si to prejl, vystehovat se do Ceskoslovenske
socialisticke republiky.
3. Ze strany obou vlad neni namitek proti tomu, aby
Nemecky cerveny kriz a Ceskoslovensky cerveny krlz
napomahaly reseni vyse zminenych otazek.
4. Obe vlady budou dale rozvijet cestovni ruch mezi
obema zememi vcetne navstev pribuznydi.
5. Obe vlady budou zkoumat moznosti technickych
zlepseni v cestovnim ruchu, vcetne plynuleho odbavo-
vani na hranicnich prechodecb, jakoz i otevreni dalsich
hranicnich prechodu.
6. Obsah techto vymenenych dopisu bude die sveho
smyslu aplikovan podle Ctyrstranne dohody z 3. zari
1971, v souladu se stanovenymi procedurami tez na
Berlin (Zapadni).
Prosim Vas, abyste mi potvrdil obsah tohoto dopisu.»
Vlada Ceskoslovenske socialisticke republiky s tim
souhlasi.
Prijfnete, pane spolkovy ministre, projev me hluboke
ucty.
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Sehr geehrter Herr Minister.
anldBlich der heutigen Unterzeichnung des Vertrages
zwischen der Tsdiechoslovakischen Sozialistischen Repu-
blik und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland iiber ihre gegen-
seitigen Beziehungen habe ich die Ehre, Sie im Namen
der Regierung der Tschechoslowakisdien Sozialistischen
Republik iiber folaendes zu unterrichten:
Von den in den Jahren 1933 bis 1945 veriibten straf-
baren Handlungen kormen naca giiltigem tschedioslowa-
kischen Recbt gegenwartig nur nodi solche Taten verfolgt
werden, die nach dem tscfcechoslowakischen Strafgesetz
strafbar sind, fur die das Gesetz die Todesstrafe vorsieht
und die zugleich die Merkinale von Kriegsverbrecnen
oder Verbrechen gegen die Menschlidikeit ira Sinne des
Artikeis 6 Buchstaben b und c des Statuts des Internatio-
nalen Militargerichtshofs in Nurnberg erfullen. Fiir Taten
dieser Art verjahrt die Strafverfolgung nicht.
In alien iibrigen Fallen ist die Strafverfolgung spate-
stens im Jahre 1965 verjahrt. An diesem Zustand wird
dieser Vertrag niciits andern.







Vazeny pane spolkovy ministre,
pri prilezitosti dnesniho podpisu Smlouvy o vzajemnych
vztazich mezi Ceskoslovenskou socialistickou republikou
a Spolkovou republikou Nemecka mam cest oznamit Vam
jmenem vlady Ceskoslovenske socialisticke republiky
toto:
Podle platneho ceskoslovenskelio prava mohou byt z
trestnych cinu spadianych v letech 1938 az 1945 v soucasne
dobe stihany jen ty, ktere jsou trestne podle cesko-
slovenskeho trestniho zakona, za ktere zakon predvida
trest smrti a ktere maji soucasne znaky valecnych zlocinu
nebo zlocinu proti lidskosti ve smyslu clanku 6 pismeno
b) a c) statutu Mezin&rodniho vojenskeho soudu v
Norimberku. Trestni stihani pro takove trestne ciny se
nepromlcuje.
Ve vsech jinych pripadech je trestni stihani nejpozdeji
v roce 1965 promlceno. Na tomto stavu tato Smlouva nic
nezmeni.









LAW CONCERNING THE TREATY OF DECEMBER 11 . 1973 ON MUTUAL
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND THE
CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC. JULY 12. 1974
The Federal Diet passed the following laws
Article 1
The Treaty on the Mutual Relations between the Federal
Republic of Germany and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republio
signed in Prague on December 11, 1973, including the
Exchange of Letters of the same day
- on the Extension of the Validity of Article II of the
Treaty as well as the Treaties resulting from the
realization of Article V of the Treaty to Berlin (West)
- on the Provisions for the Settlement of Humanitarian
Questions
has been approved. The Treaty and the two Exchanges
of Letters, as well as the Letter of the Government of
the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic concerning Questions
of Prosecution will be published hereafter.
Article 2
This law is applicable in the Federal State of Berlin
as well, in so far as the provisions of this treaty are
valid for the Federal State of Berlin and provided that




(1) This law comes into force on the day after its
promulgation.
(2) The day on which the treaty comes into force
according to the provisions of Article VI is
indicated in the Law Gazette.
The constitutional: rightB of the Federal Council
are ensured.
The la\^r as it appears above is herewith published.







TREATY OH MUTUAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY ARB THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC
The Federal Republic of Germany and the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic,
In the historic awareness that the harmonious
coexistence of the nations in Europe is a necessity for
peace,
Determined to put an end once and for all to the
disastrous past in their relations, especially in connexion
with the Second World War which has inflicted immeasurable
suffering on the peoples of Europe,
376.
Recognizing that the Munich Agreement of 29 September
1938 was imposed on the Czechoslovak Republic by the
National Socialist regime under the threat of force,
Considering the fact that a new generation has grown
up in both countries which has a right to a secure and
peaceful future,
Intending to create lasting foundations for the
development of good-neighbourly relations,
Anxious to strengthen peace and security in Europe,
Convinced that peaceful co-operation on the basis of
the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter
complies with the wishes of nations and the interests of
peace in the world,
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
The Federal Republic of Germany and the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic, under the present Treaty, deem the
Munich Agreement of 29 September 1938 void with regard to
their mutual relations.
Article II
(1) The present Treaty shall not affect the legal
effects on natural or legal persons of the law as applied
in the period between 30 September 1938 and 9 May 1945.
This provision shall exclude the effects of measures
which both Contracting Parties deem to be void owing to
their incompatibility with the fundamental principles of
justice.
377.
(2) The present Treaty shall not affect the
nationality of living or deceased persons ensuing from
the legal system of either of the two Contracting
Parties.
(3) The present Treaty, together with its
declarations on the Munich Agreement, shall not
constitute any legal hasis for material claims by the
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and its natural and
legal persons.
Article III
(1) The Federal Republic of Germany and the
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic shall in their mutual
relations as well as in matters of ensuring European
and international security be guided by the purposes
and principles embodied in the United Rations Charter.
(2) Accordingly they shall, pursuant to Articles 1
and 2 of the United Nations Charter, settle all their
disputes exclusively by peaceful means and shall refrain
from any threat or use of force in matters affecting
European and international security, and in their mutual
relations.
Article IV
(1) In conformity with the said purposes and
principles, the Federal Republic of Germany and the
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic reaffirm the inviolability
of their common frontier now and in the future and under¬
take to respect each other's territorial integrity
without restriction.
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(2) They declare that they have no territorial claims
whatsoever against each other and that they will not
assert any such claims in the future.
(1) The Federal Republic of Germany and the
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic will undertake further
steps for the comprehensive development of their mutual
relations.
(2) They agree that an extension of their neighbourly
co-operation in the economic and scientific fields, in
their scientific and technological relations, and in the
fields of culture, environmental protection, sport,
transport and in other sectors of their relations, is
in their mutual interest.
The present Treaty shall be subject to ratification
and enter into force on the date of the exchange of
instruments of ratification which shall take place in
Bonn.
In witness whereof the Plenipotentiaries of the
Contracting Parties have signed this Treaty.
Done in Prague on 11 December 1973 in duplicate in
the German and Czech languages, both texts being
equally authentic.










EXCHANGE OF LETTERS (of the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs)
OF ARTICLES II AND V OF THE TREATY TO BERLIN (WEST)1
Mr. Minister,
On behalf of the Government of the Federal Republic of
Germany I have the honour to confirm the agreement reached
in the negotiations that the validity of Article II of the
Treaty signed today on Mutual Relations between the Federal
Republic of Germany and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
shall, consistent with the Quadripartite Agreement of
3 September 1971» be extended to Berlin (West) in accordance
with established procedures.
The Federal Republic of Germany and the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic propose to agree in each individual case
on the extension to Berlin (West), consistent with the
Quadripartite Agreement of 3 September 1971, of treaties
arising out of the implementation of the provisions of
Article Y of the present Treaty, in accordance with
established procedures.
I would ask you to confirm your agreement to the above.
Accept, Mr. Minister, the assurances of my highest
consideration.
Walter Scheel
Mr. Bohuslav Chnoupek Eng.,
Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
1. In addition to document No, 1, section 2.
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Mr. Minister,
On behalf of the Government of the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic I have the honour to confirm receipt
of your letter of today's date, which reads as follows:
"On behalf of the Government of the Federal Republic
of Germany I have the honour to confirm the agreement
reached in the negotiations that the validity of Article II
of the Treaty signed today on Mutual Relations between the
Federal Republic of Germany and the Czechoslovak Socialist
Republic shall, consistent with the Quadripartite Agreement
of 3 September 1971» be extended to Berlin (West) in
accordance with established procedures.
The Federal Republic of Germany and the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic propose to agree in each individual case
on the extension to Berlin (West), consistent with the
Quadripartite Agreement of 3 September 1971, of treaties
arising out of the implementation of the provisions of
Article V of the present Treaty, in accordance with
established procedures.
I would ask you to confirm your agreement to the above."
The Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
agrees to the above.




Minister for Foreign Aggairs
of the Federal Republic of Germany
381.
No. ?
COMMUNIQUE OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
The Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany-
issued the following communique:
The Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and
the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic have agreed to establish
diplomatic relations as of today and to open embassies in
Prague and Bonn. The two countries will soon nominate their
representatives with the rank of Ambassador.
Prague, 11 December 1973
No. 4
ARTICLE 116. PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(GRUNDGESETZ) OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY.
MAY 2?t 194?
According to this Constitutional Law (Grundgesetz) a
German citizen is,junder the reservation of another
regulation by law* anyone who is in possession of German
nationality or who has established permanent residence in
the territory of the German Reich within the boundaries of
p
December 31» 1937 either as a refugee (FlUchtling), as a
displaced person (Vertriebener) of German affiliation
(Volkszugehdrigkeit) or as his marital partner or descendant.
2. The "Gesetz iiber die Angelegenheiten der Vertriebenen
und Fltichtlinge" (law Relating to the Affairs of
Displaced persons and Refugees), May 19» 1953 (Law
Gazette It p. 201 ) in the classification of the several
groups of people who have come from the East to the
Federal Republic of Germany differentiates between
"Vertriebener" (displaced persons) and "Heimatvertrie-
bener" (expellee) on the one side and "FlUchtling"
(refugee) on the other. The expression "refugee" is
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applied exclusively to those people who come from the
territory which belongs now to the German Democratic
Republic. The same law also defined "Volkszugehbrigkeit"
(affiliation). The relevant paragraphs are as follows
(extracts only)i
Paragraph 1. A displaced person is one, who, as a
German citizen or German affiliated person (Volks-
zugehbrlger) had his permanent residence...(or exercised
his business or profession) in the German eastern
provinces, now under foreign administration, or outside
the boundaries of the German Reich according to the
territorial status of December 31, 1937 and who lost
it subsequently in connection with the events of the
Second World War in consequence of expulsion, in
particular by deportation (Ausweisung; or escape (Plucht)
...The same rule shall apply to German citizens or
affiliated people who, after the general measures of
expulsion had ended, left Czechoslovakia. Excluded from
this category of people are persons who took up
residence there after May 8, 1945. ...The same rule
shall also apply to people who, although not German
citizens or affiliated persons, are married to a
displaced person according to the first definition.
Paragraph 2. An expellee is a displaced person, who
had on or before December 31, 1937 his permanent
residence in territory which on January 1, 1914 belonged
to the German Reich or to the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy... . (Additional prescriptions exist for
marital partners and descendants). ...
Paragraph 6. A German affiliated person is an
individual who in his native land avowed German
natiohality (Volkstum), provided that this avowal
was confirmed by certain facts such as birth (Abstammung)*
language, education and culture (see for comparisdnn
f.n. to Document No. 13).
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No. 5
STATUTE RELATING TO THE SETTLEMENT OF QUESTIONS OF NATIONALITY.
FEBRUARY 22. 1955 (Excerpts)
First Section. The state of nationality of persons
affiliated with the German people who had been granted
German citizenship in the years from 1938 to 1945 by
collective naturalization.
Article 1• The German affiliated persons to whom German
nationality has been granted by terms as follows:
a) Treaty between the German Reich and the Czechoslovak
*
Republic on Questions of Nationality and Option, November
20, 1938 (Law Gazette II, p. 895), ...
c) Decree on the acquisition of German Nationality by
former Czechoslovak citizens affiliated to the German people,
April 20, 1939 (Law Gazette I p. 815)* in connection with
the statute settling the questions of nationality relating
to the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia of June 6, 1941
(Law Gazette I, p. 308),
such persons have become German citizens in consequence
of the aforesaid provisions if they have not refused and do
not refuse German nationality by explicit declaration.
3. See Document No. 7.
4. See Document No. 13.
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The same rule is applicable to the wife and the children
who, according to German law, derive their nationality from
a person who is entitled to refuse German nationality. It
is irrelevant whether he makes use of his right of refusal
or not. Wives who possessed German nationality at the moment
of marriage will retain it.
Article 2. If a person entitled to decline German citizen¬
ship has met the conditions which entail the loss of German
nationality and does not exercise this right, then he has
been in possession of German nationality only until these
conditions entailing its loss set in.
Article 3. The refusal produces the effect that the
refusing person has not acquired German nationality as
provided in Article 1•
Article 4. If a person entitled to refuse German
nationality has met those conditions which entail the
acquisition of German nationality before he exercises his
right to refuse, a subsequent refusal means that he became
a German citizen at the time that the conditions for the
acquisition of German nationality were met.
Article 5. Subsequent to the effective date of this
Statute the refusal can be declared only within a year's
time.
Every person entitled to refuse is authorized to
waive the right of refusal before the expiration of the
time-limit.
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Second Section. Conditions of nationality concerning
those persons who are Germans according to Article 116,
paragraph 1 of the Constitutional Law-* without possessing
German citizenship.
Article 6. Any person who, according to Article 116,
paragraph 1 of the Constitutional Law, is a German without
however possessing German nationality has to become
naturalized on (his) application, unless there is evidence,
justifying the supposition that he will endanger the internal
or external security of the federal Republic or of a German
Federal State.
The petitioner loses the legal status of a German
citizen at the very moment when the decision to refuse the
naturalization is without appeal.
Article 7. If a German not possessing German nationality
has deliberately left the territory of the German Reich as
defined by the boundaries of December 31» 1937 (Germany)
and has taken up permanent residence in the foreign country
from whose territory he was exiled or in any of the other
countries mentioned in Paragraph 1, Article 2 No. 3 of the
g
Federal Statute on expellees, ..he loses the legal status of
a German as defined in the Constitutional Law at the moment
when this statute comes into effect.
5. See Document No. 4.
6. For the exact title of the Statute, see f.n,2.
Czechoslovakia is also "another country" in this sense.
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If the permanent residence is changed, according to
the principles defined in paragraph 1 and after this statute
comes into effect, the loss of the legal status of a German
as defined in the Constitutional lav/ comes Into effect at
the moment of the change of residence.
Third Section, Conditions of nationality of other
categories of persons.
Article 8, An affiliated person of the German nation,
who is not a German as defined in the Constitutional Law but
who has his permanent residence in Germany and who cannot be
expected to return to his native country, has a claim to
naturalization as provided in Article 6, If he is naturalized,
his marital partner also has a claim to naturalization.
If the permanent residence in Germany is abandoned
after this statute comes into force, the legal claim to
naturalization lapses from the moment such residence is
abandoned.
Article 9* An affiliated person of the German nation,
who is not a German as defined in the Constitutional law,
is permitted to apply for naturalization from abroad if he
has the legal status of an expellee under Article 1 of the
Federal Statute on expellees, ...
Fourth Section, Procedural Rules,,,
Article 14* Any person who has completed the IS^*1 year <
of his life attains majority as far as the exercise of the
right to refuse,.to disclaim and to assert his claim .. to
naturalization is concerned. ...
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Article 15. Any person who has not yet completed the
18th year of his life or who is indeed more than 18 years
old but legally incapable of exercising his majority or
who, apart from reasons other than minority, is limited in
his legal capacity will be represented by his legal
representative for personal affairs,
The guardian of an illegitimate child needs the assent
of the child's mother if she is entitled to care for the
child and has the custody of the child's person.
The same procedure is necessary if the guardian does
not use the claim of refusal and the claim of naturalization.
If a consensus between the guardian and the mother cannot
be reached, the guardian is obliged to present the matter
for decision by a Guardianship Court.
Article 16. The declaration of one marital partner does
not need the assent of the other marital partner. ...
Fifth Section. Interim and final provisions
Article 25. The domestic law on expellees and the
future provisions on nationality resulting from It are not
affected by the declaration deposed under this statute. ...
Notei In accordance with the legal requirements under
Article 1 T>3 of the Constitutional law, the Federal Government
has given its assent to the preceding Statute. ...
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No. 6 •
AGREEMENT CONCLUDED AT MUNICH ON SEPTEMBER 29. 1938
Germany, the United Kingdom, Prance and Italy, taking
into consideration the agreement, which has been already
reached in principle for the cession to Germany of the
Sudeten German territory, have agreed on the following
terms and conditions governing the said cession and the
measures consequent thereon, and by this agreement they
each hold themselves responsible for the steps necessary
to secure its fulfillments
1. The evacuation will begin on the 1st October.
2. The United Kingdom, Prance and Italy agree that
the evacuation of the territory shall be completed by the
loth October, without any existing installations having been
destroyed and that the Czechoslovak Government will be held
responsible for carrying out the evacuation without damage
to the said installations.
3. The conditions governing the evacuation will be
laid down in detail by an international commission composed
of representatives of Germany, the United Kingdom, Prance,
Italy and Czechoslovakia.
4. The occupation by stages of the predominantly
German territory by German troops will begin on the 1 st
October. The four territories marked on the attached map
will be occupied by German troops in the following order:
the territory marked No. I on the 1st and 2nd October,
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the territory marked No. II on the 2nd and 3rd of October,
the territory marked No. Ill on the 3rd, 4-th and 5th of
October, the territory marked No. IY on the 6th and 7th of
October. The remaining territory of preponderantly German
character will be ascertained by the aforesaid international
commission forthwith and be occupied by German troops by the
loth of October.
5. The international commission referred to in
paragraph 3 will determine the territories in which a
plebiscite is to be held. These territories will be occupied
by international bodies until the plebiscite has been
completed. The same commission will fix the conditions in
which the plebiscite is to be held, taking as a basis the
conditions of the Saar plebiscite. The commission will also
fix a date, not later than the end of November, on which the
plebiscite will be held.
6. The final determination of the frontiers will be
carried out by the international commission. This commission
will also be entitled to recommend to the four Powers,
Germany, the United Kingdom, Prance and Italy, in certain
exceptional cases minor modifications in the strictly
ethnographical determination of the zones which are to be
transferred without plebiscite.
7. There will be a right of option into and out of the
transferred territories, the option to be exercised within
six months from the date of this agreement. A German-Czech¬
oslovak commission shall determine the details of the option,
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consider ways of facilitating the transfer of population and
settle questions of principle arising out of the said transfer.
8. The Czechoslovak Government will within a period of
four weeks from the date of this agreement release from
their military and police forces any Sudeten Germans who may
wish to be released, and the Czechoslovak Government will
within the same period release Sudeten German prisoners who





Munich, September 29, 1938
Annex to the Agreement
His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the
French Government have entered into the above agreement on
the basis that they stand by the offer, contained in
paragraph 6 of the Anglo-French proposals of the 19th September,
relating to an international guarantee of the new boundaries
of the Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression.
When the question of the Polish and Hungarian minorities
in Czechoslovakia has been settled, Germany and Italy for





Munich, September 29, 1938
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Declaration
The Heads of the Governments of the four Powers declare
that the problems of the Polish and Hungarian minorities of
Czechoslovakia, if not settled within three months by-
agreement between the respective Governments, shall form the
subject of another meeting of the Heads of the Governments




Munich, September 29» 1938 Benito Mussolini
Supplementary Declaration
All questions which may arise out of the transfer of the
territory shall be considered as coming within the terms of




Munich, September 29» 1938 Senlio Mussolini
*0- 7
TREATY BETWEEN THE GERMAN REICH AND THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC
ON QUESTIONS OF NATIONALITY AND OPTION. NOVEMBER 20. 1938
(Excerpts)
« * *
Article 1. Czechoslovak citizens who on October 10, 1938
had their permanent residence in a community united with the
German Reich, acquire as of October 10, 1938 German nationality
while losing their Czechoslovak citizenship, if
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a) they were horn in the territory united with the
German Reich before January 1, 1910, or
b) have lost German nationality as of January 10, 1920,
or
c) are descendants of a person to whom the provisions
under the letters a) and b) can be applied, or
d) are wives of persons to whom the provisions of the
letters a) b) or c) mentioned above can be applied.
Czechoslovak citizens who are affiliated persons with
the German nation and who have had their permanent residence
outside the former Czechoslovak territory acquire as of
October 10, 1938 German nationality while losing their
Czechoslovak citizenship if they possessed the right of
domicile in a community united with the German Reich on
October 10, 1938. A wife does not acquire German nationality,
unless her husband acquires it.
Article 2. The German Government can request up till
July 10, 1939 that persons who are not affiliated persons
with the German nation, but who, under the provisions of this
Treaty, remain Czechoslovak citizens and who since January 1,
1910 have immigrated to the territory united to the German
Reich together with their descendants of Czechoslovak
nationality, leave the German Reich within three months.
The Czechoslovak Government will admit these persons to its
territory.
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The Czechoslovak Government can request up till July
10, 1939 that affiliated persons with the German nation,
who by the time this treaty comes into effect are Czechoslo¬
vak citizens and who after January 1, 1910 immigrated into
the present territory of the Czechoslovak Republic, as well
as their descendants, leave the Czechoslovak Republic within
three months. These persons thereby lose their Czechoslovak
nationality; the German Government will admit them to its
territory. This provision is not applicable to persons who
acquired Czechoslovak nationality after January 30, 1933
and who have been German or Austrian citizens up to this
date.
Article 3. Persons of non-German affiliation who under
Article 1 acquire German nationality are allowed to opt for
Czechoslovak nationality until March 29, 1939.
Article 4. Affiliated persons with the German nation
who remain Czechoslovak citizens can opt for German
nationality until March 29, 1939. This cannot be applied
to persons who acquire Czechoslovak nationality after January
30, 1933 and who have been up to this date German or Austrian
citizens.
Article 5. The option is declared
a) for Czechoslovak nationality at the Ministry of the
Interior in Prague if the declaration is made within the
Czechoslovak Republic,
outside the Czechoslovak Republic at the competent
Czechoslovak Mission.
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b) for German nationality at the competent minor
administrative board when the declaration is made within the
German Reich; outside the German Reich at the competent
German consulate. ...
Article 7. The declaration of option has to be made to
or given in written form to the competent authorities
mentioned under Article 5. The signature under the declaration
requires formal attestation either by the official mission
of the State in favour of which the option is exercised, or
by a court of law, or by a notary. The option can also be
declared by an authorized representative. ...
Article 8. The competent authority of the State in favour
of which the option is exercised, examines whether the
requirements for the option are fulfilled. In the Czechos¬
lovak Republic the examination is reserved to the Ministry
of the Interior in Prague.
If the requirements for the option are met, the
administrative body immediately hands over a document of
option to the optant and informs the authority appointed by
the other Government.
In the document of option also the members of family
referred to in the option have to be mentioned.
The option becomes effective with the receipt of the
declaration of option by the authority of option. ...
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Article 9. Any person who has completed the 18th year
of his life is entitled to make a declaration of option.
A married woman cannot opt separately; the option of
the husband is effective for the wife as well. This is,
however, not applicable if the conjugal community is suspended
by order of the court.
For persons under 18 years of age, for minors more than
18 years old who meet the requirements for legal incapacitation
and for other persons legally incapacitated or provisionally
placed under the care of a guardian,.,the option is declared
by their legal representative, even if they are not entitled
to opt. For the assessment of the requirements for a
declaration of option under this paragraph the time of the
receipt of the declaration by the competent authority is
decisive.
Article 10, An option cannot be revoked.
(Exceptions). ...
Article 15. For the examination and treatment of all
questions resulting from the implementation of this treaty,
a mixed committee will be constituted to which each of the
two Governments delegates an equal number of representatives.
• • •




LAW CONCERNING THE REUNIFICATION OF THE SUDETEN GERMAN
TERRITORIES WITH THE GERMAN REICH. NOVEMBER 21. 1938
(Excerpts)
...Article I
The Sudeten German territories reunited with the Reich
are territories of the German Reich.
Article II
With this Reunification the former inhabitants of the
Sudeten German territories become German citizens in
accordance with other provisions still to be issued.
Article III
(Contains the authorization, given to the Reichs-
Minister of the Interior to issue such provisions). ...
Berchtesgaden, November 21, 1938
The Fuehrer and Chancellor of the Reich
Adolf Hitler
The Reich Minister of the Interior
Frick
The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs
von Ribbentrop
The Representative of the Fuehrer
R. Hess
7. See Document No. 13.
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TEXT OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN HITLER AND HACHA. SIGNED OK
15 MARCH 1939
The Fuehrer and Reichskanzler to-day received in Berlin,
at their own request, the President of the Czechoslovak
State, Dr. Hacha, and the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister,
Dr. Chvalkovsky, in the presence of Herr von Ribbentrop, the
Reich Foreign Minister. At this meeting the serious situation
which had arisen, in consequence of the events of recent
weeks, within the territory which had hitherto formed part
of Czechoslovakia was subjected to a completely frank
examination. The conviction was unanimously expressed on
both sides that the object of all their efforts must be to
assure quiet, order and peace in this part of Central Europe.
The President of the Czechoslovak State declared that, in
order to serve thid end and to reach a final pacification,
he confidently placed the fate of the Czech people and of
their country in the hands of the Fuehrer of the German
Reich. The Fuehrer accepted this declaration and expressed
his determination to take the Czech people under the
protection of the German Reich and to assure to them the
autonomous development of their national life in accordance
with their special characteristics.
In witness whereof this document is signed in duplicate.
Berlin, 15 March 1939.
(Signed) Adolf Hitler Dr, Hacha
von Ribbentrop T>r. Chvalkovskv
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No. 10
TEXT OF DECREE DEFINING THE STATUS OF THE PROTECTORATE OP
BOHEMIA AND MORAVIA. ISSUED BY HITLER ON 16 MARCH 1939
For ten centuries the Bohemian-Moravian lands belonged
to the living space of the German people. Force and lack of
understanding arbitrarily tore them from their old historical
surroundings and finally created a source of permanent unrest
by incorporating them within the artificial edifice of
Czecho-Slovakia. From year to year the danger that a new,
appalling menace to European peace would emanate, as had
happened once before in the past, from this living space,
increased. For the Czecho-Slovak State, and those in power
there, had not succeeded in properly organizing the existence
side by side of the national groups arbitrarily united
within its boundaries and had thereby failed to awaken the
interests of all concerned in the maintenance of their
common State. It has thereby proved Its inmost incapacity
to exist and has for this reason now also fallen into actual
dissolution.
The German Reich, however, cannot tolerate permanent
disturbances in these territories that are so all-important
to its own peace and security and also so important to the
general well-being and universal peace. Sooner or later the
Reich, as the Power most interested and affected, by history
and geographical position, would have to suffer the most
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serious consequences. Self-preservation, therefore, requires
that the German Reich should be determined to intervene
decisively in favour of the restoration of a basis for a
reasonable Gentral European order and should take the
requisite measures. For it has already proved in the course
of its historical past of a thousand years that it alone,
thanks to its greatness and to the qualities of the German
people, can be called upon to solve these tasks.
Filled with the earnest desire to serve the true
interests of the peoples domiciled in this living space,
to guarantee the individual national life of the German and
of the Czech peoples, to benefit peace and the social welfare
of all, I therefore decree the following, in the name of
the German Reich, as the basis for the future existence in
common of the inhabitants of these territories
Article I
1. The territories which formed part of the former
Czecho-Slovak Republic and which were occupied by German
troops in March 1939 belong henceforth to the territory of the
German Reich and come under the latter*s protection as the
"Protectorate of -Bohemia and Moravia",
2, In so far as the defence of the Reich demands, the
Leader and Chancellor shall take measures differing from the
above in respect of individual parts of these areas.
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Article II
1. Inhabitants of the protectorate of German race shall
become German nationals and German citizens in accordance
with the provisions of the Reich Citizenship law of the 15th
September, 1935. Ihe provisions with regard to safeguarding
German blood and German honour shall therefore also apply
to them. They shall be subject to German jurisdiction.
2, The remaining inhabitants of Bohemia and Moravia
shall be nationals of the Protectorate of Bohemia and
Moravia.
Article III
1. The Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia is autonomous
and self-administering.
2. It shall exercise its sovereign rights within the
scope of the protectorate in consonance with the political,
military and economic importance of the Reich.
3. These sovereign rights shall be represented by its
own organs, authorities and officials.
Article IV
The head of the autonomous administration of the
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia shall enjoy the guard and
honours of the head of a State. The head of the Protectorate
must possess, in order to exercise his functions, the
confidence of the Leader and Chancellor of the Reich.
Article V
1. As trustee of Reich interests the Leader and
Chancellor of the Reich shall nominate a "Reich Protector
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in Bohemia and Moravia." His seat of office will be
Prague.
2. The Reich Protector, as representative of the
leader and Chancellor of the Reich and as Commissioner
of the Reich Government, is charged with the duty of seeing
to the observance of the political principles laid down by
the leader and Chancellor of the Reich.
3. The members of the Government of the Protectorate
shall be confirmed by the Reich Protector. The confirmation
may be withdrawn.
4. The Reich Protector is entitled to inform himself
of all measures taken by the Government of the Protectorate
and to give advice. He can object to measures calculated to
harm the Reich and, in case of danger, issue ordinances
required for the common interest.
5. The promulgation of laws, ordinances and other
legal announcements and the execution of administrative
measures and legal judgements shall be annulled if the
Reich Protector enters an objection.
Article VI
1. The foreign affairs of the Protectorate, especially
the protection of its nationals abroad, shall be taken over
by the Reich. The Reich will conduct foreign affairs in
accordance with the common interest.
2. The Protectorate shall have a representative




1. The Reich shall accord military protection to the
Protectorate.
2. In the exercise of this protection the Reich shall
maintain garrisons and military establishments in the
Protectorate.
3. Por the maintenance of internal security and order
the Protectorate may form its own organizations. The
composition, strength, numbers and arms shall be decided
by the Reich Government.
Article VIII
The Reich shall control directly the transport, post
and telegraph systems.
Article IX
The Protectorate shall belong to the customs area of
the Reich and be subject to its customs sovereignty.
Article X
1. The crown is legal tender, together with the
reichsmark, until further notice.
2. The Reich Government shall fix the ratio of one
to the other.
Article XI
1. The Reich can issue ordinances valid for the
Protectorate in so far as the common interest requires.
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2. In so far as a common need exists, the Reich may-
take over branches of administration and create its own
Reich authorities therefor as required.
3. The Reich Government may take measures for the
maintanance of security and order.
Article XII
The law at present existing in Bohemia and Moravia shall
remain in force so long as it does not conflict with the
principle of the assumption of protection by the German Reich.
Article XIII
The Reich Minister of the Interior shall issue, in
agreement with the other Ministers concerned, the administra¬




Prague, March 16 (1939)
No. 11
TELEGRAM FROM THE BRITISH SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS TO THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN BERLIN. 17 MARCH 1939
Please inform German Government that His Majesty's
Government desire to make it plain to them that they cannot
but regard the events of the past few days as a complete
repudiation of the Munich Agreement and a denial of the
spirit in which the negotiators of that agreement bound
themselves to co-operate for a peaceful settlement.
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His Majesty's Government must also take this occasion
to protest against the changes effected in Czecho-Slovakia
by German military action, which are, in their view, devoid
of any basis of legality.
No. 12
GERMAN-SLOVAK TREATY SIGNED IN VIENNA ON 18 MARCH AND IN
BERLIN ON 25 MARCH 1959
(a) Text of Treaty regarding the Protection to be extended
by the German Reich to the State of Slovakia. 18 and 25
March 1959
The German Government and the Slovak Government have
agreed, after the Slovak State has placed itself under the
protection of the German Reich, to regulate by treaty the
consequences resulting from this fact. ^or this purpose
the undersigned plenipotentiaries of the two governments
have agreed on the following provisions.
Article 1. The German Reich undertakes to protect the
political independence of the State of Slovakia and the
integrity of its territory.
Article 2. For the purpose of making effective the protection
undertaken by the German Reich, the German armed forces shall
have the right, at all times, to construct military
installations and to keep them garrisoned in the strength
they deem necessary, in an area delimited on its western
side by the frontiers of the State of Slovakia, and on its
eastern side by a line formed by the eastern rims of the
Lower Carpathians, the White Carpathians and the Javornik
Mountains.
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The Government of Slovakia will take the necessary-
steps to assure that the land required for these installations
shall he conveyed to the German armed forces. Furthermore,
the Government of Slovakia will agree to grant exemption
from custom duties to imports from the Reich for the
maintenance of the German troops and the supply of military
installations.
Military prerogatives will he exercised hy the German
armed forces in the zone described in the first paragraph
of this Article.
German citizens who, on the hesis of private employment
contracts, are engaged in the construction of military
installations in the designated zone shall he subject in
this capacity to German jurisdiction.
Article 5. The Government of Slovakia will organize its
military forces in close agreement with the German armed
forces.
Article 4. In accordance with the relationship of protection
agreed upon, the Government of Slovakia will at all times
conduct its foreign affairs in close agreement with the
German Government.
Article 5. This treaty shall become effective as from the
date of its signature and shall be valid for a period of
twenty-five years. The two governments will reach an under¬
standing on the extension of this treaty in due time before
the expiration of that period.
406.
In witness whereof the plenipotentiaries of the two
parties have signed the ahove treaty in duplicate.
Vienna, 18 March 1939. Berlin, 23 March 1939.
For the German Government:
von Rlbhentron




(b) (gext of Confidential Protocol concerning Economic
and Financial Collaboration between the German Reich
and the State of Slovakia. 23 Maroh, 1939).
1?
DECREE ON THE ACQUISITION OF GERMAM RATIONALITY BY FORMER
CZECHOSLOVAK CITIZENS AFFILIATED WITH THE GERMAH PEOPLE.
APRIL 20. 1939
(Excerpts)
Article 1. Former Czechoslovak citizens of German affiliation
O
(Volkszugehbrigkeit) who, on October 10, 1938 were in
possession of the right of domicile (Heimatrecht) in a
community to the former Czechoslovak countries Bohemia and
Moravia/Silesia acquire German nationality as of March 16,
1939 provided that they have not already acquired it
according to paragraph 1 of the German Czechoslovak Agreement
8. A definition of the meaning of "Volkszugehbrigkeit" has
never been given in a law or any formal order. But the
decree Issued by the Reich Minister of the Interior
from March 29, 1939 declared: "A German (Volkszugehbriger)
is an individual who considers himself a member of the
German people, provided his avowal Is confirmed by certain
facts, such as language, education, culture etc."
(Gazette Int. Aff. 1939, p. 783.).
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on Questions of Nationality and Option for Nationality of
November 20, 1938 in force since October 10, 1938 (Law
Gazette 1938 II, p. 895).
Article 2. According to paragraph 1, German nationality
is not acquired by individuals who, after having lost
Czechoslovak nationality, have obtained another nationality
or who had their permanent residence in the former
Czechoslovak countries of Slovakia or Carpatho-Ukrainia
on March 16, 1939.
According to paragraph 1, a married woman does not
acquire German nationality unless her husband acquired it.
Article 3. German citizens who have their permanent
residence in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia
also possess the rights of citizens of the Protectorate
of Bohemia and Moravia...
No. 14
EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA REGARDING THE FORMAL REPUDIATION OP THE
MUNICH AGREEMENT BY GREAT BRITAIN. 5 AUGUST 1942.
(a) Note from Eden to Masarvk
Foreign Office, London, 5 August 1942,
Your Excellency,
In the light of recent exchanges of view between our
Governments, I think it may be useful for me to make the
following statement about the attitude of His Majesty's
Government in the United Kingdom as regards Czechoslovakia.
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In my letter of the 18th July, 1941, I informed your
Excellency that The King had decided to accredit an Envoy
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Dr. Benes as
President of the Czechoslovak Republic. I explained that
this decision implied that His Majesty's Government in the
United Kingdom regarded the juridical position of the
President and Government of the Czechoslovak Republic as
identical with that of the other Allied Heads of States
and Governments established in this country. The status of
His Majesty's representative has recently been raised to
that of an Ambassador.
The Prime Minister had already stated in a message
broadcast to the Czechoslovak people on the 30th September,
1940, the attitude of His Majesty's Government in regard
to the arrangements reached at Munich in 1938. Mr. Churchill
then said that the Munich Agreement had been destroyed by
the Germans. This statement was formally communicated to
Dr. -^enes on the 11th November, 1940.
The for^aLng statement and formai. act of recognition
have guided the policy of His Majesty's Government in regard
to Czechoslovakia, but in order to avoid any possible
misunderstanding, I desire to declare on behalf of His
Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that as Germany
has deliberately destroyed the arrangements concerning
Czechoslovakia reached in 1938, in which His Majesty's
Government in the United Kingdom participated, His Majesty's
409.
Government regard themselves as free from any engagements
in this respect. At the final settlement of the Czechoslovak
frontiers to be reached at the end of the war they will not _






I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your
note of the 5th August, 1942, and I avail myself of this
opportunity to convey to your Excellency, on behalf of "the
Czechoslovak Government and of myself, as well as in the
name of the whole Czechoslovak people who are at present
suffering so terribly under the Nazi Yoke, the expression
of our warmest thanks.
Your Excellency's note emphasizes the fact that the
formal act of recognition has guided the policy of His
Majesty's Government in regard to Czechoslovakia, but, in
order to avoid any possible misunderstanding, His Majesty's
Government now desire to declare that, as Germany has
deliberately destroyed the arrangements concerning Czechos¬
lovakia reached in 1938, in which His Majesty's Government
in the United Kingdom participated, His Majesty's Government
regard themselves as free from any engagements in this
respect. At the final settlement of the Czechoslovak frontiers
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to be reached at the end of the war, they will not be
influenced by any changes effected in and since 1938,
My Government accept your Excellency's note as a
practical solution of the questions and difficulties of
vital importance for Czechoslovakia which emerged between
our two countries as the consequence of the Munich Agreement
maintaining, of course, our political and juridical position
with regard to the Munich Agreement and the events which
followed it as expressed in the note of the Czechoslovak
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the 16th December, 1941*
We consider your important note of the 5th August, 1942, as
a highly significant act of justice towards Czechoslovakia,
and we assure you of our real satisfaction and of our
profound gratitude to your great country and nation. Between





COMMON DECLARATION OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC. JUNE. 23. 1950.
The Government of the Czechoslovak Republic and the
Provisional Government of the Germai Democratic Republic
declare unanimously that they pursue a common fundamental
aim, to maintain and secure peace. This common aim is
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realized in both countries by a policy of successful
reconstruction, which is based on democratic and patriotic
efforts and promotes co-operation among all peace- and
freedom- loving peoples to strengthen the party of peace,
headed by the USSR, in the struggle against the forces of
imperialism and war.
In the Czechoslovak Republic the people have
definitively achieved victory, the order of the people1s
democracy has been fortified and the country has successfully
started on its way to socialism. In the German Democratic
Republic the new anti-fascist-democratic order is being
secured. The National Front of Democratic Germany is developing
its struggle for the creation of a united, democratic and
peace-loving Germany. The Government of Czechoslovakia and
the Provisional Government of the German Democratic Republic
are convinced that their common obligation to maintain and to
secure peace will be facilitated and at the same time
strengthened by the fact that there exist no controversial
or outstanding problems between the two states.
Our two States have no territorial or boundary claims
against one another and their Governments emphasize that
the evacuation of the Germans from the Czechoslovak Republic
which has taken place is irrevocable, legitimate and
definitively terminat ed,
This declaration is in perfect agreement with the policy
the German Democratic Republic has pursued from the outset
412.
and which offered ample opportunities and all kinds of
support to evaciiated people to join in the reconstruction
work and to find a new home in the German Democratic
Republic.
Guided by the conviction that their mutual support
of peaceful reconstruction benefits the interest of both
peoples and of all countries interested in maintaining and
securing peace, the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic
and the Provisional. Government of the German Democratic
Republic endeavour to strengthen the ties of friendship
between their peoples and states.
Both Governments realize that the struggle of the
German people to create a united, democratic and peace-
loving Germany as well as the struggle of both states to
strengthen the group of countries interested in world peace
under the guidance of the most powerful bulwark of peace,
the USSR, serves to maintain and secure peace in Europe
and in the whole world.
The Government of the Czechoslovak Republic and the
Provisional Government of the German Democratic Republic
declare that they will mobilize all their efforts to defeat
the intentions of the imperialistic war-makers and to
consolidate peace.
Prague, June 23, 1950
For the Provisional Government of the German
Democratic Republic
signed: W„ U^byjpht




DECLARATION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC
ON THE CESSATION OF THE STATE OF WAR ,/ITH GERMANY.
FEBRUARY 3. 1955.
At the very moment when Hitler's Germany committed
aggressive acts against the security, independence and
territorial integrity of the CSSR, a state of war between
the Czechoslovak Republic and Germany existed.
For more than six years the Czechoslovak people
suffered from the occupation of Hitler's Germany and were
finally liberated from the fascist yoke by the victorious
struggle of the Soviet Union, the decisive force in the
anti-Hitler coalition.
After their experiences with German militarism the
peoples of Czechoslovakia rightly demand a solution of the
German question by which the danger of a renewed threat to
peace-loving peoples is made impossible and which guarantees
at the same time a peaceful and democratic development for
the German people.
The agreement concluded among the four great powers in
1945 in Potsdam, whose aim was the creation of an united
Germany resting on democratic and peaceful foundations and
the conclusion of a treaty of peace with Germany, indicated
the way to these ends.
In contrast to the continuous efforts of the Government
of the Soviet Union, the Western Powers made it impossible
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to come to an agreement concerning the peaceful reunification
of Germany and to conclude a treaty of peace with her.
A decisive obstacle to a peaceful reunification of Germany
are the treaties of Paris, which aim at the remilitarization
of Western Germany and her integration into aggressive
alliances which already exist or are still to be organized.
In view of the fact that broad co-operation between the
Czechoslovak Republic and the German Democratic Republic is
developing, that mutual understanding and friendship is
constantly strengthened, that there exist no contestable and
outstanding questions and considering the interest of the
peoples of Czechoslovakia to co-operate peacefully with
the whole of Germany as well as to create good-neighbourly
relations, which could form a durable basis for peaceful
coexistence between the peoples of Czechoslovakia and the
whole of the German people, I declare in virtue of a
decision of the Government:
The state of war between the Czechoslovak Republic and
Germany is terminated.
Friendly relations between both countries are established.
The termination of the state of war with Germany does
not alter her international obligations and does not violate
the rights and obligations of the Czechoslovak Republic which
result from the valid international conventions of the four
Great Powers concerning Germany and from other international




STATUTE OF KOSICE. APRIL 5. 1945
(Excerpts)
...Chapter VIII
Because of the terrible experiences which the Czechs
and Slovaks have had with the German and Hungarian minorities
who have to a great extent become the tools of a policy of
conquest directed against the Republic from abroad and
because of the contribution of the Czechoslovak Germane to
a campaign of extermihation against the Czech and Slovak
peoples, the re-established state of Czechoslovakia finds
herself compelled to take far-reaching and lasting measures.
The Republic will not and shall not punish the German and
Hungarian citizens loyal to her, especially those who
remained faithful to her during her hardest times. But she
will act severely and inexorably against guilty persons
since this is demanded by the conscience of our peoples,
the sacred memory of our innumerable martyrs and for the
sake of the peace and security of coming generations. There¬
fore the Government will act according to these principles.
Czechoslovak citizenship is guaranteed to and if
necessary the return to the Republic is secured for the
following citizens of German or Hungarian nationality who
possessed Czechoslovak citizenship before the Munich
settlement of 1938; those persons who were anti-fascist and
anti-Nazi, those who had offered active resistance against
Henlein and Hungarian irredentism and those who led the
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struggle on behalf of CzechoSlovakia before Munich, those
who, after Munich and after March 15# 1939, were persecuted,
imprisoned or deported to concentration camps because of
their resistance to and struggle against the regime of that
time and because of their loyalty to Czechoslovakia, and
those who were forced to flee to foreign countries because
of German or Hungarian terror and who actively participated
in the struggle for the restoration of Czechoslovakia,
Other Czechoslovak citizens of German or Hungarian
nationality are deprived of their Czechoslovak citizenship.
They may choose to regain Czechoslovak citizenship but the
authorities of the Republic reserve to themselves the right
to decide on each petition.
Those Germans and Hungarians condemned for a crime
against the Republic or against the Czech or Slovak peoples
are deprived of Czechoslovak citizenship; they will be
deported forever from the Republic unless they are sentenced
to death.
Germans and Hungarians who immigrated to the territory
of Czechoslovakia after Munich 1938 will be Immediately
deported from the Republic, unless they are subject to
criminal process. Persons who have worked for Czechoslovakia
are excepted from this provision.
417.
No. 18
CONSTITUTIONAL DECREE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC No. 55
ABQUST 2. 1945
(Excerpts)
On the motion of the Government and in agreement with
the Slovak National Council I decree:
Article 1. Czechoslovak citizens of German or Hungarian
nationality who under the provisions of a foreign occupying
power, acquired German or Hungarian citizenship, lost
Czechoslovak citizenship on the day of such acquisition.
The remaining Czechoslovak citizens of German or
Hungarian nationality lose Czechoslovak citizenship on the
day this decree comes into effect.
This Decree does not apply to Germans or Hungarians who
during the time of the increased threat to the Republic
registered as Czech or Slovak citizens.••
Czechs, Slovaks and members of other Slav peoples,
who registered as Germans or Hungarians at that time because
of pressure or because of circumstances meriting special
consideration, are according to this decree not treated as
Germans or Hungarians, provided that the Ministry of the
Interior after having investigated the alleged facts,
approves the attestation of national loyalty which is
issued by the competent National Committee of the District
(Administrative Commission of the District).
Article 2. Czechoslovak citizenship is reserved to those
persons listed in Article 1 who can prove that they remained
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faithful to Czechoslovakia, that they never violated the
Czech or Slovak peoples and who can give evidence that they
either actively participated in the struggle for liberation
or suffered from the Nazi or fascist terror...
She question whether persons of German or Hungarian
nationality who are members of the Czechoslovak armed forces
retain Czechoslovak citizenship will be decided officially
in a short time by the Ministry of the Interior...
Article 3. Persons who under Article 1 have lost their
Czechoslovak citizenship can within six months petition for
its re-establishment. In cases of such petitions the Ministry
of the Interior will decide at its discretion. Petitions
will not be accepted, however, if the petitioner has violated
the obligations of a Czechoslovak citizen ...
Article 4. Por the purpose of this decree married women
and minor children are treated separately...
Article 5. Czechs, Slovaks and members of other Slav
peoples who during the time of increased threat to the
Republic...applied for the acquisition of German or Hungarian
nationality without having been forced to do so by outside
pressure or extenuating circumstances lose Czechoslovak
citizenship as of the day of the issue of this decree.
Article 6. Ihis decree beoomes effective on the day of
its promulgation. Its implementation is the duty of the
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Minister of the Interior in agreement with the Minister of
Foreign Affairs and the Minister of National Defence,
(signed) Dr. Benes... Masarvk...
No. 19
ORDINANCE OF THE GOVERNMENT CONCERNING THE RETURN OF CZECH¬
OSLOVAK CITIZENSHIP TO PERSONS OF GERMAN NATIONALITY.
NOVEMBER 29. 1949
(Exceprts)
...Article 1. The National Committee of the District can on
the application of the National Committee of the Circuit
re-confer Czechoslovak citizenship on those persons of
German nationality who under the provisions of Article 1 of
the Constitutional Decree No. 33/45 lost Czechoslovak
citizenship, if they have their permanent residence in the
territory of the CSSR and have not violated the obligations
of a Czechoslovak citizen, and particularly if they have
not committed hostile acts against the people's democracy.
Article 2. The National Committee of the District hands
out an attestation to the petitioner who has submitted a
petition within the time limit allowed for return of
Czechoslovak citizenship to the National Committee of the
District of his residence which then declared him a
Czechoslovak citizen until the question of his position is
settled provided that none of the obstacles mentioned in
Article 1 is present and that it can be supposed on grounds
of the petitioner's conduct that he will become an orderly
citizen, willing to participate in the endeavours of
420,
reconstruction undertaken by the Czechoslovak working
people ; this attestation will also be granted under the
same conditions to the members of the family included in
the petition,,,.
Article 3. Marital partners can apply in a joint
petition for the return of citizenship: the petition of
each marital partner has to be decided separately. Children
under 15 years of age who are included in the petition
together with their parents acquire citizenship together
with them.,,.
Article 6, This ordinance comes into effect on the day
of its promulgation. It is implemented by the Minister of
the Interior in agreement with the other members of the
government engaged in this matter.
No. 20
STATUTE ENABLING SOME PERSONS TO ACQUIRE CZECHOSLOVAK
CITIZENSHIP. No. 34. APRIL 24. 1953
The National Assembly of the CSSR has passed the
follo\d.ng Statute:
Article 1• Persons of German nationality who under the
Decree No, 33/1945 have lost Czechoslovak citizenship and
who at the time this statute becomes effective have their
permanent residence in the territory of the CSSR become
Czechoslovak citizens on the day this law comes into effect,
as long as they had not acquired Czechoslovak citizenship
heretofore.
421.
Together with the marital partner, eventually with the
father or mother, the wives and minor children of the persons
mentioned under Paragraph 1 become Czechoslovak citizens, as
long as this has not already occurred under the provisions of
Paragraph 1, provided that they have their residence in the
territory of the CSSR and have not become citizens of
another country.
Article 2i ^his statute comes into effect on the day of
its promulgation} its implementation is the concern of the
Minister of the Interior.
No. 21
OFFICIAL BULLETIN OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR (No. 8/1955)
CONCERNING THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTE No. 54/1955 OK THE
ACQUISITION OF CZECHOSLOVAK CITIZENSHIP BY SOME PERSONS
(Excerpts)
In response to inquiries from citizens concerning the
acquisition of Czechoslovak citizenship under the Statue
No. 34/1953* the Ministry of the Interior communicates the
followingj
¥hose persons who under the provisions of the afore¬
mentioned Statute have acquired Czechoslovak Citizenship
become Czechoslovak citizens on the day this Statute comes
into effect. It is therefore not necessary to apply for
Czechoslovak citizenship or to wait until it is granted. ...
In this connection the Ministry of the Interior calls
attention to the fact that within the territory of the CSSR
422.
the only legal proof of identity for Czechoslovak citizens
is the identity card; for foreign nationals a valid pass¬
port and residence permit is required, for stateless persons
it is the proof of the "residence permit for stateless
persons".
Documentary evidence of a foreign nationality (for
instance documents of citizenship of the German Federal
Republic)..is without legal force in the territory of our
state even if it is a copy certified by a Czechoslovak
Court of Justice,
ihe Representative of the Minister of the Interior
(signed) Colonel Kotal
4-23.
Maps concerning the cession of German-Czech Territory in 193.8,
Auswartiges Amt Berlin, Weissbuch (1938) Nr. 1, Verhandlungen
zur Losung der sudetendeutschen Frage. Anhang
(Foreign Office Berlin, White Book (1938) No. 1, Negotiations
to the Solution of the Sudeten German question, Annex)
1) Map to the German memorandum of 23. September 1938
x = Sudeten territory to be ceded.
y = territories in which plebiscites must still be held.
(Map 1)
2) Map to the Munich Agreements of 29. September 1938
x = Sections of territory to be occupied by German troops
from 1. October. (Map 2)
3) Map to the final determination of boundaries from
21. November 1938
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Addendum. The decision of the German Federal
Constitutional Court of January 25. 1977 concerning
the lav of July 12. 1974 securing assent to the Treaty
of December 11. 1975 (decree and governing -principle)
The Court ruled the following principles^
Der deutsch-tschechoslowakische Vertrag vom
11, Dezember 1973 regelt die allgemeinen poli-
tisohen Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik
DeutBchland und der Tschechoslowakischen
Soziallstischen Republikj grundrechtlich
geschtitzte Rechtspositlonen werden durch
das Zustimmungsgesetz zu diesem Vertrag
nicht betroffen,
Verfassungsbeschwerden gegen das Zustimmungs-
fesetz, die auf die Verletzung der Art. 14guarantee of own rship, g arantee of succession,
principles of expropriation), 5 (right of free
speech;, 9 (freedom of association), 11 (right
of free movement) und 2 GrGr (rights of personal
freedom, in particular the right of free
development of personality) gesttitzt werden,
sind unzul&ssig,2
1. The texts contained in brackets are those of the
author,
2, E.t.: The German-Czechoslovak treaty of December 11,
1973 shall regulate the general political relations
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the
Czechoslovak Socialist Republicj legal positions
protected by constitutional law shall not be
affected by the law securing assent to this treaty.
Constitutional complaints against the law securing
assent based on the violation of Articles 14, 5, 9,
11 and 2 CI are inadmissible.
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The authentic wording of the substantiation of the
decree reads in the tenor as followsi
Im Namen des Volkes.
In den Verfahren tiber die Verfassungs¬
beschwerden. (there follow the names of
the complainants)...Bevollm&chtigter: Professor
Dr. Fritz Mtinch, ...gegen das Gesetz vom 12.
Juli 1974 zu dem Yertrag vom 11. Dezember 1973
tiber die gegenseitigen Beziehungen zwischen der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Tschechoslo-
wakischen Sozialistischen Republik (BGB1. II
p. 989) hat das Bundesverfassungsgericht -
Erster Senat - unter Mitwirkung des Pr&sidenten
Dr. Benda und der Richter Dr. Haager, Rupp-
v.Briinneck, Dr. Simon, Dr. Faller, Dr. Hesse,
Dr. Katzenstein am 25. Januar 1977 beschlossen:
Die Verfassungsbeschwerden werden ver-
worfen.3
The Court bases its decision on the following facts
and records the formalities of the proceeding as follows:
A. Gegenstand der Verfassungsbeschwerden ist
das Gesetz vom 12. Juli 1974 (BGB1. II p. 989),
mit dem der Deutsche Bundestag dem Vertrag vom
11. Dezember 1973 tiber die gegenseitigen Beziehungen




3. E.t.: On Behalf of the People.
In the proceedings on constitutional complaints....
(complainants)..., authorized representative (of all
the complainants):...instituted against the law of
July 12, 1974 concerning the Treaty of December 11,
1973 on Mutual Relations between the Federal Republic
of Germany and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
(Law Gazette II, p. 989) the Federal Constitutional
Court - First Senate - has decided by ...on January
25, 1977:
The constitutional complaints shall be rejected.
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1. Der am 11. Dezember 1973 von den
Vertragsparteien unterzeichnete deutsch-
tschechoslowakische Vertrag ist,nachdem
er die Zustimmung des Bundestags durch das
Gesetz vom 12. Juli 1974 erhalten hat, mit
dem Austausch der Ratifikationsurkunden am
19. Juli 1974 in Kraft getreten (BGB1. II
p. 1127). Er hat folgenden Wortlaut: ...
(follows the text of the Treaty, see
Document No. 1, section 2 in the Annex)...
II. 1. Die Beschwerdefiihrer sind Sudeten-
deutsche, die nach dem Ende des Zweiten
Weltkriegs aus ihrer Heimat vertrieben wurden
und seitdem in der Bundesrepublik leben. Sie
haben nach ihren A.ngaben bei ihrer Vertreibung
Grundbesitz in denSudetengebieten zuriickge-
lassen.
2. Nach Ansicht der Beschwerdefiihrer verletzt
das Zustimmungsgesetz zum deutsch-tschechoslo-
wakischen Vertrag ihre Grundrechte aus Art. 2,
5, 9 und 14 GG.4
a) In Artikel IV des Vertrags sei eine
Grenzregelung enthalten, die ihre Meinungs-
und Vereinigungsfreiheit beeintrachtige. Durch
die Grenzregelung werde die gegenw&rtige deutsch-
tschechoslowakische Grenze als eine Grenze
anerkannt, die nach Massgabe der in Art. 3 des
Moskauer Vertrags vom 12. August 1970 enthaltenen
Regelung von niemanden angetastet werden dtirfe.
Deshalb seien sie jetzt gehindert, durch
Meinungshufierungen oder durch ihre Titigkeit in
der Sudetendeutschen Landsmannschaft fiir das
Selbstbestimmungsrecht der aus dem Sudetenland
Vertriebenen einzutreten.
4. Art. 2j Rights of personal freedom, in particular
the right of free development of personality;
Art. 5s Right of free speech; Art. 9s Freedom of
association; Art. 14: Guarantee of ownership,
guarantee of succession, principles of ex¬
propriation.
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b) Die Grenzregelung des deutsch-tschechoslo-
wakisehen Vertrags greife dartlber hinaus auch in
das Eigentum an ihrem im Sudetenland belegenen
Grundbesitz ein. Dieser Grundbesitz sei zwar schon
in der Nachkriegszeit von den tschechoslowakischen
Behdrden konfisziert worden, doch hatten diese
Konfiskationen nicht zu dem Untergang ihres Grund-
eigentums gefiihrt. Erst die Grenzregelung des
deutsch-tschechoslowakisohen Vertrags habe den
Verlust ihres Grundeigenturns bewirkt, da mit ihr
der rechtliche Status des Sudetenlandes im Sinne
einer endgliltigen Ausgliederung dieses Gebiets aus
dem deutschen Staatsverband verandert worden sei.
Die Tschechoslowakei habe damit die voile Hoheits-
gewalt iiber das Sudetenland erworben, so daS auch
die tschechoslowakischen Konfiskationsmassmahmen
der Nachkriegszeit nachtrhglich legalisiert worden
seien. Unter diesen Umsthnden miisse sich die Bundes-
regierung entgegenhalten lassen, an den Konfis-
kationsmassnahmen durch den Abschluss des deutsch-
tschechoslowakischen Vertrags mitgewirkt zu haben.
Im librigen sei eine Verletzung des Art. 14 GG
allein auch schon darin zu sehen, dass es die
Bundesregierung pflichtwidrig unterlassen habe,
im Zusammenhang mit dem Abschluss des deutsch-
tschechoslowakischen Vertrags zum Schutz des
konfiszierten Eigentums der Sudetendeutschen
tatig zu werden.
c) Die Beschwerdefiihrer sind schliesslich der
Ansicht, dass der deutsch-tsohechoslowakische
Vertrag nicht nur gegen das Wiedervereinigungs-
gebot des Grundgesetzes, sondern auch gegen
Art. 2 GG verstosse. Ihnen sei das auf das gesamte
Gebiet des Deutschen Reichs bezogene Recht auf
Preiziigigkelt genommen, da es nach Abschluss
des Vertrags in das freie Belieben des tschechoslo¬
wakischen Staates gestellt sei, ihnen den Besuch
ihrer Heimat zu gestatten Oder zu verweigern.
d) Im Zusammenhang mit ihrer Verfassungsbeschwerde
haben die Beschwerdefiihrer den Antrag gestellt, die
Organe der Bundesrepublik zu verpflichten, den durch
das Zustimmungsgesetz, den deutsch-tschechoslowa-
kischen Vertrag und dessen Inkrafttreten entstandenen
verfassungswidrigen Zustand zu beseitigen und den
dadurch entstandenen Schaden auszugleichen.
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III. Der Bundesminister der Justiz, der sich
ftir die Bundesregierung geaussert hat, hfi.lt die
Verfassungsbeschwerden fUr unzulfissig, weil die
Beschwerdeftihrer durch das angegriffene Zu-
stimmu^gsgesetz zum deutsch-tschechoslowakischen
Vertrag nicht selbst, gegenwfirtig und unmittel-
bar rechtlich betroffen seien. Der Vertrag be-
schrfinke sich darauf, die politiechen Beziehungen
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zur Tschechoslowa-
kischen Sozialistischen Republik zu regeln, und
er sei deshalb nicht geeignet, irgendwelche Individual
rechte der Beschwerdefilhrer zu beeintrfichtigen.
IV. Von der Durchftthrung einer mtindlichen
Verhandlung ist abgesehen worden, da von ihr
eine weitere Fbrderung des Verfahrens nicht zu
erwarten war (§94 Aba. 5 BVerfGG).5
5. E.t.s The subject of the constitutional complaints
is the law of July 12, 1974 (Law Gazette II, p. 989)
by which the German Federal Diet approved the Treaty
of December 11, 1973 on Mutual Relations between the
Federal Republic of Germany and the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic (German-Czechoslovak Treaty).
1. The German Czechoslovak Treaty, duly signed by
the sontracting Parties on December 11, 1973 and after
having been approved by the German Federal Diet by the
law of July 12, 1974 has come into force upon exchange
of instruments of ratification on July 19, 1974.
(Law Gazette II, p. 1127).
Its wording is as follows! ...(text of the
Treaty)...
II. 1. The complainants are Sudeten Germans who
were expelled from their homeland at the end of the
Second World War and have lived in the Federal Republic
since then. According to their information they left
real estate in the Sudeten-territory at the time of
their expulsion,
2, In the opinion of the complainants the law of
July 12, 1974 securing assent to the German-Czechoslovak
Treaty violates their constitutional rights vested In
Articles 2, 5, 9 and 14 CL.
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a) Article IV of the treaty according to their
opinion contains a frontier regulation prejudicing
their freedom of speech and freedom of union. By
the frontier regulation the present German-Czechoslo¬
vak frontier was recognized as a border which must
not "be touched by anybody according to the regulation
contained in Article 3 of the Moscow Treaty of
August 12, 1970. For that reason they claim to be
prevented from advocating the right of self-
determination for the persons expelled from the
Sudeten territory by statements of opinion or by
their acitivity in the Sudeten German Fellowship.
b) They also claim that the frontier-regulation
of the German-Czechoslovak Treaty furthermore
encroaches upon their property rights in their real
estate situated in the Sudeten territory. This real
estate was certainly already confiscated by the
Czechoslovak authorities in the post-war period,
but these confiscations had not caused the ex¬
tinguishment of their real estate property. Only
the frontier regulation of the German-Czechoslovak
Treaty raised the actual loss of their real estate
property as it changed the legal status of the
Sudeten territory in the sense of a final disembodiment
of this area from the German states. Czechoslovakia
thus has gained full sovereign power over the Sudeten-
territory and consequently the Czechoslovak confis¬
cations of the post-war period had been legalized
retroactively. Under these circumstances the Federal
Government would have to answer the charge of having
contributed to the confiscation measures by the
conclusion of the German-Czechoslovak Treaty.
In addition, a violation of Article 14 CL would be
given by the mere fact that the Federal Government
neglected to act as a protector of the Sudeten
Germans' property in connection with the conclusion
of the German-Czechoslovak Treaty.
c) Finally, the complainants are of the opinion
that the German-Czechoslovak Treaty not only infringes
the command of reunification of the constitutional law,
but also violates Article 2 CL. They claim to be
deprived of the right of free movement with regard
to the whole area of German territory, as it is left
to the sole discretion of the Czechoslovak Government
to permit or refuse the visit to their homeland after
the conclusion of the treaty.
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d) In connection with their constitutional
complaint the complainants have filed an application
that the organs of the Federal Republic of Germany
be obliged to remedy the unconstitutional situation
created by the law, the German-Czechoslovak Treaty
and its coming into force and to compensate losses
suffered thereby*
III. The Federal Minister of Justice who made a
statement on behalf of the Federal Government
considers the constitutional complaints as in¬
admissible, pointing out that the complainants
are not personally, presently and directly legally
affected by the critioized law of July 12, 1974
concerning the German-Czechoslovak Treaty. The
treaty, was stated, confines itself to regulating
the political relations of the Federal Republic
of Germany and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
and is thus ill-qualified to affect any individual
rights of the complainants.
IV. No oral submissions were made, as no further
progress in the proceedings could be expected
(Article 94 paragraph 5 LFCC).
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The legal conclusions of the Court read as follows:
B. Die Verfassungsheschwerden sind unzulhssig.
Die Beschwerdeftihrer sind durch das Zustimmungs¬
gesetz zum deutsch-tschechoslowakischen Vertrag
nicht in ihren Grundrechten betroffen. In dem
Zustimmungsgesetz ist nichts enthalten, was
unmittelbar nachteilige Wirkung fur den Schutz-
bereich der von den Beschwerdeftihrern als verletzt
gertlgten Grundrechte erzeugen kbnnte (vgl. BVerfGE
40, 141 (156) ).
I. Handlungs- oder Verhaltenspflichten, die
geeignet waren, die Rechte der Beschwerdeftihrer
aus Art. 5 und 9 GG zu beeintr&chtigen, werden
durch den deutsch-tschechoslowakischen Vertrag
nicht begrtindet, da der Vertragstext keinerlei
Formulierungen enthalt, die auf derartige recht-
lich© Yerbindlichkeiten hindeuten kbnhten (BVerfGE
38, 49 (51) ). Aus vblkerrechtlichen Vertrhgen wie
dem deutsch-tschechoslowakischen Vertrag kdnnen
unmittelbare Handlungs- oder Verhaltenspflichten
einzelner Btirger nur abgeleitet werden, wenn und
soweit dies der Vertragstext unzweideutig zum Aus-
druck bringt. Auch aus der in Art. IV des Vertrags
enthaltenen Bekr&ftigung der Unverletzlichkeit der
gemeinsamen Grenzen lasst sich ebensowenig wie aus
Art. 3 des Moskauer Vertrags eine solche unmittel¬
bare Verpflichtung Einzelner herleiten (vgl.
BVerfGE 40, 141 (164) ).
II. Die Beschwerdeftihrer sind durch das Zustim¬
mungsgesetz zum deutsch-tschechoslowakischen
Vertrag auch nicht in ihrem durch Art. 14 GG
geschtitzten Eigentum betroffen.
1. Die Beschwerdeftihrer haben ihren in den
Sudetengebieten belegenen Grundbesitz durch
Konfiskationsmassnahmen der tschechoslowakischen
Behbrden in der Nachkriegszeit verloren. Die
Beeintr&chtigung ihres Eigentums ist also nicht
auf das Zustimmungsgesetz oder den deutsch-
tschechoslowakischen Vertrag, sondern auf Mass-
mahmen zurtickzuftlhren, die als Akte ausldndischer
bffentlicher Gewalt an Art. 14 GG nicht gemessen
werden konnen (vgl. BVerfGE 41, 126 (157 f.) m.w.N.).
2. Der Abschluss des deutsch-tschechOBlowakischen
Vertrags kann auch nicht als ein Mitwirken der
Bundesregierung an den tschechoslowakischen
Konfiskationsmassnahmen gedeutet werden. Der Vertrag
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selbst enth&lt keine Bestimmung, die sich auch
nur entfernt auf Fragen des deutschen Privat-
eigentums bezieht. Die Bundesregierung hat aueh
bei Yertragsabsohluss keine auf die von den
tschechoslowakischen Behbrden vorgenommenen
KonfiBkationsmassnahmen beziigliche Willens-
erkl&rung abgegeben und insbesondere keine
Billigung oder Anerkennung dieser Massnahmen
ausgesprochen.
3. Dem Vertrag kann auch nioht die Wirkung
beigemessen werden, in sonstiger Weise eine
Verhnderung der eigentumsrechtlichen Lage zum
Naehteil der Beschwerdefiihrer herbeigefiihrt
zu haben. Dabei kann offenbleiben, ob der
deutsch-tschechoslowakische Vertrag einen Wechsel
des staats- und vblkerrechtlichen Status der
Sudetengebiete im Sinne des Vortrags der Be-
schwerdefuhrer bewirkt hat. Jedenfalls hat eine
nachtrbgliche Legalisieruhg der gegen das
Grundeigentum der Besehwerdeftthrer gerichteten
tschechoslowakischen KonfiBkationsmassnahmen im
Zusammenhang mit dem Vertrag nicht stattgefunden.
Ebensowenig entMlt der Vertrag eine Bestimmung,
die als Verzicht auf die Geltendmachung etwaiger
daraus resultierender Anspriiche verstanden werden
kbnnte. Soweit also den Beschwerdefiihrern bei
Vertragsabschluss hinsiohtlich ihres Vermbgens
noch Eigentumsrechte oder RtickgewShr- und Ent-
scMdigungsanspriiche zuatanden, hat sich die Rechts-
lage durch den Abschluss des Vertrags nicht ver-
andert.
4. Die Bundesrepublik Deuteohland ist gegen-
iiber der Tschechoslowakischen Sozialistischen
Republik weiterhin berechtigt, ftir die Belange
der Beschwerdeftihrer einzutreten. Denn diese
sind als Sudetendeutsche deutsche Staatsangehbrige
(vgl. BVerfGE 1, 322 (330 f,) ). Daran hat der
deutsch-tschechoslowakische Vertrag nichts getandert,
da er nach seinem Artikbl II Abs. 2 "die sich aus
der Rechtsordnung jeder der beiden VertragsparteLen
ergebende Staatsan&ehbrigkeit lebender und ver-
storbener Personen unbertthrt" lasst.
Bei dieser Sachlage kann die Riige der Beschwerde¬
fiihrer, die Bundesregierung habe bei Vertragsab¬
schluss die verfassungsrechtliche Pflicht zur
Gewahrung diplomatischen Schutzes ihnen gegeniiber
verletzt, nur bedeuten, dass die Beschwerdefiihrer
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die verfassungsgerichtliche Feststellung
anstreben, es hatte eine bestimmte sachliche
Regelung zu ihren Gunsten bei den Vertrags-
verhandlungen erreicht werden mtissen und im
Abschluss des Vertrags ohne diese Regelung
sei ein Verfassungsverstoss zu sehen, der die
Unwirksamkeit des ganzen Vertrags zur Folge
hatte. Soweit eine Verfassungsbeschwerde sich
auf eine solche Rttge stiitzt, kann sie nicht
als zul&ssig angesehen werden (BVerfGE 40,
141 (178) ).
III. Das Recht der Beschwerdeftihrer auf
Freiziigigkeit wird durch den deutsch-tschechos-
lowakischen Vertrag nicht beeintrSchtigt. Dieses
Recht garantiert nach Massgabe des Art. 11
Abs. 1 GG6 die Freiziigigkeit im Bundesgebiet,
d.h. das Recht, ungehindert durch die deutsche
Staatsgewalt an'jedem Ort innerhalb des Bundes¬
gebietes Aufenthalt und Wohnsitz zu nehmen, auch
zu dem Zweck, in das Bundesgebiet einzureisen
(BVerfGE 2, 266 (273)); dazu gehbren die Sudeten-
gebiete nicht.
Auch eine Verletzung des Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG
kommt nicht in Betracht; soweit die Beschwerde-
flihrer gehindert sind, die Sudetengebiete aufzu-
suchen, ist dies nicht auf den Vertrag zuriick-
zuftihren.
Auf das Wiedervereinigungsgebot des Grund-
gesetzes kann eine Verfassungsbeschwerde schon
desweften nicht gesttitzt werden, weil dieses Gebot
nicht Grundrechte gewahrleistet.
IV. Schadensersatzanspriiche kbnnen mittels der
Verfassungsbeschwerde vor dem Bundesverfassungs-
gericht nicht geltend gemacht werden (BVerfGE 1,
3). f
6. Art. 11i Right of free movement.
7. E.t.: B. The constitutional complaints are
inadmissible.
The constitutional rights of the complainants
are not affected by the law securing assent to the
German-Czechoslovak Treaty. Said law does not
include any provision that could be directly
detrimental to the area of protection of the
complainants' constitutional rights, which they
claim have been infringed (refer to BVerfGE 40,
141 (156)).
472.
I. The German-Czechoslovak Treaty does not
substantiate any patterns of action or behaviour
which would qualify to affect the rights of the
complainants vested in Articles 5 and 9 CL, as the
wording of the treaty does not include any formu¬
lations pointing to any such legal obligations
(BVerfGE 38, 49 (51)). From treaties of public
international law such as the German-Czechoslovak
Treaty, direct patterns of action or behaviour of
individual citizens may be derived only, if and
inasmuch the wording of the treaty expresses this
in an unequivocal manner. Such a direct obligation
of individuals cannot be derived either from the
assessment of inviolability of common borders
contained in Article IV of the Treaty nor from
Article 3 of the Treaty of Moscow (refer to BVerfGE
40, 141 (164)).
II. By the law securing assent to the German-
Czechoslovak Treaty the complainants1 property
rights, protected by Article 14 CL are not affected
either.
1. The complainants have lost their estate
situated in the Sudeten territory in the post-war
era by confiscation measures of the Czechoslovak
authorities. Thus the interference,with their property
is not caused by the law securing assent or the
German-Czechoslovak Treaty, but by measures which
cannot be related to Article 14 CL as acts of
foreign public authority (refer to BVerfGE 41,
126, (pp. 157), with further evidence).
2. The conclusion of the German-Czechoslovak
Treaty cannot be interpreted either as a
contribution of the Federal Government to the
Czechoslovak confiscation measures. The treaty
itself does not include any provision whatsoever
which could be related to matters of German private
property. The Federal Government has not made any
policy statement concerning the confiscation measures
taken by the Czechoslovak authorities, at the
conclusion of the treaty and in particular expressed
no approval or recognition of these measures.
3. It also cannot be attributed to the treaty that
it has influenced or caused a change in the legal
position of property rights to the prejudice of
the complainants. The question of whether or not
the German-Czechoslovak Treaty has caused a change
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in the national and international status of the
Sudeten territories in the sense of the grounds of
the complainants can "be left undecided. In any
case no retroactive legalisation of the Czechoslovak
confiscation measures directed against real
estate property of the complainants in connection
with the treaty has occured. The treaty does not
include either any provision,that could be deemM
as a waiver to the enforcement of any claims resulting
from it. Inasmuch as the complainants had legal title
to their property or claims for restitution or losses,
the legal position consequently has not been changed
by the conclusion of the treaty.
4. fhe Federal Republic of Germany shall also be
entitled in the future to represent the claims of
the complainants against the Czechoslovak Socialist
Republic. Because as Sudeten Germans they are German
citizens (refer to BVerfGE 1, 322, pp. 330)). The
German-Czechoslovak Treaty has not changed anything
in this respect, as according to its Article II,
paragraph 2 "shall not affect the nationality of
living or deceased persons ensuing from the legal
system of either of the two Contracting Parties."
Under these circumstances, the reprimand of
complainants, namely that at the time of conclusion
of the treaty the Federal Government had violated
the obligation vested in constitutional law to grant
them diplomatic protection, can only mean that the
complainants aim at the assessment of the constitutional
Court, that a certain objective settlement in their
favour should have been achieved during the negotiations
and that the conclusion of a treaty without such
settlement must be considered as a constitutional
violation, causing the nullity of the entire treaty.
Inasmuch as a constitutional complaint is based on
such a reprimand, it cannot be considered admissible
(BVerfGE 40, 141 (178)).
III. The right of the complainants for free move¬
ment shall not be prejudiced by the German-Czechoslovak
Treaty. According to Article 11, paragraph 1 CL this
right guarantees free movement within the Federal
State, i.e. the right to take up residence or domicile
at any place in the Federal States unimpeded by the
German public authority, also for the reason to enter
into the Federal States (BVerfGE 2, 266 (273)); the
Sudeten territory does not form part of it.
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A violation of Article 2, paragraph 1 CL shall
not he considered; inasmuch as the complainants
are prevented from travelling to the Sudeten
territory, this fact is not caused by the treaty,
A constitutional complaint cannot be based on
the command of reunification of the constitutional
law, for the simple reason that this command does
not warrant constitutional rights.
IV. No damage claims are enforceable by means
of a constitutional complaint before the constitutional
court (BVerfGE 1, 3).
